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reflect on everything that has happened in my life and in the world since I began graduate 
school in 2012. And by 2021, it feels as if events are developing and changing at a pace 
much faster than nine years ago. And along the way, I have carried this project and 
dissertation along with me, sometimes as a source of intellectual stimulation and 
development, and other times as an anchor weighing me down. Throughout the process, I 
reengaged the material with new ways of seeing and thinking about the world, ensuring 
that I remained embedded in the work itself. 
I mainly studied biology during my undergraduate years, hoping to establish a 
career as an evolutionary biologist, a topic I had been enamored with since my freshman 
year in high school. I attended the University of Minnesota – Morris, a liberal arts 
campus of about 1,800 students, where I was encouraged to explore outside my field, and 
I began to take history classes on medieval and early modern Europe. I took enough 
classes to minor and then double major in history. Professor Jennifer Deane encouraged 
me to blend my interests in history and science, so I wrote essays on the biology behind 
Tulipmania and the inbreeding coefficient of the Spanish Habsburgs, for example. In 
biology, Professor PZ Myers introduced me to alternative views within evolutionary and 
developmental biology as well as providing the inspiration to engage in science blogging. 
Through this I became acquainted with Arlin Stoltzfus, a protistologist who was 
convinced that the history biologists told themselves about evolution was incorrect and 
even hid important scientific concepts, such as mutationism. I picked up on a concept that 
he focused on, the notion of creativity in evolution, and wrote about the history of 
creativity within evolutionary biology as my senior thesis. I also began to co-author a 
paper with Arlin arguing for a revision of the history of evolutionary biology, elevating 
“Mendelian-mutationism” as a “forgotten synthesis” prior to the orthodox development 
of the Modern Synthesis, which was published in 2014 in the Journal of the History of 
Biology. This blending of history and science, and acquaintance with alternative views of 
biology and history, were the key intellectual factors that I entered graduate school with. 
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During this time I also volunteered in the laboratory of Michael Travisano, where 
I became acquainted with experimental evolution. In this lab they had rapidly evolved 
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before she died, I was able to tell her that I had been accepted to graduate school to study 
the history of science at the University of Minnesota. I like to think that small bit of news 
helped her rest a little as she pondered what her children’s futures would look like 
without her.  
Graduate school itself, especially during the coursework years, was an 
enlightening, stimulating, and fun experience. I thank the other member of my cohort, 
Nicholas Lewis, for his laidback style of humor and camaraderie, as well as Maggie 
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Froiland, Felipe Eguiarte Souza for all of the wonderful interactions over the years. 
Coursework and discussions with Mark, Susan Jones, Jennifer Alexander, Alan 
Love, and Michel Janssen showed me different ways to think about science and its 
history. In essence, I had joined the program as a somewhat naïve student who thought 
about science romantically, as about pure understanding of the world, which I think was 
somewhat due to my interest in evolutionary biology (as opposed to say, nuclear 
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physics). But through these interactions I began to see the other sides of science and 
examine it more critically. I soon saw experimental evolution as a way to control 
evolution. The nebulous concept of “control” became key to my project, a way to 
historicize and link experimental evolution to the world around which its practitioners 
worked (even if their laboratory work remained my focus). I thank Mark especially for 
encouraging and supporting this thematic development of the project, especially in the 
final months when I had the most trouble bringing the dissertation to a close yet needed 
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My perspective had changed radically while dissertating in 2016. Obama’s second 
term was coming to an end with nearly zero progress on most issues. But activity in “the 
streets” – Occupy Wall Street, Black Lives Matter, and Standing Rock – dispelled the 
mirage of the end of history. At the same time, Senator Bernie Sanders waged a 
presidential campaign that cut through the prevailing narratives – against “Hope and 
Change,” against “Make America Great Again,” and against “America Is Already Great” 
– pointing to another way and popularizing socialism. However, Sanders lost, another 
Clinton won the nomination, who then lost to a grotesque and reactionary reality 
television host. This process increasingly produced a feeling of deep alienation as I wrote 
about early twentieth-century biologists experimenting with rats and maize. I was also 
rather isolated due to a summer followed by having a Doctoral Dissertation Fellowship, 
which meant I was not even TAing. This made Marx’s famous “eleventh thesis” hit 
especially hard: “the philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the 
point is to change it.”1 
To relieve this anxiety, I joined a group called Socialist Alternative after I found 
myself on Interstate 94 during a post-Election Day protest they helped host. (I learned 
later the taking of the highway was a spontaneous action of the crowd and was not 
planned.) A funny thing about right-wing narratives about universities as radicalizing 
students was that my own turn towards Marxism took place outside the university 
education system. Through Socialist Alternative I learned more about Marx, Engels, 
dialectical materialism, Lewontin and Levins, and metabolic rifts, all while I helped the 
 




Ginger Jentzen City Council campaign, the Kshama Sawant re-election campaigns in 
Seattle, 15 Now, and other practical activities. Intellectually what I discovered was not 
necessarily a new way of thinking, but rather a mode of thought that matched and 
bolstered my own. Thus, in the late stages of my dissertation, I once again reengaged 
with the material, tying the notion of control to capitalism. The prominence of the 
Marxist analysis varies throughout the dissertation admittedly, which itself reflects my 
own intellectual development: I did not begin with Marx, but for this dissertation to be 
my project as I finished it in 2021, Marx had to be in it. After submission I hope to 
develop the Marxist analysis of the dissertation’s content further. 
Because it is 2021, I do have to note that I finished the dissertation during the 
COVID-19 pandemic. For an ABD student, this did not play a major factor in the 
dissertation process, though it did slow me down: I was working an overnight unloading 
and stocking job at Target and the pandemic made an already physically taxing job even 
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stimulus outside of academia. But most importantly, I thank my sister, Cassie, and her 
two children: my nephew, Ben, and my niece, Aubrey, to whom I dedicate this 
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pick me up for weekend visits so that I could participate in Ben’s and Aubrey’s lives as 
they grow and learn.  
While I hope to continue developing the project, doing so from outside academia 
will be a challenge, even if it amounts to ‘only’ a few papers. But now I finally part with 
the dissertation as a dissertation. As they say, a good dissertation is a done dissertation. 
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How to control evolution? This question has animated biologists for nearly 150 years and 
for breeders, some time longer. Charles Darwin’s theorization of evolution by natural 
selection was in part an analysis of extant breeding practices, what he called an 
“experiment on a gigantic scale.” Therefore, from its very beginning, the science of 
evolution was a study of how to control it, mediated by experimentation. This dissertation 
argues for the centrality of experimentation in the development of evolutionary biology. 
What is called experimental evolution today, a growing field of study popularized by 
Richard Lenski’s Long-Term Evolution Experiment, is an elaboration upon a rich 
bedrock laid by long-neglected biologists and breeders. For this dissertation, I consider 
experimental evolution to be controlled studies of natural evolutionary processes, such as 
selection, mutation, and inbreeding, usually over multiple generations. Throughout the 
dissertation I examine the motivations of scientists, their epistemological arguments in 
favor of experimentation, the efforts they exerted to make it possible (such as building 
research institutions), their contributions to the science of evolution, as well as the 
influence of capitalism and how practice and theory interacted. Through their various 
methods, theories, and motivations, what emerged was the scientific desire to make 
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How to control evolution? 
This question has animated biologists for nearly 150 years and for breeders, 
sometime longer. Charles Darwin’s theorization of evolution by natural selection was in 
part an analysis of extant breeding practices, what he called an “experiment on a gigantic 
scale.” Therefore, from its very beginning, the science of evolution was a study of how to 
control it, mediated by experimentation. This dissertation argues for the centrality of 
experimentation in the development of evolutionary biology, traditionally sidelined in 
favor of field and theoretical studies. What is called experimental evolution today, a 
growing field of study popularized by press accounts of Richard Lenski’s Long-Term 
Evolution Experiment, is not new, but an elaboration upon a rich bedrock laid by long-
neglected biologists and breeders. For this dissertation, I consider experimental evolution 
to be controlled studies of natural evolutionary processes, such as selection, mutation, 
and inbreeding, usually over multiple generations. Throughout the dissertation I examine 
the motivations of scientists, their epistemological arguments in favor of experimentation, 
their contributions to the science of evolution as well as the influence of capitalism and 
how practice and theory interacted. Usually, the control of evolution was a primary focus. 
Through their various methods, theories, and motivations, what emerged was the 
scientific desire to make evolution visible, controllable, and useful.2 
 
 
Challenging the Darwin Industry 
Although historians of science have sought to decenter the Great Men of History, 
Charles Darwin remains the organizing principle of the history of biology. For example, 
the eras of evolutionary studies can be delineated roughly as pre-Darwinian, the life of 
Darwin himself, the “Eclipse of Darwinism,” and the Modern Synthesis, a.k.a., the 
restoration of Darwinism. Historians have written so much about Darwin that the term 
“Darwin Industry” was coined in the 1970s and has since become something of a 
 
2 This formulation of the goals of experimental evolution came from a useful conversation I had with Susan 
Jones early in the project and helped me to orient the overall work. 
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pejorative.3 I do not dispute that Darwin holds a central place in the history of biology, 
but that his centering often distorts our view of that history. Hence, the first chapter 
begins not with Darwin, but with the breeder Robert Bakewell. 
With Darwin, the most important distortion from the perspective of this project is 
the perception of him as naturalist and theorist, rather than as experimentalist. The 
neglect of experimentation is evident in The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Darwin and 
Evolutionary Thought (2013): Of the sixty-three essays, none treat Darwin’s 
experimental practice specifically, though several essays discuss experimentation in the 
twentieth century.4 That in itself produces a double distortion: first, that Darwin’s 
experimentation is not worth discussing in an encyclopedia containing his name and, 
second, that experimental evolution is a twentieth-century innovation, rather than 
originating in the nineteenth-century under Darwin’s influence (and in some sense even 
preceding him). If experimentation is not central in an analysis of Darwin’s theory, then 
experimental evolution’s history is itself neglected.5 
To characterize Darwin solely as a naturalist and theorist, however, is mistaken; 
the work of Janet Browne, Soraya de Chadarevian, and Richard Bellon, all demonstrate 
clearly that experimentation constituted much of Darwin’s biological practice, especially 
after 1859.6 While scholars usually emphasize the naturalistic and observational aspects 
 
3 Lenoir, “Essay Review: The Darwin Industry,” 115. Even though historians acknowledge the problems of 
continuing to focus so closely upon Darwin, he appears to have become no less important, considering the 
celebrations dedicated to the bicentennial of his birth and the sesquicentennial of The Origin of Species in 
2009. Historians contributed their share: The Cambridge Companion to the “Origin of Species” in 2009 
(while a Companion to Darwin had been published in 2003). In 2013, Michael Ruse published an edited 
collection of sixty-three essays entitled The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Darwin and Evolutionary Thought, 
dedicated to exploring the breadth of Darwin’s work and his lasting influence across disciplines and 
geographies. 
4 Although “experiment” has a single entry in the index (to Joe Cain’s essay on the Modern Synthesis), the 
topic actually comprises a substantial portion of Jean Gayon’s essay on Darwinism in France post-1900 as 
well as Betty Smocovitis’ essay on evolutionary botany from 1920 to 1950. David Rudge’s essay on 
ecological genetics briefly mentions the experiments of Kettlewell on natural populations of moths. 
Strangely, Steven Hecht Orzack’s essay, “The Evolution of the Testing of Evolution,” contains no mention 
of experimental work on the topic, despite Gayon’s essay in the same volume discussing that very subject. 
(In general, the Encyclopedia contains almost no cross-referencing.) The earlier Cambridge Companions 
similarly neglect experiment; in the latter, only Jim Endersby mentions any of Darwin’s experimentation. 
5 In another compendium, Keller’s and Lloyd’s Keywords in Evolutionary Biology (1992), a mixture of 
history, philosophy, and science, philosophers and biologists are more likely to mix experimentation into 
their discussions than the historians, except for Diane Paul’s essay on heterosis. 
6 Soraya de Chadarevian, “Laboratory-Science versus Country-House Experiments: The Controversy 
between Julius Sachs and Charles Darwin”; Browne, The Power of Place, 166–178, 182–183, 193, 201, 
212, 241; Bellon, “Charles Darwin Solves the ‘Riddle of the Flower’”; Bellon, “Inspiration in the Harness 
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of Darwin’s practice – represented by biogeography, geology, and cirripedology, among 
other topics –, Browne and Bellon have made clear the importance of his experimental 
and material practices in convincing the scientific community that evolution was a 
workable scientific theory. His botanical studies were explicitly engaged to this end; both 
Asa Gray and Darwin considered Orchids, his first book after The Origin, to be a “flank 
movement upon the enemy.”7 Bellon argues that Darwin, responding to the criticism that 
The Origin was too speculative and not properly inductive, turned to botany in order to 
“tie evolution to a productive mode of original investigation [, which] proved decisive for 
the scientific acceptance of evolution in the 1860s.”8 Joseph Hooker told Darwin that he 
considered him “out of sight the best Physiological observer & experimenter that Botany 
ever saw.”9 Darwin’s continued botanical investigations testified to his commitment to 
experimental practice, including his last published words in a preface to Herman Müller’s 
Fertilisation of Flowers (1883), in which he “exhorted the “young and ardent observer” 
to “observe for himself, giving full play to his imagination, but rigidly checking it by 
testing each notion experimentally.””10 
Given the importance Darwin himself attributed to experimentation, why does it 
remain unappreciated? Why has it taken so long for historians to recognize this aspect of 
Darwin’s life? While a complicated question, Bellon offers three suggestions: First, 
Darwinian floral botany waned by the end of the nineteenth century, particularly in the 
advent of new research traditions in genetics and Clementsian experimental ecology, and 
has been since forgotten.11 Second, some of Darwin’s experiments, particularly on plant 
movement, caused a debate with plant physiologist Julius von Sachs, of which de 
Chadarevian argues was actually about the rising barriers between laboratory and 
“country-house” experimentation. As biology professionalized, Darwin’s style of amateur 
experimentation came to be regarded as illegitimate and thus not as respected by his 
scientific successors as they were by some of his contemporaries.12 (But as I show in 
 
of Daily Labor”; Bellon, “Darwin’s Evolutionary Botany.” Desmond and Moore do not stress Darwin’s 
experimental side in their 1991 biography to the same degree as Browne. 
7 Bellon, “Inspiration in the Harness of Daily Labor,” 407–409. 
8 Bellon, “Charles Darwin Solves the ‘Riddle of the Flower,’” 383. 
9 Quoted by Ibid. 
10 Ibid., 387. 
11 Ibid., 395.  
12 De Chadarevian, “Laboratory-Science versus Country-House Experiments.” Neither de Chadarevian nor 
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Chapter 4, geneticist Edward East took his experiments on plant inbreeding seriously.) 
Third, historiographically speaking, historians have often ignored the daily practice of 
Victorian scientists.13 Therefore, despite Darwin’s centrality to the history of biology, 
much of his science remains unexplored, even decades following the “turn to practice.”14 
The neglect of experimentation in evolutionary studies, then, is perhaps due more to the 
concerns and commitments of historians, rather than Darwin’s own approach.15  
A key difference between Darwin and his experimental descendants is that the 
latter gave experimentation an explicit ideological slant as the future of science. It is not 
evident that Darwin saw natural history as in conflict with experimentation, nor was he 
all that interested in controlling the evolutionary process itself. Darwin occupies an 
ambiguous role in the history of biological experimentation: he integrated 
experimentation with natural history in his own work and did so not only directly but also 
relied upon the work of breeders who exerted control over the process of evolution. He 
may not have shared Jacques Loeb’s or Charles Davenport’s ideology of control, but his 
method of treating breeding as a form of experiment was still controversial at the time 
(particularly with Alfred Russel Wallace). The first chapter of the dissertation centers this 
relationship between evolution and breeding both in history and in Darwin’s own 
perspective on evolution. 
 
The “Eclipse of Darwinism” 
Historians have long recognized that following Darwin’s death, many turn-of-the-
century biologists challenged aspects of his theory of natural selection (although rarely a 
 
Bellon discuss the details of Darwin’s experiments, but instead focus upon the changing roles of 
experimentation within the scientific community as well as the social aspects of scientific community. 
13 Bellon, 396. 
14 See the recent work of Alistair Sponsel for how a focus on practice can transform our images of Darwin 
aboard the Beagle. Even Darwin’s daily life on the Beagle has remained unexamined until recently! 
Sponsel, Darwin’s First Theory. See also Hannah Landecker, “The Matter of Practice in the Historiography 
of the Experimental Life Sciences,” in Handbook of the Historiography of Biology, eds. Michael Dietrich, 
Mark Borrello, and Oren Harman, (Cham: Springer, 2018): 1–22. 
15 Peter Bowler made a similar claim about evolutionary morphology: “Darwin himself had done important 
morphological work on the barnacles, but he did not participate directly in the creation of Haeckel’s 
evolutionary morphology. In this case, the use of structural relationships to reconstruct the history of life on 
earth extended evolutionism into an area that Darwin himself did not regard as central. Precisely for this 
reason, the rise and fall of evolutionary morphology has gone largely unrecorded by historians. … One is 
left with then with the impression that the whole episode should be regarded as something of an 
embarrassment.” Bowler, Life’s Splendid Drama (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 13. 
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wholesale rejection). The “eclipse of Darwinism,” a phrase coined in 1942 by Julian 
Huxley, characterizes the period between Darwin’s death (1882) and the Modern 
Synthesis (1930s/1942) as a time in which “Darwinism” – or natural selection, 
specifically – fell out of favor with many biologists until it was reconciled with 
genetics.16 While this period has often been viewed as scientifically stagnant and 
unproductive, a more careful interpretation is that a plethora of evolutionary theories 
flourished – including neo-Lamarckism, mutationism, Mendelism, and orthogenesis – 
that explored the possibilities of evolutionary mechanisms in the natural world, gardens, 
cropfields, and laboratories, and importantly, experimented with them.17 Stoltzfus and I 
have argued that this period was essential for the future development of evolutionary 
biology; in this dissertation I further demonstrate that the experimental evolution of this 
period was also essential. 
Until Peter Bowler’s The Eclipse of Darwinism (1983), historians had mostly 
ignored this period of evolutionary studies as they regarded it as not having produced 
anything scientifically noteworthy.18 However, Bowler argued, if historians wished to 
understand the development of evolutionary thinking, they could not ignore the fifty 
years between Darwin (or Weismann) and Dobzhansky.19 Even decades after Bowler’s 
 
16 Provine, The Origins of Theoretical Population Genetics; Bowler, The Eclipse of Darwinism. It is 
important to note that Darwinism here refers only to natural selection. As Bowler showed in The Non-
Darwinian Revolution, the biological community quickly accepted common descent, but not natural 
selection. Michael Ruse in Monad to Man has argued this quick adoption is because Darwin’s theory fit 
squarely into the Victorian ideology of progress. However, even an “eclipse of natural selection” should be 
qualified: so-called anti-Darwinists such as de Vries and Bateson accepted the existence of natural 
selection, but they did reject its creative power, which was one of Darwin’s major innovations Razeto-
Barry and Frick, “Probabilistic Causation and the Explanatory Role of Natural Selection”; Stoltzfus and 
Cable, “Mendelism-Mutationism.” 
17 One step towards correcting the misconception that the Eclipse of Darwinism was a period of little 
scientific value might be to rid ourselves of the term “eclipse” altogether, as Mark Largent has argued. 
Largent, “The So-Called Eclipse of Darwinism,” 17–18. Much like the “Dark Ages,” Largent argues 
“eclipse” is a term “employed by the succeeding generation of authors to slur their predecessors by 
implying that they worked in an ignorant and ineffective era.” Ibid., 4. 
18 Bowler, The Eclipse of Darwinism, xvi. Even if this was the case, it is impossible to understand fully the 
history of biology, as well as the history of the social sciences and the intersection of science, politics, and 
culture without also understanding how evolutionary thinking, with its ties to notions of both cultural 
progress and deterioration, developed in the early twentieth century. 
19 Bowler had the additional purpose of responding to the creationist claim that Darwin has remained 
unquestioned by biologists; instead, he shows that there was a significant period in which natural selection 
was in fact challenged. In this vein, Jean Gayon has elaborated upon this analysis by showing that the 
natural selection of Darwinism is not the natural selection of today. Gayon, Darwinism’s Struggle for 
Survival: Heredity and the Hypothesis of Selection. 
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book, figures such as the Mendelians William Bateson, R. C. Punnett, and Thomas Hunt 
Morgan remain outside what is considered the history of mainstream evolutionary 
thinking, despite their essential contributions.20 Historians still have a lot of work to do 
toward understanding this period;  Sander Gliboff is currently reevaluating the history of 
neo-Lamarckism, for example.21 What chapters 2-5 set out to do is understand some of 
the experimental side of this period. 
The “eclipse of Darwinism” was when evolutionary studies were perhaps at their 
most experimental, or, at the very least, it was during this period that experimental 
evolution was first established. In fact, the biologist who first experimentalized evolution, 
at least from the view of his contemporaries, Dutch botanist Hugo de Vries, also 
constructed the mutation theory, frequently described as one of the major competitors to 
Darwinism (this despite de Vries’ feelings to the contrary).22 In her paper, “The Battling 
Botanist,” historian Sharon Kingsland shows that Daniel MacDougal, director of the 
Carnegie Institution’s Desert Laboratory, championed the mutation theory precisely 
because it was experimentally-based (which also allowed for the control of evolution, 
more on which I discuss below).23 Other significant figures who treated evolution 
experimentally – Frederic Clements, Paul Kammerer, C. E. Brown-Sequard – were neo-
Lamarckians.24 Overall, experimental evolutionists at this time had a complicated 
relationship with Darwinism, although several distinguished between Darwinism as 
theory and Darwinism as method (which I adopt). My analysis also further establishes the 
argument made by Stoltzfus and myself that while many of the Mendelians did not accept 
Darwin’s argument for selection’s creativity, they did not reject selection; rather, much of 
their work emphasized and approached the question of how selection works in a 
 
20 Ibid.; Stoltzfus and Cable, “Mendelism-Mutationism.” In addition to contributing a new theory of 
heredity, the Mendelians reformulated Darwin’s natural selection to be “kinetic” (Gayon’s term) as it 
increased the proportion of one type over another, rather than gradually modifying the entire population 
over time. They also dropped the evolutionists’ commitment to gradualism. 
21 Gliboff, “The Case of Paul Kammerer.” 
22 Theunissen, “Closing the Door on Hugo de Vries’ Mendelism.” De Vries is also known as being one of 
the co-discoverers of Mendel, but Theunissen argues that this lens is the improper one for understanding de 
Vries on his own terms. That he ‘failed’ to integrate Mendelism into his scientific theory is to 
misunderstand de Vries. 
23 Kingsland, “The Battling Botanist.” 
24 Bowler, The Eclipse of Darwinism, 60–103; Bowler, Evolution: The History of an Idea, 234–245; 
Kohler, Landscapes and Labscapes: Exploring the Lab-Field Border in Biology. 
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Mendelian and mutating population.25 
A key argument of my dissertation is that despite the complexity (and goofiness) 
of the period, the trend of experimental evolution led by the American geneticists, such as 
Edward Murray East and William Castle, was a serious endeavor. Paul Kammerer’s 
fraudulent midwife toad experiment is perhaps the most well-known experiment of this 
era and its fame overshadows the careful experimentation of the Mendelians. 
Furthermore, while these scientists are frequently described as geneticists, I argue that 
experimental evolution may be a more fitting description for their work, including even 
Morgan and his students. I will argue in my subsequent chapters that, just as a focus upon 
Darwin can hide the experimental nature of biology during the nineteenth century, the 
common assessment of non-Darwinian theories as being unproductive misses the 
significance of the experimental nature of evolutionary studies during the period. 
In our 2014 paper, my co-author Arlin Stolzfus and I argued that Mendelian and 
mutationist biologists had been subject to historical revisionism that masked their major 
contributions to evolutionary biology. This was to make the Modern Synthesis appear 
more groundbreaking when it came to the relationship between natural selection and 
genetics. We called their work the “forgotten evolutionary synthesis.” We focused on the 
writings of five key and well-known biologists – Hugo de Vries, William Bateson, R. C. 
Punnett, Wilhelm Johannsen, and Thomas Hunt Morgan – and took their criticisms of 
Darwinism and their genetic and evolutionary contributions seriously. We discovered that 
many of their views were misinterpreted and sometimes outright misrepresented. For 
example, de Vries is almost always mentioned as having based his theory entirely on a 
single species, Oenothera lamarckiana, that ended up having an abnormal system of 
heredity, thus limiting the scope of his theory, or as is implied: De Vries was wrong.26 
However, his theory had a considerably broader evidential basis, including experiments 
 
25 Ruse, Monad to Man; Gayon, Darwinism’s Struggle for Survival. 
26 Kingsland’s useful discussion of de Vries in “The Battling Botanist,” for example, emphasizes the 
primroses but does not give examples of his other sources of evidence. Some historians have challenged the 
usual dismissal of de Vries. Smocovitis, for example, claims that de Vries’ work, “by drawing attention to 
the complex interplay of mechanisms at the chromosomal level, … Oenothera drew attention to the power 
and utility of plants as tools for understanding patterns and modes of speciation.” Smocovitis, “Botany and 
the Evolutionary Synthesis, 1920-1950,” 315. Helen Anne Curry and Luis Campos, by tracing through 
botany the use of colchicine and radiation (respectively), have shown that de Vries had a lingering 
influence through work on polyploidy, the chromosomal aberrations de Vries is noted to have given undue 
influence on evolution. 
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with buttercups, and the persistent variation of Draba verna, as I elaborate in Chapter 2. 
The relationship between our argument and this dissertation is important for the 
latter chapters. Our thesis was that Hugo de Vries made an essential critique of 
Darwinism by distinguishing for the first time between visible variation that was 
inheritable and visible variation that was not inheritable, labeled fluctuation and 
mutation, respectively. Mutation was not defined as being large and significant variation, 
but instead as definite and inheritable (and eventually, random) variation.27 Such 
variation contrasted with fluctuations – variation that occurred due to environmental 
causes such as nutrition. (Thus, the common notion that one of the Morgan laboratory’s 
contributions was to demonstrate that mutations were frequently small was not a 
discovery or innovation, but a confirmation.) This distinction had major implications for 
how evolution worked, particularly how selection operated. This was a major 
disagreement with Darwin’s theory that gave rise to the notion that Mendelian-
mutationism was a scientific dead-end. In our paper, we, building on the work of Jean 
Gayon, overturned this interpretation: the Mendelian-mutationists rejected Darwin’s 
notion that selection was creative, but accepted its importance. Their modifications to the 
theory of natural selection were ultimately transmitted to the Modern Synthesis, albeit 
with an orthodox Darwinian guise.  The theory of selection that emerged from their 
experiments will be examined at length in Chapter 4 and 5.  
While this dissertation does not focus upon elaborating upon our argument, it 
continues the overall argument. By focusing on a neglected set of biologists who pushed 
forward experimental evolution, such as William Castle and Edward Murray East, I 
discovered that they had taken up the “Mendelian-mutationist” arguments, for and 
against, in their own work. Indeed, the nature of selection was the major theoretical 
argument toward which they exerted their experimental efforts. Importantly, this debate 
was also over how to control evolution and clear concepts were fundamental to the task. 
 
Experimentation and the Control of Life 
 
 
27 Stoltzfus and I separate de Vries from the others in that the latter hardened the distinction and contributed 
more positive  
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Historians of biology have emphasized that simultaneous to the “Eclipse of 
Darwinism,” the rest of biology underwent an experimental turn, the laboratory becoming 
a standard site of biological study. While a discipline such as embryology was long 
rooted in the laboratory, the microscope being its key instrument, it was not until 
scientists such as Wilhelm Roux and Hans Driesch began to intervene upon an 
organism’s natural development that the discipline became “experimental embryology.”28 
Following this shift, the history of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century biology 
becomes a history of experimentalization across its subdisciplines, including morphology 
and ecology. But evolution is not usually viewed as one of the experimental 
subdisciplines of biology, the focus instead being upon genetics as a science of heredity 
and variation. What is required, therefore, is an attention to scientific practice and 
method: many American geneticists saw their work as being part of experimental 
evolution 
The nature of the shift toward experimentation is a matter of debate among 
historians, centered upon what is called the “Allen thesis.” In 1978, historian Garland 
Allen claimed that early twentieth-century biologists “revolted from morphology” and 
became experimentalists.29 Disappointed by the speculative nature of reconstructing 
evolutionary relationships via morphological and embryological differences, Allen 
argued that William Bateson and Thomas Hunt Morgan (among others) developed an 
experimental approach towards the problems of variation and heredity.30 Responding to 
critiques, Allen reformulated his thesis the following year to state that the early twentieth-
century biologists split into two camps: naturalists and experimentalists.31 
In subsequent decades, several historians have challenged both formulations on 
 
28 Maienschein, Whose View of Life? Embryos, Cloning, and Stem Cells, 67–68. Maienschein, responding 
to contemporary controversies such as President Bush’s halting of stem cell research development, shows 
how biologists have manipulated biological phenomena for centuries. For example, recombinant DNA 
research was controversial in the 1970s but has become rather mundane today. Overall, her book argues 
that the questions of “what is life” and “when does life begin” have changed frequently over time, but this 
is irrelevant to my purposes here. 
29 Allen, Life Science in The Twentieth Century. 
30 Peter J. Bowler has emphasized that Bateson’s and Morgan’s abandonment of evolutionary morphology 
did not kill this field of study. As with the events of the Eclipse of Darwinism generally, even if this work 
was perceived be a “sideline” to modern evolutionary biology, it does not mean this was the case. Bowler, 
Life’s Splendid Drama. 
31 Allen, “Naturalists and Experimentalists.” The key difference between the two forms is that Allen 
conceded the charge of category error: morphology is a biological discipline; experimentalism is a method. 
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grounds relevant to discipline and practice. For example, Jane Maienschein pointed out 
that the cytological work of E. B. Wilson – regarded as a triumph of laboratory biology – 
was more morphological and comparative than experimental; relatedly, Sharon Kingsland 
has noted that the Morgan lab’s program of chromosome mapping, too, was 
morphological, as it tended to ignore physiology and process.32 Keith Benson argued that 
by dichotomizing biology, Allen distorted the methodological character of the various 
biological disciplines: for example, splitting embryology into descriptive and 
experimental work with a higher-level historiographical concept “obfuscates the 
understanding of the developments within each discipline.”33 However, this assumes that 
the discipline is the proper historiographical category to analyze; thus, there is clearly a 
tension between the categories of discipline, identity, and practice. 
Bowler made a similar point about evolutionary morphology. In addition to 
criticizing historians’ neglect of such work as well as the reconstruction of phylogenetic 
relationships because of Darwin’s lack of interest in such a project, he wrote: “The new 
historiography based on research traditions and professional disciplines tends to have the 
same effect as the old when it comes to evaluating the impact of evolutionism. … The 
new historiography sidelines the impact of evolutionism because it did not form the basis 
of coherent professional groupings among biologists.” However, the “reconstruction of 
life’s ancestry was so extensive a project,” “a theme so broad that it could not be made 
the basis of a single research tradition,” that it “should be retained as a historiographical 
theme precisely because it served to connect a wide range of existing - and some newly 
emerging - disciplines.” I argue that the same applies to experimental evolution.34 
This problem is particularly poignant when it comes to experimental evolution. 
Both historically and today, experimental evolution is not a discipline or a method, it is 
not unified by theory, and while it has coherent communities, it is not itself a community. 
Rather, it is an approach to evolutionary questions, which involves not only evolutionary 
biology as a discipline, but others that sometimes relate, such as agriculture, 
 
32 Maienschein, “Shifting Assumptions in American Biology: Embryology, 1890-1910,” 94; Kingsland, 
“The Battling Botanist,” 205. I revise Kingsland’s perspective of genetics as morphology somewhat in 
Chapter 5: the Morgan lab integrated their mapping work into experiments on the operation of selection. 
33 Benson, “Problems of Individual Development,” 116.  
34 Bowler, Life’s Splendid Drama, 19-24. 
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microbiology, and molecular biology. This dissertation includes biometricians, proto-
microbiologists, botanists, agriculturists and breeders, and geneticists, and a full account 
of experimental evolution would include microbiologists, molecular biologists, 
ecologists, and even chemical engineers. Thus, following experimental evolution is to 
take a tour through all of biology (although the degree it plays within any specific 
discipline varies considerably). What unites these figures I argue is the control of 
evolution through experimentation, to make it visible, controllable, and useful. 
 
In science there is a double notion of control: to take power over the process or to 
limit the intervening variables that influence the process under study. Both are essential 
to experimental evolution: The object and goal of control change over time: sometimes 
they are restricted to theoretical questions, and at other times they seek the control of 
human evolution,  
 
The notion that experimentation is the control of nature has its roots in the work of 
Sir Francis Bacon. As Carolyn Merchant argued in The Death of Nature, the Scientific 
Revolution was entangled with the rise of capitalism, the continued subjugation of 
women, and the exploitation of the environment. Merchant argued that philosophers such 
as Francis Bacon and René Descartes replaced an organic and holistic view of nature 
from the Renaissance with a mechanistic machine-like one. She claims that this 
mechanistic view of the world - ruled by prediction-making mathematical laws - “could 
legitimate the manipulation of nature” because “nature was now viewed as a system of 
dead, inert particles.”35 According to Merchant, science is about power, control, and 
order. “In the mechanical world, order was redefined to mean the predictable behavior of 
each part within a rationally determined system of laws, while power derived from active 
 
35 Merchant, The Death of Nature: Women, Ecology, and the Scientific Revolution, 193. At the same time, 
nature was associated with and likened to femininity, the apparent passiveness of which “legitimate[d] the 
exploitation and “rape” of nature for human good.” Ibid., 171. The tying of Francis Bacon’s philosophy of 
science to the subjugation of women has proven to be the most controversial claim of Merchant’s book. It 
is unfortunate that the focus of the debate does not appear to engage the other theses of the book, such as 
science’s ties to natural magic, commercial expansion, and environmental destruction as well as what role 
mechanistic thinking played in allowing the control of nature and of women. For the latest entry in the 
debate, which includes discussions of previous bouts, see Merchant, “Francis Bacon and the ‘Vexations of 
Art’: Experimentation as Intervention.” 
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and immediate intervention in a secularized world. Order and power together constituted 
control. Rational control over nature, society, and the self was achieved by redefining 
reality itself through the new machine metaphor.”36 Merchant argues that this view of the 
world was most clearly represented in the work of Newton and Leibniz and thus imbues 
the world of physics. Due to experiment’s relatively late integration into biology in the 
late eighteenth century though physiology and embryology, Merchant did not address the 
topic.37 But not coincidentally, Charles Davenport, who launched experimental evolution 
in the United States, pointed back to Bacon, even saying that with a Station for 
Experimental Evolution, Bacon’s “dream” could finally be made real. I discuss this at 
length in Chapter 3. 
But Merchant’s thesis cannot be applied so straightforwardly to biology. The 
relationship between control and mechanistic thinking is more complicated. Darwin had a 
complex relationship with the notion of experimentation and control. He never put 
forward a vision of taking control of evolution, but did see it partially as already under 
control: the whole notion of selection, and change over time, and his theory of variation 
and heredity, largely came from the breeders who were actively working with evolution, 
an “experiment on a gigantic scale.” But regarding mechanistic thinking, Darwin is even 
more nuanced, yet informative: Donald Worster argued that Darwin had inherited the 
“well-oiled machine” of Linnean ecology and the mechanical utilitarianism of Paley’s 
natural theology, but that his theory “quietly laid an ax to the clock and broke it into 
smithereens. … In a place of the world clock Darwin gave us the evolving tree of life. … 
Darwin revealed a nature that is alive, messy, disorderly, unplanned, and seemingly 
chaotic.”38 But Darwin did not throw the baby out with the bathwater: while he was not 
so mechanistic as some of his predecessors, his “entangled bank” was thoroughly 
materialist.39 His theory therefore was based on control and implied control, even if his 
own writings did not center it and pointed to the complexities of doing so. 
No biologist tied together the experimentalization of biology with the drive to 
 
36 Merchant, The Death of Nature, 193.  
37 Coleman, Biology in the Nineteenth Century; Magner, A History of the Life Sciences. 
38 Worster, Nature’s Economy, 39; Worster, “Carolyn Merchant’s The Death of Nature at 25 Years,” 811. 
39 This is exactly what Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels saw as so valuable in Darwin’s work: that he, like 
they, had moved beyond “mechanical materialism” and made it dialectical: he had infused material nature 
with history, development, change, process, and interaction. I discuss this Chapter 2.  
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control as much as Jacques Loeb, emphasized by Philip Pauly’s 1987 biography, 
Controlling Life: Jacques Loeb and the Engineering Ideal in Biology.40 Pauly 
demonstrated how Loeb, working at the turn of the twentieth century, did not pursue his 
work for the sake of understanding the world, but for the sake of controlling it. For Loeb, 
experimentation was a way to manipulate living organisms to suit his desires. Justifying 
his approach through Ernst Mach, he disdained what he saw as the metaphysical 
speculations of evolutionists and morphologists. Mentored by the plant physiologist 
Julius Sachs, he sought to control the behavior of invertebrates such as tubularians, 
caterpillars, and sea urchins by adopting a physico-chemical and anti-vitalist view of 
biology, treating the organism as a machine manipulable by environmental stimulants 
such as light, gravity, and salts.41  
Pauly summarized “the core of the Loebian standpoint” as “the belief that biology 
could be formulated, not as a natural science, but as an engineering science. More 
broadly, it meant that nature was fading away.” Pauly continues,  
As biologists’ power over organisms increased, their experience with them as “natural” objects 
declined. And as the extent of possible manipulation and construction expanded, the original 
organization and normal processes of organisms no longer seemed scientifically privileged; nature 
was merely one state among an indefinite number of possibilities, and a state that could be 
scientifically boring. This transformation … was a generalization from biologists’ practice as they 
saw the extent of artificialization taking place in laboratories. Nature was disappearing, not as a 
result of argument, but through trivialization; not through disproof, but displacement. The natural 
became merely one among any results of the activity of biological invention.42 
 
Thus, Pauly characterized the control or engineering of life as deemphasizing an 
understanding of the natural world as it is, rejecting the distinction between artificial and 
natural, and lacking interest in practical application.43  
 
40 Philip Pauly, Controlling Life: Jacques Loeb and the Engineering Ideal in Biology (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1987). 
41 For example, Loeb found he could cause a caterpillar to starve to death at the tip of the plant, even 
though food was nearby - in this instance, the “heliotropism” determined the insect’s movement, not its 
need to nourish itself. 
42 Ibid., 199. 
43 S. Andrew Inkpen’s thesis is that biological/evolutionary thinkers have debated and renegotiated the 
relative worth of artificial and natural objects toward understanding how life works. For example, Wallace 
disagreed with Darwin’s use of domesticated species (artificial) to understand evolution (natural); in a 
fascinating turn, in the 1940s, Dobzhansky, a major neo-Darwinian, agreed more with Wallace, abandoning 
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However, by focusing his work on Jacques Loeb, Pauly did not fully explore the 
picture of controlling life during the early twentieth century. For example, for much of 
his life, Loeb dismissed evolutionary studies as too full of metaphysical speculation and 
was thus not scientific. But by following Loeb, Pauly neglected contemporary events in 
experimental evolution: the dissertation’s argument is that while Loeb may have been 
correct regarding late nineteenth-century evolutionary science, it was not entirely true of 
the early twentieth century. Furthermore, when placed alongside the scientists discussed 
in this dissertation, Loeb’s position is rather extreme: for one, they combined 
experimentation and control with understanding nature, and they also sought utility rather 
than an aloof “engineering ideal.” Even Pauly found Loeb’s direct influence to be 
limited, not founding any kind of community like his contemporaries Morgan or William 
Keith Brooks.44 While the experimental evolutionists showed less interest in how 
evolution worked in nature (or the wild) than non-experimental contemporaries, they 
occasionally worried over the question, an issue I discuss in chapters 4 and 5. (East, for 
example, wondered if methods of strict inbreeding matched any process in nature.) But as 
I will show in Chapter 3, especially, Charles Davenport, the head of the Station for 
Experimental Evolution, intended to integrate the natural with the artificial in a fruitful 
way, by searching for “laws” rather than the direct production of commodified stocks, 
although maize and poultry remained key species within experimental evolution to not 
only encourage funding but to be useful. Overall, experimental evolutionists did not 
emphasize such a distinction between artifice and nature and perhaps naively thought 
they need not worry about it, as opposed to Loeb who accepted the distinction but 
rejected orienting his research towards the natural. 
 
Drosophila melanogaster (which Kohler has considered to be a technological construction of the Morgan 
lab) for a more “natural” fly, D. pseudoobscura. Indeed, the artificial/natural distinction could be a reason 
experimental evolution is not always highly regarded by biologists, for many have a disregard for 
evolutionary hypotheses and results that originate inside a test tube. However, Kingsland argues that one of 
the key moves de Vries made with the mutation theory was to eliminate this distinction; indeed, she argues 
that de Vries, typically seen as an anti-Darwinian, strengthened Darwin’s analogy between artificial and 
natural selection. Kohler, Lords of the Fly: Drosophila Genetics and the Experimental Life; Inkpen, 
“Denaturing Nature: Philosophical and Historical Reflections on the Artificial-Natural Distinction in the 
Life Sciences”; Kingsland, “The Battling Botanist,” 492. 
44 Instead, Pauly traces strong intellectual influences on a few figures who became important in their own 
right: geneticist H. J. Muller, psychologists W. J. Crozier and B. F. Skinner, and the inventor of the oral 
contraceptive, Gregory Pincus. Pauly, 164–200. The diversity in disciplinary backgrounds of these figures 
indicates that a discipline-focused history might miss these connections. 
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Following Pauly, several historians also took up the theme of control, each 
showing how biology was experimentalized and controlled through various disciplines. 
Intriguingly, though, one has to dig for this theme as it was rarely the sole focus of a 
work: this includes Gregg Mittman’s The State of Nature (1992), Lily Kay’s The 
Molecular Vision of Life (1993), Adele Clarke’s Disciplining Reproduction (1998), and 
Sharon Kingsland’s Evolution of American Ecology (2005). Philosphers such as Ian 
Hacking also began to study the notion of “intervention” and not only “representations,” 
as part of what he called a “back-to-Bacon” movement.”45 However, no synthetic work of 
controlling life has been written. Common themes have emerged, though, particularly the 
relationship between theory and practice, the role of patronage, and problems with the 
meaning of “control.” This was part of a wider “turn to practice” within the history of 
science, although it did not fully embrace the history of evolutionary biology.46 
Lily Kay adopted Hacking’s distinction between representation and intervention 
to study molecular biology, but flipped the traditional picture of scientific development: 
molecular biology did not form as a discipline to create representations of life that would 
later produce applications; instead, “the goal of engineering life was inscribed into the 
molecular biology program from its inception.”47 A microscopic science such as 
molecular biology automatically entails control because intervention is required for 
understanding, such as X-ray crystallography and restriction enzymes. The same applies 
to some aspects of evolution, for experimentation (and statistics) was required to make it 
“visible,” a major focus of Chapters 2, 4, and 5. This contrasts with a traditional picture 
in which historians and philosophers saw representations as preceding interventions (i.e., 
pure research leads to applications). But, when experimentation and patronage come into 
play, a one-way path from representation to intervention breaks down. For molecular 
 
45 Philosopher of science Andrea Woody has made the critical point, however, that theory and models are a 
form of scientific practice also. Her example is the periodic table, which, while a representation, also 
actively categorizes the elements and upon its construction was only one way to do so. This point was 
emphasized by Nikolai Bukharin in 1931, whose perspective I discuss below. Woody, Andrea I. 
“Chemistry’s Periodic Law: Rethinking Representation and Explanation after the Turn to Practice,” in 
Science After the Practice Turn in the Philosophy, History, and Social Studies of Science, eds. Lena Soler, 
Sjoerd Zwart, Michael Lynch, and Vincent Israel-Jost (New York: Routledge, 2014): 123-150. 
46 See Hannah Landecker, “The Matter of Practice in the Historiography of the Experimental Life 
Sciences,” in Handbook of the Historiography of Biology, eds. Michael Dietrich, Mark Borrello, and Oren 
Harman (Cham: Springer, 2018): 1–22. 
47 Kay, “Life as Technology: Representing, Intervening, and Molecularizing,” 98. 
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biologists, to even see required intervening and that intervention is what organized their 
discipline.48 My dissertation argues that this applies equally to evolutionary biology. 
Intervention was not only for the sake of representation. “Just like Bacon’s 
program,” Kay argues, “the new biology should be understood on two nested levels of 
intervention”: the “proximate,” or the “technological control of life,” and the “ultimate,” 
or social control.49 While scientists may have intervened solely for the purpose of 
understanding biology at the molecular level, the Rockefeller Foundation, Kay argues, 
invested in “psychobiology” in hopes of controlling society, whether through eugenics or 
psychiatry. Despite the disparate agendas, Kay shows that the proximate and ultimate 
interests “resonated” enough to facilitate scientific work.50 As the head of the Rockefeller 
Foundation Max Mason said, the new science of molecular biology had “the aim of 
control through understanding.”51 Intervention, representation, and control therefore 
intersect. 
The scientific and sometimes political agendas of patrons has been established by 
historians as essential to understanding the development of the experimental biologies 
throughout the twentieth century.52 For example, Kingsland has examined the 
relationship between patronage and control in ecology. The Carnegie Institution funded 
the MacDougal-directed Desert Laboratory to help develop experimental ecology, a 
discipline which Kingsland describes as a “broad eclectic subject [that] became a 
discipline because the science addressed larger American goals related to economic 
development. … Ecology was connected to a larger quest for control over life that was 
 
48 Ibid., 93. How different this is from other biological disciplines is debatable. One of the critiques of late 
nineteenth-century biology, for example, is that it was too focused upon the microscope. However, the 
microscope is not an instrument of intervention, but sense extension, whereas gel electrophoresis is a 
manipulation of molecules to create representations entirely different in kind. Maienschein differentiates 
descriptive and experimental embryology on the basis that the latter violates the “normal” by “contriv[ing] 
experimental conditions to create new access to normally hidden secrets.” Maienschein, Whose View of 
Life? Embryos, Cloning, and Stem Cells, 67. 
49 Kay, “Life as Technology: Representing, Intervening, and Molecularizing,” 91. See also Kay, The 
Molecular Vision of Life: Caltech, The Rockefeller Foundation, and the Rise of the New Biology, 18–19. 
50 Kay’s claim that molecular biology was funded in the United States for the purpose of social control is 
not well-supported and in fact engendered a heated exchange in the literature between Kay and a pair of 
molecular biologists. I discuss this below. 
51 Ibid., 46. 
52 Robert Kohler, Partners in Science: Foundations and Natural Scientists, 1900-1945, University of 
Chicago Press (1991). 
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shaping the direction of the life sciences in the early twentieth century.”53 The interplay 
between the goals of scientist and patron are not always straightforward, but a clear 
alignment is found in Kingsland’s study of ecologist Frederic Clements, who engaged in 
experimental evolution, quantified the diversity of plant communities, and developed a 
theory of ecological succession modeled on the individual development of embryos, 
partially for the purpose of controlling nature. She writes, 
The level of predictability also meant that the ecologist was potentially in a position to 
control the process. Ecological knowledge meant power over nature. It was not just a 
question of working in harmony with nature; that was a bit too passive. Once understood, 
the natural process could be retarded, accelerated, telescoped, held in one stage 
indefinitely, or deflected along another course, perhaps even destroyed in order to allow 
the process to start again. It could be manipulated and modified by inserting new species. 
It could be protected from all but climatic change.54 
 
The ecology developed by Clements, Kingsland argues, was “a quintessential Progressive 
Era” science in that it focused on quantification, rationalization, prediction, and control. 
Kay’s claim about the Rockefeller Foundation’s role in the origins of American 
molecular biology elicited a critical response from biologists Robert Sinsheimer and 
David Horowitz, who indignantly declared scientists’ independence from patron 
influence. Kay’s thesis was subtler than they portray: she emphasized that scientists 
themselves did not necessarily desire to develop their science to control society through 
molecular means, but that to obtain funding for their work (which, among other obstacles, 
required expensive instruments and a place outside traditional academic structures), they 
needed to orient their work to win Rockefeller funding. The degree to which scientists 
and patrons resonate changes on a case-by-case basis. Unfortunately, though, Kay left 
this part of the analysis underdeveloped: as Bentley Glass asked, did “social control” for 
 
53 Kingsland, The Evolution of American Ecology, 1890-2000, 127. 
54 Kingsland continues: ““In short,” Clements argued, “as an instrument for the control of the entire range 
of human uses of vegetation and the land, succession is wholly unrivaled.” The value of the complex-
organism lay in its power to confer on the human observer, the scientist, the ecologist, total control of a 
landscape to the extent permitted by the climate. Faith in the possibility of control stemmed from belief in 
the objectivity of science, the objectivity of quantitative, experimental methods, and the applicability of the 
organismic concept, which was for Clements no metaphor but a statement of objective fact. Solving 
problems of the kind presented by the Dust Bowl, which were foreshadowed in the degraded lands that 
Clements studied as a student, required the ability to predict exactly what would happen when humans 
entered a landscape and disturbed its natural progress.” Ibid., 151–152. 
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the Rockefeller mean “racial cleansing” or genetic therapy for diabetes?55 Or perhaps 
such a distinction did not matter?  
Adele Clarke’s study of the development of the “reproductive sciences” showed 
the importance of looking beyond the scientist-patron relationship for the implications of 
scientific control.56 Because of the social implications and controversy surrounding the 
reproductive sciences, Clarke takes advantage of agendas and programs made explicit by 
her “social worlds”: eugenics, birth control, women’s rights, neo-Malthusians, 
philanthropies and foundations, and also the scientists themselves.57 Unlike Kay’s work, 
the ways in which these social worlds seek to control life is quite clear.58 Given the 
contrasting methods and agendas in the reproductive sciences, Clarke argues that the 
notion of “control” should be problematized, for it is “complex and multiple, unstable 
and difficult.”59 First, “control,” frequently having negative connotations, can be used 
“for liberatory, repressive, unanticipated, and unknown other purposes.”60 Even some of 
those who supported eugenics thought they were controlling heredity for the common 
good; for example, some women viewed eugenics as a path toward liberation from 
patriarchy.61 Second, although “control” implies top-down force, the movement toward 
reproductive control was also advanced by grassroots movements, such as the birth 
control and women’s movements, showing that even lay women too sought to control 
life: their own reproduction.62 Therefore, the social worlds “had varied goals, and power 
was far from equally distributed among them. But these are complicated stories of 
 
55 Glass, “Review: Caltech and the Birth of Molecular Biology.” Kay does mention Pauling’s interest in 
“orthomolecular psychiatry,” but it is not developed. She also quotes Pauling making a quasi-eugenical 
statement about how people with sickle-cell anemia should wear stickers on their foreheads. How 
representative this is of Pauling’s views are left unclear. Kay, The Molecular Vision of Life: Caltech, The 
Rockefeller Foundation, and the Rise of the New Biology, 276. 
56 “Social worlds” theory, developed by Fujimira and Clarke, seeks to understand how the actions of 
individual actors coalesce into various “social worlds” that have a collective view of one problem of topic. 
57 It is worth noting that one of the inventors of the oral contraceptive is Gregory Pincus, one of the 
“Loebians” singled out by Pauly. Pauly, Controlling Life, 191–194. 
58 Lest it appear that I am overly critical of Kay, Clarke notes that when examining the archives of an 
institution like the Rockefeller Foundation, the “why” of social control is “almost invisible;” instead, one 
sees the “how” of where they spend their funds. Clarke, Disciplining Reproduction, 274. It is possible 
therefore that Kay could not precisely define what kind of control the Rockefeller officials were seeking. 
59 Ibid., 24. 
60 Ibid., 25. 
61 Susan Rensing, “Feminist Eugenics in America: From Free Love to Birth Control, 1880-1930,” PhD 
diss., University of Minnesota, 2006. 
62 Quoted by Ibid., 26. 
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negotiations and trade-offs rather than simpler sagas of repression and denial.”63 
Furthermore, “in the heterogeneous materialities of ordering and controlling life, there 
are no simple means of control - and certainly no innocent ones. Who gets to decide 
about the design and distribution of the means of control remains the central question.”64 
Thus, like Kay, and to some extent like Kingsland, the control of life for Clarke, was not 
merely the result of a hegemonic force dictating to scientists what should be done; 
instead, actors and groups, vying for their own interests, “resonated” through agendas of 
control, each negotiating and compromising their desires, whether such interventions 
were, in Kay’s terms, proximate or ultimate. Clarke’s examination of control is 
informative although it does not bear directly upon my dissertation as it has developed, 
not from disagreement but because it focuses exclusively on the interests of scientists. It 
is worth keeping in mind however that these scientists constitute one social world among 
others, such as the philanthropists, eugenicists, and agriculturists. 
In Chapter 3, I examine the private and state patronage of experimental evolution, 
especially the Carnegie Institution’s founding of the Station for Experimental Evolution 
at Cold Spring Harbor. The addresses at its 1904 opening clearly show an interest among 
both scientists and the Carnegie for practical benefits from developing an experimental 
evolution. Because its director, Charles Davenport, also built and directed the Eugenics 
Record Office at the same site, and later merged with the Station, a similar question as 
Kay asked arises: what is the relationship between experimental evolution and 
eugenics?65  It is not as straightforward as a 1:1 relationship: in fact, I show how eugenics 
did not appear in Davenport’s extensive application materials or in the opening addresses, 
but emerged over time and while eugenics came to dominate Davenport’s own work, it 
did not dominate the Station’s work as a whole. I address this further in Chapter 3 and in 
the conclusion. 
Scientific developments do not automatically increase the ability to control and 
manipulate nature. For example, Kingsland notes that ecologist Henry Allan Gleason, 
who rejected the Clementsian paradigm of ordered succession, argued that plant 
 
63 Ibid., 25. 
64 Ibid., 27. 




communities were random assemblages, which “undercuts ecology’s usefulness.”66 Bert 
Theunissen showed how Hugo de Vries’s mutationism, which rejected selection as a 
creative force, meant that both eugenics and mass selection as a method of crop 
improvement were for him non-starters.67 (Unsurprisingly, biologists invested heavily in 
discovering ways to induce mutations so that they could gain control over evolution.68) 
That a theory could undermine scientific control shows that experimentation is not a 
straight path to controlling nature. Furthermore, competing theories are not just about 
best explaining the evidence, but also the degree to which control can follow from its 
postulates. Which evolutionary theory better facilitated control of the process itself was a 
main point of contention and worry among the experimental evolutionists in chapters 4 
and 5.  
Historians have thus highlighted how experimentalism co-evolved with the 
control of nature and that both relate to the surrounding social systems. What historians 
such as Carolyn Merchant, Lily Kay, and Sharon Kingsland have found regarding science 
and control, my dissertation argues also applies to experimental evolution in the early 
twentieth century. Merchant’s formulation of control as the combination of order and 
power is also useful. The biologists of this period took on the agenda of Francis Bacon, 
sometimes consciously, to both understand and control nature. As the biological sciences 
continued to expand, especially with the technological advances of biochemistry and 
molecular biology, the ability to control their subject has only increased. The extent to 
which experimentation and control define the subsequent history of evolutionary studies, 
however, remains an understudied topic, toward which my dissertation is a contribution. 
 
The Historiography of Experimental Evolution 
 
 Experimental evolution remains an understudied topic within the history of 
science. Typically, experiments are treated as the evidence for theoretical developments 
rather than as the primary motivation for the science, such as in William Provine’s The 
 
66 Kingsland, The Evolution of American Ecology, 1890-2000, 160. 
67 Theunissen, “Knowledge Is Power.”  
68 Curry, “Accelerating Evolution, Engineering Life: American Agriculture and Technologies of Genetic 
Modification, 1925-1960”; Campos, Radium and the Secret of Life. 
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Origins of Theoretical Population Genetics and Peter Bowler’s Evolution: The History of 
an Idea.69  The result is that experimental evolution exists as a history in pieces and 
fragments in which it is rarely the primary subject itself. Thus, well-known figures in this 
dissertation, such as Hugo de Vries, Charles Davenport, and Alfred Sturtevant appear 
frequently in histories of biology, but usually not as the main protagonist and sometimes 
even as antagonists (if their theories or ideas opposed the mainstream). Others who 
feature prominently in this dissertation as main drivers of experimental evolution, such as 
George Shull and Edward East, are usually relegated to minor roles. In addition, I argue 
that a considerable amount of genetics, such as Wilhelm Johannsen’s pure line theory and 
Drosophila work, should be reconstrued as experimental evolution, given the various 
ways in which they were taken up by contemporaries. So, my focus on experimental 
evolution as the subject brings a relatively novel set of actors to the fore and new 
motivations revealed. 
Sharon Kingsland’s 1991 article on “The Battling Botanist,” Daniel MacDougal 
was among the first works to study experimental evolution for its own sake. As she 
wrote, studies of Hugo de Vries’ mutation theory focused mostly on internal reception 
among scientists, thus requiring an analysis of how the theory was deployed by scientists 
to agitate for a broader program of experimentation and control. MacDougal made this 
motivation explicit when he said that power over mutations would overcome the 
gradualist commitment of evolutionary theory. Kingsland also viewed her study as an 
extension of Barbara Kimmelman’s useful analysis of American genetics as emerging out 
of agricultural experiment stations, which I show is the same for experimental evolution 
more broadly.70 Kingsland’s article is an insightful study that established many of the 
central themes of the historiography of experimental evolution, which was unfortunately 
not taken up for a long period of time.71 
In 2002, Robert Kohler’s Landscapes and Labscapes: Exploring the Lab-Field 
 
69 William B. Provine, The Origins of Theoretical Population Genetics (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1971).  
70 Barbara Kimmelman, “A Progressive Era Discipline: Genetics at American Agricultural Colleges and 
Experiment Stations, 1900-1920,” Ph.D. diss., University of Pennsylvania, 1987. 
71 Kingsland, “The Battling Botanist,” Isis 82, no. 3 (1983): 163-204. In fact, Kingsland told me that she 
initially desired to write a book about the history of experimental evolution in the United States but 
abandoned it for what became The Evolution of American Ecology. 
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Border in Biology examined developments in experimental ecology and evolution, 
mostly in the field. His work is a counterpoint to the developments I examine which 
primarily occurred in laboratories and agricultural experiment stations. The scientists 
depicted by Kohler sought to pave a middle path between the “control and precision” of 
the laboratory with “the old naturalists’ breadth of vision and sympathy for living 
things.72 (In fact, these “border” biologists referred back to Darwin as a role model for 
their combined methods of natural history and experimentation.)73 However, for the most 
part, Kohler argues that these biologists who lived in the “border zone” were not 
successful, one reason being that wild organisms are extraordinary difficult to control.74 
Partially the field naturalists were more interested in evolution in nature, rather than 
controlling it. The actors I examine, on the other hand, rooted themselves in laboratory 
and agricultural experimentation and for the most part sought organisms that were 
amenable to that experimentation. They still faced numerous challenges, but the 
pessimistic conclusions that come from Kohler’s history do not hold for this group.  
 Histories of experimental evolution did not appear for over a decade until Luis 
Campos’ Radium and the Secret of Life, in which a bulk of the work examines H. J. 
Muller.75 Again, experimental evolution is not the focus, instead tracing the relationship 
between biology and radiation in the early twentieth century, but Muller’s and his 
contemporaries’ drive to induce mutations come to the fore. Muller happens to be one of 
the figures who Pauly pointed to as being influenced by Loeb and that shows through in 
Campos’ analysis: Muller wrote that he was after the “rainbow bridge to power,” but left 
unsaid what the power was for. In this way, Muller reflects the “engineering ideal,” 
moreso than his contemporaries that I examine in my dissertation. (Muller does appear in 
 
72 Kohler, Landscapes and Labscapes: Exploring the Lab-Field Border in Biology, 26. That the biologists 
Kohler focuses on in his book, such as William Tower, Arthur Banta, among others, are unheard of today, 
speaks not only to the possible failure to produce substantial results, but perhaps also to the disregard of 
experimental evolutionists in general. 
73 Ibid., 33. 
74 He also notes a number of other issues, such as lack of funding, institutional support, and workspace, as 
well as problematic organisms, faulty methods, and simply wrong ideas. Furthermore, Kohler highlights the 
problem brought upon by the advent of genetics for these border biologists: When Johannsen created the 
genotype/phenotype distinction, any evolutionary work conducted that had examined only phenotypes were 
now questionable. If a scientist did not distinguish between hereditary and non-hereditary traits, nothing 
conclusive regarding evolutionary phenomena could be derived from the study. According to Kohler, due 
to this combination of reasons, experimental evolution in the early twentieth century was a failure. 
75 Luis Campos, Radium and the Secret of Life (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015). 
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Chapter 5 as a critic of William Castle.) Overall, Muller’s career is a parallel to my 
dissertation, dedicated to inducing mutations, as opposed to the actors in Chapters 2, 4, 
and 5, who were interested more in studying the effects of selection and its relationship to 
mutation.  
 Helen Anne Curry’s Evolution Made to Order is the historical work that has done 
the most to analyze twentieth-century experimental evolution but with a technological 
focus.76 Curry focuses mostly on the mission to understand and induce mutations via 
radiation and colchicine. Chapter 3 of my dissertation covers the founding years of the 
Station for Experimental Evolution, but Curry takes up the institution in the 1920s and 
1930s under the directorship of Charles Davenport’s successor, Albert Blakeslee. Like 
Clarke’s history of reproductive science, this is only a small part of her work, as Curry 
also examines other groups once mutation-inducing chemicals, particularly colchicine, 
became popular among casual gardeners. The degree to which the use of such chemicals 
became useful outside ornamental flowers was debatable, however, as shown by her 
discussion of General Electric’s failed attempt to start a mutation-based plant-breeding 
program. Like Kohler and myself, she does not consider success or failure to be the 
arbiter of what is worthy of historical discussion. 
 Therefore, much work remains to be done on the history of experimental 
evolution and its control. My dissertation is a contribution to its development in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The dissertation is a combination of original 
research and work, especially on Dallinger, the Station for Experimental Evolution, and 
several parts of the debate I cover in Chapters 4 and 5, and significant interpretation of 
existing work, especially on Darwin and Mendel. Because there is little existing work on 
experimental evolution as experimental evolution, tracing its origins and boundaries 
within the considerable literature on the history of evolution is itself a crucial and 
important task. I begin with Darwin’s and Mendel’s relationship to experimentation, and 
early attempts at experimenting with evolution by William Dallinger, Raphael Weldon, 
and Hugo de Vries, as well as the establishment of the Station for Experimental 
Evolution at the turn of the century. I then examine the debate in the first decades of the 
 
76 Helen Anne Curry, Evolution Made to Order: Plant Breeding and Technological Innovation in 
Twentieth-Century America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016). 
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twentieth century over the effects of selection on variation and heredity, centered 
primarily around William Castle, George Shull, Edward East, Herbert Spencer Jennings, 
and Raymond Pearl. I argue that the historiography of biology and evolution needs to 
integrate experimental evolution as one of the science’s main currents alongside natural 
history, genetics, and theoretical population genetics. This should be done without regard 
to its successes and failures, but because scientists (and patrons) at the time centered it 
themselves as a crucial path to take to make evolution visible, controllable, and useful. 
 
Dialectical and Historical Materialism 
 
 Throughout the dissertation, I make use of dialectical materialism to better 
understand and conceptualize developments in the history of experimental evolution. I 
follow Marx, for example, in putting labor, materialism, and activity – experimentation, 
in this case – at the forefront of scientific change, rather than theoretical or idealistic 
developments. This inversion has become somewhat popular with the “turn to practice,” 
such as Kohler’s focus on Drosophila as part of material culture in Lords of the Fly. This 
also falls in line with the common understanding that thermodynamics and 
electromagnetism were theorized following intervention in the world. But the subtlety of 
the Marxist analysis of science – following particularly Nikolai Bukharin and Boris 
Hessen, captures several aspects of my dissertation’s argument quite readily.77 First, by 
 
77 In 1931 at the International Congress for the History of Science, a surprise delegation from the Soviet 
Union gave a series of lectures, published in English within a week as Science at the Crossroads. The 
delegation was led by the Old Bolshevik leader and theorist, Nikolai Bukharin, whose lecture interpreted 
the process of science through an Marxist approach that emphasized the integral role of labor and was 
targeted at idealism. Physicist Boris Hessen delivered another of the notable lectures, “The Social and 
Economic Roots of Newton's Principia,” emphasizing the material and social context of Isaac Newton; 
rather than treating him as a lone and isolated genius sprouting a revolution from his head, Hessen 
examined the capitalist and militaristic influences, such as the importance of understanding trajectories for 
ballistics. Zavadovsky gave a biological contribution combating idealism. Nikolai Vavilov, the 
internationally known botanist who infamously fell victim to Lysenko, was also part of this delegation, 
discussing his work on the geographical origins of agricultural varieties.77 Nikolai Bukharin, “Theory and 
Practice from the Standpoint of Dialectical Materialism”; Boris Hessen, “The Social and Economic Roots 
of Newton’s Principia”; and B. Zavadovsky, “The ‘Physical’ and ‘Biological’ in the Process of Organic 
Evolution,” from Science at the Crossroads (1931). Bukharin’s and Zavadovsky’s essays are indexed at 
https://www.marxists.org/subject/science/index.htm. They left a notable impact on British Marxist 
scientists, Haldane, Needham, Levy, and Bernal. Gary Werskey, The Visible College: The Collective 
Biography of British Scientific Socialists of the 1930s (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1979), 
John Bellamy Foster, The Return of Nature: Socialism and Ecology (New York: Monthly Review Press, 
2020). Pietro Omodeo argues that the idealist (and to a large degree, internalist) trend within the history of 
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naming labor as the primary activity of humans, and around which society revolves, 
experimental evolution has a higher importance than just providing evidence for 
theoretical developments but is the primary way in which people (breeders, usually 
capitalists themselves) have engaged with evolution. Second, then, is that experimental 
evolution should be understood as developing from the society in which it formed, 
namely capitalism. Although my dissertation focuses on the technical work of biologists, 
I also point to and examine how their own capitalist context shaped their work (but did 
not fully determine it). In Chapter 1 especially I argue that Darwin and Mendel were 
theorizing what humans were doing in the (capitalist) world: taking control of evolution, 
a process which itself emerged from nature but became distinct from it. This relationship 
between capitalism and experimental evolution continues throughout the dissertation as it 
received funding from the Carnegie Institution, took place at U. S. agricultural 
experiment stations, and produced hybrid corn. Evolution was shaped by capitalism by 
more than just Malthus, but also at the intersection of experiment and control. Third, 
focusing on experimentation as primary does not relegate theory to a secondary position, 
for as Bukharin argued, theory itself is a special form of practice and the two remain 
distinct but interpenetrate. Marxism’s capacity to see the relationship between theory and 
practice (and other traditionally opposed categories, such as natural and artificial) as one 
of unity and of difference is especially attractive in understanding the history of 
experimental evolution. Lastly, historians would typically engage with just historical 
materialism, but the history of science’s unique positioning as studying a special 
relationship between humans and nature makes the dialectical aspects of Marxist thought 
more compelling. 
 
Structure of the Dissertation 
 
Chapter 1, “An Experiment on a Gigantic Scale,” reinterprets Darwin and Mendel in the 
history of experimental evolution. I open with Robert Bakewell, whose breeding practice 
 
science from Alexander Koyré to Thomas Kuhn was a reaction to the dialectical and historical materialism 
argued for by Bukharin, Hessen, and the British Marxists. Pietro D. Omodeo, “After Nikolai Bukharin: 
History of Science and Cultural Hegemony at the Threshold of the Cold War Era,” History of the Human 
Sciences 29, no. 4-5 (2016): 13-34. 
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epitomized the control of evolution and made morphological and physiological changes 
visible to the world, especially Darwin. I also argue that Mendel’s work, which is 
typically taught as the laws of heredity, is better seen as understanding and controlling 
evolution, or “artificial transformation.” Therefore, the origins of evolutionary biology 
are rooted in experimental evolution, rather than experimental evolution being a later 
offshoot. I also examine the capitalist influences upon both figures, how they dealt with 
distinctions between artificial and natural, and how practice and labor preceded theory. 
This chapter also discusses Reverend William Henry Dallinger, a figure entirely 
missed by historians of biology until now, although he is frequently mentioned by 
experimental evolutionists today. He conducted the first long-term selection experiment 
and used microbes, an experiment that began before Darwin’s death. His remarkably 
early attempt and his understanding of it demonstrated many of the difficulties 
experimental evolutionists would face over the next century and a half: how to make the 
experiments actually work and produce results, and how to bridge the gap between 
evolution within a laboratory apparatus and evolution in the wild.  
Chapter 2, “Making Evolution Visible,” examines two of the first attempts to 
make experimental evolution itself a scientific practice. First, I examine Raphael Weldon, 
one of the chief Darwinian biometricians who infamously feuded with William Bateson. I 
mostly avoid this debate which dominates the historiography. Instead, I follow the 
trajectory of his work with crabs from a purely statistical study to an astonishingly 
experimental undertaking. Although his work may not qualify strictly as experimental 
evolution for it was not a long-term multigenerational investigation of evolutionary 
mechanisms, I use it to examine the insufficiency of purely statistical methods to 
understand how evolution operated, signaling future developments. Second, I discuss 
Hugo de Vries, whose mutation theory dominated the science of evolution upon its 
publication. I show how de Vries had a broader evidential basis for his theory, including 
selection experiments and natural history, and discuss some of the key conceptual 
distinctions he made that proved essential to the trend of experimental evolution I follow 
in Chapter 4 and 5. Weldon and de Vries were transitional figures whose methods 
influenced much of the experimental evolution in the early twentieth century. 
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Chapter 3, “The New Atlantis,” examines the Station for Experimental Evolution 
in Cold Spring Harbor, New York. I briefly discuss early calls for such a dedicated 
institution among European biologists. Then I turn to Charles Davenport’s extensive and 
successful application to the Carnegie Institution of Washington to build and fund the 
Station. I show how broad Davenport’s vision of experimental evolution was (as opposed 
to being just genetics) and how both control and understanding nature were at the 
forefront. I also wade through its complicated and messy scientific work which followed 
many directions, sometimes fruitfully and sometimes as dead ends. And while it was also 
the home of the Eugenics Record Office, and eugenics soon dominated Davenport’s own 
work, I show that Davenport and the Carnegie did not build the Station with eugenical 
aims, thus making the connection between experimental evolution and eugenics not as 
straightforward as it would appear.  
Chapters 4 and 5 are one continuous study of a notoriously extensive debate over 
pure line theory, the mutation theory, and the effectiveness of selection. I examine the 
technical development of the debate at length to better understand how experimentation 
impacted the theoretical developments that are usually the historical focus. This also 
helps illustrate the importance of controlling evolution during this period. 
 
Chapter 4, “Controlling Evolution?: Mutationism, Pure Line Work, and Genetic 
Selectionism,” focuses on the work of the selectionist-geneticist William Castle and the 
pair of mutationist-pure linist botanists Edward East and George Shull. Castle’s 
experiments on small mammals convinced him that selection had the power to modify the 
hereditary material giving it evolution’s creative power. East and Shull, on the other 
hand, emphasized selection’s limits (but did not reject it) and instead relied upon 
hybridization, and inbreeding to overcome them. Thus two distinct theories of evolution 
and control emerged from their extensive experimentation. I also examine the work of 
Herbert Spencer Jennings, whose study of Paramecium corroborated East and Shull but 
with microbes (who were considered non-Mendelian). With the exception of Jennings, 
this work was funded by the Carnegie Institution and agricultural experiment stations. 
Chapter 5, ““At the Mercy of Nature”: A Debate on How to Control Evolution,” 
continues this story as it erupted into debate, centered upon Castle’s hooded rats 
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experiments. East helped articulate multiple factor theory which incorporates continuous 
variation into Mendelism and undermined Castle’s own interpretation of his work. Castle 
however relentlessly argued for his views and attacked his opponents. While East and 
Shull themselves did not participate in this debate, others rose to the task, especially 
Raymond Pearl and to a lesser extent H. J. Muller, the Dutch scientists the Hagedoorns, 
Castle’s former student E. C. MacDowell, as well as Alfred Sturtevant and Calvin 
Bridges. Particularly crucial issues were methods and materials, the role of the 
environment, conceptual distinctions, and even an emergence of “population thinking.” 
At its end, Castle conceded to his opponents while lamenting that evolution remained 
outside of human control and at “nature’s mercy.”  
The Conclusion addresses lingering questions about experimental evolution’s 
impact on the science of evolution, and points to the many directions future work on 




Chapter 1: An Experiment on a Gigantic Scale 
 
Introduction 
The attempts to control evolution long preceded the scientific understanding of 
evolution. Both Darwin’s and Mendel’s theories were rooted in what the former labeled 
“an experiment on a gigantic scale,” the art and science of systematic breeding. Darwin in 
particular recognized that human societies had shaped evolution for thousands of years, 
and that breeders of plants and animals had just recently brought process and product 
under more direct willful control. That Darwin and Mendel emerged when and where 
they did — mid-nineteenth-century England and Moravia — is in retrospect no surprise 
given that both settings were centers of systematic selective and hybrid breeding. In this 
light, Darwin’s and Mendel’s theoretical contributions connected a systematizing practice 
that had emerged unconsciously, due to capitalist social relations, back to nature. While 
Darwin almost entirely relied upon the results of breeders, Mendel experimented with 
evolution directly. Therefore, what came to be known as “experimental evolution” was 
present in the very beginning of evolutionary science and formed much of the basis from 
which their theories of variation, inheritance, hybridization, and selection would spring.78  
To that end, I first illustrate through Robert Bakewell how breeders began to take 
direct control of morphological and physiological evolution, which provided Darwin and 
Mendel the material evidence to formulate their theories of biological evolution and 
inheritance. That is, Darwin (and Mendel) provided theories to explain what the breeders 
had already accomplished in practice, although he had the broader aspiration of 
explaining all biological unity and diversity, natural and artificial. While the specific 
nature of pea plants has been emphasized as important for Mendel’s work (as opposed to 
his later failure to work out the heredity of hawkweed), I also adopt Bert Theunissen’s 
argument that Darwin’s theory of selection was particularly shaped by pigeon fanciers, 
contributing further to the ties between theory and practice mediated by capitalism 
 
78 This argument is reminiscent of one made by a Marxist named Paul Lafargue in “Economic Determinism 
and the Natural and Mathematical Sciences,” Social Democrat 10, no. 3 (1906): 137, 145. 
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through amateur hobbies.79 
 I then discuss the first long-term selection experiment (of microbes) by parson-
naturalist Reverend William Henry Dallinger. His work illustrates the enormous 
difficulties involved in experimental evolution, from setup, biological material, and 
equipment, to the active operation of the experiment itself, and the subsequent theoretical 
interpretations and extrapolations. I suggest that had Darwin taken up experimental 
evolution himself, it would be more reminiscent of Dallinger’s work, than that of Weldon 
or de Vries, the subjects of the following chapter, largely due to the looser laboratory 
standards employed by amateur biologists prior to professionalization.  
 
The Beginnings of Systematic Breeding in England 
The introduction of systematic selective breeding, or the control of livestock 
evolution, is surprisingly recent. While some varieties of dogs and livestock existed, 
Margaret Derry writes that “it is likely that most practices were haphazard in nature.”80 
Before enclosure, which planted the seeds of a capitalist economy in England, “mating 
was random and variation in type tended to relate to geographical districts.” Thus 
livestock and crops, tended to be adapted to local conditions, rather than adapted to meet 
specific standards, as a result of what Russell calls “domestic-environmental selection” 
(although at the time it could be explained by Lamarckian ideas). This was particularly 
the case for sheep who lived in semi-wild conditions unlike their draft animal brethren.81 
Indeed, the thoroughbred racing horse was the first breed of livestock created for a 
specific purpose — speed —, the result of repeated crossings of Arabian stallions with 
English mares.82 The thoroughbred’s emergence over the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries shows that systematic selective breeding, the oldest form of evolutionary 
control, is of recent invention. 
 
79 Bert Theunissen, “Darwin and His Pigeons: The Analogy Between Artificial and Natural Selection 
Revisited,” Journal of the History of Biology 45, no. 2 (2012): 179-21; Peter J. van Dijk and T. H. Noel 
Ellis, “The Full Breadth of Mendel’s Genetics,” Genetics 204 (2016): 1327-1336. 
80 Margaret Derry, Masterminding Nature: The Breeding of Animals, 1750-2010 (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2014), 13. 
81 Nicholas Russell, Like Engend’ring Like: Heredity and Animal Breeding in Early Modern England 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 196–97. 
82 Bert Theunissen, “Darwin and His Pigeons. The Analogy Between Artificial and Natural Selection 
Revisited,” Journal of the History of Biology 45, no. 2 (2012): 201; Derry, Masterminding Nature, 14–17. 
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Few figures capture the ties between breeding, control, and evolution as well as 
Robert Bakewell (1725-1795), England’s most prominent animal breeder in the late 
eighteenth century. Rather than relying upon crossing, the technique behind the 
thoroughbred, Bakewell developed his own breed of Leicestershire sheep through a 
combination of selection and inbreeding.83 Contrary to the folk knowledge of the 
preceding centuries, Bakewell claimed that an animal’s “blood” had a stronger influence 
over development than its environment. (This folk belief had begun to fade once farmers 
noticed that imported breeds could withstand the environmental change.) By selecting for 
improved traits of interest and “breeding in-and-in” the individuals who bore those traits, 
to a degree that astonished his contemporaries, Bakewell concentrated his improvements 
within the breed’s “blood.” In contrast to crossing, he developed a predictable method of 
controlling the evolution or genetic composition of his livestock. Although Bakewell’s 
methods were only one of many, techniques being contingent on species, culture, 
purpose, and even personal preference, the point is that Bakewell introduced a 
systematic, formalized approach to the practice that produced visible morphological and 
physiological change over generations.84 
One reason for the late arrival of systematic breeding was that to improve livestock in 
a given direction required ideological shifts. Historians Vítězslav Orel and Roger Wood 
claim that some breeders, including Bakewell, had come to think of domesticated animals 
as integrated machines — or “machines for turning herbage … into money.”85 They were 
not automata, but dynamic and malleable. It had long been observed (since the ancient 
Greeks) that domesticates displayed more variability than their wild counterparts, a 
byproduct they attributed to changed environments. By 1700, breeders selected to 
preserve these characters.86 However, the emerging belief that animals should be 
improved conflicted with natural theologians such as John Ray, who believed God’s 
creations were already perfect; to him, selection should be used only to ‘repair’ 
 
83 Derry, Masterminding Nature: The Breeding of Animals, 1750-2010, 17–18. 
84 Derry, 19. 
85 Quoted by Roger J. Wood and Vítězslav Orel, Genetic Prehistory in Selective Breeding: A Prelude to 
Mendel (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 38. 
86 Wood and Orel, 39, 48–49. As we will see, this observation regarding increased variability under 
domestication became a critical point of disagreement between Darwin and Wallace, the latter of whom 
rejected domesticates as a relevant example of natural selection. 
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degenerated breeds.87 Others also considered inbreeding animals, as in humans, to be 
against God.88 As late as 1810, agriculturist Richard Parkinson wrote to Joseph Banks, 
President of the Royal Society, that “changing things to extremes as some breeders have 
attempted, is setting themselves in opposition to their creator by endeavoring to destroy 
his works.”89 
These conservative positions yielded in the wake of Bakewell’s ability to wield 
considerable power over the shape and physiology of his flock as well as by market 
desires for such. Sheep breeders had already selected for size and wool quality, as well as 
the removal of horns, but Bakewell focused on meat production: he bred for lighter and 
smaller bones, larger rib cages, and smaller heads and necks, so as to maximize the 
amount of meat as well as the speed at which sheep fattened. The short legs he developed 
prevented lambs from being able to nurse, a mistake that Bakewell then reversed 
(whether by selection or crossing is unknown).90 Bakewell’s power to control evolution, 
whether real or alleged, was unprecedented.91 
Bakewell’s need for profits combined with his theory of breeding produced a method 
that foreshadowed later experimental standards. Rejecting emphases on “purity” and 
ancestral heredity, he practiced a method akin to the present/future-oriented “progeny 
test.” Although he held that the “blood” was independent from the environment, he 
introduced a method of standardization for the dual purposes of establishing an 
experimental controls while optimizing a breed’s potential (e.g., wool quality partially 
depends upon climate and nourishment). Bakewell raised individuals of different breeds 
born at the same time on the exact same food regimen, eliminating environmental 
variation. To carry this out, he engineered his 450-acre farm, equipped with a mill and a 
canal, to efficiently transport materials, provide stable housing, and produce all the 
animal feed required. Upon their maturity, Bakewell experimented with his rams, leasing 
 
87 Wood and Orel, 39. According to the authors, this “plastick Nature” meant that God did not have to 
micromanage the variations that resulted from an artificial environment. 
88 Wood and Orel, 195–96. 
89 Quoted by Wood and Orel, 79. 
90 Wood and Orel, 75–79. 
91 There is uncertainty over how much Bakewell’s methods were actually successful. Russell points out, for 
instance, that Bakewell sought for improved food conversion efficiency among his sheep, but the necessary 
weighing instrumentation did not exist, so Bakewell selecting on this basis is unlikely. Russell, Like 
Engend’ring Like: Heredity and Animal Breeding in Early Modern England. 
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them out to other farmers and assessing the quality of their offspring under changed 
conditions in different pairings. This also allowed him to check against the negative 
effects of his extreme inbreeding.92 Thus the proper judge of an individual’s breeding 
quality was not in its ancestral records, but in its demonstrable offspring based upon 
careful environmental control. These would become the basic tools of the geneticists over 
one hundred years later. 
Bakewell also helps demonstrate that from the very beginning, “experimental 
evolution” or processes akin to it, is tied to political economy. Foreshadowing the 
dominance of the twentieth-century seed companies, this form of systematic selective 
breeding was feasible only for men who owned land.93 Russell points out that small 
farmers had their own system of breeding, at least with cattle, in which they leased 
“common bulls” held by the parish. This social relation produced its own “breeding 
structure,” in which “more cows were inseminated by one bull than was likely to have 
been the case with the herds of private owners of bulls. The potential for selective 
breeding was therefore greater, although the realisation of any scheme of improvement 
would seem unlikely,” particularly because the bull itself was likely of low quality.94 
Thus from different social relations emerged various breeding practices even within the 
same counties. 
Furthermore, Bakewell’s intentions for his sheep reoriented the species along new 
capitalist lines. Because sheep needed to survive on their own for long periods of time, 
and consequently bred freely, they remained a “semi-wild” animal in which natural 
selection played a dominant role, as shown by the geographic differences among varieties 
dependent upon their specific environments. Before Bakewell, sheep were not bred to 
have specialized traits, due to being a multi-purpose animal that supplied meat, milk, 
wool, usually low quality, and helped fertilize fallow land. However, Russell describes 
Bakewell’s “economic objective” as “the creation of a profitable meat animal,” 
particularly through faster growth rates, efficient food conversion of fodder into meat, 
and reshaping its form to maximize the profitable cuts on its body. The focus on efficient 
 
92 Wood and Orel, Genetic Prehistory in Selective Breeding: A Prelude to Mendel, 59–65, 82–84, 93. 
93 Russell, Like Engend’ring Like: Heredity and Animal Breeding in Early Modern England, 197. 
94 Russell, 150. 
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food conversion entailed changes to the sheep’s lives: minimizing walking and other 
forms of activity, for example.95 The notion of a “profitable meat animal” additionally 
necessitates the existence or creation of a market for such meat, which had not emerged 
until post-medieval times. Therefore, Bakewell transformed the dominant pressure upon 
his sheep from domestic-environmental and natural selection to artificial selection.96  
Bakewell demonstrated the power of breeding. Humans were capable of more than 
simply perpetuating a variety or preventing its deterioration but could actively create new 
forms according to economic demands. Due to his interest in keeping the source of his 
profits secret, his influence was not so much in the specific technique and theories he 
developed, but instead was the power he visibly wielded. (There were also the difficulties 
of putting his ideas into practice and the contradictory obsession among many breeders 
for purity.)97 Bakewell’s construction of a farm dedicated to the modifications of 
organisms, and his visible and economic success, signaled future possibilities. The 
growth of systematic breeding throughout the nineteenth century then allowed Darwin to 
argue that evolution through practice had already been made visible, controllable, and 
useful. For as German agronomist Albrecht Thaer asked, 
Did not Bakewell reduce the skeleton of his sheep by up to one half in weight while at the 
same time doubling the weight of flesh? Did he not change the shape of these animals in 
any way he wished?98 
 
 
Charles Darwin, Breeding Theorist 
The work of the systematic breeders set the stage for the scientific achievements of 
Charles Darwin and Gregor Mendel; indeed, they can be thought of not only as fathers of 
evolutionary and genetic science, but as a unique pair of breeding theorists. I argue that 
Darwin was himself an experimental evolutionist, indirectly, by exploiting the social 
divisions of labor in British society. Although he never conducted a proper selection 
 
95 Russell, 199–200. 
96 I can only suggest here, and take up somewhat in the conclusion, that this shift had significant 
environmental consequences and is an example of Marx’s metabolic rift. Foster, John Bellamy, Marx’s 
Ecology: Materialism and Nature (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2000).  
97 Russell, 219–220; Wood and Orel, Genetic Prehistory in Selective Breeding, 92. 
98 Quoted by Wood and Orel, Genetic Prehistory in Selective Breeding: A Prelude to Mendel, 119. 
35 
 
experiment, he paid attention to contemporary developments that pointed in that 
direction, such as Dallinger’s work, but more crucially used artificial selection and 
domestication as experimental interventions of a sort. He did however conduct long-term 
inbreeding experiments with plants, which I discuss briefly in Chapter 4 when Edward 
East challenged his conclusions.99 But what makes Darwin not just a mere “breeding 
theorist” is that his goal for evolutionary science was not to control nature, but to 
understand and explain it.  
Although Darwin is frequently portrayed as a naturalist and theorist, due to his 
extensive work in biogeography, geology, and the natural history of barnacles, he was 
equally an experimentalist. For example, Richard Bellon has shown that Darwin’s first 
post-Origin work, the Fertilisation of Orchids (1862), was a “flank movement upon the 
enemy” in that it “tie[d] evolution to a productive mode of original investigation, 
prov[ing] decisive for the scientific acceptance of evolution in the 1860s.”100 That is, not 
only did he engage with experimentation, he considered it to be of decisive importance in 
evolutionary science. In fact, in his last published words, in a preface to Herman Müller’s 
Fertilisation of Flowers (1883), Darwin “exhorted the ‘young and ardent observer’ to 
‘observe for himself, giving full play to his imagination, but rigidly checking it by testing 
each notion experimentally.’”101  
However, Darwin’s commitment and apparent love for experimentation did not 
include direct experimental evolution. He famously tested dispersal patterns of seeds in 
marine environments, for example, but he did not experimentally practice selection over 
generations to test its effects. Because he never explained why he did not pursue such 
studies, we can only speculate. One factor certainly includes his theoretical commitment 
to gradualism, which would prevent seeing such an experiment as feasible or valuable – 
in fact, much of later experimental evolution centered upon grappling with gradualism, 
making evolution visible. The extraordinary difficulties likely also played a role as we 
will see in the work of his contemporary, Reverend Dallinger, which when combined 
 
99 Charles Darwin, The Effects of Cross and Self Fertilisation in the Vegetable Kingdom (1876). 
100 Richard Bellon, “Inspiration in the Harness of Daily Labor: Darwin, Botany, and the Triumph of 
Evolution, 1859-1868,” Isis 102, no. 3 (2011): 383. 
101 Richard Bellon, “Charles Darwin Solves the ‘Riddle of the Flower,’ or, Why Don’t Historians of 
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with his chronic illnesses, would have added even more stress. But perhaps a more 
productive question to pursue is: how did Darwin view the relationship between 
experimentation and the mechanisms of evolution? 
Darwin’s 1859 and 1868 publications, On the Origin of Species and The Variation of 
Animals and Plants Under Domestication, studied evolution under human command to 
explore the workings of nature, a controversial position.102 Darwin’s collapsing of a 
distinction between nature and artifice can be seen when he argued,  
No doubt man selects varying individuals, sows their seeds, and again selects their 
varying offspring. But the initial variation on which man works, and without which he 
can do nothing, is caused by slight changes in the conditions of life, which must often 
have occurred under nature. Man, therefore, may be said to have been trying an 
experiment on a gigantic scale; and it is an experiment which nature during the long 
lapse of time has incessantly tried.103 
 
Philosopher Andrew Inkpen has discussed how Darwin’s contemporaries, particularly 
Alfred Russell Wallace and Charles Lyell, were skeptical of this use of breeding. They 
thought that domesticates, which varied more than their wild relatives and appeared 
temporally unstable, were too artificial to apply to nature.104 But as this quotation shows, 
Darwin did not accept such a rigid distinction: both “Man” and “nature” have 
experimented upon the same initial variation caused by “slight changes in the conditions 
of life.” As we will see, he did not think of them as totally identical, but not as entirely 
different, either; instead, he treated them dialectically, exploring one as informative of the 
other.  
Eduardo Wilner substantiates Darwin’s “Man” as “a legion of sloppy laboratory 
technicians,” the breeders, who worked outside a coordinated scientific framework.105 In 
Darwin’s eyes, this work amounted to a kind of exploratory and natural experimentation. 
 
102 I note here that much of Darwin’s own experimentation as well as his reading of breeders was not 
related to selection, specifically, but the processes of variation and heredity. 
103 Charles Darwin, The Variation of Animals and Plants under Domestication, vol. 1 (London: John 
Murray, 1868): 3. 
104 S. Andrew Inkpen, “Denaturing Nature: Philosophical and Historical Reflections on the Artificial-
Natural Distinction in the Life Sciences” (University of British Columbia, 2014). 
105 Eduardo Wilner, “Darwin’s Artificial Selection as an Experiment,” Studies in History and Philosophy of 




While this framing is enlightening, it should not be taken too literally. Breeders such as 
Bakewell belonged more to Darwin’s class and were not “technicians,” in that scientific 
knowledge was incidental to the primary goal of financial profit, or in the case of 
pigeons, aesthetic pleasure. 
Indeed, Darwin thought that breeding was evolution made visible, controllable, and 
useful, despite his own apparent lack of interest in the latter two. For Darwin, breeding’s 
primary utility was not financial profit, but as evidence of a similar process in nature and 
specifically of natural selection. Even here though, the distinctions were not absolute, for 
he asked, “is it an illusion that these recently improved animals [the Hereford cattle 
breed] safely transmit their excellent qualities even when crossed with other breeds? … 
Hard cash, paid over and over again, is an excellent test of inherited superiority.” Thus, 
within the world of artifice, profit (a proxy for survival) was the standard by which an 
individual was judged and propagated. This rhetoric was essential for Darwin’s theory.106  
That Darwin thought artificial selection was so informative of natural selection was 
not a result of treating the former as a metaphor for the latter; rather, rhetorician Oren 
Abeles suggests that Darwin’s comparison is actually a metonym.107 Metaphor compares 
objects across categories whereas metonymy reduces a complex object into a simple one. 
Darwin’s controversial move was to consider artificial selection a type of natural 
selection, reduced to its most visible and understandable form. The modern art of 
breeding unraveled the “entangled bank” of causes and effects, allowing Darwin to 
establish natural selection as a vera causa. It is in this way that breeding functioned as an 
experiment: breeders unconsciously imported natural objects into quasi-artificial 
environments and enacted a natural process through a (apparent) monocausal and 
tractable form. 
Abeles further argues that what allowed Darwin to slide between artificial and natural 
selection, two seemingly exclusive categories, was the rhetoric of “incrementum.”108 In 
The Origin, Darwin co-opted a contemporary and self-congratulatory narrative that 
 
106 Margaret Derry notes that Darwin’s perspective was misguided: many cultural and social factors 
influenced a particular stock’s price as well, especially when it came to notions of purity. Derry, 
Masterminding Nature, 33. 
107 Oren Abeles, “The Agricultural Figures of Darwin’s Evolutionary Rhetoric,” Quarterly Journal of 
Speech 102, no. 1 (2016): 41–61. 
108 Abeles, 46, 48. 
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nineteenth-century breeders were the cultural culmination of a millennia-long trajectory 
of domestication. Accepting, but slightly challenging this Whiggish narrative, Darwin 
wrote, 
It may be objected that the principle of selection has been reduced to methodical practice 
for scarcely more than three-quarters of a century… But it is very far from true that the 
principle is a modern discovery.109 
 
Darwin distinguished the “methodical selection” of nineteenth-century English 
breeders with the practices of the “barbarous periods of English history” (as well as those 
of the ancient Chinese and Romans), and, reflecting the developmentalist narrative, 
among contemporary “savages in South Africa.” To him, ancients and “savages” 
practiced 
a kind of Selection, which may be called Unconscious. … I cannot doubt that this 
process, continued during centuries, would improve and modify any breed, in the same 
way as Bakewell … [who,] by this very same process, only carried on more methodically, 
did greatly modify, even during their own lifetimes, the forms and qualities of their cattle. 
Slow and insensible changes of this kind could never be recognised unless actual 
measurements or careful drawings of the breeds in question had been made long ago, 
which might serve for comparison.110 
 
Darwin also used breeding as a natural experiment to demonstrate that unconscious 
selection can occur even under methodical selective regimes. William Youatt, a veterinary 
surgeon, reported that two breeders had each kept their own herds of Bakewell’s “purely 
bred” Leicester sheep, and “yet the difference between the sheep possessed by these two 
gentlemen is so great that they have the appearance of being quite different varieties.”111 
(This is reminiscent of Darwin’s analysis of South American rheas.) Darwin extrapolated 
the results of this experiment to claim that selection is a natural tendency of humans: “in 
a vast number of cases we cannot recognise, and therefore do not know, the wild parent-
stocks of the plants which have been longest cultivated in our flower and kitchen 
 
109 Charles Darwin, The Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection: Or, the Preservation of Favored 
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111 Darwin, 36. Abeles shows that Youatt, which Darwin read enthusiastically, was who offered Darwin the 




Darwin’s introduction of “natural selection” to the narrative was in this gray zone of 
“incrementum” between nature and artifice: 
In regard to the domestic animals kept by uncivilised man, it should not be overlooked 
that they almost always have to struggle for their own food, at least during certain 
seasons. And in two countries very differently circumstanced, individuals of the same 
species, having slightly different constitutions or structure, would often succeed better in 
the one country than in the other, and thus by a process of “natural selection,” … two 
sub-breeds might be formed. This, perhaps, partly explains … [why] the varieties kept by 
savages have more of the character of species than the varieties kept in civilised 
countries.113 
 
Thus, not only did Darwin treat artificial selection as a type of natural selection, he 
introduced his controversial term in the context of domesticated livestock living in 
natural conditions (such as British sheep before Bakewell). Darwin’s use of incremental 
and metonymic rhetoric provided him a way to blur the lines between them while keeping 
them distinct. The  qualitative distinctions between natural and artificial selection arose 
from differences in complexity (such as competing selective forces) and time, but at root 
they shared an identity.114 Abeles concludes, 
The Origin is grounded in that climactic narrative, with Darwin's combination of tropes 
articulating an incremental alignment of nature and culture, in which the breeder's 
metonymic power stands as a summation of the selective efficacies that culturally 
precede it.115 
 
Ironically, despite Darwin’s emphasis on breeders wielding his vera causa, Darwin 
presented a limited picture of breeding practices. Historian of breeding Bert Theunissen 
argues that in The Origin and throughout his life, Darwin downplayed the importance of 
 
112 Darwin, “The Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection,” 37. 
113 Darwin, 38. Emphasis mine. 
114 Abeles, “The Agricultural Figures of Darwin’s Evolutionary Rhetoric,” 45. For example, Darwin wrote, 
“Slow though the process of selection may be, if feeble man can do much by his powers of artificial 
selection, I can see no limit to the amount of change, to the beauty and infinite complexity of the co-
adaptations between all organic beings, one with another and with their physical conditions of life, which 
may be effected in the long course of time by nature's power of selection.”  Darwin, “The Origin of Species 
by Means of Natural Selection,” 109. 
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crossing and inbreeding, instead emphasizing the power of selection of incremental 
improvements.116 Theunissen suggests that Darwin’s argument was somewhat arbitrary in 
that he modeled breeding on the practices of pigeon fanciers. Darwin himself reported 
that when a fancier suggested crossing at a meeting, the others displayed “solemn, 
mysterious & awful shakes of the head.” Had Darwin instead chosen to study and 
theorize the practices of livestock breeders, focused on utility, he may have witnessed 
more crossing (as with Thoroughbreds) and inbreeding (as suggested by Bakewell).117 
Breeding, in practice and in theory, was complex and consensus rare. Despite his brief 
stint at breeding pigeons, Darwin had to rely upon the expertise and testimony of 
breeders, the “sloppy technicians,” much of which was contradictory.118 The pigeon 
fanciers’ emphasis on purity prevented them from crossing, and thus, Darwin’s theory 
downplays these mechanisms.119 
If Theunissen is correct, this shows further how capitalism shaped Darwinism. 
Scholars now emphasize, especially in pedagogy, how the theories of political economist 
Thomas Malthus provided Darwin the key to how (artificial) selection would operate in 
the wild through the struggle for existence. As Marx commented to Engels, “It is 
remarkable how among beasts and plants Darwin recognises his English society with its 
division of labour, competition, opening up of new markets, ‘inventions’ and Malthusian 
‘struggle for existence.’” I argue that an extension of this recognition is that the 
phenomenon of systematic breeding as developed during the British Agricultural 
Evolution equally shapes the social context from which Darwinism emerged, as well as 
its very content. This is amplified by the [possibility] that the content of Darwin’s theory 
of natural selection is a transference of not breeding in general, but pigeon fancying, an 
 
116 By the publication of Variation of Animals and Plants under Domestication (1868), Darwin allowed for 
some crossing to explain the existence of some domesticated breeds, but its power and ubiquity remained 
subservient to artificial selection. Inbreeding remained inconsequential. Theunissen, “Darwin and His 
Pigeons. The Analogy Between Artificial and Natural Selection Revisited,” 198–99. 
117 But Theunissen suggests that breeding culture became obsessed with “purity” (as seen in stud books), 
thus causing some breeders to downplay the importance of crossing, which “contaminated” the breed. 
Theunissen, 201, 204–5. 
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varieties of cultivated plants were known only to specialists. Darwin considered his views to be equally 
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amateur and cultural practice, in particular. Therefore, breeding, the active transformation 
of animals and plants, should at minimum be considered not simply as one of Darwin’s 
lines of evidence, but as a social and cultural determinant of his theory, equal with 
Malthus and the Beagle voyage. Darwin attests to this when he wrote regarding selection 
in the margins of Youatt’s cattle-breeding manual: “As this simple principle only lately 
discovered even in most valuable practice, no wonder not discovered, as theory of 
Species.”120 No capitalism, no Darwinian theory of evolution by natural selection. 
Indeed, considering Wallace’s role bolsters this argument of a fuller capitalist 
influence on Darwin’s theory of evolution. In Darwin Deleted, Peter J. Bowler uses a 
counterfactual historical analysis to inquire about the history of evolution in Darwin’s 
absence, requiring an analysis of Wallace’s contributions. Bowler notes that the historical 
consensus states that while similar, Wallace’s theory of selection (importantly, he did not 
use the term “natural selection”) was more group-based against a static environment than 
Darwin’s individual-based competition theory of selection. There are two key social-
theoretical reasons for these differences: one, Wallace rejected comparisons between 
domesticated varieties and wild species, so Darwin’s personal attention to this capitalistic 
phenomenon left its stamp on his theory, but not Wallace’s. Second, Wallace’s personal 
radicalism meant he tended to downplay competition, individualism, and parasitism in 
favor of emphasis on cooperative groups. His spiritualist views also grated against 
Darwin’s materialism, leading him to adopt idealist tendencies such as mind-body 
dualism.121 That is, Wallace forsook comparisons to the trove of results produced by the 
labor of breeders that Darwin treated as a form of experimental data, resulting in a theory 
that did not mesh with Darwin’s worldview. This places Wallace outside the history of 
experimental evolution, or to some extent, places him as a critic.122 But it also places 
capitalism as a necessary condition for Darwin’s specific theory in the first place. 
As I will show, much the same could be said of Mendel, and indeed, my dissertation 
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will show how practice, theory, and capitalism became more intertwined with evolution 
via breeding and experimentation, particularly as scientists became far more interested 
than Darwin in taking control of the process itself, a focus that began with Mendel.  
 
Gregor Mendel, Breeding Modeler 
It is no coincidence that a Moravian monk was the figure to discover the laws of 
inheritance, for historians have revealed this region was also a thriving center of 
systematic breeding. Moravia had established a thriving community of natural scientists 
and agriculturists tied together by societies, professorships, journals and even 
monasteries.123 Thus, both founding figures of modern evolutionary science were firmly 
embedded within cultures that valued the art of breeding, the de facto control of 
evolution, as a method by which to understand how nature operated. Unlike Darwin, 
however, Mendel set himself the task of understanding and modeling, by direct 
experimentation, what he later said in his famous paper was the “transformation of one 
species into another through artificial fertilisation.” 
Reflecting the economic interests of Moravia, scientifically-minded breeders 
focused primarily upon sheep and plants. Ferdinand Geisslern, for example, had adopted 
Bakewell’s methods of combining crossing, inbreeding, and selection as well as 
conducting progeny tests. His methods and his farm, reminiscent of Dishley Grange, led 
him to become known as the “Moravian Bakewell.”124 Cyril Napp, Mendel’s later abbot, 
was a fruit breeder who served as the president of the Brno Pomological Society, writing 
handbooks for local orchardists and establishing a nursery described as an “institute 
created for practical experiments.”125 The Moravian breeders, who did not share 
Bakewell’s secrecy, were keen to elucidate practical scientific principles, circulating and 
debating their ideas through forums such as the Sheep Breeders’ Society.126 This culture 
of exchanging theory and practice made Moravia a breeding capital. 
 
123 Vítězslav Orel, Gregor Mendel: The First Geneticist, trans. Stephen Finn (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1996), Chapter 2. 
124 Wood and Orel, Genetic Prehistory in Selective Breeding: A Prelude to Mendel, 192. 
125 Orel, Gregor Mendel: The First Geneticist, 23–24. 
126 For information on these interactions, see Wood and Orel, Genetic Prehistory in Selective Breeding: A 
Prelude to Mendel, 230–39. Curiously, while Mendel would not use the word “genetics” in his work, 
figures involved with the Sheep Breeders’ Society referred to “genetic laws of Nature” (“genetische 
Gesetze der Natur”) and “genetic forces.” 
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For the Moravians, natural history included agriculture. M. K. Fraas, a professor 
of agricultural botany, submitted a history to the Moravian Society for the Improvement 
of Agriculture, Natural Science, and Knowledge. Reminiscent of Darwin’s “experiment 
on a gigantic scale,” he wrote: 
The fact that agriculture represents a summary of natural scientific experiments, governed 
by national economic priorities, is not generally understood. The results of experiments in 
open fields mean little to the pure naturalist. In contrast, we take it as axiomatic in the 
history of agriculture that it is fully competent to bring about scientific progress.127 
 
Through this culture, Mendel was directly influenced by the tradition of plant 
breeders, particularly the hybridists Kölreuter and von Gärtner, whose problematic he 
took on himself.128 Vítězslav Orel describes Joseph Gottlieb Kölreuter (1733–1806) as 
“the first pure naturalist to carry out systematic experiments with plant hybridization.”129 
This was not only to understand the phenomenon; he imagined, for example, that it could 
be possible to produce a tree that grew at double the rate for the purpose of increasing 
timber production.130 Karl Friedrich von Gärtner (1772–1850), who conducted his work 
to win a prize issued by a Dutch academy of science to confirm Kölreuter’s discovery, 
performed “over 10,000 artificial fertilizations in 700 plant species, yielding 250 different 
hybrids,” publishing his work in 1849.131 Not only was Mendel heir to a tradition of 
experimental breeding, their work sparked a debate that Mendel specifically addressed: 
did hybridization show the generation of new species or, as Kölreuter and Gärtner 
thought, did it show that species were constant?  While his experimental work is 
frequently described as about inheritance, this motivating question was about 
transformation, control and evolution – experimental evolution. 
Unlike Darwin, who interpreted the “experimental” results of breeders, Mendel 
conducted evolutionary experiments himself. He was not interested in natural selection, 
though, and not narrowly in heredity, but in hybridization, reflecting his botanical 
 
127 Quoted by Wood and Orel, 254. 
128 Mendel was also shaped by his academic experiences with physics and mathematics, as discussed by 
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focus.132 Thus, like Darwin, Mendel’s work follows a specific tradition of breeding. 
Mendel described his findings not as the “laws of inheritance” (as we do today), but as a 
“generally standard law for the formation and development of hybrids.”133 This was to 
explain why “the same hybrid forms reappeared whenever fertilisation took place 
between the same species.”134 Kölreuter’s and Gärtner’s experiments on “artificial 
fertilisations of ornamental plants to produce new color variants” were his inspiration. 
Mendel’s concluding remarks revealed that he discovered his so-called laws of 
inheritance by pursuing a statistical model to explain the conflicting results regarding the 
“transformation of one species into another through artificial fertilisation.”135 
Before describing his experiments, Mendel justified his experimental system: peas 
in a garden.136 For his choice of plant, he had three criteria. The first, “possess[ion of] 
constantly differing characters,” eased analysis. The second, a shield to prevent 
unintentional pollination by neighboring plants, and the third, steady hybrid fertility, 
minimized environmental influences.137 After selecting the plant genus Pisum, he 
conducted an experimental control through a two-year trial to confirm that his seeds bred 
true to type. To justify an extrapolation from domesticated peas to other organisms, he 
appealed to evolution: 
One might well suppose that for important points a fundamental difference cannot occur 




132 Mendel’s focus on hybridization as opposed to selection perhaps reflects Mendel’s following of 
Kölreuter and Gärtner, rather than Moravian sheep breeders who focused on artificial selection. 
133 Emphasis mine. 
134 Scott Abbott and Daniel J. Fairbanks, “Experiments on Plant Hybrids by Gregor Mendel,” Genetics 204, 
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Mendel echoed Darwin and Fraas when minimizing the distinctions between the 
garden and the “natural landscape.” He scoffed, “no one will seriously assert that the 
development of plants in a natural landscape is governed by different laws than in a 
garden bed.”139 However, the use of a cultivated plant, when combined with the garden 
bed, generated a further complication he had to address. Recall that Wallace and Lyell 
had opposed Darwin’s use of domesticated livestock on the grounds that domesticates, by 
virtue of their environmental history, were more variable than their wild counterparts, and 
thus too artificial to serve as parallels to biological evolution.140 Mendel interpreted this 
trend of “opinion” as holding “that the stability of a species has been disrupted to a high 
degree or utterly broken through cultivation.” He suggested that this belief implied that 
“the development of cultivated forms … proceed[s] without rules and by chance.”141 
Mendel’s research would provide these rules, but he had to account for this opinion; in 
fact, he believed his laws demonstrated that this difference between wild and cultivated 
was not one of kind, but one of degree. 
Mendel wrote, 
It is not apparent, however, why the mere placement in garden soil should result in such a 
drastic and persistent revolution in the plant organism. … Here, just as there [in the 
“natural landscape”], typical variations must appear if the conditions of life are changed 
for a species, and it has the ability to adapt to the new conditions. It is freely admitted, 
through cultivation the production of new varieties is favoured, and by the hand of man 
many a variation is preserved that would have failed in the wild state, but nothing gives 
us the right to assume that the tendency for new varieties to form is so extremely 
augmented that species soon lose all stability and that their offspring break up into an 
infinite array of highly variable forms.142 
 
Mendel argued similarly to Darwin’s use of metonymy: the results may differ between 
“Man” and “nature,” but the processes of variation and heredity remain the same. Thus, 
according to Mendel, the garden and the wild did not operate under different laws; the 
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production of variation and the “ability to adapt” were the same in both sites. The 
difference was that in the garden, breeders encouraged variations to persist that nature by 
itself would never allow.143 
Mendel also countered the Wallacean trend by emphasizing the importance of 
internal factors. He pointed out that if “the change in the conditions of vegetation were 
the sole cause of variability,” then plants “cultivated under almost the same conditions for 
centuries would have acquired stability.”144 But, acquired stability is not the case, because 
such plants continued to produce new varieties; thus, he argued, there is something 
internal. 
That there were internal laws to species was exactly what Mendel demonstrated 
through his model of hybridization. Following his experiments, Mendel believed he could 
explain hybridity’s apparent contradictions discovered by Kölreuter and von Gärtner 
through mathematical rules. For example, a hybrid sometimes resembled one parent more 
than the other; Mendel explained this as one parent having more dominant characters 
than the other. Additionally, statistical reasoning dictated that an incredible number of 
individuals were required to detect inherited patterns — “for seven different characters” 
the two parents would “reappear” only twice among 16,000 offspring.145 
Mendel’s theory also explained the variable results reported by his predecessors 
regarding “artificial transformation.” What they ascribed to vague differences in “vigour” 
or type, Mendel explained with dominance and recessiveness. In fact, his laws provided a 
model by which to predict the speed of transformation. Kölreuter and von Gärtner had 
developed a method, “the most difficult in the production of hybrids”: If one took Plant A 
and wished to transform it into Plant B, a series of hybridizations between Plant A-B 
hybrids with Plant B’s pollen could eventually effect the transformation. The number of 
generations is what had confused them. Mendel explained their troubles: Longer 
transformations were due to a higher “number of differing characters” and a low “number 
of experimental plants.” For three differentiating characters, in which Parent A was 
 
143 A difference that Hugo de Vries would emphasize is differences in nutrition, which he considered to be a 
notable influence in evolution. 
144 Abbott and Fairbanks, “Experiments on Plant Hybrids by Gregor Mendel,” 419. While the Mendelians 
would argue that “changes in the conditions of life” were not a major cause of variability, Mendel — like 
Darwin — did. 
145 Abbott and Fairbanks, “Experiments on Plant Hybrids by Gregor Mendel,” 419–20. 
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dominant (AABBCC) and B recessive (aabbcc), F1 hybrids would be identical (AaBbCc) 
but produce eight different gametes, only one of which would contain all three recessive 
characters (abc); thus, a cross between A-B and B would reproduce B in 1/8 of the 
offspring. If the number of offspring was too low, B might not appear at all; but, if one 
isolated the closest combinations, in which two characters were the same as B (recessive) 
(e.g., aaBbcc), and cross again, the F3 generation would reproduce B in half of the 
offspring (aaBbcc and aabbcc). The following generation could give B permanently. 
Following the modernized interpretations of Hartl and Orel, these “transformed” 
hybrids were “constant hybrids,” which propagated offspring true to their type when 
crossed (because they were homozygous). They could be broken again, however, if 
crossed with a different form. What von Gärtner and Mendel labeled “transformation,” 
geneticists may see as a mere extraction of a type from a hybrid, or a backcross (a 
common method in Drosophila genetics). That this was considered such an important 
problem highlights how different pre-Mendelian theories of heredity were to modern 
ones, where the goal, transformation, has become a mere technique, the backcross. 
Thus, Mendel had devised a model by which variation in “artificial 
transformation” could be explained, if not predicted, reflecting a practical bent to his 
research.146 As with Darwin and with other Moravian breeders and academics, Mendel 
deployed artificial experimentation to understand both nature and artifice and to develop 
practice into theory. Because of his interest in hybridization, development, and evolution, 
I argue that Mendel’s landmark work can be considered an early episode of experimental 
evolution — even though natural selection had no place in it. By minimizing the 
distinction between the artificial and the natural, with regard to both organisms, via their 
evolutionary history and proper environmental controls, and site, via the universality of 
scientific law, Mendel helped lay down the foundations for an experimental biology — 
genetics and experimental evolution. From its very foundation, Mendel’s genetics 
intertwined theory with practice, a practice grounded in the capitalist social relations that 
gave rise to the modern methods and culture of breeding. In contrast to Darwin’s theory, 
however, Mendel’s was less capitalist in content. Mendel did not produce or envision a 
theory as all-encompassing as Darwin and he did not have the time to do so. (Although 
 
146 Abbott and Fairbanks, 421–22. 
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notably when he became abbot he remained active in agricultural and plant-breeding 
societies and even experimented with bees.147) There was not obvious room to 
incorporate the thought of political economy in a model that explained color inheritance 
in pea plants, at least not immediately. The further integration between theory and 
practice, science and society, had to wait for Mendel’s rediscovery in 1900.  
 
Toward Making Evolution Visible: Reverend William Dallinger 
While Mendel focused on hybridization and “artificial transformation,” the first 
explicit selection experiment, strangely enough, was conducted upon microbes in 
England. In the 1870s, Wesleyan Reverend William Henry Dallinger (1839-1909) sought 
to test the fact of organic change and constructed an incubator specific to the job.148 By 
slowly increasing the incubator’s temperature over several years, Dallinger forced protists 
to adapt to an environment of his own making.149 In contrast to Darwin’s use of breeding 
as an experiment, Dallinger designed, constructed, and conducted the experiment himself 
with the intention of demonstrating a hypothesis — evolution by natural selection —, 
thus providing a “first” for experimental evolution, showing both its promises although 
moreso its difficulties.  
William Dallinger was part of the nineteenth-century tradition of parson-
naturalists, Darwin’s destiny had he not boarded the H.M.S. Beagle. Focusing on the 
microscopical study of microbial life, Dallinger dedicated his scientific research to the 
intertwined debates over spontaneous generation and Darwin’s theory of evolution by 
natural selection.150 His scientific views were unusual from the perspective of both 
Wesleyanism and microbiology. Many microbiologists, led by Louis Pasteur, rejected 
spontaneous generation, but due to a perception that Darwinism rested upon spontaneous 
generation, they also rejected Darwinism. With respect to religion, while Methodists and 
 
147 Orel, Gregor Mendel: The First Geneticist, 219–42.  
148 J. W. Haas, Jr., “The Rev. Dr. William H. Dallinger F. R. S.: Early Advocate of Theistic Evolution and 
Foe of Spontaneous Generation,” Perspectives on Science and Christian Faith 52 (2000): 107–17. 
149 “Protists” is not a term that Dallinger would have used. Neither was “microbe.” He described his 
organisms as “monads” and “infusoria.” Because I am not focusing on microbiology, I see no need to 
restrict myself from using more familiar terms. 
150 Like Darwin, the financial stability required for this lifestyle was achieved through marriage. Haas, Jr., 




Wesleyans had positive views of science, they initially rejected Darwin’s theory.151 That 
Dallinger devoted his scientific career to studying microbes while rejecting spontaneous 
generation and supporting Darwin makes him unusual. 
Dallinger’s views and research, however, did align him with the X Club, a small 
cadre of scientists (including T. H. Huxley and John Tyndall) whose goal, among others, 
was to establish Darwinism in English science. Among their goals was to decouple 
Darwinism from spontaneous generation, primarily by eliminating the latter as a 
legitimate scientific theory.152 Dallinger’s work on microbes, therefore, supported the 
Darwinian cause. By closely tracking the life cycle of “monads,” Dallinger concluded, 
along with a collaborator, James Drysdale (who could observe the organisms while 
Dallinger slept), that small spores did not spontaneously arise, but originated from larger 
monads. Their work became a weapon for the X Club, especially for Tyndall, who 
personally encouraged Dallinger and cited him in public lectures.153 Haas, Jr., the only 
author to treat Dallinger in a historical context, concludes, “Dallinger had been used by 
his X-club friends to furthering their campaign from the question of the origin of life. In 
turn, he used their patronage to carve out a scientific niche based on his meticulous work 
in microbiology.”154 
Following his research on monad life-cycles, Dallinger turned toward an 
experimental demonstration of Darwinism. As Dallinger later reported in his 1886 
presidential address to the Royal Microscopical Society, he sought to discover “whether it 
was possible by change of environment, in minute life-forms, whose life-cycle was 
relatively soon completed, to superinduce changes of an adaptive character, if the 
 
151 Haas, Jr., 110–12. Wesleyan rejection of Darwinism appears primarily to have been on moral grounds. 
Unfortunately, we do not know why Dallinger accepted Darwinism. From 1877 to 1902, he wrote about 
science for the Wesleyan Methodist Magazine, possibly contributing to the sect’s growing acceptance of the 
theory. 
152 James Edgar Strick, Sparks of Life: Darwinism and the Victorian Debates over Spontaneous Generation 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000). Maureen O’Malley has also shown that Darwin did 
the same in the third edition of The Origin: He distanced himself from Lamarck’s theory in that it rested 
upon “the spontaneous generation of simple life-forms that make evolutionary progress into complex 
ones.” Maureen A. O’Malley, “What Did Darwin Say about Microbes, and How Did Microbiology 
Respond?,” Trends in Microbiology 17, no. 8 (2009): 343. 
153 J. W. Haas, Jr., “The Reverend Dr William Henry Dallinger, FRS (1839-1909),” Notes and Records of 
the Royal Society 54, no. 1 (2000): 58–59. 
154 Haas, Jr., 56. 
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observations extended over a sufficiently long period.”155 Dallinger personally saw no 
need for “direct demonstration” of Darwin’s theory. To him, it “underlies as a necessity 
all our widest and deepest biological knowledge” and that “concurrent adaptation to 
concurrent changes of environment is in fact so apparent now, that we wonder, often, why 
it was not earlier seen.”156 Still, experimentally demonstrating the truth of natural 
selection “cannot be other than a gain both to philosophical and practical biology.”157 
Dallinger meticulously conducted a year-and-a-half long trial, concluding that the 
monads from the life-cycle studies were optimal for the experiment. From his experiment 
investigating the “death point” of monads, he found that “the best and most amenable 
agent … for altering slowly and cumulatively the environment, was heat.”158 Dallinger 
communicated his preliminary findings to Darwin, who responded, 
I did not know that you were attending to the mutation of the lower organisms under 
changed conditions of life; and your results, I have no doubt, will be extremely curious 
and valuable. The fact which you mention about their being adapted to certain 
temperatures, but becoming gradually accustomed to much higher ones is very 
remarkable.  
 
Ever the naturalist, Darwin continued, “it explains the existence of algae in hot springs. 
How extremely interesting an examination under high powers on the spot, of the mud of 
such springs would be.”159 
Following Darwin’s theories, Dallinger emphasized the “smallness of every 
variation.” Normally imperceptible, it was only Darwin’s own emphasis on domestication 
as an agent of evolutionary change that “made clear” “the great process of biological 
progression.”160 Likening biology to another historical science — astronomy, in which 
 
155 William H. Dallinger, “President’s Address,” Journal of the Royal Microscopical Society 7, no. 2 (1887): 
191. 
156 He further claimed that “variations are constant, of that there can be no doubt” (p. 192). 
157 Ibid., 191. By “practical biology,” Dallinger meant experimental biology. 
158 Ibid., 191. 
159 Quoted in Dallinger, “President’s Address,” 1887, 191–92. Charles Darwin, “To Dallinger, W. H.,” July 
2, 1878, https://www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/?docId=letters/DCP-LETT-11587.xml, accessed on 15 May 
2021. Dallinger and Darwin had corresponded briefly previously, in which Darwin lauded the work of 
Dallinger and Drysdale on microbial life-cycles and spontaneous generation. Haas, Jr., “The Rev. Dr. 
William H. Dallinger F. R. S.: Early Advocate of Theistic Evolution and Foe of Spontaneous Generation,” 
112. 
160 Dallinger, “President’s Address,” 1887, 192. 
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observations of “a minute fraction of the complete cycle of movement, leaves us … 
certain” of the entire cycle  — Dallinger thought “any observed facts that may come 
within our reach, or be possible to our laboratories, [are] of even enhanced value.”161 
Thus, a laboratory experiment of natural selection in action was legitimate and useful. 
However, an adherence to gradualism ruled out plants and animals, whose complexity 
and “relative fewness of generations” would prevent the observation of evolutionary 
changes “during the working life of an observer.” Thus, only microbes allowed evolution 
to be made visible.  To justify these organisms as legitimate objects of evolutionary study, 
Dallinger reminded his audience that all organisms are composed of cells. 
Once he finished his preliminary 
experiments, Dallinger ordered a 
customized thermostatic incubator 
outfitted with a mercury regulator that 
allowed water in three glass chambers to 
be kept indefinitely at steady 
temperatures, but also raised and 




Figure 1. From Dallinger, “President’s 
Address,” Journal of the Royal 




161 Dallinger, 192. 
162 Dallinger, 193–95. See Appendix A for a description of how the instrument worked. William H. 
Dallinger, “Dr. Dallinger’s Thermostatic Continuous Stage,” Journal of the Royal Microscopical Society 7, 
no. 2 (1887): 317–18. Dallinger had initially constructed a similar apparatus for the purpose of studying a 
“septic organism” at its normal temperature, 90-95° F. For an interesting discussion of the instrument, see 
Sheref Mansy and Sascha Pohflepp, “Living Machines,” in Synthetic Aesthetics: Investigating Synthetic 




For seven years, Dallinger slowly and meticulously raised the temperature of his 
instrument from 60° F., where the three microbial species (Monas Dallingeri, Dallingeria 
Drysdali, and Tetramitus rostratus) could thrive, all the way up to 158° F.163 This was not 
a smooth increase, however; after an increase of a few degrees, continued adaptation 
paused — once for up to twelve months (from 137° to 138° F.). Dallinger noticed that at 
each pause, the monads would “vacuolate,” in which internal empty chambers grew 
within the cell, and “the vital vigour and all the vital activities of the organisms … 
regained.”164 Dallinger never postulated a reason for this change. He did observe that 
when these vacuoles disappeared, the microbes became adaptable to further temperature 
increases. He noticed no morphological or behavioral changes. 
When Dallinger’s incubator reached 158°, “the accident happened, destroying the 
use of the instrument, and causing the whole to collapse.”165 Dallinger concluded from 
his long experiment: 
… There seems to be indicated in these observations, as imperfect as they are, that there 
is at certain points in the endurance of cumulative thermal elevations, a distinct 
physiological change brought about with greater or less difficulty, which seems to be 
directly correlated to the power of adaptation to a given measure of heat increment. It is 
not a quiet rhythmic progression. There are points of greater and of less difficulty.166 
 
Cautious, Dallinger recognized the artificiality of his experimental system. 
Perhaps referencing Darwin’s comments to him about algae, Dallinger prefaced this 
conclusion that he “did not succeed in raising the temperature in these forms to anything 
like the elevations that the algae and other low forms have been found in nature to 
flourish in.” Furthermore, “I do not pretend to say, nor do I wish to draw any general 
inference as to even this group of organisms. My observations were only on these three 
special forms.”167 Dallinger was wary to extrapolate beyond these specific organisms that 
 
163 The organisms Dallinger used were Tetramitus rostratus, Monas Dallingeri, and D. Drysdali. The 
degree to which our named microbial species today match what was used by Dallinger and his 
contemporaries is unclear. For example, the genus Monas has mostly been dissolved, its species being 
dispersed throughout the protista. Jens Boenigk, “The Past and Present Classification Problem with 
Nanoflagellates Exemplified by the Genus Monas,” Protist 159, no. 2 (2008): 319–37. 
164 Dallinger, “President’s Address,” 1887, 196. 
165 Dallinger, 199. 
166 Dallinger, 199. 
167 Dallinger, 199 Emphasis original. 
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evolved in this specific instrument. Furthermore, he recognized the novelty generated by 
his experiment. He had evolved these three species of microbes to thrive in temperatures 
that would kill them normally, but if he placed the evolved populations into the original 
temperature, they, too, would die.168 Although he did not say so explicitly, Dallinger had 
created a microbial form that had never before existed and that no longer existed after the 
experiment. 
What Dallinger’s address left unclear was the “method” by which this adaptation 
was produced; however, in an 1887 published lecture, The Creator, and What We May 
Know of the Method of Creation, Dallinger pointed to natural selection. Citing his 
experiment, he continued to use “adaptation,” but on the following page, he cited and 
summarized Darwin’s theory of natural selection and wrote, “it is impossible for a 
biologist to withhold consent to the fact that a ‘law,’ a method, has been demonstrated, 
which has been a certain and powerful factor.” Furthermore, “that there are other factors 
of evolution not yet discovered is almost inevitable; they, however, will be but added 
‘laws.’”169 Given this strong endorsement of natural selection at a time in which it was 
not well-accepted, I am inclined to think Dallinger thought he had demonstrated not only 
evolution and adaptation, but natural selection specifically.170 
 
168 Dallinger, 199. 
169 William Henry Dallinger, The Creator, and What We May Know of the Method of Creation (T. Woolmer, 
1887), 69–70. Dallinger’s address is an argument for natural theology in the wake of major scientific 
developments, specifically reconciling his work on spontaneous generation and evolution with a Creator 
God. He argued that, contra Paley, there was no special creation — either of species or of life; instead, he 
thought God endowed the universe with laws (e.g., gravity and natural selection) at the beginning of time. 
Scientists were thus revealing those laws and the “methods” by which God designed the universe. He 
rejected Ernst Haeckel’s reduction of protoplasm to simple albumen, i.e., that life was simply the 
congregation of complex molecules (pp. 34-35). Dallinger’s primary target was Herbert Spencer’s 
materialist philosophy which he argued could not explain much of anything, but especially mind and 
consciousness. He endorsed the evolution of humans, also, but thought it remained a mystery as to the 
“method” by which God “breathed into [Man’s] nostrils the breath of life” (p. 81). 
170 However, Dallinger, like Asa Gray, was not fully on board with Darwin’s vision. To Dallinger, what 
Darwin left unexplained were the universal “laws” of variation and inheritance (pp. 69-74). He wrote, “An 
equally powerful weapon in defence of theism takes its place: I designate it ‘CONCURRENT 
ADAPTATION;’ that is, fitness, for ever, throughout all time and all space; and fitness absolutely constant 
amidst all changes. Adaptation is universally concurrent with existence; and whether we have to account 
for it by sudden and unexplained action, or by the slow operation of laws, is a matter of no essential 
moment: it is there” (p. 72). Recapitulating Darwin’s instances of orchid-insect coevolution, what “this 
great biological law affirms, is, that whatever the changes, and however brought about, past or future, there 
never has been, there is not, and there never will be, an instant’s cessation of concurrent adaptation:— the 
operation of the ‘law’ that secures to all that lives adjustment to its environments” (p. 74). Thus, natural 
selection, like gravity and matter, had its origins in the Creator when he set forth the laws of the universe 
upon its creation: “That surely must be a method that took its origin in mind; and it must have had its 
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As unique as Dallinger’s evolution experiment was for the time, he never 
published the results beyond this address. In fact, he ceased most research on microbes, 
although it is clear he paid close attention to developments in the field. In 1892 and 1893, 
for example, he lectured as president to the Quekett Microscopical Club, mostly updating 
members on recent developments in microscopy and microbiology. In 1892, he discussed 
extensively the pathological role bacteria play as emphasized by Pasteur and Koch. 
In these lectures, Dallinger suggested further conclusions that he did not include 
in his initial 1887 address. He noted that he began his evolution research before Pasteur, 
so that his results are not directly relevant to research on pathogenic bacteria; however, he 
did make a case for comparison. He claimed his research had shown that microbes, “in 
less than ten years,” can be “trained by prolonged and cumulative change of 
environment” “to live, even with increased fecundity” at temperatures nearly 100° F. 
higher than normal. He pointed out that he observed not morphological changes, but 
physiological changes — “simply a modification of function.”171 Therefore, 
it is physiologically and not morphologically that the saprophytes are subject to mutation, 
so much so that unless we take a very broad and philosophical view of what is specific, 
we may even appear to approach by such mutation a physiological specificity 
concurrently with a morphological identity with unaltered forms. The remarkable 
morphological similarity of certain bacilli, whose physiological differences are terribly 
unlike, must strike a very casual observer.172 
 
Here Dallinger speculated that the defining characteristic of microbes was not their 
shape, size, or form, but their physiology and function. In fact, he thought morphological 
identity could mask physiological evolution, especially because his experiments 
demonstrated how quickly these microbes could evolve. 
How far may these [physiological changes], if constantly taking place in nature, at times 
fill the air with minute organisms in vast clouds, which by certain altered conditions have 
become endowed with functional characters inimical to man and beast, taking for a time 
the place of common forms with which the air is usually charged, but as a rule innocuous 
 
prevised and pre-ordered place potentially assigned, from the earliest creative moment” (p. 74). For more 
on the acceptance of Darwinism, see Peter J. Bowler, The Non-Darwinian Revolution: Reinterpreting a 
Historical Myth (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988). 
171 William H. Dallinger, “President’s Address,” Journal of the Quekett Microscopial Club 5 (1893): 42. 
172 Dallinger, 43. 
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to man and beast?173 
 
He concluded, “I venture to believe that the question of the functional mutability of these 
organisms and its causes and consequences will form some considerable portion of the 
work of the next quarter of a century.”174 
However, he was not to take part. As Haas, Jr. points out, Dallinger wrote in his 
address that because his study of saprophytic microbes had led him “to the very edge of 
pathological inquiry, I was obliged to leave it there, having neither special medical 
training nor proper opportunity for its further pursuit on the pathogenic side.”175 He thus 
lamented the professionalization of science that had taken place during his lifetime, 
causing him to wonder what role amateurs like him could play. Although in 1892 he 
indicated that he had an ongoing evolution experiment, he never published results. In his 
1893 address, he critiqued O. Bütschli’s work on the artificial generation of protoplasm 
and discussed positively Sergei Winowgradsky’s discovery of the bacterial role in soil 
nitrification, but he reported no research of his own. Instead, Dallinger focused on the 
microscope itself, writing and publishing a revamped edition of William B. Carpenter’s 
The Microscope and Its Revelations, his last scientific contribution before his death in 
1909. 
Dallinger’s experiment is noteworthy for a number of reasons. He is likely the 
first scientist, besides Mendel, to whom we can attribute the term “experimental 
evolution,” and the first to conduct a selection experiment, for he worked within a 
modern evolutionary framework and utilized an evolutionary force — natural selection 
— over many generations. From a historical perspective, what makes Dallinger’s 
experiment of such interest, beyond it merely being “the first” scientific selection 
experiment, is how well it captures aspects that characterize all of experimental 
evolution, then and now. Dallinger was not an evolutionary scientist — at least to the 
degree that such a person existed in the nineteenth century —, but an amateur parson-
naturalist studying microbes, a predecessor to the bacteriologist, and later, the 
microbiologist. He dedicated most of his scientific research to refuting spontaneous 
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generation and developing the microscope, but for nearly a decade, he also conducted an 
evolutionary experiment on adaptation. Strikingly, the importance of instruments and 
systems built specifically for the problem at hand is already present in his work, 
something that would not resurface in experimental evolution until the 1930s (population 
cages) and the 1950s (chemostat). As with many later experimental evolutionists, he was 
careful about his experimental organism(s): they needed to be simple, manipulable, and 
quick to reproduce. However, unlike those who worked after him, his response to the 
artificial/natural distinction was to limit most of his conclusions to the system itself. 
Although he did conclude that evolution is not always a “quiet rhythmic progression,” but 
potentially a process of fits and starts, and warned of physiological changes in bacteria, 
he never put forward a general theory based on these claims. Another major difference 
between Dallinger’s experiments and those conducted by early twentieth-century 
biologists is that Dallinger had purely a research question at mind; he apparently 
envisioned no practical purpose beyond demonstrating the reality of evolution. But as a 
parson-naturalist he saw his work as part of a natural theology. 
Despite Dallinger’s achievement, he had little influence on evolutionary research. 
Strangely, while scientists mentioned him a few times in the late nineteenth century, I 
have yet to find him cited by any early twentieth century experimental evolutionist; even 
stranger, he is cited today by twenty-first century biologists as a “father” to the field even 
though there is no genealogical connection. (What is important to today’s scientists is that 
he worked with microbes, not plants or animals.)176 His colleagues did praise his work, 
however. See Appendix A2 for a discussion of reactions from his contemporaries and 
later nineteenth-century scientists.  
Dallinger was not necessarily “ahead of his time.” His work bore the stamps of 
 
176 Scientists also argue that Dallinger’s experimental success was due not to evolution, but to 
contamination. See Tadeusz J. Kawecki et al., “Experimental Evolution,” Trends in Ecology & Evolution 
27, no. 10 (2012): 547–60; Theodore Garland and Michael R. Rose, eds., Experimental Evolution: 
Concepts, Methods, and Applications of Selection Experiments (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2009). Claudia Bank et al., “Thinking Too Positive? Revisiting Current Methods of Population Genetic 
Selection Inference,” Trends in Genetics 30, no. 12 (2014): 540–46; Rees Kassen and Paul B. Rainey, “The 
Ecology and Genetics of Microbial Diversity,” Annual Review of Microbiology 58, no. 1 (2004): 207–31. I 
am not sure if there exists a definitive solution to the dilemma, unless we know that such a stark adaptation 
is impossible. We do know that Dallinger was careful and rather observant, so if there was contamination, it 
is likely due to instrumentation not so much a failure in his character. The problem of contamination will 
surface again, specifically in my discussion of Hugo de Vries and William Tower. 
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nineteenth-century evolution and biology. He was contemporary with Louis Pasteur and 
other biologists who had begun to experimentalize the discipline and take microbes 
seriously as experimental subjects. In contrast to modern microbial experimental 
evolutionists, Dallinger did not employ his monads because of their astonishingly large 
population sizes; instead, he cited only simplicity and fast generation times. Furthermore, 
his results were depicted as drawings of idealized (“average”) individuals; no population 
indices were quantified or likely even considered. Instead, he was simply concerned with 
adaptiveness to temperature via morphological and visible physiological responses. 
Dallinger was thoroughly a naturalist of the nineteenth century. As experimental 
evolution took off in the early twentieth century, the complications of Dallinger’s 
experiments, as well as his focus on microbes and not plants and animals, likely 
contributed to his historical neglect. The first selection experiment was quite a 
spectacular achievement, despites its problems, but it apparently failed to capture the 
imagination of his immediate successors, waiting until the late twentieth century to be 
noticed once again. 
 
Conclusion 
Experimentation was crucial to modern evolutionary science from its very 
inception; in fact, without experimentation, there would be no evolutionary biology as we 
know it today. While Darwin conducted experimental evolution in an unusual and 
indirect way, his reliance on the practice and experience of breeders was essential to 
forming his theory of evolution by natural selection. Darwin’s use of metonymy 
highlights what Marx and Engels saw as valuable in his work: he did not see a formal 
distinction between nature and artifice, as two unrelated spheres, but instead as two poles 
of opposition and interdependence, artifice as having emerged from nature itself. This 
transformation of nature had begun thousands of years prior, but what had changed was 
breeders’ conscious control of nature according to their desires (i.e., profit, in a 
capitalized system of agriculture) at a visible rate. This activity of transformation could 
now be theorized. As Bukharin wrote, “Practice is an active break-through into reality, 
egress beyond the limits of the subject, penetration into the object, the "humanising" of 
nature, its alteration.” That the “sciences ‘grow’ out of practice, the ‘production of ideas’ 
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differentiates out of the ‘production of things.’”177 That evolution is not immediately 
perceptible, but happens on the scale of generations, does not alter this core thesis, that 
“theory is accumulated and condensed practice.” Where Darwin further excelled beyond 
mere theorization of practice was to then, in combination with Malthus, argue that the 
practice of breeders also explained the unity and diversity of life through the wealth of 
facts accumulated by the disciplines of natural history.  
Mendel forged a similar path through his work on “artificial transformation.” 
Considered somewhat of an outsider to the evolutionary tradition, requiring interpretation 
and synthesis, viewed his own project of understanding “artificial transformation” as part 
of the breeding agenda of Moravia, one similar to Darwin’s own, and not as simple “laws 
of inheritance.” He, too, saw his work in a universal way, challenging the notion that 
there were distinct laws governing cultivated plants in soil beds apart from wild plants in 
natural landscapes. He did not pursue his theories with the same verve as Darwin, but he 
did lay the groundwork for sweeping changes to both theory and practice when 
rediscovered decades later, especially when it his work was rechristened as “genetics.”  
Dallinger, the first to conduct a long-term selection experiment, was far more 
reluctant to extrapolate his work to nature, instead emphasizing the artificiality of his 
work, in creating new forms in small volumes of hot water. Yet he had achieved the task 
(arguably, in retrospect) of rendering the normally imperceptible process of evolution 
visible, showing that there were ways to overcome Darwinian gradualism without 
resorting to “sloppy technicians” through dedication to long-term experimentation. 
Control and utility under scientific guidance would come later. 
The question remains of the connections between this early work of experimental 
evolution to its later development. The tenuous and indirect connections were partially a 
result of a lack of institutionalization — Darwin, Mendel, and Dallinger did not launch 
experimental programs with established physical or social spaces (including journals) that 
could build a store of accumulated theory and practice. Furthermore, they were not 
professional scientists and the latter two especially did not share Darwin’s extensive 
 
177 Nikolai Bukharin, “Theory and Practice from The Standpoint of Dialectical Materialism,” in Science at 
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network and wealth to fund work that would make evolution visible, controllable, and 
useful. The realization of this need would emerge, but not before experimental evolution 
re-emerged on a stronger and professionally scientific basis and importantly as central to 
the debates that raged over the relationship between the two founding figures of 
evolutionary sciences, Darwin and Mendel, and critically over the debate’s implications 
for the control of evolution. Thus, the history of experimental evolution must begin with 
Darwin and Mendel, in combination with the social relations of capitalism from which 
they emerged, of which I chose Robert Bakewell, an eighteenth-century English sheep 


























Chapter 2: Making Evolution Visible 
 
Introduction 
Two biologists in particular took on experimental evolution in the late nineteenth 
century: English naturalist and statistician Walter Frank Raphael Weldon (1860–1906) 
and Dutch botanist Hugo de Vries (1848–1935).178 They both shared a vision of making 
natural evolution visible, just as Dallinger had attempted, but proclaimed differing (but 
not mutually exclusive) programs to carry out the task. Weldon adopted (orthodox) 
Darwinian theory, and developed in collaboration with Karl Pearson the methods of 
biological statistics, biometry, to amass the data that could reveal natural selection in 
action. De Vries championed Darwinian method, relying upon experimentation, whilst 
developing a heterodox theory of evolution by mutation. (De Vries also argued that his 
theoretical ideas germinated from Darwin’s thought.) They both thus claimed heritage of 
the Darwinian tradition, revealing its ambiguous meaning. But particularly crucial was 
that as much as Weldon wanted to avoid experimentation, his projects forced him to take 
it on. The first half of this chapter examines Weldon’s non-experimentalist research 
program as it developed into experimental lines to answer the questions he had of 
evolution. This is an interesting case of theoretical commitments giving way to 
limitations it imposed upon practice. I then briefly address geneticist William Bateson’s 
critique of biometry as it highlights the experimentalist ideology that was coming to the 
fore in biology. The second half of this chapter turns to Hugo de Vries, in which I clear up 
some of the many misconceptions that surround his work, how he adopted 
experimentalism, and elaborate upon the crucial theory that emerged from practice: that 
of the opposed variational types of fluctuations and mutations, which laid the basis for 
experimental evolution’s central dispute covered in Chapters 4 and 5. Thus in the 
juxtaposition of Weldon and de Vries is further revealed the interplay of theory and 
 
178 This chapter could also have included Wilhelm Johannsen as a key experimental evolutionist, but his 
work and theories were extensively picked up by and elaborated upon by the figures I focus on in Chapters 
4 and 5, and thus would be redundant, and his published work did not include the ideological bent and 
methodological agitation that Weldon and de Vries emphasized. For some discussion of practical 
influences upon Johannsen, see Jean Gayon and Doris T. Zallen, “The Role of the Vilmorin Company in 
the Promotion and Diffusion of the Experimental Science of Heredity in France, 1840–1920,” Journal of 




practice, with the underlying drive being that of practice. Although curiously in their 
work the notions of control and utility were entirely absent in Weldon’s work and muted 
in de Vries’. (This was not the case for the latter’s public remarks, an extensive 
discussion of which appears in the following chapter.) What united them however was 
that their vision was centered upon making evolution visible. 
 
Making Evolution Visible by Statistics: Raphael Weldon 
Roughly a decade after the premature conclusion of Dallinger’s experiment, 
Walter Frank Raphael Weldon began to study and make visible the action of natural 
selection in a more methodical fashion than anyone before him.179 Upon reading Francis 
Galton’s Natural Inheritance (1889), a statistical analysis of human inheritance, Weldon 
sought to further integrate statistics into the biological sciences, particularly to support 
Darwinism. The methods and philosophy that Weldon developed, alongside his 
statistician collaborator Karl Pearson, became known as biometry.180 Weldon’s goal was 
not to create an experimental evolution; instead, by graphing fine measurements of large 
samples, biometry would render the minutiae of biological variation, diversity, and 
evolution visible. While Darwin had studied artificial selection as “an experiment on a 
gigantic scale,” Weldon was interested in wild populations of animals. In fact, Weldon’s 
1898 presidential address to the Zoological Section of the British Association for the 
Advancement of Sceince was considered by some, for decades, one of the few 
demonstrations of natural selection in action (and, critically, of directional selection).181 
Ironically, while Weldon, and the positivism of the biometrical program, intended to 
avoid causal claims in favor of descriptive correlations, his large-scale experimentation 
 
179 Much of my analysis of biometry was influenced by Jean Gayon, Darwinism’s Struggle for Survival: 
Heredity and the Hypothesis of Selection (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). A 
reinterpretation of Weldon’s career and thought is likely coming, due to Gregory Radick’s forthcoming 
Disputed Inheritance: The Battle over Mendel and the Future of Biology (University of Chicago Press). 
180 Because he was the biologist of the pair, I focus on Weldon. Additionally, Weldon started down this path 
before becoming into contact with Pearson and it was Weldon who influenced Pearson to take up biological 
problems. For a discussion of Weldon’s influence on Pearson’s statistical methods, see M. Eileen Magnello, 
“Karl Pearson’s Gresham Lectures: W. F. R. Weldon, Speciation and the Origins of Pearsonian Statistics,” 
The British Journal for the History of Science 29, no. 1 (1996): 43–63. Magnello’s article provides more 
detail on statistical methods, such as curve fitting, than I do here. 
181 The other example, Bumpus’ study of sparrows, I mention in the following chapter. Jean Gayon, 
Darwinism’s Struggle for Survival: Heredity and the Hypothesis of Natural Selection (Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), 197. 
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on Plymouth Sound crabs showed that understanding evolution required understanding 
causes through experimentation. 
While Galton had done much to introduce statistics into several sciences, 
including meteorology and biological inheritance, Weldon brought the new science to 
bear on natural evolution. Weldon wrote in 1894, apparently disregarding Darwin’s 
reliance on breeding, 
The questions raised by the Darwinian hypothesis are purely statistical, and the statistical 





The method was simple in theory, being “all questions of arithmetic”: calculate the 
“degrees of abnormality” between individuals and among organs, and their associated 
death rates. Then, 
when we know the numerical answers to these questions for a number of species we shall 
know the direction and the rate of change in these species at the present day—a 





The biometricians were addressing the theoretical and methodological problem 
inherited from Darwin: gradualism. Galton, wrote in Biometrika, the new journal co-
edited by Weldon and Pearson, that “the primary object of Biometry is to afford material 
that shall be exact enough for the discovery of incipient changes in evolution which are 
too small to be otherwise apparent.” He continued, 
The organic world as a whole is a perpetual flux of changing types. It is the business of 
Biometry to catch partial and momentary glimpses of it, whether in a living or in a fossil 





182 Weldon, “Remarks on Variation in Animals and Plants. To Accompany the First Report of the 
Committee for Conducting Statistical Inquiries into the Measurable Characteristics of Plants and Animals,” 
Proceedings of the Royal Society of London 57 (January 1, 1894): 381. Pearson later wrote, Weldon’s 
research “first formulated the view that the method of the Registrar-General [statistics] is the method by 
which the fundamental problems of natural selection must be attacked.” Karl Pearson, “Walter Frank 
Raphael Weldon. 1860-1906,” Biometrika 5, no. 1/2 (1906), 19. 
183 Weldon, “On Certain Correlated Variations in Carcinus maenas,” Proceedings of the Royal Society of 
London 54 (1893): 329. 
184 Francis Galton, “Biometry,” Biometrika 1, no. 1 (1901): 9–10. 
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The exact statistical study of evolution in wild populations would make natural 
selection visible quantitatively. Through rigorous statistical analysis and graphing trait 
variation and population mortality, biologists, they argued, could see what natural 
selection saw, while avoiding the artifice of laboratory work. Galton wrote, “biology 
could soon be raised to the status of a more exact science than it can as yet claim to 
be.”185 
Thus, Pearson introduced Biometrika by arguing that “the evolutionist has to 
become in the widest sense of the words a registrar-general for all forms of life.” That is, 
a statistician. As was common in these days, Pearson pointed to Darwin as their 
predecessor: while Darwin may have applied rudimentary statistical thinking to his 
research, particularly in Orchids, Darwin’s letters revealed a naturalist who wished he 
knew more. Pearson compared the biometrization of Darwinism to Maxwell’s 
mathematization of Faraday’s electromagnetism.186 
An advantage of the program, according to the biometricians, was that this 
method neither posited physiological causes nor rested upon direct experimentation. In a 
period mired by metaphysical speculations regarding the qualities and material causes of 
heredity and variation, the biometricians desired to simply describe and measure changes 
numerically.187 For example, whether variation was continuous or discontinuous, would 
be masked by the “mathematics of large numbers.” (The work also moved beyond 
traditional Darwinian naturalism which naively explained apparently useful traits as 
selective adaptations.188) For Pearson, experimentation was a legitimate method, but: 
When he [the evolutionist] cannot observe and measure in Nature, then he must 
experiment on “populations” within the laboratory. But few biological laboratories have 
 
185 Galton, 10. 
186 Pearson, “Editorial: The Spirit of Biometrika,” Biometrika 1, no. 1 (1901): 4–5, 3. 
187 This also followed from Pearson’s philosophical idealism; see Theodore M. Porter, Karl Pearson: The 
Scientific Life in a Statistical Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 6-8 Note that Pearson’s 
philosophy of science is directly opposed by Bukharin’s philosophy of science of dialectical materialism. 
188 Gayon, Darwinism’s Struggle for Survival: Heredity and the Hypothesis of Selection, 214–16. As 
Bumpus soon noted in his statistically cruder and anti-Darwinian study, “We are so in the habit of referring 
carelessly to the process of natural selection, and of invoking its aid whenever some pet theory seems a 
little feeble, that we forget we are really using a hypothesis that still remains unproved, and that specific 
examples of the destruction of animals of known physical disability are very infrequent.” Hermon C. 
Bumpus, “The Elimination of the Unfit as Illustrated by the Introduced Sparrow, Passer domesticus,” in 
Biological Lectures from the Marine Biological Laboratory at Wood’s Holl, Mass. 1898 (Boston, Mass.: 
Ginn & Company, 1899), 209–26. 
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Therefore, the biometrists considered statistics as not only the proper method by which to 
study evolution, but also the only available method.190 It also avoided the problematic 
leap from the artificial to the natural: whereas Dallinger studied microbes living in a 
machine, the biometricians studied variation, inheritance, and selection among animal 
populations in nature. This position opposed the program of the contemporarily emerging 
experimental biologists, such as that of Wilhelm Roux’s Entwicklungsmechanik, (and 
soon, the Mendelians) and was key to their coming conflict.191 
Biometrika promulgated a program that Weldon had already worked out and 
conducted. He claimed in his first biometrical studies to have provided evidence of 
natural selection in action without resorting to causal claims (although this would change 
in 1898, discussed below). By measuring trait variations, he found that three different 
populations of shrimp (Cragnon vulgaris), while obeying the “law of error” (a normal 
bell curve), showed distinct differences., stability (he speculated) arising from stabilizing 
selection.192 In additional work, he discovered that some correlation coefficients 
remained constant between races even if their means and curves differed.193 Examining 
shore crabs (Carcinus maenas), Weldon found an asymmetrical distribution in frontal 
 
189 “Editorial,” 3. Here he advocated for a “well-equipped Biometric Farm Laboratory, where breeding and 
survival experiments on large numbers could be carried out with ample room and care and, when necessary, 
for long periods.” I discuss the proposals for such farms and laboratories in the following chapter. 
190 Charles H. Pence, “‘Describing Our Whole Experience’: The Statistical Philosophies of WFR Weldon 
and Karl Pearson,” Studies in the History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 42, no. 4 
(2011): 475—485. Pence usefully distinguishes between the statistical philosophies of Weldon and Pearson 
despite their shared methods. Pearson held to a stricter positivism that used statistics to reduce various 
phenomena to mathematical relationships, whereas Weldon embraced statistics as a way to capture the 
considerable variation of the world while avoiding unjustified physiological speculation. As Pence writes, 
biological complexity meant that “correlation is the only type of connection that can be drawn between 
biological systems of the kind Weldon was interested in investigating…” (p. 482). The initial avoidance of 
experimentation was therefore due to more practical concerns. 
191 See Jane Maienschein, “The Origins of Entwicklungsmechanik,” in Developmental Biology: A 
Comprehensive Synthesis, vol. 7, ed. Scott F. Gilbert (New York: Plenum Press, 1991): 43-62. 
192 Already, Weldon was beginning to posit causes, pointing to the limitations of the program: He suggested 
that the separate curves he detected were not due to heredity as Galton might hold, but instead was due to 
the “selective action of the surrounding conditions – an action which must vary in intensity in different 
places.” Weldon, “The Variations Occurring in Certain Decapod Crustacea. I. Cragnon Vulgaris.,” 
Proceedings of the Royal Society of London 47 (1889): 451. Gayon notes that this stance contradicted 
Galton’s theory as well. Gayon, Darwinism’s Struggle for Survival, 203. 
193 This led him to wonder if these correlations explained taxonomic differences. Weldon, “Certain 
Correlated Variations in Cragnon Vulgaris,” Proceedings of the Royal Society of London 51 (1892): 11. 
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breadth (measured “from tip to tip of the anterior lateral teeth”) in the sample from 
Naples. He consulted Pearson, marking the beginning of their collaboration, who 
demonstrated that the curve could be composed of two different morphs with disparate 
means and probable errors, i.e., the females exhibited dimorphism. Gayon suggests that 
Weldon considered this a possible snapshot of evolution in action, Darwin’s “divergence 
of character,” but he decided not to follow this population through its generations.194 
In the meantime, a group of scientists — Weldon, Galton, Francis Darwin, and E. 
B. Poulton, among others — established a Committee for Conducting Statistical Inquiries 
into the Measurable Characteristics of Plants and Animals, later referred to as the 
Evolution Committee.195 While this organization published several significant reports — 
particularly, Weldon’s, and later, William Bateson’s and Edith Saunders’ first reports on 
genetics — it had a rocky and mostly unproductive history.196 The Evolution Committee’s 
first major project was an attempt to replicate in herring the detection of dimorphism, but 
despite the accumulation of good data, the Committee’s practical failure to resolve that 
data statistically prevented Weldon from publishing.197 The Committee’s study of ox-eye 
daisies also failed. Weldon conducted laboratory “experiments on repeated selection of 
infusoria,” but again, never published the work.198 
Weldon changed his strategy, hoping to discover “selective destruction,” or a 
death-rate due to natural selection, occurring in a wild population, and in so doing 
unveiled a new way to study evolution in action.199 Published as a report to the Evolution 
Committee, Weldon sought to convince the biological community of his method’s power. 
 
194 With only this study, the dimorphism could be explained by Galtonian selection-by-replacement or by 
Darwinian selection-by-disruption. Gayon, Darwinism’s Struggle for Survival, 209–10. This distinction, as 
emphasized by Gayon and Stoltzfus & Cable, would be critical for later theories of evolution following the 
rediscovery of Mendel. 
195 It was initially proposed as the Committee for the Statistical Enquiry into the Variability of Organisms. 
In 1897, it expanded its scope to “accurate investigation of Variation, Heredity, Selection, and other 
phenomena relating to Evolution.” Pearson, “Walter Frank Raphael Weldon. 1860-1906,” 23. 
196 William B. Provine, The Origins of Theoretical Population Genetics (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1971), 48–51, 54–55. 
197 Gayon, Darwinism’s Struggle for Survival, 211; Magnello, “Karl Pearson’s Gresham Lectures,” 59–61. 
198 Pearson, “Walter Frank Raphael Weldon. 1860-1906,” 24, 22. 
199 Weldon, “Report of the Committee, Consisting of Mr. Galton (Chairman), Mr. F. Darwin, Professor 
Macalister, Professor Meldola, Professor Poulton, and Professor Weldon, ‘for Conducting Statistical 
Inquiries into the Measurable Characteristics of Plants and Animals.’ Part I. ‘An Attempt to Measure the 
Death-Rate Due to the Selective Destruction of Carcinus moenas with Respect to a Particular Dimension,’” 
Proceedings of the Royal Society of London 57 (1894): 360-379. 
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For this study, Weldon measured several dimensions among 7,000 adult female crabs in 
Plymouth Sound (again, Carcinas maenas, but a different population) that swarmed the 
beach below the Marine Biological Station at which he worked: the carapace length (to 
standardize growth), frontal breadth, and “right dentary margin” (distance between the 
end teeth of one side).200  
With the data, Weldon developed statistical formulas to calculate and graphically 
depict selective destruction. He estimated that 7.7% of the population was eliminated due 
to differences in frontal breadth. In contrast, natural selection was not acting upon the 
“right dentary margin” because variation in length increased with growth.201 While he did 
not consider the exact numbers reliable, “the point which seems worthy of confidence” 
and possibly of “very great importance, is the form of the result.”202 “By pure statistical 
methods, and without making any [physiological] assumptions,” he had determined “the 
time of life which natural selection must be assumed to act, if it acts at all” and a 
“numerical estimate” of selective destruction as a function of frontal breadth. In essence 
he had detected natural selection at work.203 
But while Weldon had shown how to “determine the direction and rate of 
evolution,” he was dissatisfied by the lack of explanation: why was a wider frontal 
breadth disadvantageous? To understand its “physiological function” and “functional 
adaptation,” he was forced to experiment. Working under a barrage of criticisms, Weldon 
expanded the study into large-scale experimentation.204 Five years later, he reported — as 
 
200 Weldon, “Opening Address of the Zoological Section,” Nature 58, no. 1508 (1898): 504. 
201 Weldon, “An Attempt to Measure the Death-Rate Due to the Selective Destruction of Carcinus moenas,’ 
368. Weldon interpreted the relationship between variation and growth as consistent with “Darwin’s 
statement that many variations appear at a late period of development.” He noted, however, that without 
experiment, it was possible but unlikely that the plateauing and shrinking of frontal breadth was merely a 
condition of growth in crabs. 
202 Ibid., 371. Emphasis mine. The power of this method was its possible generality, although it had several 
limitations. It would fail if directional selection were too strong, as in “rapid changes such as those induced 
artificially by domestication,” which was outside of his concern, or if there was rapid migration or changes 
in the environment. The method also covered only traits with a normal distribution, but Weldon considered 
violations to be the exception: only one crab in 5,000 had a “right dentary margin” outside the probable 
error. 
203 Pearson was critical of Weldon’s claim to have causally linked frontal breadth and natural selection. 
Charles H. Pence, “‘Describing Our Whole Experience’: The Statistical Philosophies of WFR Weldon and 
Karl Pearson,” Studies in the History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 42, no. 4 
(2011/12): 475-485. 
204 Pearson complained about the vitriol the 1894 publication engendered, despite his caution and 
admission of limitations. Pearson, “Walter Frank Raphael Weldon. 1860-1906,” 26. 
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President of the British Association’s Zoological Section — a further study of Carcinus 
maenas, in which he had experimentally determined the frequency and cause of the 
death-rate due to variation in frontal breadth.205  
In fact, “the mean frontal breadth of this race of crabs is, in fact, changing at a rate 
sufficiently rapid for all the requirements of a theory of evolution.”206 Statistical data had 
revealed that between 1893 and 1898, the frontal breadth of both male and female 
Carcinus maenas had measurably decreased. He could therefore also counter the claim 
that Darwinism relied on an unimaginable amount of “fortuitous variation” that was too 
minute for selection to detect: it simply did.  
The sophisticated and large-scale experimentation he conducted also left him 
“confident” as to the causal link between selection and frontal breadth: environmental 
changes in Plymouth Sound. Over the previous half-century, Plymouth Sound had 
become blocked by a “huge artificial breakwater” that had curbed water flow. A number 
of rivers deposited china clay into the water, but instead of being washed out to sea, the 
clay now settled and accumulated. As the surrounding human population grew, an 
increasing amount of sewage and garbage was thrown into the water. These changes had 
noticeably eliminated several animals from occupying the space (while they continued to 
inhabit the area on the others side of the breakwater). For Weldon, the situation created an 
obvious selective condition to explain decreasing frontal breadths of Carcinus maenas. 
Weldon constructed a “large vessel of sea-water, in which a considerable quantity 
of very fine china clay was suspended … by a slowly moving automatic agitator.” 
Raising 248 crabs, he measured the frontal breadths of the 154 that died and the 94 that 
survived. The mean of the surviving sample was smaller than that of the original 
population and the mean of the dead sample larger. When he used coarser clay, this 
difference was smaller and “not selective.”207 Weldon, believing he had sufficiently 
replicated natural conditions within this artificial environment, argued, 
I see no shadow of reasoning for refusing to believe that the action of the mud upon the 
beach is the same as that in an experimental aquarium; and if we believe this, I see no 
 
205 Weldon, “Opening Address of the Zoological Section.” Weldon framed his address as a defense of 
Darwinism, arguing that his methods showed that selection had the available variation to act upon despite 
its minuteness.  
206 Weldon, 504. 
207 Weldon, 505. 
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escape from the conclusion that we have here a case of Natural Selection acting with 




Before confirming this conclusion, Weldon performed a control experiment. If selection 
were truly acting on this trait, then “protecting” the broader crabs from suspended clay 
should produce an adult population in which the mean did not diminish. To do this, 
Weldon “established an apparatus consisting of some hundreds of numbered glass bottles, 
each bottle being provided with a constant supply of clean sea-water by means of a 
system of glass syphons. Into each of these bottles [he] placed a crab from the beach.”209 
(See Figure 2.) 
 
Figure 2. From Karl Pearson, “Walter Frank Raphael Weldon. 1860-1906” (1906), Plate IV. 
Weldon’s “experimental crabbery.” 
 
 
208 Weldon, 505. 




Pearson was astonished by the project, writing that “the labour involved was 
excessive”: 
One "crabbery" consisted of 500 wide-mouthed bottles … and each crab had to be fed 
daily and its bottle cleaned. During the summer of 1897 Weldon spent the whole of his 
days at the aquarium, and his wife hardly left him except to fetch the needful chop.
210
 
The sewage experiment was "horrible from the great quantity of decaying matter 




Following each of an individuals’ molts, Weldon measured the length and frontal 
breadth of the crab’s shell, finding that when compared to a wild crab of the same length, 
the difference was “a little less.”212 He explained this by attributing selective action upon 
acclimatization. Acknowledging the difficulty of keeping the apparatus clean, he 
performed another control experiment in which the crabs were raised in “putrid water” 
and those that survived again had “distinctly” smaller frontal breadths than the dead. But 
under clean conditions, the adult crabs were “unmistakably broader than wild crabs of 
their own size.”213 
Weldon remained cautious. He acknowledged that his assumption that size and 
age were directly correspondent had not been demonstrated and that the bottles, an 
artificial environment, could unintentionally impact growth. Indeed, “we could not accept 
this experiment by itself as proof that some selective agent exists on the shore which is 
absent from the bottles.” But, the experimental results were “in complete harmony” with 
the hypothesis that the increase in suspended mud was “the selective agent” making crabs 
in Plymouth Sound narrower. Further, contrary to his conclusion five years prior, Weldon 
posited a physiological explanation: dead crabs had gills covered with china clay and 
survivors did not, i.e., “narrow frontal breadth [probably] renders one part of the process 
 
210 Pearson noted earlier in his obituary that Weldon’s wife Florence computed data alongside him. 
211 Pearson, “Walter Frank Raphael Weldon. 1860-1906,” 27. Pearson does not cite this quotation, but I 
presume that it comes from a letter to Pearson from Weldon. 
212 Weldon, “Opening Address of the Zoological Section,” 506. Gayon points out that Weldon explicitly 
relied upon the developmentalist views of Darwin and Weismann; this would conflict with the genotype-
phenotype distinction followed by the geneticists. 
213 Weldon, 506. 
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of filtration more efficient than it is in crabs of greater frontal breadth.”214 
Thus, Weldon concluded, that in addition to the utility of statistics in describing 
variation,  
I hope I have convinced you that the action of natural selection upon such fortuitous 
variations can be experimentally measured, at least in the only case in which any one has 
attempted to measure it. I hope I have convinced you that the process of evolution is 
sometimes so rapid that it can be observed in the space of a very few years. … Numerical 




Weldon had produced a rich combination of experimentation, statistics, and field 
naturalism. By the end, Weldon’s work did not demonstrate Pearson’s anti-materialist and 
idealist philosophy, but it was still shot through with his pioneering statistical methods 
that was born from it.216 Rather than deploying statistics to avoid causal reasoning, 
Weldon pointed to a plausible environmental mechanism that explained evolutionary 
change in a methodical and controlled manner. Moreover, he claimed that evolution had 
been observed in action. 
However, the apparent success of the experimentation left Weldon underwhelmed 
by his overall project. Gayon writes, “It was because this purely ‘statistical’ approach was 
mathematically and materially too complex that Weldon turned to a classical 
experimental method, with all that implied in terms of causal hypotheses and laboratory 
procedures.” He further points out that the biometrical emphasis on sticking to 
correlations between parent and offspring had not been calculated at all in the work and 
the precise physiological explanation about gills remained speculative.217 Weldon had 
shown the immense amount of rigor required to study evolution and selection in nature, 
and that it was possible. 
Like Dallinger and despite his apparent success, Weldon’s evolutionary 
 
214 Weldon, 506. 
215 Weldon, 506. 
216 This is consistent with Pence regarding Pearson and Weldon in “‘Describing Our Whole Experience.’”  
217 Gayon, Darwinism’s Struggle for Survival, 223. Gayon also accepts the argument that Pearson’s 
phenomenology undermined their project: “The major epistemological weakness of the biometricians lay in 
their intransigent phenomenalist epistemology. Fueled by their enthusiasm, this method led them to believe 




experimentation did not launch a research program.218 But this was not because he 
abandoned experimental evolution. Even with his growing emphasis on biometry via his 
editorship of Biometrika, Pearson considered Weldon “essentially a field naturalist.” 
According to Pearson, Weldon was “impelled” to biometry because he thought “no 
further progress with Darwinism could be made until demonstration from the statistical 
side was forthcoming.” Weldon’s image as a statistician, rather than an experimentalist, 
likely originated not only from his criticism of experimental genetics, but because he 
failed to publish much of his work, whether experimental or field-based. In addition to 
the experiments on infusoria, he also worked with Daphnia, “which had shown him how 
widely Daphnia are modified by their chemical and physical environment, and how this 
modification is largely due to selection.”219 He also studied the caterpillars of pedigree 
moths, “his first big experimental investigation into heredity,” lasting three years. 
(Unfortunately for Weldon, “no definite inheritance at all of the character selected for 
consideration was considered.”) Weldon’s published work on snails hoped to “get to the 
kernel of selection in its action on local races,” but unlike the crab work, no 
experimentation was involved. 220 Thus, Weldon, like Dallinger, pointed to the 
possibilities of experimental evolution, but did not develop a lasting program for others to 
help conduct. Had he succeeded to publish more of his work, it is possible his 
experimental research would have been equally as famous as the statistical. But Weldon’s 
unfortunate and early death in 1906 at the age of 46 prevented that from ever occurring. 
Despite his feud with geneticist William Bateson, Weldon’s demonstration and 
elaboration of statistical methods impacted the American experimental evolutionists who 
fruitfully integrated the feuding programs mostly along Mendelian lines (Chapters 4 and 
5). 
 
Bateson's Critique of the Biometrical Method 
Essential to this story, however, is the acrimonious debate between Weldon and 
geneticist William Bateson. Here, I focus specifically on Bateson’s searing 
 
218 Note that Weldon’s research, too, was published as an address, not a research article or monograph. 
219 Pearson, “Walter Frank Raphael Weldon. 1860-1906,” 31. 
220 Pearson, 32. 
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methodological critique of biometry, for it demonstrates the growing need for 
experimentation that many biologists perceived at the time (setting aside the theoretical 
debate over the law of ancestral inheritance). From this exchange, I suggest that biometry 
— as the biometrists envisioned it — failed partially because of its programmatic neglect 
of experimentation, broadly construed. While their statistical methods were embraced by 
geneticists after Bateson, the program as envisioned by Pearson and Weldon was 
insufficient. That is, biometry appeared to make evolution visible, but it glossed over 
hereditary and evolutionary complexities to such a degree that biometry alone did not 
throw light on much at all, especially when it came to questions of control. 
Bateson’s critique of biometry, and much of evolutionary science in general, was 
that its fundamental method was hopelessly flawed.221 Biometrists treated “the 
indiscriminate confounding of all divergences from type into one heterogeneous heap 
under the name “Variation” which “creat[ed] an enduring obstacle to the progress of 
evolutionary science.”222 According to Bateson, the biometrists’ methods were contrary to 
Darwin’s, in that they treated 
the evidence of the collector, the horticulturist, the breeder, the fancier … with neglect, 
sometimes, … with contempt. That wide field whence Darwin drew his wonderful store 





Instead, Bateson was “convinced that the investigation of heredity by experimental 
methods offer[ed] the sole chance of progress with the fundamental problems of 
 
221 In this address, Bateson called biometrists “Ancestrians,” referencing their promotion of the law of 
ancestral inheritance. It was this adherence that many geneticists attacked as incongruent with biology, 
which they alleged undermined Pearson’s positivist program. Again, however, I am here interested in 
methods, not theories. 
222 William Bateson, “Opening Address of the Zoological Section,” Nature 70 (August 25, 1904): 407. He 
specifically pointed out the “heterogeneous” characters of variation as “quantitative or qualitative, 
permanent or transitory, in size, number of parts, chemistry, and the rest.” Ironically, though, Karl Pearson 
had criticized Bateson in 1902 for sloppy, incoherent, and inconsistent definitions of “variation” and 
“discontinuity.” Karl Pearson, “On the Fundamental Conceptions of Biology,” Biometrika 1, no. 3 (1902): 
320–44. Pearson further criticized Bateson for never testing the inheritability of “discontinuous variations” 
and developing a method by which to distinguish such variations from “continuous” or “normal” variation. 
This highlights how essential Mendel and Johannsen were: Bateson could not have undermined biometry 
without them. 
223 Bateson, “Opening Address of the Zoological Section,” 407. 
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evolution.”224 Furthermore, like Darwin (and Mendel), he embraced the artificial: “The 
breeding-pen is to us what the test-tube is to the chemist.”225 Bateson’s rhetoric adopted 
Darwin’s metonymy regarding the natural and artificial: 
In the natural world, in the collecting-box, the seed-bed, the poultry-yard, the places 
where variation, heredity, selection may be seen in operation and their properties tested, 
answers to these questions meet us at every turn—fragmentary answers, it is true, but 
each direct to the point. … If he [anyone] breed two or three generations of almost any 
controllable form, he will obtain immediately facts as to the course of heredity which 




Bateson also believed genetics “will be found of extraordinary use.”227 While the 
phylogenetic studies he had pursued perhaps revealed “the history … of Evolution,” 
genetics “deal[t] not only with the present and the past, but with the future also.”228 He 
quoted Francis Bacon, 
I entreat men to believe that it is not an opinion to be held, but a work to be done; and to 
be well assured that I am labouring to lay the foundation, not of any sect or doctrine, but 




Bateson also argued that the biometric theory discouraged experimentation. He 
reiterated this critique more forcefully in 1909: 
By suggesting that the steps through which an adaptive mechanism arose were indefinite 
and insensible, all further trouble is spared. While it could be said that species arise by an 
insensible and imperceptible process of variation, there was clearly no use in tiring 





224 Bateson, 409. 
225 Bateson, 409. In his 1902 defense of Mendel, he wrote “the breeder … will be second only to the 
chemist in resource and in foresight.” William Bateson, Mendel’s Principles of Heredity: A Defence, with a 
Translation of Mendel’s Original Papers on Hybridisation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1902), 208. 
226 Bateson, “Opening Address of the Zoological Section,” 407. Emphasis mine. 
227 Bateson, 413. Olby points to the irony that Bateson’s “objections to utility were deep,” yet “Bateson did 
much more for horticulture, and indirectly, for agriculture, (through Biffen) than possibly any other British 
biologist of his generation.” Robert Olby, “The Dimensions of Scientific Controversy: The Biometric-
Mendelian Debate,” The British Journal for the History of Science 22, no. 3 (1989): 318. 
228 Bateson, “Opening Address of the Zoological Section,” 409. 
229 Bateson, 409. Bacon’s quote comes from Great Instauration. 
230 William Bateson, “Heredity and Variation in Modern Lights,” in Darwinism and Modern Science, ed. A. 




To summarize, Bateson regarded biometry and traditional Darwinian studies to be 
following the wrong method. It was genetics, not biometry, that rendered evolution 
visible, controllable, and useful. Bateson argued that while the biometricians may have 
adopted Darwin’s theory of natural selection, it was the Mendelians who had adopted 
Darwin’s method — experimentally and rhetorically. The argument here, therefore, is that 
during “the eclipse of Darwinism,” it is crucial to distinguish between Darwinian theory 
and Darwinian method. Darwin did not develop his theory of evolution by natural 
selection by studying animals in the wild via statistics, but by engaging in hands-on 
experimentation (even if not a long-term selection experiment), by considering 
physiological mechanisms, and by embracing the artificial world of the breeders. In this 
sense, the Mendelian adoption of Darwinian method reshaped Darwinian theory.231 
 
Making Evolution Visible by Experiment: Hugo de Vries 
Contemporary with Weldon, the Dutch botanist Hugo de Vries developed another 
scientific program, culminating in his landmark publication of 1900, Die 
Mutationstheorie, which expounded fifteen years of work on experimental evolution.232 
While known primarily for its lengthy observations on the evening primrose, Oenothera 
lamarckiana, its legacy was far more substantial. It promulgated an experimental 
ideology that was still just emerging within the evolutionary sciences, proposed theories 
that would fuel twenty years of debate, and bolstered the Darwinian legacy by integrating 
natural history with agriculture and horticulture. 
Hugo de Vries remains an enigma, however, presenting a number of paradoxes in the 
historical literature.233 While he considered himself a follower of Darwin, he is known as 
an anti-Darwinian. He was one of the co-discoverers of Mendel, yet rejected its 
fundamentality. Christened the “godfather of experimental evolution” by Charles 
 
231 Arlin Stoltzfus and Kele Cable, “Mendelism-Mutationism: The Forgotten Evolutionary Synthesis,” 
Journal of the History of Biology 47, no. 4 (2014): 501–46. 
232 Hugo de Vries, The Mutation Theory: Experiments and Observations on the Origin of Species in the 
Vegetable Kingdom, vol. 1, trans. John Farmer and Arthur Darbishire (Chicago: Open Court Pub. Co., 
1909). 
233 Bert Theunissen, “Knowledge Is Power: Hugo de Vries on Science, Heredity, and Social Progress,” The 
British Journal for the History of Science 27, no. 4 (1994): 291–311. 
75 
 
Davenport, his Oenothera work, usually the only science of his presented by historians, is 
remarkably non-interventionist. Furthermore, as the rest of the dissertation will 
demonstrate, much of the distortion and confusion regarding both de Vries as well as 
those whom he inspired (particularly Edward East and George Shull) results from not 
seriously interrogating what is meant by terms such as “mutation,” “fluctuation,” 
“selection,” and “species.” Because the meanings of these terms changed substantially 
between Darwin and the Modern Synthesis, they cannot be taken as rigid categories, but 
as contingent ideas specific to the individual historical scientists.234 Thus reassessing de 
Vries’ position in the history of experimental evolution is important to understanding the 
history of experimental evolution in general. 
The Mutation Theory was not based solely upon Oenothera, but on a number of 
additional pillars, including breeders’ and scientists’ experiences with horticulture and 
agriculture (although this was complicated), problems with the theory of natural 
selection, his experimental treatments of regression and nutrition, and to some extent, the 
rediscovery of Mendelism.235 The experimental species were also not restricted to 
Oenothera, and included maize, poppies, chrysanthemums, coriander, and dill, among 
others. Thus, any simplistic description of de Vries’ mutation theory usually results in 
distortion, because to explain it requires explaining its ontological and epistemological 
basis. 
De Vries’ method was a mixture of natural history, experimentation, and statistics. 
Despite the later disputes between biometry with Mendelism and mutationism, de Vries 
embraced biometry (although not with the same sophistication as Pearson), applying the 
statistical methods of Quetelet and Galton to his own plants and confirming that 
variability matched a predictable bell curve. 
For de Vries, the mutation theory and experimental evolution were virtually identical, 
and opposed to gradualism. The naturalists’ rejection of experimental evolution “has its 
root … in the opinion that the species of animals and plants have originated by 
imperceptible gradations,” “so slow that the life of a man is not long enough to enable 
 
234 For an example, see Luis Campos’ discussion of geneticists’ changing use of “mutation” and “mutant” in 
the 1920s in Radium and the Secret of Life, 175-180. 
235 Arlin Stoltzfus and Kele Cable, “Mendelism-Mutationism: The Forgotten Evolutionary Synthesis,” 
Journal of the History of Biology 47, no. 4 (2014): 501–46. 
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him to witness the origin of a new form.” Instead, de Vries argued that “…species arise 
by saltations and that the individual saltations are occurrences which can be observed like 
any other physiological process.”236 Thus, this combination of method and theory would 
not only render evolution visible, but also asserted that evolution was visible. 
The visibility of evolution was the key result of de Vries’ Oenothera research, which 
were remarkably and ironically not all that experimental. Indeed, de Vries wrote that “the 
object of the experiments in my garden was not to induce mutations, but to make a closer 
study of the process of mutation than was possible in nature.” That is, his “experiments” 
were more like a closely tracked natural history of Oenothera under observable 
conditions. The point was not to “determin[e] the causes of these processes,” but to 
simply observe the process in the first place, under controlled, well-nourished conditions 
free from “the sources of error and uncertainty,” such as insect fertilization.237 This was 
not all that different from Weldon. 
De Vries also criticized the reckless use of breeders’ testimonies as scientific 
evidence. Although Darwin’s use of such had provided key support for the theories of 
selection and common descent, “the ‘doctrine of selection’ require[d] a new set of facts. 
Since Darwin, a new standard of evaluation of facts has come to be.”238 He believed that 
experimentalism’s embrace of reductionism and simplicity to isolate patterns and laws 
conflicted with breeders’ need for complexity and hybridization (i.e., contamination) for 
commercial use. Breeding had questionable relevance to the origin of species; it could 
“not help us to choose” between the selection and mutation theories. De Vries argued that 
biologists should “fix our attention on the simplest processes,” with crossing excluded, so 
that the effects of mutation and selection could be revealed.239 Until then, most historical 
and even experimental claims could not properly differentiate between the two factors of 
selection and mutation. De Vries did not reject agriculture and horticulture as important 
 
236 Hugo de Vries, The Mutation Theory, viii.  
237 De Vries, 1909, pp. 300-301, 500-501. “The point is that the cultures in the garden disclose to us what 
happens, but ordinarily escapes observation, in nature.” p. 307 It was also important to determine how 
hybridization worked within the group. “The experiment does not create anything new. It merely enables us 
to see and study what happens in nature.” 
238 De Vries, 1909, pp. 12-13. In a way this was an extension of de Vries’ mentor Julius Sachs’ arguments 
regarding laboratory science versus Darwin’s amateur experimentation. Soraya de Chadarevian, 
“Laboratory-Science versus Country-House Experiments: The Controversy between Julius Sachs and 
Charles Darwin,” The British Journal for the History of Science 29 (1996): 17–41. 
239 De Vries, 1909, p. 82 
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sources of information, but emphasized the limitations. 
As Theunissen suggests of Darwin, de Vries argued that the type of breeding a 
biologist paid attention to would color the evolutionary theory they expounded, a primary 
division being between agriculture and horticulture. In horticulture, new varieties 
appeared suddenly which were then “made constant by selection.” However, “it would be 
more correct to say that they are freed from the adulterating effects of free crossing.” 
That is, selection did not have “any object other than the purification of the new race 
from the effects of mixed ancestry.” (This claim was very important for his followers, 
discussed in Chapters 4 and 5.) Agriculturists, in contrast, gradually improved crops by 
selecting extant variation, but the race deteriorated once selection was relaxed. In neither 
case did selection have permanent and creative effects.240 However, the method of 
agriculture, “which can only be achieved by a few and at the cost of great sagacity and 
patience, produces a great impression”; horticulture’s reliance on chance “makes none at 
all.” Therefore, agricultural methods “loomed much larger in our discussions on the 
origin of species.” But de Vries argued that horticulture bore stronger resemblance to 
evolution because it produced the constancy that the latter depended upon.241  
De Vries held that the theory of selection, especially Wallace’s, who at this point was 
considered an ultra-selectionist by critics, rested upon two “unproved” hypotheses: that 
“the advance brought about by selection may increase for an indefinite period” and that 
“the result of selection can become independent of selection.” He worried that the first 
hypothesis, which usually entailed a belief that selection would take thousands of 
generations to effect creative change, “deterred many investigators from instituting 
experiments of this kind.” But, selection experiments that attempted to transform wild 
carrots, radishes, and parsnips into something akin to their cultivated form took only a 
few years. However, they reverted to their wild forms if selection slackened — regression 
— and therefore, despite their changes, the plants’ traits did not become “independent of 
selection.” Furthermore, even when selection continued, progress halted; therefore, 
 
240 De Vries also points out that these two methods lead to different market effects. In horticulture, the 
sudden but permanent appearance of a novelty means the breeder has a monopoly only if they did not sell 
it. In agriculture, the need for rigid selection combined with its gradual improvements meant that it could 
be sold during the course of improvement and the breeder to some degree keeps their monopoly. 
241 Ibid., pp. 78-82 
78 
 
selection could not advance “for an indefinite period” and any recourse to eons of time 
were “absolutely without foundation.” Instead, selection “becomes gradually more 
difficult to effect any change until finally it becomes impossible.”242   
The breeding work de Vries thought most fit for the job for examining selection was 
with sugar beets, of which breeders had doubled its sugar content by artificial selection. 
“All this has been done by selection of the best individuals afforded by ordinary 
fluctuating variation. Neither spontaneous variations nor crossings have played any part 
in it. We are dealing here with the process in its simplest form.” However, as impressive 
as these results were, they did not address the question of selection, evolution, and the 
origin of species. The sugar content in beets had doubled under artificial selection, but 
“by no manner of means is the improvement independent of selection.” Failure to keep 
up rigid selection on all target characters “would soon lead to a degeneration of the whole 
race.” The same was true of the cereals.243 
From a series of experiments comparing and combining the effects of selection with 
nutrition, de Vries developed a crucial distinction between inherited and non-inherited 
variation that animated decades of debate, that between “fluctuations” and “mutations.” 
Instead of relying only on breeders’ work, de Vries began in 1891 to test the relative 
powers of selection and nutrition (manuring) to modify plants. In a four-way comparison 
between positive and negative selection and manuring and lack thereof with Oenothera 
laevifolia (a subspecies of Lamarckiana). De Vries found that over three generations, the 
positive effects of manuring overwhelmed negative selection. “Positive selection has, in 
combination” with nutrition, “only been able to achieve very little more.” In another 
condition, in which de Vries grew seedlings in pots instead of in the garden, “and without 
any selection at all, an exceptionally high nutrition had a far better result than the first 
two combinations.”244 In further experiments, de Vries discovered the relative powers of 
each varied among the six species he tested. Thus, de Vries did not argue that selection 
 
242 De Vries, 1909, pp. 85, 89, 119-120. De Vries suggested that Darwin’s view that introduction to 
cultivation engendered variability in plants was probably due to the existence of several subspecies within 
the initial population, as well as the increased population size. 
243 Ibid., p. 100, 104-106. De Vries also supported his theorization through selection experiments on maize 
conducted by Fritz Mueller and himself. Ibid., pp. 71-74  




was without effect, but that its effects were not straightforward either.245 
Methodologically, de Vries concluded that biologists should keep nutrition as constant as 
possible, and “not to be too ready to interpret any changes that may occur as the effects of 
selection.”246 His theoretical conclusions were more profound, however, and were the 
foundation of decades of debate over the relationships between variation, heredity, and 
selection, a debate that will be followed throughout the rest of the dissertation, for their 
implications in evolutionary theory as well as the possibility of taking control of 
evolution.  
The central contradiction emanating from these experiments was how evolution 
produced novelty. For one, selection’s power was limited by regression and nutrition. It 
also eliminated variation. Another problem was that specific characters, those that 
differentiated species from each other, “are absolutely independent of selection.” 
However, most agricultural varieties, the evidence that much of the selection theory 
rested upon, did not have traits independent of selection. Indeed, it was “the instability of 
races” that served as “the central fact on which all agricultural breeding processes are 
based.”247 Selection and agriculture thus went hand-in-hand, but they said little about the 
origin of species. 
Quoting philosopher Paul Janet, who stated that “the real difficulty of Darwin’s 
theory is the transition from artificial to natural selection,” de Vries wrote: 
This difficulty can only be surmounted by admitting that the improvement of races and 
the origin of new forms are really entirely different, and only apparently similar, 




Thus, the core claim of de Vries’ mutation theory was that there were essential 
differences between the natural and artificial (although this specific claim was not 
necessarily adopted by his followers). Returning to the distinction between agriculture 
 
245 Ibid., p. 573. One especially interesting case was that of Chrysanthemum, which sown from packets of 
mixed seeds showed a dimorphic curve (as Weldon saw in crabs). Assuming this to be the result of two 
races, a round of negative selection then produced a monomorphic curve. That is, selection reduced 
variation within a mixed population (pp. 562-565). 
246 Ibid., p. 543. 
247 Ibid., pp. 90-91, p. 129. 
248 Ibid., p. 211. These remarks are especially interesting given the arguments of Abeles regarding Darwin’s 
rhetoric of metonymy. It appears that de Vries recognized it as such, although not explicitly. 
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and horticulture, in which the associated dominant factors of evolution were selection and 
mutation, respectively, de Vries singled out mutation as the creative factor of evolution. 
More than that, de Vries in some sense constructed two parallel processes of variation-
heredity-selection modeled on the distinction between agriculture and horticulture. The 
key was that there were two kinds of variation with physiological and evolutionary 
differences: fluctuations and mutations. 
De Vries argued that his distinction between fluctuations and mutations was rooted in 
Darwin’s original theory, but critiqued Darwin for his “lack of definiteness.” That is, 
“Darwin was never quite clear about the physiological part of the theory of Selection.” 
Instead, he see-sawed between emphasizing “single variations” (i.e., sports) or 
“individual variation” (i.e., small, ever-present, multi-directional). Much of the mission 
of Die Mutationstheorie then, was to not only experimentalize evolution, but to 
physiologically distinguish between kinds of variation. De Vries rechristened Darwin’s 
“single variation” and “individual variation” as “mutation” and “fluctuation,” 
respectively.249 But he also theorized that fluctuations were inherited only partially and 
temporarily, whereas mutations were inherited fully and permanently. 
De Vries’ experiments on selection and nutrition were therefore a study of 
fluctuations. He generalized that fluctuating variability resulted from some combination 
of “selection, i.e., by the characters of its parents and grandparents and partly by 
nutrition, i.e., by the operation of external influences on the individual itself.” But 
because the ancestors themselves “were also determined by the conditions of life,” this 
variation was the result entirely of external conditions. Fluctuating variability, subject to 
statistical laws, was “the physiology of nutrition.” but the “external causes of mutation 
are, on the other hand, as yet wholly unknown.”250 
Therefore, “mutation and the actual process of mutating must become the object of 
investigation.” The problem was that catching mutations in the act of happening had been 
 
249 De Vries, 1909, pp. 5, 29. A reason de Vries considered himself a part of the Darwinian heritage is that 
he argued Darwin himself relied on single variations as the basis for evolution. Darwin’s “chance 
variations” must be single variations, not individual variation, due to the later being ever-present (pp. 35-
36). De Vries did consider himself opposed to Wallace, however, whose lack of caution and pluralism had 
resulted in a “compact, clear and surprisingly simple” theory based on only natural selection of individual 
variation (pp. 40-41). Later in the book, de Vries argues that Darwin’s work had allusions to what he called 
mutation periods, see pp. 206-208. 
250 Ibid., p. 575. 
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difficult; most of the time a scientist or horticulturist discovered them afterward. Because 
they happened by chance and without direction, and not by the directive actions of the 
breeder, they could be detected only if that breeder were on the hunt for them, of which 
he cited numerous examples.251 
The major work of natural history that de Vries pointed to as evidence of mutation 
was that of the French botanist and taxonomist Alexis Jordan. A critic of Linneaus, Jordan 
was a splitter, not a lumper, and distinguished 200 species of Draba verna. Given that 
Linnaeus had considered these forms one single species, it followed that the differences 
between these 200 so-called “elementary species” “may be very slight and often only 
visible to the initiated.” Indeed, they “differ[ed] less from each other than extreme 
variations in the same characters usually do in other plants.”252 However, they were 
“perfectly constant,” a constancy that could “only be proved by cultivating the plants by 
seed.” 
Indeed, these slight differences, mutations, 
also entailed overlapping variation: depending on external conditions, such as nutrition, 
the variation within character of one elementary species could be both smaller and larger 
than another species’ character. However, elementary species differed from each other in 
more than a single character, so unlike Darwin’s view of species, there were no 





He also cited the work of Davenport and Blankinship, which showed that “in the case of 
Typha latifolia and angustifolia, the curves describing their various characters overlap.” 
From this and other examples, de Vries concluded that Linnean species were arbitrary 
collectives, “mixtures,” just like genera and phyla, and explained why it had been 
impossible to witness the appearance of a new species: Linnean species were too large of 
a jump! De Vries’ sudden mutations or saltations were therefore small, even if they 
included multiple characters. This experimental-based definition of species overstepped 
“the species problem” which had proved to be an obstacle to the experimentalization of 
 
251 Ibid., pp. 189, 195. 
252 Ibid., 55-56. 




The student of morphological and historical evolution is concerned with the origin of the 
Linnean or collective species, genera, families and larger groups. The student of 
experimental evolution is concerned with the origin of elementary species, or rather with 
the origin of specific characters.
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Therefore, de Vries made evolution visible not through large leaps, but by tests of 
cultivation. 
De Vries’ distinction between fluctuations and mutations had much broader 
implications: a new definition of species, a different role for selection, the introduction of 
mutation as a creative force in evolution, and as his followers would reveal, new methods 
of breeding and controlling evolution. 
Mutation solved the problem of regression, for they arose “independent of 
selection.” De Vries claimed that “…species have arisen from one another by a 
discontinuous … process. Each new unit, forming a fresh step in this process, sharply and 
completely separates the new form as an independent species that from which it sprang. 
The new species appears all at once; it originates from the parent species without any 
visible preparation, and without any obvious series of transitional forms.” The essence of 
the mutation theory was that “species have arisen after the manner of so-called 
spontaneous variations.”255 
In contrast to these sudden, distinct, random, and non-directional mutations, 
fluctuations conformed to Quetelet’s laws. They were always present, grouped around a 
mean, and were “perpetual,” “gradual, continuous, reversible, [and] limited.” 
Fluctuations were linear in that they increased or decreased a given trait (“plus” or 
“minus” variation), but did not produce novelty. While selection of these variations was 
 
254 Ibid., p. 211. 
255 Ibid., pp. 3, 165. De Vries’ mutations were of a different quality than that of the later Mendelians. The 
Mendelians tended to think that a mutation affected a single character, or perhaps a few, whereas de Vries 
held mutations to effect change throughout the entire organism (in “all their organs and peculiarities”), but 
were due to “the expression of a single character, a single unit…” Ibid., p. 57. The Mendelians also adopted 
a hardline position that fluctuations were not at all inherited, whereas de Vries believed they were, but 
subject to regression. The key for later developments then, as Stoltzfus and Cable argue, is that the 
Mendelians adopted de Vries’ critique of selection and some of the basic schematics of his mutation theory, 




responsible for “the origin of many improved races” in agriculture, fluctuation’s response 
to selection was governed by Galton’s laws of regression, preventing species change. 
From this distinction, de Vries constructed a new theory of evolution and 
selection. Selection-of-fluctuations followed what his experiments had shown: increase or 
decrease of a given trait followed by regression. With mutations, selection’s role was to 
sort between them: “the struggle for existence chooses from among the mutations at its 
disposal those which are best adapted at the moment.” The units were not individuals 
within a species, but the elementary species themselves, and therefore, natural selection 
did not “create” species, but “eliminated” them. Because mutations were random with 
respect to their adaptiveness,  
we see therefore that in the process of the origin of new species some certainly do arise 
which are not capable of existence for any length of time. Nature does not confine herself 
to producing just what is wanted; her creative power seems to be almost unlimited. She 
furnishes every possibility, so to speak, and leaves it to the environment to choose what 




From another set of experiments, de Vries explained local adaptation as well as 
Lamarckian claims of the inheritance of acquired characters: they were fluctuations. In 
1899, he published an experiment with a “monstrous” subspecies of poppies (Papaver 
somniferum polycephalum) that had up to 150 supernumerary carpels. He experimentally 
determined that the variability in carpel number was entirely dependent on its conditions, 
“the more favorable the conditions the more numerous the supernumerary carpels.” But 
in addition to this trait, better conditions were correlated with stronger plants in thickness 
of stem, total height, and fruit weight. Therefore, selection for a larger carpellary crown 
or a stronger plant is “merely a selection of the most highly nourished.” Reverse selection 
produced reverse results. To de Vries, the growth of the monstrous carpellary crown 
under selection “would be called an acquired character in the usual acceptance of the 
term.” Furthermore, he held that due to parallel experiments in other plants, a “universal 
and very important principle” (but with some exceptions) was “the simultaneous 
influence of the conditions of life on the visible character of an organism and on its germ 
 
256 Ibid., p. 506. 
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cells. In other words we may say that selection is the choice of the best nourished 
individuals.”257 De Vries’ solution to the Lamarckism problem, therefore, was to relegate 
acquired characters to fluctuations and the origin of specific characters to mutation.258 
The explanation was further confirmed by the transplantation experiments of Bonnier, 
which de Vries replicated with Othonna crassifolia, showing that growing plants in 
different environments produced adaptive ranges of variability.259 Furthermore, these 
curves were broader in wild populations of Chrysanthemum segetum than in descendants 
of a single individual sown in a field, despite having the same mean.260 That is, a mixed 
population was more adaptable than a single individual. 
Therefore, acquired characters and localized adaptations were merely fluctuations. 
Indeed, following his experiments, he pointed out that “nutrition … is at the bottom of all 
individual variability.” This identity was further indicated by so-called acquired 
characters’ inheritance being subject to Galtonian regression following selection. 
Therefore, “selection consists in the choice of the most highly nourished.” 
As mentioned above, de Vries’ theory of evolution consisted in two parallel processes 
that were formerly considered one. Their relationship was that mutations produced new 
means, “on both sides of which fluctuations may occur.” Thus, “constancy and variability 
are perfectly compatible.”261 Their evolutionary differences were that: 
On the one hand the struggle takes place between the individuals of one and the same 
elementary species, on the other between the various species themselves. The former is a 




The former produced “local races,” explained acclimatization, and was subject to 
regression. But, 
The natural selection of newly arisen elementary species in the struggle for existence is 
an entirely different matter. They arise suddenly and without any obvious cause; they 
 
257 Ibid., p. 142. 
258 Ibid., p. 143. 
259 “Far too little attention has been paid to the relation between the range of variation of the individual 
characters and the degree of their adaptation to changing conditions of life; and the whole matter is still 
very much of a mystery. Here again it is probable that further study will tend to emphasize the fundamental 
distinction between variability and mutability.” p. 154. 
260 Ibid., pp. 151-152. 
261 Ibid., p. 518. 
262 Ibid., pp. 211-212. 
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increase and multiply because the new characters are inherited. When this increase leads 




But natural selection did not create species in either cycle: selection of fluctuations did 
not lead to speciation; selection between mutations was selection between species. “The 
rôle played by natural selection in the origin of species is destructive, and not a 
constructive one.”264 Rather, mutations were evolution’s creative force. 
The theoretical results of de Vries’ natural history, statistical analysis, and 
experimentation indicated how to take control of evolution, although for the moment, his 
views were more deflationary than productive. His refashioning of selection imposed 
limits: “all that he [the breeder] can do by selection is to intensify the produce and yield 
of characters already present; but so far it is not within his power to call into existence 
new characters.” Hybridization was a halfway measure towards creating “new forms.” 
For new characters, scientists had to develop an “experimental physiology of the origin of 
species” that would allow for “control over much that at present seems beyond our 
reach.” Specifically, once “the breeder has obtained control over variability, why should 
he not obtain it over mutation as well?” Inducing “mutations at will” would likely take “a 
long time,” however. Until then, mutations “must be waited for.”265 
Throughout the book, de Vries called for further investigations; his theory was to be a 
launchpad for research, not a final resolution. He called for more demonstrations of 
Quetelet’s law, particularly across generations. He was interested in an explanation for 
polymorphic curves (as Pearson and Weldon were puzzling out), which he suggested 
would be due to “mixtures of perfectly distinct elementary species growing together or to 
the existence of antagonistic characters within the limits of a single species” (e.g., annual 
vs. biennial forms). He called for more work on correlative variation, ecology and 
growth, and the workings of artificial selection with respect to regression. He also 
advocated for work that could contradict his theory, such as a selection experiment that 
began with seed-parents small, weak, and pale and tried to create “apetelous, fruitless, 
 
263 Ibid., p. 212. 
264 Ibid., pp. 211-212. 
265 Ibid., pp. 57-58, 186, 306, 33. Calls for the control of evolution are scattered throughout the book, see. 
pp. 164, 167-168, 207. 
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glabrous, spineless, white-flowered, unisexual or sterile plants,” i.e., could selection push 
an elementary species beyond its limits? All of this was to “aim at … a complete control 
of variation. We must become so thoroughly acquainted with the underlying factors that 
we can predict the results of our experiments.”266 What de Vries had done was provide 
“the proof … that this phenomenon can be dealt with experimentally.”267 
 
As de Vries would say in his public address at the opening of the Station for 
Experimental Evolution in Cold Spring Harbor (discussed in the following chapter), he 
thought evolutionary science had important applied implications for society, particularly 
with regard to agriculture.268 While he always thought science would ideally remain 
“pure,” with applications following automatically, he consistently reported to the public 
and to agriculturists/horticulturists the latest developments in the botanical sciences.269 
(Recall though that de Vries’ own work was partially derived from practical and applied 
work in breeding.) The distinction between fluctuating variation and definite mutations 
was key to improving crops, he thought. More important for de Vries was the potential 
control of mutations: he lamented that they “occur frequently, but always by chance,” and 
that a primary goal for science was “to try and free the practice from this dependence on 
chance.”270 (Theunissen notes that by the end of his life, he had to admit defeat.) These 
close ties between theory and practice de Vries believed were fundamental to social 
progress, one achieved through the “close, noble alliance of capital and science.”271 Such 
work would be mediated by the universities, which he thought should “cultivate the most 
intimate connection between theory and practice, between abstract science and actual 
life.” In a more excited moment, he declared: “New races and also new species! This will 
 
266 Ibid., pp. 159-164. 
267 Ibid., p. 497. 
268 De Vries also drew eugenical, or anti-eugenical, conclusions from the mutation theory. In essence, he 
believed that human races, like animals and plants, were stable and not undergoing a mutation period, and 
were thus not amenable to improvement via selection or through changes in environmental conditions. For 
more on his beliefs, see Theunissen, “Knowledge Is Power,” 308–11. 
269 Theunissen usefully points out that de Vries’ fellow champion of control, Jacques Loeb, who was also 
trained by Julius Sachs, had a different perspective. Loeb was a follower of Ernst Mach and much less 
interested in structural explanations (as opposed to de Vries’ drive to understand variation and heredity 
physiologically). Loeb also saw no distinctions between pure and applied science, whereas de Vries did. 
Theunissen. 
270 Quoted in Theunissen, 304. 
271 Hugo de Vries, “Kapitaal En Wetenschap,” Album Der Natuur (1898): 353–66. 
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henceforth be our slogan, first for science, but then also for practice, for the flourishing of 
agriculture and the prosperity of all nations!”272  
 
Conclusion 
Experimental evolution began in the nineteenth century rife with challenges, but 
its motive forces – understanding, control, experimentation, profit – drove it forward. 
This was not the story of a new method arriving on the scene and taking science by 
storm. Even some of its apparent achievements, such as Dallinger’s instrumentation or 
Weldon’s statistical methods, did not initiate long-term growth or the establishment of a 
new research program. Yet its core questions animated further work. Darwin, Mendel, 
Dallinger, Weldon, and de Vries all wrestled with how to extrapolate the artificiality of 
experimentation to the natural world. Darwin and Mendel (and Bateson) did not see much 
of a distinction at all — indeed, Darwin considered artificial selection of livestock a 
detectable and simple version of natural selection on wild animals. Dallinger, on the other 
hand, was reluctant to extrapolate even to other individuals of the same species, although 
he did provide a couple of general conclusions. Weldon articulated a program intended to 
avoid the artificial entirely, but the practice of his theory could not solve the problems he 
set out to research, and thus, he reluctantly conducted experiments, mimicking the crabs’ 
changed environment by design. Hugo de Vries also traveled between nature and artifice 
but cautioned against unconditional use of breeders’ work, arguing for experimentation, 
but not in lieu of natural history. In this way, de Vries was remarkably Darwinian, 
whereas Weldon was not. 
Weldon and de Vries were far more involved in theoretical disputes over the 
relative powers of evolution’s forces and the nature of variation and heredity, the former 
particularly due to new practical advances of statistics. These theoretical debates were in 
part fueled by the search for patterns in a wider range of organisms, beyond pigeons, 
cattle, and sheep, and especially for de Vries, in the plant kingdom. By this time science 
had taken evolution as a fact, and both Weldon and de Vries considered it visible, 
although by different methods and for different reasons. However, de Vries’ influence 
was far more lasting and significant — not only did he produce a different theory rooted 
 
272 Quoted in Theunissen, “Knowledge Is Power,” 300, 303–4. 
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in different practices, but he also brought the question of power and control to the 
forefront. Weldon, like Darwin, was not particularly interested in making evolution 
controllable and useful, reflected in his theory and his practice; de Vries, like Darwin, 
thought the de facto control of evolution was an important well of information. It was up 
to him and the following generation, however, to develop practice as accumulated theory 
and theory as accumulated practice. 
Among nineteenth-century biologists, Weldon, a professor and journal editor, was 
in the best position to institutionalize an experimental evolution, but his research program 
and the controversy it engendered, perhaps causing an early end to his life, prevented him 
from training a new generation to follow in his footsteps. The statistical methods he 
helped develop would leave a lasting impact as biologists continued to train with Karl 
Pearson, however. De Vries also did not establish a program, but Die Mutationstheorie 
took the world of evolutionary science by storm. This was particularly so in the United 
States, where the theoretical and the practical (experimental) were of interest to wealthy 
patrons looking to help develop an independent American science.273 As Sharon 
Kingsland notes, de Vries’ emphasis on control “served as vehicle to attract the patron’s 
interest to the scientific enterprise, an enterprise that would invigorate American research 
and contribute to the wealth of the nation. De Vries was shrewd enough to understand 
Americans’ pride in their independent development of science.” It also tapped into the 
mood among biologists for experimentation, particularly Daniel MacDougal and Charles 
Davenport, soon to be directors of Carnegie Institution of Washington experiment 
stations. De Vries helped convince the wealthy to fund work that would make evolution 
visible, controllable, and useful. 
As my next chapter will show, it took a set of ambitious biologists — particularly 
Charles Davenport, an early biometrician — to lobby a capitalist philanthropy to build 
and fund a permanent research station dedicated exclusively to the experimental study of 
evolution and biology. This station funded by Andrew Carnegie, combined with a 
growing consensus that experimentation was the path forward on the heels of Die 
Mutationstheorie and Mendel’s rediscovery, provided the firm base upon which 
 
273 Sharon Kingsland, “The Battling Botanist: Daniel Trembly MacDougal, Mutation Theory, and the Rise 
of Experimental Evolutionary Biology in America, 1900-1912,” Isis 82, no. 3 (1991), 491. 
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experimental evolution could emerge. The Station would soon house the Eugenics 
Record Office as it also became a birthplace of hybrid corn, further signs of the 
dominating forces of capitalism in experimental evolution as a dialectic between nature 





Chapter 3:  
A New Atlantis: The Station for Experimental Evolution (1890-1920) 
 
The Need for an "Institut Transformiste" 
In the wake of nineteenth-century experimental evolution, biologists recognized 
the need for a well-financed institution that could conduct long-term experimentation, 
commit to a program that tested theories and hypotheses, and house several scientists: a 
station for experimental evolution. I briefly discuss the various calls that scientists made 
for such an institution and then examine at length the Station for Experimental Evolution 
at Cold Spring Harbor. I analyze Charles Davenport’s extensive application materials to 
the Carnegie Institution of Washington to understand his broad vision for the endeavor, 
and then follow its first fifteen years of existence through 1920, when it was reorganized 
as the Department of Genetics. Hugo de Vries also reappears to articulate his vision of 
experimental evolution at the Station’s grand opening in 1904. I show that the Station’s 
work was incredibly broad, perhaps engaging in too many projects at once. But through 
its direct work and its grants, it was a central organizing force for American experimental 
evolution that helped bring Mendelism and mutationism to the fore. While Darwin, 
Mendel, and de Vries dialectically integrated theory and practice as individuals, the 
Station did so as an institution, only possible due to the interest from capital to take 
control of evolution. 
In 1890, French biologist Alfred Giard lectured before the Sorbonne on 
Lamarckian evolution, challenging Darwin’s methods of “experimentation,” signaling the 
professionalization and increasing standardization required by biological science: 
If evolutionists must content themselves in most cases with experiments unconsciously 
carried on in Nature, or those of breeders, instead of applying themselves to verifications 
made with all the rigour of modern scientific precision, is it not because of the deplorable 
insufficiency of our laboratories? One is astonished that in no country, not even where 
science is held in greatest honour, does there yet exist an instiut transformiste consecrated 
to the long and costly experiments now indispensable for the progress of evolutionary 
biology.274 
 
274 Originally published on December 5, 1890 in Revue scientifique, the article was translated into English 
and published as Alfred Mathieu Giard, “The Principle of Lamarck and the Inheritance of Somatic 




In 1891, Darwin’s disciple George John Romanes proposed such a station to 
Oxford University, quoting Giard and providing brief commentary with a budget. 
Believing England to be “the natural territory of an establishment of this character,” he 
suggested a two- to three-acre plot housing three residents — a naturalist, a gardener, and 
a keeper —, as well as animals.275 (This was reminiscent of Bakewell’s Dishley Grange.) 
He circulated this letter to fellow biologists, but Romanes’ English Institut transformiste 
was not to be. 
Also in 1891, the French zoologist Henry de Varigny called explicitly for an 
“experimental evolution” — the term’s first documented use — in a series of lectures at 
the Summer School of Arts and Sciences in Edinburgh.276  He thought experimental work 
could demonstrate the reality of evolution in real time, so as to convince special 
creationists that Darwin was generally right. De Varigny also argued that turning 
evolution experimental would help biologists advance a science bogged down by 
competing speculative theories. Pointing to breeders as a kind of ‘experimental 
evolutionist,’ de Varigny claimed practical and economic benefits would result.  
To launch an experimental evolution, de Varigny, echoing Giard and Romanes, 
suggested the construction of an “institution of some sort,” that would have “extensive 
grounds, a farm with men experienced in breeding, agriculture, and horticulture, some 
greenhouses, and a laboratory with the common appliances of chemistry, physiology, and 
histology.”277 Such a station would allow for long-term experiments. It would be akin to 
an agricultural research station, but not devoted solely to practical questions, reflecting a 
commitment to discovering laws with organisms most useful to the task. It would thus 
mediate between agricultural and capital needs and the scientific understanding of nature. 
Not every biologist agreed with Giard and de Varigny. Liberty Hyde Bailey, the 
American horticulturist, followed Darwin in believing that the work of breeders was 
sufficient to demonstrate the reality of evolution. After listing a bounty of examples of 
radically changed forms in the plant kingdom under domestication, Bailey argued in 
 
275 George John Romanes, “An Institute Transformiste,” in The Life and Letters of George John Romanes 
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276 Henry de Varigny, Experimental Evolution (London: Macmillan and Company, 1892). 
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“Experimental Evolution Amongst Plants,” 
He [everyone] knows that nearly every plant which has been long cultivated, has become 
so profoundly and irrevocably modified that people are disputing as to what wild species 
it came from. It is immaterial whether they are called species or varieties. They are new 
forms. Some of them are so distinct that they have been regarded as belonging to distinct 
genera. Here is the experiment to prove that evolution is true, worked out upon a scale 
and with a definiteness of detail which the boldest experimenter could not hope to attain, 
were he to live a thousand years. The horticulturist is the only man in the world whose 
distinct business and profession is evolution. He, of all other men, has the experimental 
proof that species come and go.278 
 
According to Bailey, Huxley’s critique of Darwin – that biologists needed to show the 
formation of a new species to prove the truth of evolution – had, in fact, been answered 
thousands of years prior and continued to be demonstrated in his own time. Even though 
these were not strict experiments by modern standards, Bailey thought his examples (i.e., 
most fruits, vegetables, and nuts) and the profit they produced proved his point. But for 
scientists interested in causes, Bailey’s argument held no water. Giard, Romanes, and de 
Varigny were to be proven correct: long-term and steady experimentation of evolution 
was required to understand how it worked. 
 
Lobbying a Robber Baron’s Philanthropy  
While the European proposals for experimental institutions dedicated to evolution 
failed, Charles Davenport lobbied the Carnegie Institution of Washington (CIW) to 
construct one in 1904 at Cold Spring Harbor, New York: The Station for Experimental 
Evolution. Through the Station, Davenport sought to “realize that dream of [Francis] 
Bacon, who saw in the New Atlantis, gardens devoted to the experimental modification 
and improvement of animals and plants.”279 In this chapter, I explore Davenport’s vision 
for experimental evolution and analyze the Station’s work through 1920 (when it became 
the Department of Genetics). Davenport’s vision was all-encompassing, reflected by the 
Station’s wide-ranging and contradictory research, and demonstrated the need for 
 
278 Note that Bailey specifies the horticulturist, in line with de Vries in Mutation Theory. Bailey, 
“Experimental Evolution Amongst Plants,” The American Naturalist 29, no. 340 (1895): 318–25.  
279 CIW Yearbook, Vol. 3, 1904, p. 33. CIW yearbooks are published the January of the following year of 
the report. For the sake of clarity, my citations reflect the year the report covers, not its publication date. 
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significant capital to carry out the research program. The resonance between capitalism 
and experimental evolution that had begun with Bakewell and Darwin continued to be 
key to the latter’s historical development and potentially the former’s expansion into the 
agricultural sector.280 
Charles Davenport, like many of his contemporaries, began his scientific career as 
a zoological morphologist, but became convinced that the future of biology was 
experimental, quantitative, applicable, and causally focused. He began by integrating the 
statistics developed by Pearson and Weldon into his morphological research, which 
rendered evolution visible and possibly predictable. The shape and skew of the curves 
produced by biometry were themselves shaped by “the direction of evolution.” Weldon’s 
crab work, according to Davenport, produced “beautiful results,” and refuted the belief 
that “we should not expect in man’s brief lifetime, nor even within historic times, to find 
such changes [in racial differentiation in nature].” Evolution remained invisible if 
biologists relied on “adjectives for specific description,” but with quantitative methods, 
“we can hope soon to prove that many species are undergoing change and to determine 
the cause of the change.”281 The rapid adoption of quantitative methods by a wider swath 
of biologists was leading to the “discovery” of “the role of natural selection, the method 
of evolution and the laws of inheritance, especially where combined with 
experimentation.”282 Although biometry did not itself address causes, it was “the key to 
the first door that has barred true progress in the difficult subject of the origin of organic 
diversity.”283 Statistics 
will enable us to measure precisely the results of any change in environment, artificially 
or naturally brought about. We shall thus be able not only to tell what are the factors of 
phylogenetic change, but also the rate of such changes. We shall get possession of the 
laws of evolution so that we can not only reconstruct the past, but also predict the future 
 
280 I briefly address the historiographical debate over the impact of biology on agriculture in the 
Conclusion. 
281 Davenport 1899, p. 271. Already Davenport was becoming interested in the control of evolution, writing 
that “the quantitative studies made on the result of experiments to produce race change will be the most 
striking. In fact, in its application of combined experimental and statistical methods to genetic problems, 
zoology will reach its highest development.” p. 272. (He reiterated a similar point in 1901, p. 448.) 
282 Davenport, “A History of the Development of the Quantitative Study of Variation,” Science 12, no. 310 
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development of a race.284 
 
Davenport also began to emphasize experimentation and control after the 
rediscovery of Mendel’s laws (1900) and Hugo de Vries’ publication of The Mutation 
Theory (1901). He argued that “prominent among the advances of the [twentieth] century 
will be the ability to control biological processes,” including the “direction of ontogeny 
and of phylogeny.” “The morphologist will more and more consider experiment a 
legitimate method for him.”285 Davenport therefore sought to synthesize the methods of 
the major competing theoretical trends. 
Davenport recognized that a program of experimental evolution required a 
dedicated institution with a stable source of funding. The Carnegie Institution of 
Washington (CIW) was the perfect patron, launched in 1902 with a $10,000,000 
endowment from the captain of the steel industry. Before the development of extensive 
public funding, Carnegie (and Rockefeller and Ford) provided a niche for scientific 
visionaries and organizers such as Davenport. Biologists took advantage of what public 
funding existed in the agricultural sciences, but the requirements of immediate 
application prevented what Davenport considered to be the scientific need to discover 
laws. This is exactly what CIW was looking to fund. 
Independent of Davenport, Roswell H. Johnson also submitted a brief proposal 
for a “vivarium” to CIW.286 Published alongside Davenport’s proposal and Whitman’s 
“biological farm,” Johnson himself noted that, “I remember that Professor Davenport in 
his course on evolution at Harvard made a strong plea for experimental work.”287 In 
 
284 Davenport, 459–60. 
285 Davenport, “Zoology of the Twentieth Century,” Science 14, no. 348 (1901): 317. 
286 Roswell Hill Johnson, “Biological Experiment Station for Studying Evolution,” in CIW Yearbook, vol. 1 
(Washington, D. C.: CIW, 1902): 274–80. He also published a condensed version as “The Carnegie 
Institution,” Science, 1902, 987–990. Johnson told Davenport in June 1902 that he had written to a CIW 
trustee to gauge the institution’s interest. He also thought the University of California could establish one. 
Johnson to Davenport (1902/6/13), APS Davenport, Box 59, “Johnson, Roswell H.,” folder 1. 
287 Whitman’s proposal was an edited excerpt from “A Biological Farm: For the Experimental Investigation 
of Heredity, Variation and Evolution and for the Study of Life-Histories, Habits, Instincts and Intelligence,” 
The Biological Bulletin 3, no. 5 (1902): 214–24. He hoped it would be built at Woods Hole. Whitman 
emphasized that a station would not only allow for long-term experimentation, but long-term observation: 
“The functions of a biological farm are not all summed up in experimentation. That old and true method of 
natural history — observation — must ever have a large share in the study of living things. Observation, 
experiment and reflection are three in one. Together they are omnipotent; disjoined they become impotent 
fetiches. The biology of to-day, as we are beginning to realize, has not too much laboratory, but too little of 
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contrast to Davenport’s emphasis on control, Johnson emphasized the need for 
experimental hypothesis testing. He considered “nearly all of the post-Darwinian writing” 
to be “largely deductive” or too “static” (biometry). Instead, “evolution, above all, 
requires dynamic studies” of “selective life values of different variations, inheritance of 
acquired characteristics, environmental alterability of the germ-plasm; modification 
preventing death under adverse conditions, etc.” His suggested experiments included the 
isolation of two populations to determine whether their traits regress to the mean or 
diverge and testing selection by subjecting shrimp to fresh water. He even proposed a test 
for “organic evolution” (the Baldwin effect) using camouflaging tree frogs. Other 
experiments could test “fecundal selection,” “sport prepotency,” assortative mating, 
correlations, and the existence of determinate variation. He emphasized institutional 
needs, noting that experimental evolution “has hardly begun” due to the expense, time, 
and permanence required. It would benefit from an experimental station that hired 
workers to carry out routine labor using superior equipment and infrastructure 
constructed for the tasks directed by resident scientists, much like the agricultural 
experiment stations. Johnson estimated the startup costs to be $10,000 (including a barn, 
greenhouse equipped with aquaria, and a laboratory) with $6,300 annually for 
maintenance. David Starr Jordan, one of America’s leading biologists, commented that 
Johnson’s proposal was “extremely desirable.”288 
Davenport’s first – and unsuccessful – proposal was like Johnson’s. He declared 
such a station’s aims to be “the analytic and experimental study of the causes of specific 
differentiation—of race change.” The methods of study included crossbreeding to study 
“laws and limits of inheritance,” “the experimental production of variation” via 
hybridization or changes in external conditions, biometrical investigations of geographic 
distribution and isolation, as well as selection experiments aimed at “the origin of 
adaptation of organisms.” He also cited the previous proposals of Whitman, Romanes, 
 
living nature. The farm will certainly do much to mend this great deficiency.” CIW considered Woods Hole 
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and de Varigny. He proposed the site of Cold Spring Harbor, estimating startup costs at 
$36,000 with annual expenditures of $9,000. CIW did not find either application worthy. 
Davenport’s second and successful application was exhaustive and demonstrated 
his broad vision of experimental evolution’s future. Noting a visit to “many of the 
principal experimental evolutionists of Europe,” Davenport urged to CIW that “more than 
ever is the importance of an experimental station felt where quantitatively exact 
experiments in breeding through many generations can be conducted and from which 
material can be supplied to various specialists for cytological and biochemical 
investigation.”289 With his application, discussed in the following section, Davenport 
included “a summary of progress in experimental evolution,” a “statement of eight 
experiments which it is desired to start as soon as assistance is granted,” a promised lease 
from the Wawepex Society of Cold Spring Harbor to grant CIW the required land, and an 
estimated budget of $7,500. Its purpose would be to 
Study the laws of inheritance of ontogenetic + phylogenetic variation. … Study the 
adjustment of organism to conditions (adaptation) whether by self-adjustment; survival of 
the fittest individuals or segregation in the fittest environment.290 
 
Davenport's Vision 
Davenport’s application materials, along with lecture notes dating from this 
period, demonstrated a broad vision of what experimental evolution could be, embedding 
it within a history of science so as to convince CIW that they would not be funding a 
novelty, but contributing to the next stage of scientific progress. Notably, given that 
Davenport and the Station for Experimental Evolution are historically associated with 
eugenics, the application materials do not contain any mention of allusion to eugenics 
whatsoever. Instead, Davenport’s initial interests remained almost exclusively among the 
zoological and botanical, eugenics emerging afterward. 
In his “summary of progress,” Davenport echoed de Varigny, stating that 
evolution had been demonstrated, but scientists had yet to “learn its method.” He wrote, 
With the modus operandi of evolution the case is quite different. Indeed, we have 
 
289 Davenport to the Trustees of the Carnegie Institution (1903/3/5), APS Davenport, Series II, Box 100, 
“Davenport, C.B. To Executive Committee of C. I. W., 1904” folder. Davenport did not note who these 
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practically no satisfactory cases where the process has been carried through. Only by 
following through a case of evolution under perfectly known conditions can we hope to 
learn the method. This, then, is what is required; a place to study the conditions under 
which evolution takes place--a Station for the experimental study of evolution. The 
importance of such a Station has long been recognized.291 
 
Davenport’s history of experimental evolution began with Francis Bacon, who in 
New Atlantis (1627) “recognized not only the possibility of modifying species but also 
the importance of studying the laws of such modification.”292 He speculated that Bacon 
may have drawn inspiration from Japan (via Dutch sailors), where “more than in any 
other country, experimental breeding has been carried on, in a half curious, half 
commercial spirit. … Examples of this Japanese art are now familiar to us: such are the 
chrysanthemums, dwarf trees, double-tailed gold fishes, and long-tailed poultry.”293 
Bacon also envisioned the “House of Solomon,” an institution of orchards, gardens, 
parks, enclosures, ponds, and buildings dedicated to the modification and breeding of 
plants, livestock, and insects.294 
According to Davenport, “the ideas of Bacon lay long latent, as did the 
evolutionary doctrines of the Greeks,” until Lamarck, who “founded a French school of 
evolutionists in which this suggestion [experimental evolution] arose again,” primarily 
through Isidore Geoffroy Saint Hilaire (the son of Étienne Geoffroy).295 Davenport 
quoted from the younger Geoffroy’s work, Histoire naturelle générale des règnes 
organiques, in which he stated: 
Since Nature left to herself never exhibits great changes in the conditions of existence it 
is clear that there is left us only one method of seeing such changes and of determining 
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To take control of evolution, Geoffroy promoted Bacon’s own methods of modification, 
whether through environmental or dietary changes, and “to introduce an element with 
which, unhappily we cannot dispense, namely, time.”296  
Davenport surveyed the prior calls to establish a station dedicated to experimental 
evolution. He mentioned that Darwin “seems to have undertaken no [experiments] nor to 
have urged the importance of an experimental station for the purpose.” Instead, “the post-
Darwin revival of effort in this direction seems to have been due to … [the] Frenchman 
Giard.” Here Davenport discussed Giard, Romanes, and de Varigny. Davenport also noted 
that the Royal Society of London’s Committee on Evolution, chaired by Francis Galton 
(the “father of scientific methods of investigating evolution”), had also discussed such a 
station. Herbert Spencer, a member, corresponded with Andrew Carnegie, but “these 
efforts bore no immediate fruits and since these rebuffs the plan for a great Evolution 
Station have lain dormant in England.” In Germany, “likewise, the money has not been 
forthcoming.” Turning to America, Davenport discussed Whitman’s idea of a “lake 
biological station.” Whitman wrote in 1892, 
Such a station has been nowhere provided but its need has been felt and acknowledged by 
the foremost biologists of today. There are no problems in the whole range of biology of 
higher scientific interest or deeper practical import to humanity than those which center 
in variation and heredity. For the solution of these problems, and a thousand others that 
turn upon them, facilities for long-continued experimental study, under conditions that 
admit of perfect control, must be provided.297 
 
Davenport quoted from his own 1897 lecture to the American Society of 
Naturalists, in which he said, 
The reason why they [variation and heredity] have not been worked upon is largely 
because they don’t lend themselves to investigation in the laboratory. For the successful 
study of these problems one needs, indeed, not an ordinary laboratory, but a farm or an 
extensive zoological reserve with hothouses, breeding ponds, insectaries and vivaria of 
various sorts. With such means at his disposal a naturalist might hope, during a long 
series of years, to answer many of these fundamental phylogenetic questions.298 
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For a science dedicated to controlling evolution, a continuing concern among its 
practitioners was that it was they who were subject to nature, not only due to their lack of 
knowledge but also by the process itself. Concluding that “naturalists have for some time 
realized the necessity of an experimental station for the proper prosecution of scientific 
evolutionary studies,” he turned to experimental evolution’s achievements thus far, 
conducted “under great limitations and difficulties.”299 
Davenport defined evolution as “the movement of the germ plasm,” and therefore, 
experimental evolution “seeks to control the rate and direction of the movement of the 
germ plasm.” Its purpose was “not to test truth of evolution, not to produce an example of 
evolution … but to determine laws + limits of racial modification.”300 For Davenport, 
experimental evolution was identical with the control of evolution. The language of 
“modification,” “induction,” “production,” and “direction” permeate his notes, implying 
that the elucidation of causes would provide levers of control. That is, if biologists 
discovered the causes of mutation, presumably the biologist could induce mutations 
artificially with the same agent. As Bacon had advocated for the utility of experimental 
philosophy, so did Davenport. 
Davenport’s historical accounts also display his Baconian and Darwinian mission, 
blending the work of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century breeders and botanists into the 
history of experimental evolution.301 For example, he discussed Rudolph Camerarius’ 
discovery of plant sexuality as well as Joseph Kölreuter’s work on hybridization. He 
quoted from Paul Dudley’s 1724 article in the Philosophical Transactions which reported 
that differently colored rows of maize would “mix and interchange their colors.” He 
listed papers by Benjamin Cooke, who crossed varieties of apple trees and maize. He 
considered the nurseryman Thomas Fairchild, active in the early seventeenth century, as 
 
299 APS Davenport, Series II, Box 100, “A Summary of Progress in Experimental Evolution.” Note that 
Davenport made little to no distinction between naturalists and experimentalists. 
300 Note that Davenport’s use of “racial” refers to the biological, not the human and eugenical. APS 
Davenport, Series I, Box 37, “Experimental Evolution Lectures” folder 1 and 2. He noted also that 
experimental evolution is “not concerned with [hard to read] (embryology, ethology). 
301 Davenport’s theoretical history followed Osborn’s Greeks to Darwin, beginning with the ancients and 
leaping to Linnaeus and John Ray. He noted the evolutionary mechanisms advocated by Lamarck, St. 
Hilaire, Weismann, and de Vries. 
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“the first scientific hybridizer,” i.e., “the first hybridizer for material purposes.”302 He 
concluded this historical section with Christian Sprengel, the botanist, and Thomas 
Knight, a horticulturist. For Davenport the history of botany and horticulture were 
intertwined and long had elements of experimental evolution even if the historical actors 
had no concept of such. 
 
An overriding concern for Davenport was the role of the environment in 
evolution. Experimental evolution required a stable institution because biologists needed 
to control for the environmental effects that permeated an organism’s development and 
evolution. Since at least the days of Lamarck, and particularly during the post-Darwinian 
period, theories of evolution posited incommensurable roles for the environment; thus, to 
study evolution, the role of the environment had to be isolated and controlled. This was a 
problem — both theoretical and methodological — that dominated the initial decades of 
experimental evolution. 
To illustrate “the problem of experimental evolution,” Davenport developed a 
nautical metaphor. Treating evolution as “the movement of the germ plasm” and adopting 
Weismann’s “fundamental” germ/soma distinction,303 he asked, 
Is this movement directed from within like the movement of a mighty ocean steamer, 
unaffected by the somas it throws off [just] as the path of the steamer [i]s unaffected by 
the spray or the foam it leaves in its wake? Does the germ plasm go thundering through 
the ages impelled by its own [unclear] Or is the germ plasm like a canal boat little 
[launch?] led hither + thither by a rope in the [unclear] of spring fastened to 
“environmental conditions”? Does every soma it produces sway the germ plasm to this 
side or that [just] as the mother sheep transformed its bleating progeny? Is the 
movement? of the germ plasm definitely directed like the torpedo that rushes from the 
warship, or is it like the clip? on the water that bobs up + down on the waves and only 
gets anywhere as some prevailing current causes it to drift? One or the other of these 
hypotheses, or both or neither is true. How can we ever find out the fact of the case?304 
 
 
302 APS Davenport, Series I, Box 37, “Experimental Evolution Lectures” folder 1. 
303 Later in his lecture notes, Davenport, at length, questioned the validity of this distinction. 
304 APS Davenport, Series I, Box 37, “Experimental Evolution Lectures” folder 1. Underline original. He 
later offered a different metaphor, likening the fate of the germ-plasm not to a “stream,” but to an 
“inextricable network of bayous” because of sexual reproduction (CIW Yearbook, Vol. 7, 1908, pp. 88-89). 
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For Davenport the key question was whether the germ plasm determined its own 
direction or was controlled by environmental conditions. If the latter, did the environment 
produce particular changes or merely increase variability? Davenport categorized theories 
of evolution along a spectrum in which either option made up its ends. The ocean steamer 
represented Nägeli, who thought “phylogenetic change is determined by an automatic 
perfecting principle (modified and controlled by an adaptive variation).” The canal boat 
represented George Henslow, who thought the environment induced definite and 
inheritable variation “always in the direction of adaptation to the environment itself.” 
That is, “self adaptation [w]as a cause of variation.” In the middle lay, from steamer 
(internal) to boat (external), the theories of de Vries, Darwin, Weismann, as well as the 
theory of organic selection (articulated by Baldwin, Osborn, and Lloyd Morgan), and 
Yves Delage.305 Davenport concluded, “I set the problem of the modifiability of the germ 
plasm by extrinsic or intrinsic causes; acting directly or indirectly; definitely or 
indefinitely — the alterability of the amplitude of the pendulum’s swing and the change 
of the centre of its vibration.” Given the central role of environment, Davenport wrote, 
biologists should “study variation and learn the external or internal conditions with which 
it is correlated in nature + the conditions under which it may be experimentally be 
induced and controlled.”306 
Not only was the environment a theoretical issue, it produced methodological 
problems. Because the germ plasm’s “movement” was inaccessible to observation and 
measurement, one had to “study the successive somas it produces one after the other.” 
But, because somas developed in response to environmental causes, a biologist had to 
find ways to standardize environmental variables. When controlled, and “if the successive 
somas a, b, c, d, &c. produced from the same germ-plasm in successive years are alike 
then the germ-plasm is probably undergoing no change”; but, if they are different, the 
germ-plasm itself is probably changing. However, it was possible that sexual 
reproduction produced germinal changes, so Davenport advocated the use of 
 
305 Ibid. Henslow authored The Origin of Plant Structures by Self-Adaptation to the Environment (1895), 
who in this discussion took Lamarck’s place. Davenport intended to discuss orthogenesis, but Theodore 
Eimer’s name is crossed out, replaced with Delage. 
306 Ibid. He also emphasized the importance of studying inheritance, self-adjustment, selection, and 
“segregation in the fittest environment.” 
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“parthenogenetic and self-fertilizing” animals as well as plants that could be propagated 
through grafting and cutting. In addition, biologists should study characters that seemed 
the most independent of environmental influence.307 Thus the environment, or external 
conditions, caused a host of entangled problems that biologists spent years working to 
resolve. 
Even with Davenport’s organismal recommendations, what was striking about 
Davenport’s vision, and as experimental evolution developed, was the breadth of topics 
and organisms under study. Referencing William Bateson’s 1894 Materials for the Study 
of Evolution, Davenport lectured on surveys of variation throughout all the zoological 
phyla, noting whether scientists had discovered mutations, fluctuations, and 
environmental effects.308 As noted above, he integrated the history of plant breeding (but 
curiously little on animal breeding) into his history of experimental evolution, but his 
proposed experiments, discussed below, included spiders, ladybird beetles, goats, and 
cats. Historical examples featured poultry, sparrows, butterflies, crabs, scallops, and apple 
trees. Before the reign of Drosophila and E. coli, experimental evolution reflected its 
roots in natural history, botany, entomology, and zoology, as well as the practical arts of 
horticulture and agriculture. 
In his “Summary of Progress in Experimental Evolution,” which he submitted to 
CIW as part of his application, Davenport categorized previously conducted experiments 
into eight classes: (1) the statistics of variation and selection, (2) the effects of 
domestication and multi-generational captivity, (3) the inheritance of acquired characters 
as well as self-adjustment/plasticity, (4) the existence and fate of sports in breeding and in 
the wild, (5) telegony, (6) intra-specific crossing, (7) inter-specific hybridization, and (8) 
the effects of isolation.309  
 
307 Ibid. He framed somas as “our index of the qualities of any germ-plasm… Each soma is the biological 
analysis of its germ-plasm.” Environmental variation and dominance produced “error” (CIW Yearbook, 
Vol. 7, 1908, pp. 86-87). 
308 APS Davenport, Series I, Box 37, “Experimental Evolution Lectures,” folders 1 and 2. 
309 APS Davenport, Series II, Box 100, “A Summary of Progress in Experimental Evolution.” In his lectures 
and in a “lines of work” section of his application, his classes are similar, although in his lectures, he 
classified selection into its own category (whereas here selection studies, such as Weldon’s work, are 
included under “study of individual variation). In his lectures he also included a heading for “control of 
pleomorphism” (stark changes in bacterial form), which he did not elaborate upon and appears nowhere 
else in his work as far as I can find. Note that my discussion that follows combines comments from his 
“Summary of Progress” along with his lecture notes. 
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Davenport’s pluralistic treatment of evolution can be witnessed in his discussions 
of the effects of domestication and multi-generational captivity (2, 5) in addition to the 
inheritance of acquired characters and self-adjustment (which he would later reject) (3). 
Indeed, while he thought “results gained from rearing animals for a long time under 
changed conditions of life” were “surprisingly few,” there was “plenty of experimental 
proof that climatic factors cause a change in the specific characters of the individuals 
acted upon.” For example, in 1864, “Dorfmeiser found that chrysalids of the butterfly 
Venessa, normally destined to develop into the winter form … might be forced to develop 
into the summer form … or at least something approaching to it by heat.” Other studies 
of Lepidoptera by Weismann and Fischer lasted only one to three generations, and were, 
according to Davenport, of limited value.310 Biologists had discovered nutritional effects 
upon insect color, but the question remained “whether from such peculiarities in the 
course of years a new specific form could become established.”311 He noted the “pioneer” 
transplantation experiments of Bonnier, but again emphasized the neglect of carrying out 
the work across multiple generations.312 In a section explicitly dedicated to “inheritance 
of acquired characters,” he emphasized the attempts of Weismann and Galton to disprove 
neo-Lamarckism and Darwin’s theory of pangenesis. A related theory, telegony, “or the 
alleged modification of offspring through some influence left on the mother by a previous 
sire” was a common belief among breeders, but biologists Romanes and Ewart had 
conducted experiments that indicated it was rare and not important in evolution. 
Davenport did not elaborate any further (and appears to have never investigated it).  
Scientists using statistical methods had detected correlations between 
environmental fluctuations and populational variation, usually with the goal of detecting 
selection and adaptation (1). These studies included Allen’s rule (the colder the climate 
the shorter an animals’ limbs) and the previously discussed study by Weldon of Plymouth 
crabs. Additional work included biometrical studies of mollusk shells in relation to the 
stillness and density of water in Cold Spring Harbor by Davenport himself and Abigail 
 
310 He also discusses this work, as noted above, in Experimental Evolution Lectures, folder 2.  
311 In an earlier draft, Davenport had included this work under the heading of “self-adjustment” or 
plasticity. 




Dimon.313 Davenport also included the research of de Vries in this category for 
“combining experiment with measurement” to modify “the form of the distribution 
polygon.” An advantage of Davenport’s program was that he championed Mendelism 
while incorporating biometrical methods, a stance that shaped the Station’s activities 
during his tenure and American experimental evolution in general. 
Davenport turned to natural selection, or “selective annihilation” (parallel to 
“selective mating”). He characterized selection as when “external agents” did not modify 
the germ plasm, but instead eliminated germ plasms that “produce somas … unfitted to 
live” or “distinctly less fit to live than their fellows.” Furthermore, selection could act 
upon both “trivial variations” and “sports.” Not relegating selection to a minor role in 
evolution, Davenport wrote, “selection is a universal and necessary factor in … 
determining the kind of germ plasm that shall survive in directing its movement.”314 
Davenport cited several selection studies, particularly the work of Bumpus, Crampton, 
and Weldon.315 
 
Hugo de Vries’ mutation theory (4) and work on the evening primrose had 
launched a new interest in sports, enough for Davenport to classify it as a growing area of 
experimental study. As with other theories, the existence and importance of sports were 
primarily evidenced by the “undoubted fact that many domesticated and even some wild 
races seem to have started with such sports,” such as merino and Ancon sheep, as well as 
several plants. He wrote, “we have also the testimony of successful breeders of plants and 
 
313 Abigail Camp Dimon, “Quantitative Study of the Effect of Environment upon the Forms of Nassa 
Obsoleta and Nassa Trivittata from Cold Spring Harbor, Long Island,” Biometrika 2, no. 1 (1902): 24–43. 
314 APS Davenport, Series I, Box 37, “Experimental Evolution Lectures” folder 2. This is a clear example 
of how natural selection was clearly accepted by many biologists; the question is whether it fit Darwinian 
interpretations. 
315 Bumpus’ work was to statistically analyze the morphological traits of 64 house sparrows that died 
during a severe winter storm in New England compared to 72 that had survived. He found several traits that 
correlated with survival and death, determining that the storm acted as what we would call today stabilizing 
selection. George M. Cook points out that while the work was used as an example of selection in the wild, 
Bumpus emphasized that its stabilizing effect was not creative. Davenport suggested however that this type 
of selection could split a species into two, “in some cases, at least, evolution seems to take place by small 
differences rather than by leaps, etc.” Hermon C. Bumpus, “The Elimination of the Unfit as Illustrated by 
the Introduced Sparrow, Passer domesticus,” in Biological Lectures from the Marine Biological 
Laboratory at Wood’s Holl, Mass. 1898 (Boston: Ginn & Company, 1899), 209–26; George M. Cook, 
“Neo-Lamarckian Experimentalism in America: Origins and Consequences,” The Quarterly Review of 
Biology 74 (1999): 417–37. 
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animals that they get results quicker by hunting for sports among a large random produce 
than by the selection of individual variations.” As would soon become a prominent theme 
among biologists, “up to the present time no means has been discovered for getting any 
desired sport. … Clearly a great step will have been gained when we shall know how to 
call forth at will any wished-for sport.” What interested Davenport, though, was the fate 
of a sport in the wild, “a crucial experiment.” 
Studies on sports were intimately tied with experiments “on the nature of 
inheritance in normal [intra-species] crossing” and inter-species hybridization (6, 7). Here 
Davenport emphasized the research on blending and alternative inheritance by Mendel 
and his followers. (Note that Mendelism refers not only to heredity but to the 
transformative process of hybridization.) He wrote, “as Galton says, a peculiar interest 
attaches to alternative inheritance because of the aid that it must afford to the 
establishment of incipient races.” Not yet swept up by Mendelism, he also mentioned 
Karl Pearson’s demonstration that stature and skin color blended. He noted the extensive 
work and historical legacy of hybridization research, especially regarding its use to 
demarcate species. Now, he noted, 
While many of the early hybridizers sought primarily to discover the laws of hybridizing 
(and of these Darwin is a notable example) the work of to-day is almost wholly in the 
hands of commercial horticulturalists or of government experiment stations. These too 
often look with disdain on the work of dabbling with the unknown for the sake of 
discovering general laws, instead of gaining some immediately practical result. Very 
recently, however, a new school has arisen from whom great things have already begun to 
appear.316 
 
(8): Lastly, Davenport discussed “the effects of isolation” (8). He wrote, “a careful 
study of species in nature seems to prove that there is a close relation between the origin 
of species in nature and the isolation of parts of the old species. Yet there have been few 
experiments on isolation attempted.” In his lecture notes under the heading of “Isolation,” 
he quoted in full two brief notices by T. D. A. Cockerell in Nature. First, Cockerell 
communicated a report from a California local that the individuals of a group of goats 
stranded on an island looked identical, whereas its mainland relatives showed greater 
 
316 This school included de Vries, Carl Correns, H. C. Webber, and Lucien Cuénot. 
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diversity. Second, Cockerell pointed to a recent monograph that described 134 distinct 
races of Cerion snails in the Bahamas, material he thought would be useful for the study 
of the possible effects of selection on specific differences.317 Although Darwin discussed 
a natural experiment of two sheep colonies separated for fifty years becoming dissimilar, 
Davenport argued that “no experiment is more needed than that of keeping two carefully 
measured races in isolated but climatically similar regions for a long number of 
generations to observe the differences that crop out in them.”318 
Curiously, the experiment he discussed at most length was Friedrich Hunger’s 
work with Aspergillus niger, black mold, perhaps because of how the work illustrated the 
theoretical and methodological importance of the environment. As Davenport 
emphasized, standardized environments were critical to experimental evolution and 
Hunger did so by using precisely controlled media and varying solution density with 
salt.319 Among three lots of Aspergillus raised in denser solutions for 0-2 generations, 
Hunger found that descendants raised in a denser solution could thrive in even denser 
solutions, indicating adaptation, but did not thrive as well in the original control solution. 
From this experiment, along with a few others, Davenport concluded that modifications 
in response to density and temperature were inherited, whereas modifications in response 
to light, gravity, and use and disuse, were not. 320 The work also showed the difficulties 
inherent to experimental evolution, particularly in how to differentiate competing 
hypotheses, such as whether changed conditions shaped the soma and transmitted the 
changes to the germ, or shaped both simultaneously. Thus, for Davenport, the immediate 
result was a pluralistic view of evolution. He had written publicly that “the signs of the 
times indicate that we are about to enter upon a thorough, many-sided, inductive study of 
this great problem, and that there is a willingness to admit that evolution has advanced in 
many ways.”321  
 
317 T. D. A. Cockerell, “The San Clemente Island Goat,” Nature 65, no. 1672 (1901): 31; T. D. A. Cockerell, 
“The Evolution of Snails in the Bahama Islands,” Nature 66, no. 1698 (1902): 56. 
318 APS Davenport, Series I, Box 37, “Experimental Evolution Lectures,” folder 2. 
319 The method was established by Léo Errera, “Hérédité d’un Caractère Acquis Chez Un Champignon 
Pluricellulaire,” Bulletins de l’Académie Royale Des Sciences, Des Lettres et Des Beaux-Arts de Belgique 
(1899): 81–102; Léo Errera, “Inheritance of Acquired Qualities,” The American Naturalist 33, no. 390 
(1899): 522–23. 
320 APS Davenport, Series I, Box 37, “Experimental Evolution Lectures,” folder 2. 




This history and classification influenced the directions Davenport thought a 
Station for Experimental Evolution should take. In another document, Davenport 
generalized the scientific concepts his Station would study: the shape of the “variation 
polygon” in different environments, the causes of variation, self-adjustment of an 
individual in a new environment, “the conditions under which sports may be induced or, 
perhaps, produced at will” and their fate in a natural environment, the “limits” and 
“different classes” of inheritance, and the role of hybridization in evolution.322 In his 
“statement of eight experiments,” Davenport imagined a set of experimental studies that 
further illustrated his grandiose vision – but most of which never occurred. These were a 
genetic, biometric, and biogeographical study of the snail Helix nemoralis using 1,000 
breeding pairs; a genetic study of endemic chinch bugs that display two distinct morphs 
(long wing and short wing); a study of direct environmental effects on the common pond 
snail Limnaea; a genetic study of a spider in which the males show two different morphs; 
a genetic study of a sporting Neapolitan goat (and possibly “polydactyl cats and abnormal 
rodents”); a general test of Mendel’s laws using guinea pigs, mice, and moths; a study of 
the effects of inbreeding and genetic isolation over eight or ten generations in lady-bird 
beetles and other species; and, an attempt to evolve marine animals such as the beach flea 
and the shore snail into terrestrial forms “by gradually acclimating them to dryer 
conditions.” The general method: “Experiments with the greatest attainable precision, 
under well controlled environmental conditions. Large numbers of individuals must be 
used and the characters of progeny and offspring are to be measured.”323 All of this 
required money, personnel, infrastructure, and time. 
“To Get Better Fruits” 
Accepting Davenport’s application, CIW decided to build the Station in Cold 
Spring Harbor on Long Island, New York, providing $34,250 in funds to establish it. 
Although the location sacrificed the steady climate of a place like California, it was 
closer to a larger number of biologists and libraries — less than 30 miles from New York 
 
322 “Some of the lines of work of a Station for the Experimental Study of Evolution,” n.d., APS Davenport, 
Series I, Box 100, “Dept. of Genetics - History” folder. 
323 “The [?] on Experimental Evolution which it is desired to start at the Cold Spring Station, and for which 
Assistance is Asked,” n.d., APS Davenport, Series I, Box 100, “Dept. of Genetics - History” folder. 
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City. Furthermore, Cold Spring Harbor offered a variety of habitats as well as a “free 
offer of about ten acres of land, with house and stable and horse shed.”324 The land was 
leased from the Wawepex Society, which had also leased land to the Long Island 
Biological Association, adjacent to the Station. On June 11, 1904, a gathering of locals, 
journalists, administrators, and scientists, including Hugo de Vries, inaugurated the 
Station for Experimental Evolution.325 
After Davenport introduced himself, John S. Billings, the chairman of CIW’s 
board of trustees addressed why they had decided to fund the Station.326 Recognizing that 
applications may be slow to come, dedicating the funds to this project was still 
worthwhile because 
the results of biological research have had a strong influence on philosophy and theology, 
and we can hardly even imagine what the outcome may be in sociology and political 
science. The problems of evolution and development through heredity involve the 
structure and functions of that part of the living organism which seems to be necessary 
for what we call mental action, from the lowest, dimmest forms of consciousness, 
through memory and will to the highest flights of art, philosophy, poetry, and religion.327 
 
CIW had high hopes for the Station. While there is little mention of it in the Station’s first 
few years, it is no surprise that CIW, Davenport, and the Station would embrace eugenics 
as a form of applied science with its implications for “sociology and political science.” 
Clearly CIW thought the Station would produce results beyond the mere confirmation 
and refutation of evolutionary hypotheses such as the Mendelian laws of inheritance. 
Davenport had requested de Vries to “formally open” the Station, as he was 
experimental evolution’s “God-father” and “the one person who has done most to 
stimulate the line of work which we are to pursue.”328 Davenport introduced de Vries as 
the author Die Mutationstheorie, “a work destined to be the foundation stone of the rising 
science of experimental evolution.”329 In his address entitled “The Aim of Experimental 
 
324 CIW Yearbook, Vol. 3, 1904, p. 23. 
325 Other attendees included Frank Lillie, Henry E. Crampton, Daniel T. MacDougal, H. J. Bumpus, 
William Castle, and Nathaniel and Elizabeth Britton. 
326 For the sake of brevity, I will refer to the “Station for Experimental Evolution” as “the Station.” 
327 CIW Yearbook, Vol. 3, 1904, p. 38. 
328 Davenport to Hugo de Vries (1904/4/17) and Davenport to Hugo de Vries (1904/3/22), APS Davenport, 
Series I, Box 93, folder 1. 
329 CIW Yearbook, Vol. 3, 1904, p. 39. 
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Evolution,” de Vries declared 
A bright prospect opens before us. … Strenuous endeavors are proposed to wrest from 
nature secrets which not long ago seemed almost impregnable. The matter of the 
evolution of organic life on this earth, hitherto a subject of great admiration, admitting 
only of appreciative and comparative studies, is to be investigated to its very core. We are 
no longer content to look at it in a broad way, to enjoy the mighty display of harmony 
between all living beings and to sit down and wonder. We want to have a share in the 
work of evolution, since we partake of the fruit. We want even to shape the work, in order 
to still get better fruits.330 
 
Emphasizing a Baconian approach to the study of evolution just as Davenport had, de 
Vries continued: “Evolution must become an experimental science. First it must be 
controlled and studied, afterwards conducted along selected lines, and finally shaped to 
the use of man.” For de Vries, “science is a mighty means of broadening our conceptions 
and our ideas, as well as our power to utilize the laws and materials of nature.”331 
De Vries emphasized that experimentation would elucidate contemporary causes, 
not historical narratives. He said, 
The process of the evolution of animals and plants has to be attacked by direct 
experiment. This evolution, however, has a long history, covering many millions of years. 
Its historical part, of course, is not accessible to experimental work. From its innermost 
nature it must be studied according to historical and comparative methods. In laboratory 
work we may simply pass it by.332 
 
He also suggested that, due to the uniformity of the laws of nature across time, species 
may even be arising in the present (and that pre-cellular life may be detected in the 
oceans!). 
De Vries then laid out two broad approaches to experimental evolution on both 
 
330 Hugo de Vries, “The Aim of Experimental Evolution,” in CIW Yearbook, Vol. 3, 1904, p. 39. Emphasis 
added. 
331 de Vries, 39–40. For example, “We may hope some day to apply the physiological and activity of the 
rays of Röntgen and Curie to experimental morphology” (p. 43). Strangely, the example he provided was 
more experimental embryology (which Davenport had excluded from the Station’s program), not evolution. 
In a white peacock, if biologists could “seize upon the representative particles of the color and impede their 
development, perhaps we would succeed in reproducing the white variety at once and quite artificially.” De 
Vries also cited the embryological work of Engelmann, Johannsen, Overton, Wilson, Loeb, and Delage, 
specifically their contributions towards stimulating or inhibiting growth. 
332 de Vries, 44. 
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plants and animals: through biometry, “the direct study of variability,” and through 
experiment, a study of “the dependency of this variability on the outer conditions of 
life.”333 While biologists conducted both styles of inquiry, de Vries concluded they were 
rarely if ever combined. He considered Davenport’s training in both schools as a unique 
strength for the Station.334 
Defending the mutation theory and his method of discovering mutations, de Vries 
reiterated the further need to determine causes and this quest’s association with power. It 
was the knowledge of causes that would “enable us to take the whole guidance of it 
[mutation] into our own hands.” As difficult as this was, de Vries was confident that “this 
aim lies within the possibilities of the first series of years.” Regarding mutations, he 
suggested that 
exact methods of working, severe isolation of the single individuals, artificial fecundation 
with complete exclusion of the visits of insects, and above all the great principle of 
individual seed-saving and seed-sowing, have to be the guides. Following the lines which 
are indicated by these prescriptions, gradually a power will be developed which will first 
enable us to increase the number of mutating seeds and afterwards to widen the range of 
mutability. New and unexpected species will then arise, and methods will be discovered 
which might be applied to garden plants and vegetables, and perhaps even to agricultural 
crops, in order to induce them to yield still more useful novelties.335 
 
In closing his address, de Vries lamented that the Station was “the most dreadful 
competition that I could have,” to which “I have to yield my much beloved child,” but “it 
is the interest of the child itself which commands me.” And thus, its godfather blessed the 
opening of the Station for Experimental Evolution. 
 
Davenport reiterated the goals of the Station announced by de Vries and Billings 
through his annual reports to CIW. In 1906, he reminded the leaders of CIW that the 
station’s “present aims” were to understand biological evolution in order to “improve the 
 
333 de Vries, 45. 
334 “Fluctuating variability, however, has been the chief line of study [via biometry] for Mr. Davenport, and 
he would be a bold man who would try to show the way where such a guide is at hand” (p. 46). 
335 de Vries, “The Aim of Experimental Evolution,” 48. Here he cited the plant breeder Korshinsky. It is 
also worth noting that de Vries later published a book dedicated to plant breeding. Hugo DeVries, Plant-
Breeding: Comments on the Experiments of Nilsson and Burbank, by Hugo de Vries. (Open Court Pub., 
1907). Note de Vries’ focus on plants in contrast to Davenport’s emphasis on animals. 
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human race,” as well as understand “how organisms may be best modified to meet our 
requirements of beauty, food, materials, and power.” He reported the following year, 
claiming that its purpose was to ask, “How may the course of the stream of germ plasm 
that has come down to us from remote ages be controlled in its onward course?”336 In 
1908, he wrote, 
Certain portions of that unending stream of reproductive matter which has come down to 
us from the time when life began on earth and by changes in which all evolution has 
taken place are now under our careful observation and to a large extent under our control. 
It is the business of the Department of Experimental Evolution to study the behavior of 
this germ-plasm and to note its reaction to the conditions we impose.337 
 
Direct application was not the immediate goal of the Station. CIW sought to avoid 
replicating the work of the fifty-six American agricultural experiment stations as well as 
the federal bureaus of Animal Industry and Plant Industry, institutions too burdened with 
practical work to study potential new laws and principles. Davenport wrote, 
We could easily produce new and valuable races. We could do all these things with 
certainty by the application of well-known and constantly employed principles. But we 
prefer to risk certain results for the uncertainty of attaining new principles. … We 
propose to leave the question of application to others, bending our whole energy to our 
main work – the discovery of general principles or laws.338 
 
Thus, the Station undertook basic research to inform applied science. The need to do so 
was shown by history: Mendel, unconcerned with “making plants more beautiful or 
useful,” discovered a principle of “inestimable value to breeders” that went “overlooked 
by the practical breeder, and through thirty-five years of practical work was never 
rediscovered by the thousands of breeders or the scores of experiment stations.”339 This 
reasoning attested to the notion that biologists needed to move beyond Darwin’s reliance 
on breeders to work out the deeper method of evolution. 
 
336 CIW Yearbook, Vol. 6, 1907, p. 76; Vol. 5, 1906, p. 92. 
337 CIW Yearbook, Vol. 7, 1908, p. 86. 
338 CIW Yearbook, Vol. 5, 1906, p. 93. This is slightly exaggerated; the next chapter shows that East and 
Pearl combined practical work with natural science, but experimental evolution was not the priority of any 
station. 
339 CIW Yearbook, Vol. 5, 1906, p. 93. Note that Mendel’s work was built upon prior research on 
ornamental plant color, but it was not his immediate goal. 
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Furthermore, direct application was limited by the nature of most biological 
organisms. As Davenport wrote, “Nature is in no hurry, and for most animals and plants it 
takes a year to make a single onward step.”340 CIW’s president, Robert S. Woodward, 
recognized that experimental evolution differed from other experimental sciences, writing 
that “a decade is the smallest convenient time unit for measuring the progress” of work at 
the Station.341 
Alongside the Station for Experimental Evolution, CIW established the Desert 
Botanical Laboratory in Tuscon, Arizona under the auspice of a Department of Botanical 
Research. Woodward reported, 
A considerable knowledge of biology, of plant, insect, and animal life is, indeed, now 
essential to successful economic husbandry; but although tradition has furnished a large 
aggregate of useful inductions for the needs of agriculture and horticulture, it is only in 
recent decades, dating substantially from the advent of Darwin's great work, that such 
inductions have begun to rise to the level of coordinated knowledge.  
 
The laboratory was directed by Daniel Trembly MacDougal, much of his work also 
directed towards experimental evolution. In fact, he was an early disciple of Hugo de 
Vries and a champion of the mutation theory.342 That his research was directed towards 
inducing mutations demonstrates that CIW dedicated serious resources to the emerging 
program. 
 
The Station: 1904-1909 
The early years of the Station were dedicated to preparation. Hired to the station 
were four resident scientists and four “helpers.” In addition to Davenport, the resident 
staff included geneticist and botanist George H. Shull, entomologist Frank E. Lutz, and 
cytologist and secretary Anne M. Lutz (unrelated). (I ignore Shull’s maize work in this 
chapter, because it is central to Chapter 4, but it also happens at the Station during this 
period). Roswell Johnson, whose application to CIW I quoted above, joined them a short 
 
340 CIW Yearbook, Vol. 6, 1907, p. 76. 
341 CIW Yearbook, Vol. 5, 1906, p. 23. 
342 MacDougal’s research was expansive, similar to Davenport’s early career before the Station. Sharon 
Kingsland’s article on MacDougal, “The Battling Botanist,” is one of the few histories of science dedicated 
entirely to experimental evolution (Isis 82, no. 3 (1991): 479–509). 
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time later. The helpers included a part-time librarian, a mechanic, an animal caretaker and 
janitor, and a gardener. A series of associates received funding through the Department of 
Experimental Biology or collaborated with one of the resident staff. These included 
Nathaniel Britton, William Castle, Henry Crampton, E. L. Mark, Daniel MacDougal, 
William J. Moenkhaus, William Tower, and E. B. Wilson, who all worked on some aspect 
of experimental evolution, whether it was mutation studies, hybrid breeding, selection 
experiments, or cytological investigations. There were also correspondents, including 
Bateson, Correns, Cuénot, Hurst, Tschermak, and C. O. Whitman. The Station for 
Experimental Evolution was not only a place, but also the center of a growing network of 
experimental biologists in the United States funded by CIW.343 
The establishment of animal and plant colonies required considerable effort. In his 
first reports, Davenport divided the work by “material” (species) rather than topic 
because “especially among animals, each kind of material offers special difficulties in 
rearing and breeding that have to be mastered before further progress can be made,” and 
due to slow reproduction, such mastery could take years to accomplish.344 As the Station 
opened, Davenport was breeding “cows, sheep, goats, cats, poultry, and canary birds,” 
planning to test characters for Mendelian ratios, as well as experimenting with “wild 
species of crustacea and mollusca.”345 The entomologists determined which species were 
useful and how to raise them, in terms of workable crosses and the unique conditions of 
captivity required by each species.346 Frank Lutz’s goal was to investigate the Mendelism 
of wing lengths in addition to assortative mating. Johnson reported the difficulties in 
determining the best species of plant-lice (food) as well as temperatures for his lady-
beetles, testing, as Davenport had emphasized, whether “laboratory conditions would in 
themselves produce modifications,” finding only one instance.347 Plants required less 
maintenance, but their mating systems were “more difficult to control.” They were also 
prone to “weeds, … parasitic plants and animals,” and meteorological conditions, so, an 
irrigation system was constructed to protect plants from drought. Their environmental 
 
343 CIW Yearbook, Vol. 3, 1904, pp. 28-29. 
344 CIW Yearbook, Vol. 4, 1905, p. 87. 
345 CIW Yearbook, Vol. 3, 1904, p. 29; CIW Yearbook, Vol. 4, 1905, pp. 92-94. 
346 CIW Yearbook, Vol. 4, 1905, p. 89. 
347 CIW Yearbook, Vol. 5, 1906, pp. 102-103. 
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sensitivity meant that Shull had to find plants “which will tolerate the production of 
adaptive structural modifications.” He began preparing an abandoned garden plot, but in 
the meantime collaborated with MacDougal at the New York Botanical Garden to grow 
seeds given to the Station by Hugo de Vries, including (but not limited to) O. 
lamarckiana. He also grew crops as feed and to sell, saving some that showed potential 
hereditary variations.348 Immediately the Station was proving the argument that a well-
funded institution was required to make headway in experimental evolution. 
This argument was further proved by the physical infrastructure. As Kohler notes, 
“it was not a biological farm, exactly, but more biodiverse and integrated with its natural 
surroundings than any laboratory, then or now.”349 When the Station opened in 1904, it 
consisted of only one research building, 60 feet by 35 feet, two stories high with a 
basement. On the ground floor were rooms for breeding animals and another to house 
aquatic animals, along with smaller rooms for food preparation and work. Above was a 
series of five research rooms, a secretary’s office, a library that could hold 1,000 books, 
and a room with a glass roof for plants, birds, and insects. The attic could hold a further 
7,000 books. The basement had rooms for food and tool storage, heating facilities, a 
photographic dark room, a “low temperature room,” and an artificial “dark room” for 
“cave studies.” The station was electrified for both power and light and heated by steam. 
For the following year, Davenport planned to build a greenhouse, a wire roof for the 
experimental garden, and outdoor fishponds. (Given the severity of accidents in ruining 
experimental studies of evolution, the building was fireproof — a fortuitous decision as a 
fire that broke out in the middle of a night in 1906 “due to the carelessness of a 
workman … was confined to the room in which it started.”)350 But within one year, the 
Station was already at its infrastructural limits, thus, building a poultry-house, brooder-
house, the green-house, and fourteen small chicken-houses. In following yearbooks, 
Davenport reported the construction of a vivarium (for insects), a birdhouse (for genetic 
studies of canaries), and additional small green-houses to grow food for the insects and 
birds. The Station built forty portable “colony houses” in addition to fifty new breeding 
 
348 CIW Yearbook, Vol. 4, 1905, p. 88; Vol. 3, 1904, p. 30. 
349 Robert Kohler, Landscapes and Labscapes (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2002), 48. 
350 CIW Yearbook, Vol. 3, 1904, pp. 24-27; Vol. 5, 1906, p. 97. 
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pens. They also hired more workers, including a poultryman. The work of the Station was 
proving biologists’ realization that experimental evolution required permanent 
infrastructure and significant capital funds, especially given Davenport’s wide-ranging 
vision.351 
 Davenport remarked, “it is a feature of experimental work in biology that it tends 
to increase geometrically.” In 1906, Shull reported that 46 plant species had been raised 
and measured, composed of 291 pedigrees of 29,077 individuals. Lutz had measured 
2,000 pedigreed individuals of Gryllus (field crickets). Separately from the Station 
proper, Moenkhaus and Castle had themselves raised over 10,000 flies and 3,000 rodents, 
respectively. This was in addition to the dozens of strains of poultry, cage-birds, and 
mammals.352 To track and control the rapidly growing numbers of experimental 
organisms, Station researchers implemented pedigrees. Shull developed a card catalogue 
to track pedigreed lineages and data regarding variability and heritability. Davenport 
pointed out that pedigrees not only controlled for confounding variables, but existed for 
the sake of control. He wrote they had started 
a certain number of strains with the intention of controlling their onward progress, first 
by controlling all matings, and, secondly, by controlling or at least observing the 
environmental conditions.353 
 
Significantly in 1908 Davenport and his wife, zoologist Gertrude Davenport, 
extended the Station’s pedigree-keeping to human eye and hair color, signaling the 
introduction of eugenics based on Mendelism. Davenport claimed that the Station had 
accumulated “a lot of pedigree data—much of it quantitative—the like of which exists, I 
venture to think, nowhere else in the world.”354 While not experimental in themselves, 
careful pedigrees “have much the value of experimental data” that could enable 
predictions.355 (Note that pedigrees had emerged from within the experimental context of 
breeding, in general.) This was evidenced by his own work in the inheritance of chicken 
 
351 CIW Yearbook, Vol. 4, 1905, p. 95; Vol. 5, p. 97; Vol. 6, 1907, p. 83. 
352 CIW Yearbook, Vol. 4, 1905, p. 96; Vol. 5, 1906, pp. 97-98; Vol. 7, 1908, p. 91; Vol. 5, 1906, pp. 105, 
243. 
353 CIW Yearbook, Vol. 6, 1907, p. 76. 
354 CIW Yearbook, Vol. 7, 1908, p. 89. 
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color, which even as a result of multiple factors could be expressed in “simple 
formulae … by which the proportions of any color in a given hybrid mating can be 
predicted.”356 This combination of natural history (pedigrees) and experimentalism had 
brought Davenport to eugenics, a subject not explicitly discussed in his applications or 
mission statements, but would become one of the Station’s most infamous contributions 
to early twentieth-century biology. 
The work increased geometrically not only in population sizes, but in lines of 
investigation. Despite employing only four or five scientists, their research included 
assessing the mutation and pure line theories, de Vries’ primroses, the effects of 
inbreeding, the breadth of Mendelian inheritance, the breeding methods of Luther 
Burbank, and whether or not “new, inheritable characteristics” “can be induced of a 
desired sort” “so that evolution can be directed at will.”357 The still somewhat practical 
bent of the Station was evident in the organisms used for study: while Drosophila played 
some role and biologists elsewhere made use of Paramecia and hydra, many of the 
species at the Station were crops or livestock. The bias towards domesticated species is 
indicated by Davenport’s research on canaries: he used a semi-domesticated bird to refute 
the claim that Mendel’s laws applied only to domesticated varieties.358 The canary also 
reveals that domesticated animals and plants were so common in part because such 
organisms are easier to handle given their co-evolution with and recently directed 
evolution by humans, a transition from wild species to model organisms. 
The Station’s collective reports reveal the confusion and contradictions that 
permeated evolutionary science at the time during the so-called “eclipse of Darwinism.” 
Davenport himself wrote in support of Mendelism, unit characters, and the mutation 
theory; however, he remained open to Castle’s theory of genetic contamination.359 
Associate William Tower, on the other hand, emphasized continuity and the non-
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randomness of variation, dismissing mutations. Frank Lutz, carrying out similar work to 
Tower on insects, had found Mendelian inheritance in color patterns.360 Roswell Johnson 
followed Lutz in concluding that species and varieties of Hippodamia (ladybeetles) 
expressed Mendelian inheritance and arose by mutations, “intergrades in nature and in the 
laboratory [being] very rare.” But he agreed with Tower that mutations were orthogenetic 
(contra de Vries), believing that “polyphyletic origins of varieties and species must be far 
more common than generally supposed.”361 Both Tower and Johnson rejected selection as 
important, although William Castle, a CIW-funded associate at Harvard, began to argue 
for selection’s power and utility while challenging common Mendelian notions such as its 
use for explaining blending inheritance; Davenport at this time accepted Castle’s 
skepticism.362 Johnson declared instead that “evolution is very active” through mutation 
and environmental stimulus.363 Henry Crampton, another CIW-funded correspondent, 
thought that variation in snails (Partula) on the Society Islands were mutations that were 
not environmentally caused.364 Davenport rejected the inheritance of acquired characters 
but remained open to its possibility. He did write that “it can not be doubted” that some 
environmental stimuli triggered mutations, as Bonnier, Lutz, Tower, Johnson, and others 
had found. Furthermore, their work showed that variations occurred in a “definite 
direction,” even in nature.365 Meanwhile, Shull (with Edward East) was developing the 
mutation theory, challenging Darwin’s ideas about inbreeding, and investigating how 
variation, heredity, and selection interacted. Out of these messy results, the strongest 
statement Davenport could muster was that the Station had “confirm[ed] the fundamental 
importance of Mendel’s law.” Particularly, they had “silenced the objection that 
[Mendelism] related only to ‘artificial’ varieties and proved that they hold equally for 
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species in nature.”366 This affirmed Davenport’s goal of discovering and working out 
laws of nature, as opposed to producing new horticultural and agricultural varieties, while 
also demonstrating that evolutionary science required significant investments to work out 
even modest conclusions. 
As for taking control of evolution, the Station had made limited progress. In his 
five-year review, Davenport expressed uncertainty regarding the “modification of 
characteristics”: 
By changed environmental conditions characteristics may, of course, be changed and the 
modifications, though usually somatic only, are sometimes transmissible (Tower). By 
selective breeding, characteristics may be modified, increased, or diminished, and there is 
evidence that such modifications are sometimes inherited. Thus Castle has shown that the 
extent of the pigmented area in rats may be varied in an inheritable fashion by selection 
of slight variations and, beginning with a scarcely recognizable trace of syndactylism, I 
have succeeded in getting very exaggerated forms of this condition. On the other hand 
attempts, in other cases, to increase or diminish characteristics (i.e., certain color-
characters) by selection have not yet met with success. This whole subject of the 
modifiability (and particularly the inheritable modifiability) of characters deserves 
thorough investigation.367 
 
De Vries had suggested that the scientific control of evolution (or at least, mutations) “lie 
within the possibilities of the first series of years,” but Davenport admitted this was not 
the case. He foresaw the dilemma as the “crux of the controversy between the Darwinian 
‘selectionists’ and the De Vriesian mutationists,” a debate rooted in both theory and 
practice funded by CIW. All was well, though, because this is what CIW had expected. 
Indeed, CIW kept the money flowing: after startup costs of $70,000, CIW 
increased its annual funding of the Station’s research from $12,000 in 1905 to $29,000 in 
1909. Capital costs, including land, construction, and maintenance, increased from 
$23,201.81 to $46,005.86, for a total of $75,005.86 annually. Given the limits of 
scientific funding for the biological sciences in the early twentieth century, this was an 
astonishing amount.  In fact, the amount of money, or more importantly, the perception 
that the Station was drowning in funds, proved to be somewhat of an issue: Woodward 
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complained that “our attempts at cooperation” with others “have in most cases led to 
difficulties, arising from an exaggerated estimate of the Institution’s capabilities.”368 
The time required to conduct substantial work in experimental evolution 
apparently contradicted the professional careers of its resident scientists. In 1909, Frank 
Lutz resigned from the Station to take a position at the American Museum of Natural 
History. Roswell Johnson also resigned, finding a position at Pittsburgh and became an 
influential advocate of eugenics. To replace them, Davenport hired zoologist Arthur 
Banta, to work in the artificial cave, and Ross Gortner, a biochemist.369 By 1920 only 
Davenport remained of the original scientific staff; in general, only the directors of the 
Station (i.e., Blakeslee, Demerec) spent more than a decade working at the Station. 
The work of the Cold Spring Harbor station featured in several newspapers in its 
first years. The New York American wrote in 1910: 
‘Freaks’ Are Bred to Get New Knowledge of Heredity.  
Combless Poultry, One-Footed, Wingless and Tailless Birds Successfully Raised.  
“To Aid Human Affairs” 
Experimental Evolution Station Hopes to Indicate Characteristics of Unborn.370 
 
The article functioned as a five-year update, acknowledging that the nature of the 
station’s work meant that “five years more will probably be employed in experiment and 
observation” before the Station would publicly reveal its results. Davenport told the 
newspaper that several characteristics in poultry had arisen de novo and were 
permanently inherited. The article focused not only on domesticated breeds, but also on 
Banta’s study “on the modifications which cave breeding produces in a species” and that 
“Tower has found he can breed a new Colorado potato beetle in high temperature and dry 
air in which the germ-plasm produces less pigment.”371 It also mentioned the biochemical 
and cytological work of Gortner and Anne Lutz. The article also noticed the Station’s 
interest in eugenics, about which Davenport told them: 
We are co-operating with the Committee of Eugenics in gathering data concerning the 
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transmission of human characteristics. … Although not strictly within the scope of 
experimental work, the necessity of applying the new knowledge of heredity to human 
affairs is too important to be overlooked. Expectation is that it will be possible, in the 
case of the marriage of two individuals, even differing in characteristic, to state how the 
characteristic will be distributed among the children.372 
 
The Station: 1910-1920 
Over the next decade, the Station’s personnel, infrastructure, and projects 
continued to expand. By 1916, the Station employed about 20 staff, including seven 
resident scientists and several women (which grew temporarily during the military 
draft).373 As the Station grew, so did the number and diversity of research projects, 
making the history difficult to summarize. As Davenport admitted in his 1923-1924 
report, a “friendly criticism” of the Station was that “its investigations are somewhat 
diffuse and not concentrated sufficiently upon a single point.”374 
The fluidity of what constituted experimental evolution is perhaps best seen in the 
ever-shifting categories under which Davenport listed research projects in his annual 
reports. They also show that much of the work conducted by the Station was not directly 
experimental evolution — only three of the listed seven “principal developments” in 1911 
were such: the publication of Frank Lutz’s research on Drosophila (in which he “secured 
variations in the wing venation unlike anything known in nature” and showed that these 
were not lost by disuse), the end of Shull’s study of Burbank, and the refutation of neo-
Lamarckism. These three contrast with the establishment of the Eugenics Record Office, 
the discovery of how epilepsy is inherited in humans, the publication of James Arthur 
Harris’ biometrical studies on plants, and Gortner’s discovery of two types of melanin.375 
What CIW President Woodward considered the Station’s most promising investigations 
also showed this ambiguity: Shull’s study of “the effects of self-fertilization in maize” 
over time (Chapter 4) and the heredity of epilepsy in humans.376 The following year, the 
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Station’s work had been conducted “chiefly along the lines of studies in cytology, in the 
chemistry of pigmentation, in the factors of mutation, and in the problems of human 
heredity.”377 1914’s reported accomplishments included the inheritance of depression, 
sex-limited inheritance of “nomadism” and alcoholism, polygenic inheritance, 
“experimental evidence … of the selective nature of elimination” in plants, and “the 
evolution of the chromosomal complex.”378 The blend of experimental evolution, 
genetics, and eugenics along with cytology, biochemistry, and biometry continued 
throughout Davenport’s tenure. The complex mix of evolutionary theories that 
characterized the Station’s first years had given way to a more general biology centered 
around genetics. This reflected the consolidation among experimental evolutionists 
around the theories of de Vries, Johannsen, and Mendel against Lamarck, Eimer, Nageli, 
Henslow, and Delage.  
Thus, Davenport did see theoretical progress made in the “methods of evolution” 
over the past decade through work which the Station had taken part in. He emphasized 
the discoveries that: 1) characters are independent of each other and their genetic 
“determiners” are not “bound together”; 2) genetic discontinuity passes into continuity 
with multiple factors and small mutations; 3) selection is optimized by selecting the 
“most favorable blood, race, strain or pure line (biotype, Johannsen)” rather than 
individual somas (which remains useful if necessary); 4) Mendelism and mutationism 
solved species formation by eliminating swamping as a problem; and 5) mutations occur 
independently from somatic changes but conditions may effect the germ plasm. He 
admitted that experimental evolution’s contribution to the question of adaptation “has not 
been great,” but that “on the whole, I think it may be fairly said that experimental work 
supports the principle of selective elimination but finds many characters that are wholly 
neutral.”379 
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The possibility of controlling evolution remained an open question. In 1910 
Davenport reported the quest to “induce at will a wholly new characteristic by 
experimental methods” remained unfulfilled, but by sheer numbers — 17,000 poultry, for 
example — new strains could appear.380 Several years later, Davenport declared that “no 
student of evolution by experimental methods can doubt the importance of mutations,” 
but they remained outside of human control, limiting their investigation.381 Mendelism 
explained how humans could “combine determiners at will” to “make new and improved 
breeds,” but this was the original point of Mendel’s work anyway.382 
Davenport continued to raise large numbers of domesticated animals, assessing 
whether variations followed Mendelian laws and whether they functioned as 
mutations.383 Davenport briefly collaborated with the New Hampshire Agricultural 
Experiment Station to improve sheep by “modern methods,” including Mendelian 
crossing and progeny-based selection.384 The extensive use of pedigrees in this work was 
rather similar to eugenics pedigrees, one of the implicit ways that Davenport linked 
experimental evolution and eugenics. 
Genetics had become the focus of the Station’s research. To display to CIW’s 
trustees the payoff of funding the Station, Davenport addressed them on “The New 
Principles of Heredity.”385 While Davenport claimed in 1909 that the Station’s major 
achievement to be the confirmation of Mendel’s laws of inheritance in a diverse array of 
species, questions remained; “the subject … [was] by no means … exhausted.” Shull, 
Lutz, and Johnson reported “irregular” dominance, for example. The Station followed up 
the discovery of chromosomal mechanics, which included Anne Lutz’s study of 
Oenothera chromosomes, which produced “the suggestion … that ‘mutation’ is always 
induced by some irregularity in chromosomal division.” While Anne Lutz soon departed 
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following a dispute with Davenport, this project was a consistent part of the Station’s 
work for over the next two decades led by Charles Metz and Albert Blakeslee. 386 Another 
sign of the Station’s increasing focus on genetics was CIW’s grants to the Morgan lab 
starting in 1915.387  
This increased focus on genetics did worry Davenport, at least temporarily. In a 
memo to Woodward, Davenport admitted that “since its beginning this Station [for 
Experimental Evolution] has been chiefly engaged in studying the laws of inheritance… 
It has become plainer that there are other fields to be worked in the subject of 
experimental evolution which we have hitherto largely neglected.” Davenport attributed 
this neglect to a “realization that the new lines of investigation would require a new and 
more expansive kind of equipment than that which we have possessed.” Eugenics, or 
human heredity, had been funded by the railroad heiress Mary Harriman through the 
Eugenics Record Office, but other research programs required new capital and 
equipment. One new line of work included the effects of light upon pigmentation. The 
desire to control the production of mutations and to increase variability by changing the 
environment of the germ plasm,” apparently required a new building of laboratories and 
animal shelters. Following the work of MacDougal and William Tower, in which the 
“application of … agents” such as temperature and moisture could effect morphological 
and hereditary changes, Davenport sought to construct two rooms dedicated to either 
constant high or low temperatures.388 He also proposed a project on the “surgical 
interference with the germ cells” as another method of inducing mutations. Sheep, useful 
for “determination of sex characters,” and Whitman’s pigeons, to which Oscar Riddle 
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Objects, Practices, Contexts, ed. Luis Campos and Alexander von Schwerin (Max Planck Institute for the 
History of Science, 2010), 11–48. 
387 Robert Kohler, Lords of the Fly (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 106. 
388 Reporting on research concerning the “relation of physico-chemical properties of vegetable sap to 
environmental factors” (in collaboration with the Desert Lab), Harris highlighted the importance of 
understanding in full an organism’s context: “Any attempt to influence the germ-plasm of species as a 
means of controlling evolutionary phenomena should, if it is to throw light upon the problem of the 
methods by which evolution has taken place in nature, be made by means of factors which are of 
fundamental biological importance in nature. Such factors are light, temperature, and moisture” (CIW 
Yearbook, Vol. 14, 1915, p. 146). 
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would dedicate several years, would be given more space. (Davenport even estimated the 
energy costs for this requested infrastructure.)389 While he desired the Station to dedicate 
more resources to inducing these changes, Davenport did not mention natural selection or 
other relevant evolutionary mechanisms in the memo, despite some of his staff’s active 
investigation of the subject. 
Ten years following the Station’s inauguration, Davenport reported that “the 
problem of variation … still remains unanalyzed” and “finally, we have made a beginning 
on the task of inducing variations at will.”390 Under this heading, work included a search 
for mutations around Cold Spring Harbor, “periodicity in abnormality in the passion 
flower,” “chemical and morphological differences in the sap of crape myrtle,” 
“modification of the germ-plasm by alcohol” (in rats), and the use of a centrifuge to 
induce developmental changes in amphibian eggs.391 Oscar Riddle apparently found a 
method to “force” pigmentation in albino doves and Banta reared a cave amphipod in 
daylight, suggesting the role of light in producing pigment.392 Yet the “experimental 
modification of the germ-plasm” remained “the loftiest aim of the experimental 
evolutionist” but “has been so rarely achieved that all reported successes in this direction 
are received with critical skepticism.”393 
Research that blended experimental evolution with “immediate sociological 
importance” was G. C. Bassett’s project, conducted under the direction of behaviorist 
John B. Watson, to produce genetic and mental changes in rats via alcoholic vapors.394 
Specifically, the work touched on whether “in man, alcoholism in the parents results in 
their children having less than normal mentality.” What made this project odd among the 
Station’s research projects is that it had no purpose of improvement. Davenport saw 
parallels with inbreeding in maize, leading to a proposal to use inbreeding and selection 
in rats to produce a “strain of rats of inferior intelligence,” then use hybridization to test 
 
389 Davenport to Woodward, n.d., “Woodward, R. S. 1912 Folder 2, Oct. - December.” 
390 CIW Yearbook, Vol. 13, 1914, p. 120. 
391 CIW Yearbook, Vol. 13, 1914, pp. 120-122. Davenport suggested the speed at which changes occur is a 
“limit [that] serves, in a way, to measure the relative strength of hereditary and environmental forces in the 
given case of development.” CIW Yearbook, Vol. 13, 1914, pp. 120-122. 
392 CIW Yearbook, Vol. 16, 1917, pp. 129-130. 
393 CIW Yearbook, Vol. 14, 1915, p. 131. 




its inheritance.395 This is one of the few explicit links between eugenics and experimental 
evolution that occurred at the Station. But its evolutionary motivations were also murky: 
while the research relied upon the shared evolutionary history of two mammals, the rats 
here were studied in a situation they would never encounter. It was also based on 
perceived psychological similarities between rats and humans along with the 
experimental control available to rat studies. It was eugenical, however, and it was 
important enough to be conducted for six to seven years.396 (The Station also intended to 
test temperature and humidity, installing an air-conditioner that failed.397) The conclusion 
of the project was that alcohol did have negative hereditary effects. 
Besides the basic tenets of Mendelian inheritance, another certainty that emerged 
from the Station’s researchers and other CIW-funded biologists was the falsehood of neo-
Lamarckism, specifically the inheritance of acquired characters. In 1908, C. C. Guthrie 
published work on ovary transplantation in chickens, claiming to demonstrate an 
experimental example of the inheritance of an acquired character, namely color. After 
transplanting ovaries from white chickens to black chickens (and vice versa), Guthrie 
observed that some chicks showed the influence of the foster mother’s color, concluding 
that the ovary and its eggs were directly affected by their new environment. Upon reading 
this result, and of similar experiments on rabbits, Davenport and Castle (funded with 
$1,000 by CIW) replicated the experiments in chickens, guinea pigs, and frogs, but not 
the results. Davenport concluded that Guthrie had not actually shown the chicks were 
from the transplanted ovary; instead, it was possible that the foster mother never “became 
functional” and the removed ovary had regenerated. Castle and Phillips succeeded in 
making the transplanted ovary functional, and with their more rigorous genetics work, 
showed that the offspring of the foster mother instead matched the original owner of the 
ovary. They emphasized, “we can detect no modification.”398 Castle reported to CIW that 
 
395 CIW Yearbook, Vol. 12, 1913, p. 115. Referencing maize is curious given Shull’s upending of that 
commonplace. 
396 CIW Yearbook, Vol. 20, 1921. 
397 CIW Yearbook, Vol. 14, 1915, p. 132. 
398 Guthrie, “Further Results of Transplantation of Ovaries in Chickens,” Journal of Experimental Zoology 
5 (1908): 563–576; Davenport, “The Transplantation of Ovaries in Chickens,” Journal of Morphology 22 
(1911): 111–122; Castle and Phillips, “A Successful Ovarian Transplantation in the Guinea-Pig, and Its 
Bearing on Problems of Genetics,” Science 30 (1909): 312–13. They continued the work with CIW funds, 
confirming their conclusion: Castle and Philips, “On Germinal Transplantation in Vertebrates,” Carnegie 
Institution of Washington 144 (1911); Castle and Phillips, “Further Experiments on Ovarian Transplantation 
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this work, instead of confirming neo-Lamarckism, “affords the strongest existing 
experimental evidence in support of Weismann’s postulate” of a separation between germ 
and soma.399 While this work has not been discussed by historians, it follows what Peter 
Bowler has argued generally: the experimental turn in biology brought about 
Lamarckism’s downfall.400    
For another line of research investigating use and disuse, Davenport hired Arthur 
Banta to conduct studies in the Station’s mostly unused “artificial cave.” The purpose was 
to study “the way in which body pigment is lost, eyes degenerate or disappear, and tactile 
organs hypertrophy in animals inhabiting caves, abysmal waters, and other dark 
situations. … The artificial cave affords conditions approximating those of a natural 
cavern.” Recapitulating the Station’s initial years, Banta spent considerable time 
collecting species and working out how to maintain them. In following reports, the sheer 
number of species under study — mud minnows, crayfish, salamanders, wood-frogs, 
amphipods, isopods — obscured the conclusions at which Banta arrived. But by 1915, 
“enough ha[d] been seen” to determine that differences between unpigmented cave forms 
and pigmented forms were likely genetic, not lost due to “disuse.”401 
Two resident investigators illustrate the broader notion of experimental evolution 
conducted by the Station — statistician James Arthur Harris and biochemist Ross Aiken 
Gortner. Harris, who had arrived at the Station in 1907, carried on the biometrical 
tradition of Weldon and Pearson as well as their anti-genetic tendencies. Harris’ extensive 
statistical studies attempted to correlate “selective elimination” and fecundity with 
botanical traits, including ovule and leaf size and the placement of beans within a pod. 
Gortner’s research was dedicated to the “great gap” “between the determiners in the 
germ-cells and the adult characters.” That is, he worked to decipher the links between 
genotype and phenotype, or in a sense, the biochemical pathways that linked genetics and 
biometry — the “chemistry of ontogeny.” In Davenport’s view, this was linked to 
experimental evolution through heredity as “the control or direction of ontogeny.”402 
 
in Guinea Pigs,” Science 38 (1913): 783–86. 
399 CIW Yearbook, Vol. 9, 1910, p. 240. See also CIW Yearbook, Vol. 10, 1911, p. 240. 
400 Peter Bowler, The Eclipse of Darwinism (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983), 102. 
401 CIW Yearbook, Vol. 9, 1910, p. 82; Vol. 12, 1913, pp. 111-112; Vol. 14, 1915, p. 145. 
402 CIW Yearbook, Vol. 14, 1915, p. 128. Davenport explained in 1907 that “more and more it becomes 
clear that problems of inheritance are chemical problems, and that the development of this or that 
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Harris found statistical correlations between physiological and morphological variations, 
while Gortner dedicated much of his time to studying the biochemical pathways of 
pigmentation (the most common trait for Mendelian studies). Thus, both Gortner and 
Harris fulfilled supplementary roles in the Station, both conducting their own research 
but frequently collaborating with others. 
Shull’s return to the Station on a more permanent basis after his work with 
Burbank lasted only several years, taking a position in Princeton in 1915 and replaced by 
Albert Blakeslee, the Station’s future director. Blakeslee initially focused on mutation 
induction by chemicals in mucors (a genus of fungal mold).403 Adopting Datura 
(jimsonweed) in the 1920s helped him realize Davenport’s goals of mutation induction 
using the chemical colchicine, discussed extensively by Helen Anne Curry.404 
World War I pulled away the resident scientists and assistants in 1917-1918 
through conscription and applied scientific research. Davenport remained in the U.S., 
serving on the National Research Council’s Anthropology committee, developing 
selection criteria for naval officers. MacDowell, a Quaker, worked in the Red Cross’ 
reconstruction unit in France. Metz researched malarial mosquitoes for the Public Health 
Service and Riddle was a captain of the Army’s Sanitary Corps. Two others remained in 
the U.S. because of children (presumably Harris and Banta) and Blakeslee, working 
under the National Research Council, expanded his “extensive project for perfecting a 
superior race of prolific [adzuki] beans.”405 Most of the assistants went to war (one of 
whom died) and were replaced with women (although a number of women already 
 
characteristic of the adult is to the presence of a specific enzyme in the germ cells. Thus an albino mouse 
may be derived from a gay mouse, a black mouse, or a chocolate mouse. … Indeed the fact, that the 
enzymes of the germ cells and particularly of the egg determine hereditary characters, points the way to the 
modification of hereditary qualities, and to the production of this or that character at will. Such, at least, is 
the goal of the investigator.” Davenport, “Recent Advances in the Theory of Breeding,” Proceedings of the 
American Breeders’ Association 3 (1907): 132-135. 
403 CIW Yearbook, Vol. 12, 1913, pp. 104-105. 
404 Helen Anne Curry, Evolution Made to Order: Plant Breeding and Technological Innovation in Twentieth 
Century America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016). Given Curry’s as well as Luis Campos’ 
extensive histories of induced mutation research in the 1920s, I do not discuss them in-depth in this 
dissertation. 
405 CIW Yearbook, Vol. 17, 1918, pp, 104, 104. Here Blakeslee noted that the work was a “primarily a 
practical problem with relatively little theoretical interest,” but there was research on seed-color, in hopes 
of finding a correlation to yield, “but also satisfy the market requirements in respect to seed appearance,” a 
cultural criterion. There were also the selective criteria of palatability. 
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worked there), who mostly maintained stocks.406 The Station itself supplied mice for 
laboratory studies. Gregg Mittman has written about biologists’ desire and struggle to 
match physical scientists’ considerable contributions to the war effort, and the trajectories 
of Station scientists reflect that: from the most well-funded biological laboratory in the 
country, only Blakeslee brought experimental evolution to bear upon it.407 
By 1920, the Station combined genetics and eugenics to an increasing degree. In 
1919, of the thirteen accomplishments Davenport listed, only two or three were explicitly 
experimental evolution; most were eugenics, genetics, and biostatistical. In his 1920 
review of the Station’s research, Davenport suggested that “the work of the Station for 
Experimental Evolution and that of the Eugenics Record Office are so akin and so 
interdependent that they should obviously be united in one department of Genetics.” He 
lamented, “that our highest hopes for the Station have all been realized can not be 
affirmed.” Still, Davenport claimed for the Station “the first discovery the variation of 
chromosomes associated with, and inducing, a corresponding mutation of a species (the 
evening primrose),” opening the path for Morgan’s lab. Station workers had isolated 
“types of mutations — … interchromosomal mutations and intrachromosomal 
mutations.” The Station also confirmed that “evolution has proceeded not primarily by 
modifications” of somas, but by “changes in the ‘germ-plasm,’ the chromosomes,” 
sometimes spontaneously, sometimes by induced changes via hybridization or changed 
conditions.408 
It is rather apparent that the increasing focus on chromosomes was the hallmark 
of the Station’s research. Davenport wrote, 
Mankind is what it is in its physical, mental, and temperamental aspects because of the 
antecedent changes that occurred in the chromosomes of man's ancestors; and even inside 
of the "human" group, by changes in genes, numerous inheritable subgroups or 
"biotypes" have arisen with their physical, mental, and temperamental peculiarities. All 
these conclusions, which arise naturally and inevitably from experiments and 
 
406 CIW Yearbook, Vol. 17, 1918, pp. 103-104. 
407 Gregg Mitman, The State of Nature: Ecology, Community and American Social Thought, 1900—1950 
(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1992). The Station’s contribution to WW1 contrasts with that of WW2 
in which under Demerec it led a project on penicillin. 
408 CIW Yearbook, Vol. 18, 1919, p. 123; Vol. 19, 1920, p. 108. CIW had purchased the Eugenics Record 
Office in 1918. Davenport also suggested the Station should primarily occupy itself with mammals, to 
study temperament, cancer, color, and fecundity. 
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observations in which this country has taken a leading part, are bound to revolutionize 
man's attitude toward himself, toward racial differences, and toward those aberrant 
individuals who constitute so great a “social problem.”409 
 
Renaming the Department of Experimental Evolution to the Department of Genetics 
made sense, given the Station’s growing focus on genetics and eugenics.410 Eugenics was 
not experimental in the traditional sense, but relied on pedigrees of traits and statistical 
analyses of “human mate-selection, differential fecundity, and the sex ratio.” It was the 
“genetics of man.”411 Experimentally, Davenport desired to “push the study of inheritance 
of instincts (in dogs), of tumor-growth (in mice), of sex ratio, of the meaning of sex and 
sex intergrades, of fecundity, of sterility, of particular traits in animals and plants.” In 
Davenport’s view, “the experiments of the department proper with plants and animals are 
thus supplemented very advantageously” by the pedigrees of human heredity.412 
From 1909 to 1920, grant funding more than doubled from $29,000 to $78,343.27 
and capital funding more than tripled from $46,005.86 to $161,199.99.413 Following the 
end of the war, money at CIW became quite tight from their contributions to 
governmental research, forcing Woodward to request Davenport reduce the Station’s 
expenses by more than a tenth. Davenport’s projected expenses for 1920 dedicated 
$58,280 to salaries distributed among 34 employees. In addition to Davenport ($7,200) 
and six investigators (between $3,000 and $3,720 each), there were: a research associate 
for Metz, superintendent, carpenter, mechanic, stenographer, engineer, “greenhouse man” 
and greenhouse laborer, nine assistants to the investigators (six of whom were women) 
three computers (all women), a poultryman, farmer, laborer, an artist, and summer 
assistants (unknown number).414 This was substantial growth from the less than dozen 
 
409 CIW Yearbook, Vol. 19, 1920, pp. 107-108. 
410 Davenport’s initial proposal included a section of Drosophila Investigations, supervised by Morgan, who 
was already receiving $3,600 per year from CIW, as well as one for biometry. Davenport to Woodward 
(1919/3/3) and (1919/5/7), APS Davenport, Box 105, “Woodward, R. S. 1919 Folder 2, March - June.” 
411 Davenport to Woodward (1919/2/10), APS Davenport, Box 105, “Woodward, R. S. 1919 Folder 1, 
January - February.” I say “in the traditional sense,” because it can be argued that eugenical laws and 
practices were interventions on the genetics of the population — an “experiment on a gigantic scale.” 
412 CIW Yearbook, Vol. 19, 1920, p. 109; Vol. 11, 1912, p. 19. 
413 In 2017 dollars, $2,908,522.29. ERO funding in 1920 totaled $218,491.90; in 2017 dollars, 
$2,652,917.73. Total of SEE + ERO in 1920 in 2017 dollars was $5,561,440.02. 
414 Woodward to Davenport (1919/10/9), APS Davenport, “Woodward, R. S. 1919 Folder 5, October – 
November”; Davenport to Metz (1919/12/31), “Woodward, R. S. 1919 Folder 6, December”; “Estimated 
Expenses for 1920,” APS Davenport, “Woodward, R. S. 1919 Folder 6, December.” 
130 
 
employees at its founding and showed CIW’s commitment to the science. 
Throughout the 1920s under Davenport’s leadership, the now Department of 
Genetics continued its focus on chromosomes, mutations, and eugenics with other 
projects including the genetics of leukemia and how to control sex ratios and sex 
determination. Under Blakeslee and then Milislav Demerec in the late 1930s onward, 
eugenics dropped out and the Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory became a center of 
Drosophila, maize, phage, and microbial genetics, hiring and hosting biologists such as 
Barbara McClintock, Dobzhansky, Delbruck and Luria, among many others.  
 
Conclusion 
In its first fifteen years, the Station had partially fulfilled Davenport’s vision of a 
New Atlantis. It had certainly received the financial support and built the infrastructure 
that biologists had argued were necessary for a program in experimental evolution. The 
Carnegie Institute of Washington’s interest in the control of evolution meant pouring 
enormous sums into experimental biology and creating a network of scientists dependent 
on its resources. Like Woods Hole, it had also become a center for students to train and 
for scientists to conduct summer projects. Davenport succeeded in creating his vision, at 
least socially. 
Scientifically, the Station’s work appears quite messy, reflective of the state of the 
evolutionary sciences at the time. Davenport’s application materials alone demonstrate 
the plethora of vying theories and mechanisms in the early twentieth century. While the 
following two chapters also demonstrate that natural selection was far from ignored and 
biologist’s understanding of its dynamics developed immensely, it is interesting how 
small a role it played in the work of the Station proper aside from Shull. This is especially 
odd given selection’s prominent role in breeding, and indeed, Davenport’s increasingly 
rare non-eugenics scientific work – sheep breeding (mentioned above) – did involve the 
Mendelian theory of selection. Perhaps he thought CIW grantee William Castle (and the 
debate) sufficiently covered the topic. This is further supported by the Station hiring 
Castle’s student E. C. MacDowell, who carried out selection experiments on Drosophila 
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(that contradicted Castle, discussed in Chapter 5).415 The “eclipse of Darwinism” meant 
there was initially no reigning paradigm to center the work; instead, what guided the 
Station’s diverse research was an ideology of experimentation and the potential for future 
control of the evolutionary process. The result was the elimination of some theories and 
mechanisms as contenders that did not survive experimental treatment, particularly neo-
Lamarckism, and an emphasis on the more (potentially) manipulable elements of 
variation and heredity, namely the chromosomes. 
In 1916, Davenport wrote about “the form of evolutionary theory that modern 
genetical research seems to favor.”416 In addition to paleontological and embryological 
results, as well as analogies to radioactive decay, Davenport pointed to the results of 
“experimental breeding.”417 
The core result was the “primacy of internal factors.” Read back into the nautical 
metaphor that appeared in his application materials, Davenport argued that the Station 
had demonstrated that evolution was more like a steamship, acting independently of the 
environment, rather than a canal boat. Experimental evolution had elucidated four 
principles: (1) variations among related organisms are parallel, such as the genetics of 
coat color in rabbits and guinea pigs or mutations in species of Drosophila; (2) mutations 
were not multifarious, but limited, as shown by Harris’ examination of variation in over a 
million bean seedlings; (3) most mutations are losses; and (4) “many mutations begin 
small and can be rapidly evolved into highly developed characters,” a phenomenon 
discussed extensively in the next chapter through William Castle’s polydactylous guinea 
pigs.418 If evolution proceeded primarily through internal factors, Davenport explained 
that adaptation was not so much created or “brought about,” but occurred through the 
“absence of non-adaptiveness,” a de Vriesian position based also on Darwin’s position 
 
415 MacDowell spent 38 years at the Station, retiring in 1952. After Drosophila, he took up the effects of 
alcohol in mice through the 1920s, and due to a serendipitous development in his cultures, dedicated the 
rest of his career to understanding the genetics of leukemia. CIW Year Book XYZ 
416 Charles Davenport, “The Form of Evolutionary Theory That Modern Genetical Research Seems to 
Favor,” The American Naturalist 50, no. 596 (1916): 449–65. 
417 Luis Campos has highlighted the context in which the analogy to radioactive decay was made. Luis 
Campos, Radium and the Secret of Life (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015), 116–17. 
418 For this fourth principle, Davenport cited four lines of evidence, two of which were from experiments 
conducted at the Station by Davenport and Frank Lutz, another by Castle partially funded by the CIW, and 
the fourth by de Vries. Regarding the third principle, specifically, Davenport alluded to the theory of 
William Bateson’s. Note also that Davenport subscribed to the presence and absence theory of genetics. 
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that variation did not respond to specific conditions. The role of natural selection, then, 
depended largely upon the degree to which the soma reflected the germ, the index 
between phenotype and genotype.  
The “form” of the evolutionary theory Davenport thought conformed to the 
evidence best was then a combination of genetic reductionism and orthogenesis. 
Whatever differences existed among geneticists, he wrote, “upon one point all geneticists 
are … agreed — that we must interpret all of our results in terms of our genes alone.” 
(Note Davenport’s easy extension from genetics to eugenics.) The orthogenetic aspect 
was two-fold: 
A theory of evolution that assumes internal changes chiefly independent of external 
conditions, i.e., spontaneously arising, and which proceeds chiefly by a splitting up of 
and loss of genes from a primitively complex molecular condition of the germ plasm 
seems best to meet the present state of our knowledge.419 
 
Because mutations remained spontaneous, and selection was dependent upon their 
occurrence and their clear expression in the soma, experimental evolution was at 
somewhat of an impasse, a notion expressed by several experimentalists in the following 
chapters. Davenport wrote, the resulting theory “renders less hopeful (but not hopeless) 
the prospect of being able to control completely by experimental methods evolutionary 
change.” He remained open to the possibility that the “germ plasm is not beyond the 
reach of modifying agents,” and suggested the continuation of experiments along those 
lines. 
While I have not discussed eugenics, and Davenport did not tie this theory 
explicitly to eugenics, it does seem to fit the general ideas of eugenics from the time. 
Genetic reductionism eliminated the importance of environmental effects and variation, 
critical to justifying eugenical laws in capitalist society. The notion that evolution 
proceeded through loss also pointed to the need to restrict who was permitted to 
contribute to the following generation. For Davenport, “loss” did not necessarily entail 
degeneration, although that was one direction it could take.420  
 
419 Davenport, 1916, p. 463. This view seems reminiscent of Bateson’s theory of evolution by decay.  
420 After all he had to explain the diversity and complexity of life and all of its specializations, which he did 
by pointing to the possibility that “the loss is not merely of a whole gene, but of some part of it; a 
fractionation, as it were, by which the gene becomes altered or split up into two or more.” 
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As much as the results of the Station’s work, in Davenport’s view, appeared to not 
have produced the active control of evolution, to argue that it was a failure would be to 
succumb to the belief that positive results are all that matter. The other side of “the 
primacy of internal factors” was the elimination of external-based theories of evolution, 
namely, neo-Lamarckism. 
This restrictive view of evolution was not present at the Station’s founding — 
instead, the resident scientists considered a plethora of evolutionary theories. A focus on 
early twentieth-century experimental evolution shows that a reading of this period as the 
“eclipse of Darwinism” undersells and in fact misunderstands the period. One major 
consequence of focusing on experimentation is that debates within evolution appear far 
less partisan and the experimental biologists advocate multi-causal, not monocausal, 
accounts. That is, the Station engaged with several mechanisms and theories in a fair 
way: whereas Weismann, who in a polemical experiment sliced off rats’ tails to disprove 
a neo-Lamarckian strawman, Davenport and Castle replicated the experimental 
procedures of a neo-Lamarckian. Davenport, Tower, Johnson, Frank Lutz, and others 
considered seriously and experimented with natural and artificial selection, orthogenesis, 
neo-Lamarckism, direct effects, organic selection, mutationism, and Mendelism. Of what 
entered the Station in 1904, though, only mutationism and Mendelism exited, combined 
with a unique take on orthogenesis. This to some degree matched the results of the 
debates over selection and mutation about pure line theory, which Davenport referenced 
directly in 1916. I focus on this debate for the last two chapters of the dissertation  
CIW and Davenport built the Station for Experimental Evolution to test theories 
through practice. Many scientists had argued that evolutionary science’s theoretical 
morass could be solved only through experimentation on a large scale. It needed 
significant capital investment to afford the physical infrastructure, the laboratory and 
agricultural populations of animals and plants, and the resident scientific and caretaking 
personnel to carry out the long-term experimentation. Thus in this case private capital 
was necessary for the work to even take place, especially before the explosion of public 
funding that began during World War 2. The Station itself occupied a mediating space 
between science and (agricultural, later eugenic) society, searching for and testing laws 
that governed evolution’s control. The theories the Station tested were an eclectic mixture 
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of ideas produced by scientists, breeders, and farmers to explain the changing material 
they witnessed and even controlled – but only to some extent. The result was the 
elimination of most theories that emphasized the environment and the promulgation of 
theories that emphasized internal factors such as genes and chromosomes. As the next 
chapters discuss, selection, itself a mediation between the external environment and the 
internal organism, was in turn reshaped to be the mechanical operation of the 
environment, rather than creative, choosing between differences independently thrown up 
by the genetic material (rather than creating the differences itself). Therefore, in the view 
of an important segment of American geneticists and experimental evolutionists, the 
Station had helped take theories accumulated by practice, and through the particular 























Chapter 4: Controlling Evolution?:  
Mutationism, Pure Line Work, and Genetic Selectionism  
 
Introduction 
Although the development of experimental evolution in the early twentieth 
century was rather messy, exemplified by Davenport’s Station for Experimental 
Evolution, there also emerged a coherent and intense debate on the interactions and 
relative creative powers among heredity, variation, and selection. The debate centered 
upon theories rooted in experimentation, such as pure line theory and gametic 
contamination, each competitor having major implications for how to control evolution 
and especially the degree to which it could be controlled, if at all.  
This chapter introduces a few of the scientists involved: Harvard geneticist 
William Castle, an early adoptee of Mendelism whose experimental evolution led him to 
formulate the theory of gametic contamination, elevating the power of selection over 
mutation; botanists George Shull (Station for Experimental Evolution) and Edward 
Murray East (Connecticut Agricultural Experimental Station, then Harvard), whose 
breeding experiments eventually helped produce hybrid maize, based on the mutationist 
and pure line theories of Hugo de Vries and Wilhelm Johannsen; and Johns Hopkins 
protozoologist Herbert Spencer Jennings, who independently formulated a pure line 
theory that limited the power of selection. The next chapter follows these scientists, 
experiments, and theories as they clashed and as other scientists, such as Morgan’s 
laboratory, entered the fray.421 
 
421 Raymond Pearl would have fit perfectly as one of the main actors in Chapters 4, but I concluded that his 
work offered little narrative contrast with what I had already included. He does feature prominently as a 
debate participant in Chapter 5, however. For his work, see “Inheritance of Fecundity in the Domestic 
Fowl,” American Naturalist 45, no. 534 (1911): 321–45; “The Mendelian Inheritance of Fecundity in the 
Domestic Fowl,” American Naturalist 46, no. 552 (1912): 697–711; “Seventeen Years Selection of a 
Character Showing Sex-Linked Mendelian Inheritance,” American Naturalist 49, no. 586 (1915): 595–608; 
“Fecundity in the Domestic Fowl and the Selection Problem,” American Naturalist 50, no. 590 (1916): 89–
105. Kathy J. Cooke has examined Pearl’s relationship to agriculture and practice; see “From Science to 
Practice, or Practice to Science? Chickens and Eggs in Raymond Pearl's Agricultural Breeding Research, 
1907-1916,” Isis 88, no. 1 (1997): 62-86. Kyung-Man Kim interestingly suggests that Pearl’s work had 
established the necessary terms for the breeder’s equation, although Pearl never put them together in that 
way (e.g., heritability, response to selection, and selection differential); see Explaining Scientific Consensus 




In this chapter, I argue that the period from about 1900 to 1920 is best understood 
not only as the formative era of genetics, but also as the era of experimental evolution. In 
the previous chapter, I showed that Charles Davenport had envisioned experimental 
evolution broadly, which included Mendelism, pure line theory, mutationism, natural and 
artificial selection, and hybridization. In some ways, experimental evolution and genetics 
became fused by 1920, but I argue that the framing of “experimental evolution” is more 
explanatory of this preceding period. Much of what follows precedes the paradigm-
setting chromosome research of the Morgan laboratory, for example. Rather, the 
“geneticist” figures examined in this chapter — Castle, East, and Shull — were primarily 
concerned with how the experimental sciences of heredity and variation interacted with 
evolution, and especially selection, both natural and artificial. This can be explained 
largely due to their second (but not secondary) focus: systematic breeding, the control of 
the evolution of crops and livestock. Instead of treating genetics as a static science, such 
as confirming Mendelian ratios or mapping chromosomes, these scientists endeavored to 
witness and control evolution within the experimental laboratory or agricultural field. 
This is also shown by the Morgan laboratory’s underappreciated preoccupation with 
evolution. Thus, genetic science has a subservient role to evolutionary science. 
Their experimental work had profound impacts on the history of evolutionary 
theory. As I have explained, Arlin Stoltzfus and I have argued that the mainstream history 
of biology has underplayed the influence of the early twentieth-century Mendelians and 
mutationists, painting them as having concocted absurd theories of species-creating 
mutations that negated the role of natural selection. These chapters build on the 
“forgotten synthesis” thesis by investigating how another set of biologists engaged with 
these same critiques of Darwinian theory (through Darwinian method!) and Mendelian-
mutationist notions of mutation and selection.422 The biologists discussed in the paper by 
Stoltzfus and myself – Bateson, Morgan, de Vries, and Johannsen – were perceived as 
advocating hardline and totalizing positions. Castle, East, Shull, Jennings, as well as 
Raymond Pearl and Morgan’s students, in contrast, developed and changed their views in 
response to experimental results. (This was also characteristic of Charles Davenport.) 
 
422 Arlin Stoltzfus and Kele Cable, “Mendelian-Mutationism: The Forgotten Evolutionary Synthesis,” 
Journal of the History of Biology 47, no. 4 (November 2014): 501–46. 
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This chapter thus shows how the experimentalists’ theories developed out of practice; for 
a majority, their theoretical positions at the end of this period, as they concluded long-
term experimental work, contradicted their position at its beginning.423 Specifically, 
Castle and Jennings moved from Mendelian-mutationism and pure line theory to a 
genetic Darwinism, whereas East and Shull moved from a lukewarm Darwinism to 
Mendelian-mutationism.424 Keeping in mind that the theories these biologist took 
recourse to also had their own practice-driven history. Thus, a history of experimental 
evolution reveals a dichotomy between hardline theory-makers and open-minded 
experimentalists – a focus on the former, through a history of ideas, distorts the field’s 
broader history. 
These chapters also build on the dissertation’s goal of establishing the central 
concern among biologists of taking control of evolution. All agreed that experiment, 
theory, and application were deeply intertwined. They adopted the Darwinian and 
Mendelian tradition that artificial experimental work in the guise of breeding provided 
knowledge on how evolution operated both under human practice and in nature (although 
this latter concern received less emphasis, which I discuss throughout). As in Davenport’s 
history of experimental evolution, they also worked in the tradition of breeders, 
particularly Louis de Vilmorin, Nils Heribert-Nilsson, Willet Hays, as well as their 
experimentalist interpreters Hugo de Vries and Wilhelm Johannsen. Particularly striking 
is how experimental work produced theories, selectionism versus mutationism (broadly), 
that conflicted on how evolution worked and how evolution could best be controlled. I 
show specifically that most of them were worried about the implications of mutationism 
in limiting human control. The point being that the desire to control evolution was not at 
all new, but with the biologists in these two chapters, how best to control evolution 
became a point of dispute. To be specific, their concern hinged on whether mutation or 
selection were the creative factors of evolution. 
I will briefly note that while this concern has faded with time, the notion of 
 
423 In parallel, Kim (1994) shows how most relevant biologists switched from Pearsonian biometry to 
Mendelism, and rarely the other direction. 
424 Although Castle at the very end of this period, in 1919, conceded that his experiments did not 
demonstrate his theory of genetic Darwinism, which is where the body of my dissertation comes to an end 
in Chapter 4/5.  
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“creativity” was important to many evolutionary scientists in this period.  Darwin had 
compared natural selection to an architect building with formless matter, an evocative 
description of his view of evolution. Mutationists instead compared selection to a censor 
or a sieve, reflecting their view that selection eliminated variation, but did not create that 
variation. Whichever process in evolution held the creative agency was then its dominant 
factor, but that did not necessarily mean it could be controlled.425 
That they had practical concerns is not so surprising when considering the 
institutional context. Castle was funded by the Carnegie Institution of Washington and 
worked at Harvard University’s Bussey Institution. East began his career at the Illinois 
and Connecticut Agricultural Experiment Stations and later joined Castle at Harvard and 
Bussey. Shull was a resident scientist at the Station for Experimental Evolution directed 
by Charles Davenport. Jennings worked at a variety of colleges and universities 
throughout his early career, and even served briefly as acting director of the U.S. Fish 
Commission at the Great Lakes Biological Survey, but for the duration of these chapters, 
he was Professor of Experimental Zoology at Johns Hopkins University, thus the most 
purely academic of this set.426 (This is consistent with Barbara Kimmelman’s study of 
early genetics arising primarily at land-grant agricultural colleges.427) CIW and Charles 
Davenport’s Station thus loom large as a proxy organizers of this debate, and even 
partially funded both sides of the debate: Davenport mentored Castle and Jennings; 
Davenport employed Shull; and CIW provided grants to Castle and later the Morgan 
laboratory. Most of this work did not occur at the Station for Experimental Evolution, 
 
425 Stoltzfus and Cable, “Mendelian-Mutationism: The Forgotten Evolutionary Synthesis” (2014) and John 
Beatty, “The Creativity of Natural Selection? Part I: Darwin, Darwinism, and the Mutationists,” Journal of 
the History of Biology 49 (2016): 659–684. My undergraduate senior thesis was also on the historical 
perceptions of creativity in evolution.  
426 Jennings was the successor to W. K. Brooks as Director of the Zoological Laboratory. Before taking this 
position, he was being courted by the Rockefeller Institute, but not to do experimental evolution, but 
studies of cell growth and division. He ultimately lost this opportunity to his rival Jacques Loeb. The 
President of CIW’s Executive Committee had steered him towards CIW, but this too failed. He nearly lost 
the directorship to Morgan as well. See Sharon Kingsland, “A Man Out of Place: Herbert Spencer Jennings 
at Johns Hopkins, 1906-1938,” American Zoology 27: 807-817 (1987). Raymond Pearl, a former student of 
Jennings, worked for the Maine Agricultural Experiment Station and later joined Jennings at Johns Hopkins 
where he took up public health and biostatistics. 
427 Barbara Kimmelman, “A Progressive Era Discipline: Genetics at American Agricultural Colleges and 
Experiment Stations, 1900-1920,” PhD diss., (University of Pennsylvania, 1987). The Morgan laboratory 
plays an important role in the following chapter as Sturtevant, Bridges, and Muller become involved in the 
debate with Castle. 
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showing the importance of CIW’s funding network established by Davenport.  
This area of experimental evolution linked the immediately practical work of 
agricultural experiment stations with the academic biology more interested in the 
workings of nature. East, Shull, and Pearl worked on maize, potatoes, and poultry, 
contributing to Johannsen’s pure line theory that had its own origins in practical concerns. 
Castle’s choice of small mammals, especially color, may have had useful applications in 
breeding, but this was not emphasized. Jennings at Johns Hopkins was able to conduct 
long-term experimentation on non-medical microorganisms. Through their combination 
of research through collaboration, corroboration, and dispute, this area of experimental 
evolution was able to continue the Darwinian and Mendelian methodological traditions of 
examining both artificial and natural evolution. 
There were important theoretical developments, again linked to practical work. 
Experimental evolution required the use of populations, whether a field of maize or 
Paramecia in petri dishes, and this necessity encouraged a transition from “typological 
thinking” to “population thinking.” A dichotomy proposed by Ernst Mayr, early 
geneticists are usually lumped together as “typological thinkers” who missed, or rejected, 
a key component of Darwinism (as interpreted by the architects of the Modern 
Synthesis). The population thinking that emerged from these scientists is not identical 
with that of Fisher, Mayr, or Dobzhansky in that they saw selection as deciding between 
types within a population. But Mayr’s static dichotomy misses that East, Shull, Castle, 
Jennings, and others investigated the dynamics of selection within populations. As 
Stoltzfus and I argued respecting natural selection, the interrogation of genetic and 
evolutionary mechanics required a new understanding of populations and points to the 
critical theoretical developments that emerged from experimental evolution. 
I argue, therefore, that the history of evolutionary science was shaped by 
institutional and scientific interests and desires in controlling it. The impact was profound 
enough, that, to put it strongly, evolutionary science “reset.”428 Instead of merely 
elaborating upon Darwin’s ideas, what emerged from this period were new theories of 
 
428 A better phrase would be the Hegelian term “sublation” (Aufhebung) in which a critique of the old 




variation, new theories of heredity, a new conception of natural selection, along with 
subsidiary theories of mutation, sex, and inbreeding (and, in addition, chromosomal 
mechanics). Where they were potentially weakest — adaptation and speciation — is also 
then not surprising: for the former, adaptation consisted of (socially-shaped) breeder 
desires and was therefore built into the experiment.429 The traditional view of their 
disregard for these problems is not entirely incorrect, but that they rejected selection as an 
important factor in evolution is decidedly incorrect. 
This chapter begins with the work of William Ernest Castle (1867-1962) as his 
experimental evolutionary research on small mammals initially confirmed the importance 
of mutations, but gave way to a genetic Darwinism, opposed to most of his colleagues. 
Known for mentoring Sewall Wright and for his dispute with pure line theory, this 
chapter highlights his early experimental evolution work prior to the hooded rats and 
their roles in convincing him of that the genetic factors could themselves be changed by 
natural selection through a process he called “gametic contamination.” Working at 
Harvard University’s Bussey Institution, Castle’s work was funded by the Carnegie 
Institution of Washington (CIW) for four decades (1904-1943).430 Although Castle 
himself rejected Mendelian-mutationism, his vehement opposition to the theory drove 
this section of experimental evolution forward until he conceded in 1919 that genes were 
immune to selection. 
The work of botanists Edward Murray East (1879-1938) and George Harrison 
Shull (1857-1954) provides the contrast to Castle, as they began their experimental 
evolution work loosely attached to Darwinism and selectionism but abandoned it as they 
took up the theories of de Vries and Johannsen. Their primary focus — crop breeding, 
especially of maize — motivated their interest in these theories, theories borne from 
experimentation and conceptualization of breeding practices. Both are known for their 
contributions to hybrid corn, which they conducted in the spirit of experimental 
evolution. 
The chapter concludes with the work of Herbert Spencer Jennings, the odd duck 
 
429 Questions of adaptation were a focus of experimental evolutionists who worked in the field, but as 
Kohler emphasizes, this sort of hybrid work proved to be difficult to conduct. 




of this cohort. His entire career was primarily dedicated to microorganisms, initially their 
behavior and then how they illustrated evolution at work. Given the state of 
microbiological research outside of medicine, his work had the least obvious 
applications, yet his colleagues treated it as theoretically valuable in their practice-
oriented debate. His work thus serves as a contrast to the desire to control, showing 
possibly that experimental evolution need not be tied so explicitly to material and 
economic interests, although I show that it clearly was historically. He did share rather 
parallel worries to Castle, East, and Shull, in that his experimental results in support of 
pure line theory left him puzzled as to how evolution in nature could even work, which I 
call “Jennings’ Problem.”  
Experimental evolution was the intersection of theory and practice, natural 
science and breeding, and control. While much has been made of the disputes among 
evolutionists regarding the relative roles of mutation and natural selection in the early 
twentieth century, rather less attention has been paid to how these scientists viewed these 
debates through the prism of application. For them, there was little to no distinction, just 
as Darwin argued domesticated species were essential to understanding the action of 
selection as well as the rules of heredity and variation. Thus, this chapter and the 
following show that 1900-1920 was the era of experimentalism in the evolutionary 
sciences and critically shaped its future.  
 
Castle: From Mendel to Darwin 
Upon reading William Bateson’s defense of Mendel, William Castle adopted the 
genetics of small mammals as his lifelong field of study with experimental evolution 
being his focus through 1920.431 He was among the first American biologists to fully 
accept Mendelism, publishing seven papers on the subject in 1903. Castle had worked as 
an assistant for Davenport at Harvard in the 1890s (where Herbert Spencer Jennings was 
a fellow student), both sharing an early interest in heredity and evolution. His early 
summaries of Mendelism emphasized its core tenets but identified a number of 
exceptions, including distinct and stable hybrid classes, mosaic inheritance, and the 
 




coupling or separation (“disintegration”) of two different characters — what he called 
“suspensions” of the laws of dominance and recessiveness.432 His attention to exceptions 
would lead him to reject Mendelian-mutationism in favor of Darwinism, which put him 
in a productive conflict with Morgan, among others, although he continued to accept, 
teach, and publish on the basic Mendelian framework. 
In his first years as a Mendelian, Castle adopted a Batesonian view of variation 
and selection. He agreed with Bateson that “discontinuous (or sport) variation [w]as of 
the highest importance in bringing about polymorphism” and speciation.433 Articulating 
an early version of the “lucky mutant” scenario, Castle suggested that sports may be 
common enough that “even if a particular combination of characters is uniformly 
eliminated by natural selection under one set of conditions, it may reappear again and 
again, and finally meet with conditions which insure its success.” He even acknowledged, 
following Bateson, that Mendelism could account for continuous variation: because a 
cross between tall and short pea plants produces offspring of intermediate height, the 
original tall and short characters could potentially “disintegrate” into a “dozen classes,” 
“resulting in a practically continuous frequency-of-error curve.”434 Castle was well on his 
way to becoming one of the chief proponents of Mendelian-mutationism. 
Castle also followed Darwin and Bateson in believing that scientific theory and 
breeding practices informed each other. Indeed, Castle argued that “the biologist must 
himself turn breeder.” Because “the variations of domesticated and animals [threw] light 
on the origin of species,” “the successful practical breeder, the man who originates 
breeds,” is himself an agent of evolutionary change. In fact, he argued, “there is no 
essential difference between breeds and species.” This held methodological importance 
because breeds “are forming under our very eyes all the time and that this has been going 
on since the early historic times…, yet the method eludes us.” However, breeders usually 
could not articulate their methods, keeping them private or because they did not know the 
“real nature of the material used and the processes involved.” Thus, Castle echoed 
 
432 W. E. Castle, “Mendel’s Law of Heredity,” Science 18, no. 456 (1903): 396–406; W. E. Castle and 
Glover M. Allen, “The Heredity of Albinism,” PNAS 38, no. 21 (1903): 608–9. 
433 Castle, “Mendel’s Law of Heredity,” 404. 
434 Castle, “Mendel’s Law of Heredity,” 405. One of the mysteries of early Mendelism is how frequently 
this hypothesis was asserted but continually failed to be adopted, including by Castle himself. Later in this 
chapter I discuss how East claimed to experimentally demonstrate the case; Castle rejected it. 
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Mendel’s own interest in artificial transformation, asserting that Mendelism would 
transform breeding from an “art” that “consisted largely of groping for treasure in the 
dark” to a rational and predictable science.435 Even his verbal articulation of what would 
become Hardy-Weinberg he called the “law governing race improvement in cases of 
alternative inheritance.”436 Thus for Castle, the experimentalization of evolution entailed 
the control of evolution, and vice versa, and would transform the practical knowledge and 
application of evolution, breeding, from being impressionistic to scientific. To do so, 
Castle (perhaps unconsciously) adopted the quasi-breeding method of conducting routine 
work, in this case genetic analysis of guinea pigs, rabbits, rats. and mice, and taking 
advantage of mutations that arose by chance, and then investigating how selection and the 
mutation interacted. While Castle began this work as a Mendelian-mutationist, his 
practical engagement with these mutation-selection experiments converted him to a 
hardened genetic Darwinism, which the rest of this section will illuminate. 
As Castle worked out classical Mendelian inheritance in small mammals, he 
encountered two mutations or sports that he thought supported a Mendelian-mutationist 
theory of evolution. The first was a long-haired (“Angora”) guinea pig that appeared after 
inbreeding a “supposedly pure” short-haired stock, shown to be a recessive Mendelian 
trait.437 The second sport (mutation) was a polydactylous guinea pig, an apparently novel 
character. In the following years, Castle developed and fixed these traits in stocks, from 
which he articulated a synthetic account of evolution, presented to the American Society 
of Naturalists in 1904.438 
 
435 Castle, 401. For an example of Mendelism as a rational breeding technique, he suggested that “the task 
of the practical breeder who seeks to 'establish' or 'fix' a new variety, produced by cross-breeding, in a case 
involving two variable characters, is simply the isolation and propagation” of the double homozygous 
recessive, present as one-sixteenth of the second generation. 
436 Castle also engaged in some modeling, showing how selection — here, the complete elimination of 
homozygotic recessives within a population — had varied results, depending on how long it was practiced. 
W. E. Castle, “The Laws of Heredity of Galton and Mendel, and Some Laws Governing Race Improvement 
by Selection,” PNAS 39, no. 8 (November 1903): 237. Ernst Mayr noted Castle’s work but failed to point 
out Bateson’s and Saunders’ initial contributions. Ernst Mayr, The Growth of Biological Thought: Diversity, 
Evolution, and Inheritance (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press, 1982), 838. 
437 W. E. Castle, “The Heredity of ‘Angora’ Coat in Mammals,” Science 18, no. 467 (1903): 760–61. Castle, 
finding a parallel case in rabbits, generalized that long hair behaves as a recessive trait in mammals, and 
corrected Darwin’s speculation that long hair arose via the direct influence of climate. 
438 Published in April 1905. W. E. Castle, “The Mutation Theory of Organic Evolution, from the Standpoint 
of Animal Breeding,” Science 21, no. 536 (1905): 521–25. Castle’s fusion of Mendelism, mutationism, and 
selection — despite his soon disavowal of such views in 1906 — is reminiscent of the historical theory that 
Arlin Stolzfus and I present in our paper, in contradiction to the mythical “mutation theory” that some 
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At this point, Castle rejected the belief that selectionism and mutationism were 
mutually exclusive. After all, Darwin had accepted “single variations” and mutationists 
accepted a role for natural selection. His own experimental breeding demonstrated the 
case: first, the sudden appearances of a polydactylous guinea pig and a long-haired 
guinea pig showed the importance of mutations within individuals; second, by breeding 
and selecting progeny with the “best” extra digits, he established a race “not created by 
selection, though it was improved by that means. … Any amount of selection practised on 
other families of my guinea-pigs would probably never produce a four-toed race,” and 
had not yet happened in seven generations.439 Therefore, mutations furnished the 
variation for selection to work upon. 
From the case of recessive long-haired guinea pigs, Castle theorized the fate of 
mutations in a state of nature under the evolutionary dynamics of mutation and selection. 
He suggested a mutation would produce an interbreeding but non-blending “dimorphic 
species” that would be subject to selection, eliminating the non-advantageous of the two 
(although it could possibly survive in another area, as in allopatric speciation).440 Castle 
contradicted Darwin’s theories of speciation and breeding, arguing that breeders usually 
“discovered” new breeds or created new breeds via crossing — “both cases … mutations, 
i.e., … characters unconnected by a series of transition stages with the normal form.”441 
Creating a new trait within a breed solely by selection “is an exceedingly difficult and 
slow process.” Instead, following the mutation’s appearance, selection and crossbreeding 
“free[d] the stock from undesirable alternative characters” but did not “modify the 
characters retained.”442 Castle pointed out, these two traits — extra digits and long hair 
and their absence — could be combined in four ways, and the “breeder” or “nature” “may 
 
historians continue to present. That is, Castle did not adopt the cartoon version of de Vriesian mutationism, 
but instead presented the theory as synthesized by Bateson, Morgan, and Johannsen. Arlin Stoltzfus and 
Kele Cable, “Mendelian-Mutationism.” 
439 Castle, “The Mutation Theory of Organic Evolution, from the Standpoint of Animal Breeding,” 523. 
Emphasis original. 
440 Ibid. Note that Castle does not say that the mutation itself creates a species, but instead a dimorphic 
species; speciation results from the elimination of or separation from one of the morphs. What makes this 
differ from Darwinism is that the mutation immediately produced two competing varieties; they were not 
created by selection. The last sentence reflects “segregation to the fittest environment.” 
441 As far as I can tell, Castle is unique here in considering a hybrid to be a mutation. However, it points to 
the notion that mutations were not characterized by size, but by their non-transitional “unconnected” 
nature.  
442 Castle, “The Mutation Theory of Organic Evolution, from the Standpoint of Animal Breeding,” 522–24. 
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now select the particular combination of characters” that best suited the agent’s 
purpose.443 The evolutionary theory that resulted was closer to de Vries than to Darwin in 
which mutations were the basis of variation upon which selection could build or 
eliminate. This limited both breeders and natural selection to what mutations offered to 
them. 
But as Castle and his students continued to develop these experimental systems — 
polydactylous and long-haired guinea pigs — in addition to hooded rats and lop-eared 
rabbits, his interpretations swung the other way, emphasizing selectionism while 
diminshing Mendelism-mutationism.444 Specifically, Castle rejected “gametic purity,” in 
which the hereditary material of both parents remained unaffected by the other. Although 
he had declared gametic purity “fully substantiated” in 1903, he now announced that it 
“does not exist.” Instead, he was “certain that the units [of heredity] are capable of 
modification” through gametic contamination.445 Through gametes’ mutual effect upon 
each other, selection became the agent of creative change, rather than solely mutation. 
The switch was apparently stark enough that Castle never once cited his 1904 address 
(and it does not appear in his collected bibliography by L. C. Dunn).446  
As Castle abandoned this synthetic approach to evolutionary theory, he also 
ceased speculating as to how selection worked in nature, instead focusing solely upon 
artificial selection within the laboratory environment. The irony is that naturalists, not 
totally incorrectly, accused laboratory geneticists of dismissing the power and ubiquity of 
natural selection because of their lack of experience in the field. But soon the chief 
selectionist geneticist, Castle, arguably created the largest divide between nature and the 
laboratory through his use of intensive inbreeding. 
Two of the three results that challenged gametic purity emerged from routine 
work on Mendelian inheritance: ear length in rabbits and additional results from Angora 
guinea pigs. When Castle crossed short- and lop-eared rabbits, the following generation 
(F2) did not break apart the characters according to the 3:1 ratio, but were instead 
 
443 Castle, 524. Even accounting for his budding skepticism of gametic purity, Castle believed a modified 
trait could “facilitate the creation of desirable breeds, for it serves to induce new mutation.” 
444 Castle, “The Mutation Theory of Organic Evolution, from the Standpoint of Animal Breeding,” 525. 
445 Castle and Allen, “The Heredity of Albinism,” 620; W. E. Castle, “Yellow Mice and Gametic Purity,” 
Science 24, no. 609 (1906): 280. 
446 [Cite Provine] 
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homogeneously intermediate, showing no sign of dominance or segregation. He 
concluded that ear size was a “non-Mendelian character.”447 Castle also tentatively 
retracted his claim (upon which the synthetic account of evolution was partially based) 
that short and Angora hair were Mendelian alternatives in guinea pigs. Although the 
characters were discontinuous and followed the rules of dominance, expected Mendelian 
ratios did not appear, leading him to wonder if segregation was incomplete or if the trait 
was latent.448 Castle and his student, Alexander Forbes, crossed short- and long-haired 
stocks, producing only short-haired offspring (as expected in a simple case of 
dominance), but, in the second generation, individuals had hair lengths that fell between 
the two categories in a continuous gradation.449 Although Castle had articulated a 
possible solution in 1903 — these were the result of multiple factors — , he now 
concluded there was no Mendelian explanation for the character distributions. 
Specifically, Castle interpreted these two results in rabbits and guinea pigs as 
contrary to the doctrine of gametic purity; in its place Castle substituted gametic 
contamination.450 It appeared that the two alternative characters, when crossed, somehow 
affected each other. Intermediate hair length in guinea pigs was transmitted as a “new 
creation due to a partial and permanent blend” of long and short hair. Castle felt “forced 
to admit modification of gametes from their original pure condition.” That is, the 
“paternal and maternal representatives of a character,” by virtue of their “union” within 
the germ, may “have exercised on each other a considerable influence.”451 While he still 
accepted the basics of Mendelian genetics, Castle now rejected what had become a core 
doctrine that had major implications for evolutionary science. 
 
447 William E. Castle, Heredity of Coat Characters in Guinea-Pigs and Rabbits (Carnegie Institution of 
Washington, 1905), 74, 76; Provine, Sewall Wright and Evolutionary Biology, 39. 
448 Castle, Heredity of Coat Characters in Guinea-Pigs and Rabbits, 66–67. For Castle, “latency” occurred 
when a trait, whether dominant or recessive, did not appear when expected, probably because it depended 
upon the existence of an additional independent trait. Working out epistatic interactions was one of Castle’s 
strengths and it is no surprise his student Sewall Wright emphasized them in his evolutionary theorizing. 
449 William Ernest Castle and Alexander Forbes, Heredity of Hair-Length in Guinea-Pigs and Its Bearing 
on the Theory of Pure Gametes, 49 (Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1906), 5. 
450 Provine notes that Davenport and Morgan had also questioned gametic purity, but they soon returned to 
a full commitment to the doctrine. Provine, Sewall Wright and Evolutionary Biology, 39. 
451 Castle and Forbes, Heredity of Hair-Length in Guinea-Pigs and Its Bearing on the Theory of Pure 
Gametes, 13. Note this all precedes the chromosomal theory of heredity and the discovery of crossing over. 
Castle’s theory was distinct from crossing over as well: crossing over is an exchange of genetic material 
between chromosomes, Castle was positing mutual influence.  
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Castle’s interpretation of the new results forced him to modify his understanding 
of evolutionary dynamics. The degree of gametic contamination varied between traits 
which in turn determined the speed of fixation. In the case of ear length in rabbits, the 
genetic factors for short and long “completely blend and intermingle,” allowing 
immediate fixation. In cases with complete dominance and segregation (traditional 
Mendelism as a special case) or when a character appeared only in the heterozygous 
state, contamination was minimized, thus requiring selection and inbreeding to fix.452 
Castle had flipped his evolutionary thinking from 1904 upside down: selection, natural or 
artificial, did not have to wait for mutations, but could actively produce new traits. 
Castle’s establishment of a true-breeding race of polydactylous guinea pigs also 
caused him to question his initial conclusions as presented in 1904: rather than a case of a 
sudden mutation merely “improved” by selection and breeding, the system was now 
evidence for selection’s creativity.453 In 1901, Castle had discovered a male guinea pig 
with an “imperfectly developed” fourth toe on one of its hindfeet. Although this pig’s toe 
had a claw, the bones were unattached to the foot, hanging from the body like a “bag of 
skin,” and fell off upon maturity. Seizing the opportunity, Castle bred the individual with 
a close relative. Within a few generations of inbreeding and selection, he increased the 
percentage of polydactylous offspring from 19.5% to 56%, some of which had a fully 
formed extra toe on each hind foot. By the fifth generation of inbreeding, Castle had 
produced a pair of polydactylous guinea pigs whose 88 offspring all inherited the trait.454 
Not only had Castle fixed the trait through inbreeding and selection, via gametic 
contamination, he had also changed (“improved”) the trait itself: it appeared as if 
selection, not mutation, had been the major source of creativity. Although he, the breeder, 
had chanced upon a mutation, it was he who had transformed an imperfect toe in an 
individual into a full and fixed trait of a lineage. (See Figure 3.) 
 
 
452 Castle and Forbes, 10. William E. Castle, “The Production and Fixation of New Breeds,” Proceedings of 
the American Breeders’ Association 3 (1907): 34–41. 
453 William Ernest Castle, The Origin of a Polydactylous Race of Guinea-Pigs, 49 (CIW, 1906). 
454 Ibid., 27–28. Normally the species has four on its forefeet and only three on their hindfeet. 
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Figure 3: From Castle, 
Heredity in Relation to 
Evolution and Animal 
Breeding (1911), fig. 38. 
Caption: “A. Front feet of an 
ordinary guinea-pig. B. Its 
hind feet. D. Hind feet of a 
race four-toed on all the feet. 
C. Ordinary condition of the hind feet of a young [sic] obtained by crossing B with D.”  
  
Castle also claimed that Mendelism could not account for the trait’s distribution in 
crosses. When he crossed a polydactylous pig with a normal pig, the offspring were 
neither uniform nor present in equal numbers (as expected in the F1 generation). When 
the experiment’s middle generations were crossed, something like Mendelian ratios were 
sometimes given, but the quality of extra toes varied from “good” to “poor.” That is, there 
was more than one dimension at play: discontinuous presence/absence plus continuous 
quality. The matter was too complex to fit into the simple framework of Mendelism. 
Thus, Castle interpreted the character’s inheritance upon crossing with normal pigs as 
“intermediate between blending and alternative inheritance,” in which “there occurs a 
partial blending of gametes in the zygote, and a partial segregation as the zygote gives 
off gametes.”455 Mendel’s laws described only the extreme cases. And Mendelism as a 
special case had been revealed over the course of multigenerational experiments in which 
selection had played an active role. 
Gametic contamination decided selection’s precedence over mutation in breeding, 
enhancing the human control over evolution, although his still pluralist views maintained 
a role for mutation. Now believing that partial blending and segregation was the most 
common method of inheritance, “in dealing with such characters, selection must be the 
breeder’s method of working.” To overcome blending, the breeder had to carefully 
choose parents “many times over.” But Castle did not relegate mutations to irrelevance. 
When it came to the extra toe’s origin, Castle compared his results with those who 
 
455 Ibid., 24. 
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worked on poultry (Bateson) and humans (Davenport), concluding it arose by mutation, 
although not de novo. The extra digit appeared in the “precise position of a lost one” (in 
mammalian ancestry) along with “all the appropriate nervous and muscular connections,” 
so the extra toe must be latent, and thus appeared under certain and probably complex 
conditions. He concluded that while polydactyly and a “great many of the characters 
[that] distinguish … domesticated animals and plants” originate as a “discontinuous 
character or mutation, … without the aid of selection it would probably never become a 
racial character.”456 Thus mutation retained an important role in revealing a latent trait or 
providing the germ for a new trait, but his experiments led him to turn towards selection 
as the major source of evolutionary creativity.  
He wondered if “the same thing [was] true of a great many of the characters 
which serve to distinguish the various races of domesticated animals and plants?”457 His 
question reflects a preoccupation with breeding and notably he did not extend it to nature. 
His theory as it was rested upon a mutation that became fixed through a process that 
overcame blending through choosing parents “many times over.” The relevance to nature 
was therefore unclear.  
In his report to CIW, Castle regarded both the mutation and selection theories as 
“important in evolution.”458 But because his interests were in breeding and control, a 
trajectory towards selectionism was not necessarily a surprise. Ironically, his new 
theoretical methods were more in line with that of the traditional breeder as artisan, rather 
than the “scientific” breeding that Castle had envisioned as emerging from Mendelism. 
Orthodox Mendelism could apply to special cases, such as coat color, in that it provided a 
“rational explanation of the origin of the various color varieties of rodent” via loss 
mutations, and it allowed the breeder predictable control of extant traits. But, it could not 
account for improvement (e.g., polydactyly) or blended traits (e.g., length of hair and ears 
in guinea pigs and rabbits, respectively).459 Rather than mutation and Mendelism, Castle 
 
456 Castle, 23–24, 29. 
457 Castle, 29. 
458 CIW Year Book, Vol. 5, 1906, p. 243. 
459 Castle also included a possible practical scenario for de Vries’ “mutation period,” but also demonstrates 
Castle’s distaste for waiting for them as a method: “It has been observed that one mutation is often 
followed by another. De Vries in his Mutationstheorie speaks repeatedly of periods of mutation. We can 
begin to see the significance of this; given one mutation, we can produce others. Suppose, for example, that 
we possess agouti and ordinary red varieties only and desire black, we are not compelled to await a 
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thought selection and gametic contamination were the keys to the control of evolution --- 
this not only emerged from his experimental work, but theoretically selection was 
evolution’s most controllable force, opposed to waiting for mutations. 
 
Although lop-eared rabbits and Angora and polydactylous guinea pigs had already 
begun to change Castle’s views about evolution, the hooded rats clinched it. In 1907, 
Castle and MacCurdy reported to CIW the experiment’s initial results, which reinforced 
selectionism and gametic contamination.460 Because theories of evolutionary change are 
predicated upon theories of variation and inheritance, Castle now argued that gametic 
contamination overthrew the entirety of de Vries’ thought.461 Castle and MacCurdy 
considered de Vries to be “too sweeping” when he claimed that because continuous 
variation arose from non-inheritable environmental effects, that selection of extreme 
variations was incapable of permanently modifying a race. They argued that de Vries 
“overlooked” the possibility that not all causes of continuous variation need to be 
external. If any causes internal to the germ plasm acted to produce a continuous 
distribution, it should be inheritable, and such causes were not limited to spontaneous 
mutations. There was no logical reason to exclude germinal variations from being 
gradual, common, and accumulable. (Even his geneticist opponents, East and Shull, 
would agree, reflecting their pluralistic view.) 
While Castle described the differences in theoretical terms, they clearly had 
implications for control. Under de Vries’ theory, Castle claimed, “selection is unable to 
form new species, because it can neither call into existence mutations nor permanently 
modify a race by cumulation of abmodal fluctuations.” Instead, selection could only 
 
mutation to produce it; we can cross red with agouti and obtain black in the second generation. … To 
produce a red variety from agoutis and blacks alone would not be so easy; it would be necessary either to 
await a mutation or to work by the slow process of selection from continuous variations in the intensity of 
blacks under cross-breeding with agoutis.” W. E. Castle, “On a Case of Reversion Induced by Cross-
Breeding and Its Fixation,” Science 25, no. 630 (1907): 151–53. 
460 Hansford MacCurdy and William Ernest Castle, Selection and Cross-Breeding in Relation to the 
Inheritance of Coat-Pigments and Coat-Patterns in Rats and Guinea-Pigs, 70 (Carnegie Institution of 
Washington, 1907). 
461 Specifically, de Vries’ thought. Castle and MacCurdy did not engage with the emerging Mendelian-
mutationism of Johannsen, Morgan, and Bateson. This explains Castle’s conflation of continuous variation 
with fluctuation and large changes with mutation. The Mendelian-mutationists considered the degree of 




perpetuate extant variation and species. But, 
Darwin,  …  ascribe[d] evolutionary progress chiefly to the cumulation through long 
periods of time of slight individual differences. … according to the Darwinian view, new 
species arise through the direct agency of selection, which leads to the cumulation of 
fluctuating variations of a particular sort.462 
 
To test the two (somewhat outdated) alternatives, Castle and MacCurdy developed two 
new experimental systems — color patterns in hooded rats and in guinea pigs — to 
determine whether selection and inbreeding could “modify” discontinuous variations, 
specifically “to bridge the gap between them.” That is, could selection change the genetic 
factors themselves?  
Their first new experimental system – and soon, major focus – was the 
manipulation of color distribution in the coats of hooded rats. The rats showed four 
different color distributions ranging from fully pigmented to “Irish,” hooded, and albino, 
each pattern a Mendelian dominant to the next. (See Figure 4.) Their intent was to select 
the stripe of the hooded rat to be wider and narrower to “bridge the gap” between these 
Mendelian alternatives. Bateson had asserted that these four patterns were “definite, and 
can not be built up by cumulative selection.” But Castle and MacCurdy, in fact, began to 
transform hooded rats towards both Irish and albino forms via selection and breeding. 
Castle reasserted that “heterozygosis leads inevitably” to gametic contamination, its 
degree corresponding to the “imperfection of dominance in the heterozygote.” In a 
special case of orthodox Mendelism, crosses between albino and pigmented rats produced 
“mixed litters … close to the Mendelian expectations, indicating [no] selective union of 
gametes.”463 This would prove to be an exception as the experimental system continued 
to demonstrate, according to Castle, creative selection and gametic contamination. 
 
462 Ibid., 2–3. Castle to some extent misled his readership: While de Vries may have thought mutations 
created species, most Mendelians did not, as Castle himself had showed in 1904. 




Figure 4: MacCurdy and Castle 1907, Plate I. The 
initial variation in the color pattern of the hooded 
rats, although not necessarily of the four types 
outlined by Castle. 
 
 
Castle and MacCurdy began two 
long-lasting selection experiments — for 
wider stripes (“plus series”) and for narrower 
stripes (“minus series”). In the minus series, 
selection reduced the variability and “the 
distance between mean and mode,” implying 
that its effects “will be permanent” and that 
the new “variety will breed true.”464 In the 
plus series, a bimodal curve initially resulted, 
interpreted as due not to the “heterogeneity of 
the material included” (which later became a 
common criticism), but indicated instead a 
transitional condition, “that part of the gametes formed by the cross-bred individuals 
transmitted a modified (wide-striped) condition … in process of segregation through the 
action of selection.” That is, they were witnessing the creation of a new gamete, catching 
selection in the act of creation. Indeed, propagating individuals from only the extreme 
end of the curve produced a generation whose stripes were all wider than the mode of the 
initial lot. There was no regression to the original mean. True also of the minus series, the 
curve was “nearly symmetrical, indicating approach to a condition of stability.” 
Therefore, “characters can be permanently modified by selection.”465 
The guinea pig experiment was similar: select from one extant character to another, 
“bridging the gap.” Like the rats, there were several common coat color distributions that 
 
464 MacCurdy and Castle, 15–16. 
465 MacCurdy and Castle, 17. 
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were alternative in inheritance: spots on the head, above the eyes, and on the torso. 
However, they could not “fix” these patterns as they could with the hooded rats; the trait 
was inherited only 50-80% of the time. What they did discover was that the total pigment 
was inherited and amenable to selection. They explained their apparently contradictory 
results — selection for head and rump spots or against shoulder spots both produced 
more spots overall — due to the varying rates in which pigment was dedicated to 
different areas; hence “the entire inefficiency of selection in guinea-pigs to fix a coat-
pattern.” That is, after studying 1,048 pedigreed individuals, MacCurdy and Castle 
concluded that “one can by selection either increase or decrease the extent of the 
pigmented areas, but it is impossible by selection to fix this pigmentation in a particular 
pattern.” In this instance, “it is powerless.”466 But, as Castle reported to CIW, “spotted 
races can be created at will which bear” either much or little pigment.467 Clearly there 
were limits to evolutionary control by selection, but it remained the creative and 
controllable agency.  
In their conclusion, MacCurdy and Castle suggested that de Vries’ own selection 
experiments with buttercups corroborated their experimental results — if only he had 
conducted them longer, he probably would have found regression decreased to a 
negligible degree. Combined with their own results, they asserted that “selection is a 
most important factor, not only in the isolation of discontinuous variations, but also in 
their production.” Furthermore, “a sharp line of division” could not be drawn between 
continuous and discontinuous variations (as well as between alternative and blending 
inheritance). Specifically, the distinct hooded and Irish patterns in rats followed Mendel’s 
laws, but Castle and MacCurdy had produced intermediates, “bridging the gap,” 
witnessing the origins of change in real-time. Thus, “it is fallacious to assign all 
evolutionary progress to one sort of variation or to one sort of inheritance.”468 However, 
as their experiments continued, and despite the community’s move to the opposite pole 
regarding the creativity of selection, Castle would ignore this compromise in favor of 
selectionism. As Darwinism and Mendelian-mutationism separated, Castle affirmatively 
 
466 MacCurdy and Castle, 19–27. 
467 CIW Year Book, Vol. 5, 1906, p. 243. 
468 Ibid., 33–34. 
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supported “the Darwinian view” that selection was responsible for the establishment of 
new races, both natural and artificial, and was thus, the directive force of evolution.469 
For Castle, experimental evolution had re-established Darwinism. 
 
George Shull and Edward East: From Darwin to de Vries and Johannsen 
George Harrison Shull and Edward Murray East integrated evolutionary science 
with plant breeding to articulate methods of control that had theoretical implications. By 
1907, they adopted specific methods aligned with Mendel, de Vries, and Johannsen, as 
opposed to Darwinism and mass selection. Shull considered “mutation, Mendelism, and 
unit characters” to be “all part and parcel of one consistent view of the world of living 
matter.”470 A view that not only described nature, but how to control it. Throughout this 
chapter I will present East and Shull as a pair, although they did not recognize their 
thorough agreement until 1908, having developed parallel views independently. 
For both Shull and East, and like Castle, there was little that marked a difference 
between “pure science” and “practical breeding,” so long as that science was rooted in 
experimentation. As much as their work rejected Darwinian theories, they, like Bateson, 
recognized that a key to the Darwinian methodological tradition was experimental 
evolution; the “artificial” evolution in the field of maize or potatoes had as much to say 
about evolutionary dynamics as a population of flora and fauna in the wild. The role of 
experimental evolutionists, East envisioned, was to reduce the breeders’ “thousands of 
observations” and “surprising complications” to “a few natural laws.”471 Their focus on 
practice aligned well with their positions at Agricultural Experiment Stations and the 
CIW-funded Station for Experimental Evolution. 
To East, plant breeding was explicitly about the control and direction of crop 
growth and evolution, or in its capitalist guise: improvement. He differentiated farming 
practices along a spectrum of control: “beyond our control” were temperature and 
rainfall, “slightly under our control” were “attacks of insect enemies and parasitic fungi,” 
 
469 MacCurdy and Castle, 3–4, 11. 
470 Shull, “Importance of the Mutation Theory in Practical Breeding,” Journal of Heredity 3, no. 1 (1907): 
65. 
471 East, The Relation of Certain Biological Principles to Plant Breeding, 158 (Connecticut Agricultural 
Experiment Station, 1907), 5. 
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and “very largely under our control” were tillage, nutrition, and fertilization (although 
expensive). These environmental conditions (in addition to market fluctuations) 
contrasted with the control of heredity, “the productive forces which reside within the 
germ itself,” an area of still untapped potential.472 As East wrote, “here are powerful 
factors in crop production ready to act for or against us, with or without our knowledge or 
control. It is the province of the corn breeder to obtain knowledge of and to bring these 
factors under his control.”473 What exactly this control entailed was contested over the 
next decade. 
There were numerous difficulties the plant breeder had to overcome that East 
argued animal breeders — more advanced, in his eyes — had not encountered. For one, 
much of animal breeding relied upon visible characteristics, such as coat color and size, 
whereas East was forced to develop methods to measure the chemical (protein and fat) 
content of maize kernels. More important, though, was that animal breeders dealt with 
mammals and birds with relatively stable sexually mating and reproductive systems, 
whereas plant breeders had to contend with an array of angiosperms with diverse mating 
systems. Maize, for instance, is wind-pollinated, and important developments in maize 
breeding were solely about controlling the mating process, especially detasseling and ear-
to-row tests. The advantage plant breeders had, however, was high numbers.474 Even 
though Castle would eventually pedigree over 30,000 individuals in his hooded rats 
experiment, this was dwarfed by the numbers Shull and East could produce. There were 
experimental virtues and costs to not only specific organisms, but the broad classes to 
which they belonged, namely animal and plant. 
 
472 Interestingly, a search for “productive forces” in Google Scholar brings up mostly results from Marxist 
literature, East’s paper being the sole biological result. The related term, “productive powers,” comes from 
Adam Smith. 
473 East, The Improvement of Corn in Connecticut, Bulletin 152 (New Haven, Conn.: Connecticut 
Agricultural Experiment Station, 1906), 4. Breeding was not the primary focus of the agricultural 
experiment stations. East noted in 1908 that the most important problem in Connecticut agriculture was the 
productiveness of the soil and finding the best variety of crop for a particular soil type. East, “Report of the 
Agronomist,” in Report of the Connecticut Agricultural Experiment Station for the Years 1907-1908 
(Hartford, Conn.: State of Connecticut, 1908), 448. 
474 Another feature of maize is that its ears “must pass through the hands at husking time, and thus bring to 
notice its good and bad variations,” “undoubtedly [leading] to the conscious selection of the largest ears for 
seed from very early times, and has given to us many types of greater or less excellence.” East, The 
Improvement of Corn in Connecticut, 5–6. This is another example of Darwin’s “incrementum” and 
“metonymy” discussed in Chapter 1.  
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East’s career began with an important long-term selection experiment of maize at 
the Illinois Agricultural Experiment Station. The experiment’s goal was to increase a 
kernel of maize’s protein or oil content at will. The work was quite thorough, analyzing 
maize’s microscopic structure and pointing to practical ways the ordinary farmer may 
improve his crop by his own artificial selection.475 As much as historians have 
emphasized the experiment’s relationship to the problem of selection, Hopkins, Smith, 
and East considered the “most important improvement” to be “that which relates to the 
prevention of inbreeding.”476 Indeed, they were explicitly Darwinian, attributing 
(partially) to him the “well-known principle … that injurious effects are produced from 
the self-pollination of plants which are naturally cross-pollinated.”477 That is, inbreeding 
produced “evil effects.” At this point in 1903 East remained Darwinian, regarding both 
inbreeding and the effects of selection, but in a reverse example to Castle, he later 
reinterpreted these results along Mendelian-mutationist lines alongside practical and 
theoretical developments. Like Castle, the longer the experiment continued, the more he 
was convinced his initial position was incorrect. These two are a rich demonstration of 
Bukharin’s interplay of practice and theory with the former leading but not determining 
the latter.  
East and Shull embraced the theories of de Vries, although they did not accept it 
entirely. East was skeptical of the Oenothera work, for example, but believed that “other 
data by Bateson, De Vries, and others, [were] more convincing to my mind.”478 There 
 
475 Cyril G. Hopkins, East, and Louie Henrie Smith, The Structure of the Corn Kernel and the Composition 
of Its Different Parts, 87 (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Agricultural Experiment Station, 1903). 
476 Cyril G. Hopkins, East, and Louie Henrie Smith, “Directions for the Breeding of Corn, Including 
Methods for the Prevention of in-Breeding,” Bulletin (University of Illinois (Urbana-Champaign Campus). 
Agricultural Experiment Station); No. 100, 1905, 601. Shull at this time also noted the importance of 
isolation [Prob out of place] and progeny tests as developed by Vilmorin, Willet Hays and Hjalmar Nilsson. 
Shull, “Importance of the Mutation Theory in Practical Breeding,” 64. 
477 Hopkins, East, and Smith, “Directions for the Breeding of Corn, Including Methods for the Prevention 
of In-Breeding,” 602. 
478 East, The Relation of Certain Biological Principles to Plant Breeding, 34. East addressed this again in 
1914, writing that although “de Vries did indeed lay great stress upon his work with the evening 
primroses,” he produced additional “props so sturdy that in the opinion of some, the Oenothera 
investigations might be disregarded without weakening the edifice. East, review of The Mutation Factor in 
Evolution: with Particular Reference to Oenothera, by Reginald Ruggles Gates, Rhodora 17, no. 204 
(1915): 235. That is, historians’ tendency to treat the mutation theory as wholly dependent on the success or 
failure of Oenothera is misguided. However, East implied that de Vries’ mutation theory was “no new 
Evolution theory.” De Vries “showed the frequency with which germinal changes of comparatively great 
size occur, and why they are not swamped by intercrossing. [These] merely extend and modify Darwin’s 
ideas insofar as these new facts tend to change the emphasis the latter placed upon particular types of 
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were numerous breeding examples de Vries could have cited instead, such as the little red 
poppy (Papaver rhœas), a long neglected plant that suddenly produced a remarkable 
individual in 1882 that the English Reverend Wilks isolated, transplanted, and 
propagated, resulting in the Shirley poppy.479 Therefore, the popularity that the mutation 
theory enjoyed in the United States did not rest solely upon Oenothera; as Shull stated, 
signaling the importance of practice, “even its most strenuous opponents grant that it is 
supported by garden experience.”480 
Of utmost importance to understanding the entire debate that followed was the 
distinction, first made by de Vries, between “fluctuations” and “mutations.” (This was 
explained in Chapter 2.) East and Shull repeatedly pointed to this distinction as his 
greatest contribution: a scientific explanation for breeders’ mixed experiences with mass 
selection. As East and Shull recognized, de Vries distinguished between fluctuations: 
environmentally caused, temporarily inherited, linear variation; and mutations: internally 
caused, permanently inherited, discontinuous and definite variation in any direction. The 
implication of this distinction, theoretically and practically, was that much of the visible 
variation within a population was not inheritable and, therefore, not selectable. (It also 
pointed to a rejection of the inheritance of acquired characters.) Although historians, as 
well as opponents such as Castle, tend to equate mutations with large-scale variations and 
fluctuations with small-scale variations, the distinction was actually one about 
inheritability and response to selection. Shull admitted that known mutations tend to be 
“large and striking,” but this was a result of an expected bias of breeders to simply notice 
them more frequently.481 East was more explicit, stating that “the mutation may be within 
the limits of a fluctuation, but still be a true mutation.” (Indeed, there is no other way for 
Johannsen’s experiment to have made any sense.) According to Shull, what characterized 
a mutation was a “fundamental [and “transmissible”] change in the internal composition 
or structure of the vital substances”; mutations are “often very insignificant, 
 
variation” (p. 235). This passage signals a synthetic view of evolution independent of the more 
“ideological” scientists, such as Bateson or Pearson, but bears more in common with Mendelian-
mutationism. 
479 Shull, “Importance of the Mutation Theory in Practical Breeding,” 62.  
480 Shull, 65. 
481 Shull, 62. Therefore, the Morgan lab’s accomplishment regarding mutations was not proving that they 
were small, for this was already accepted; instead, their accomplishment was to build an experimental 
system to better detect and understand mutations, à la Robert Kohler’s notion of the “breeder reactor.”  
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quantitatively.”482 This distinction was the central theory that animated a decade of debate 
among the experimental evolutionists. 
The careful methods East developed were precisely because “fluctuations overlap 
and are indistinguishable in appearance.” (The difference “is merely in their 
transmission.”)483 For example, a pure line of sugar beets may normally produce 12% 
sugar with fluctuations between 10-14%, whereas another line may normally produce 
10% sugar with fluctuations between 8-12%. East’s and Shull’s methodological goal was 
to differentiate between these two lines via pedigree breeding.484 In addition, a mutation 
produced “a new range of fluctuating variability,” possibly with a greater range than the 
parents. Because of this overlap, recognizing and accounting for the problem would 
increase the efficiency of crop improvement.485 This meant that this theoretical 
distinction that emerged from practice was a distinction that could be made only by 
practice in any given situation. 
East and Shull considered this a non-Darwinian, if not anti-Darwinian, view of 
evolution, but this did not entail a rejection of selection. As East explained (and citing 
Morgan), 
… Natural selection theory is mainly … a theory of adaptation to environment. It is a 
sieve which sifts out variations which have appeared that are of prime utility to the 
organism or to the species. It is not a cause of evolution itself, but a working agent for 
destroying organisms less fit for their station in life than some of their relatives or species 
less fit for existence than others. It is not a selective agency, but a rejective agency. It is 
plainly evident that it is one of the great factors of evolution, possibly the greatest factor; 
but it is as plainly evident, even with the added theory of sexual selection, that numerous 
characters possessed by living organisms must have developed without its agency.486 
 
482 Furthermore, bud variations and hybrids were not mutations. This distinction he considered one of the 
most practical benefits of the theory. Shull, 61, 65. 
483 East, The Relation of Certain Biological Principles to Plant Breeding, 35. East repeated this 
interpretation numerous times: East, A Study of the Factors Influencing the Improvement of the Potato, 127 
(Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Agricultural Experiment Station, 1908), 417; East, review of Principles 
of Breeding, by E. Davenport, Science 29, no. 737 (1909): 261–62. See also: East, “The Role of Selection 
in Plant Breeding,” Popular Science Monthly 77 (1910). 
484 East, The Relation of Certain Biological Principles to Plant Breeding, 35. 
485 Shull, “Importance of the Mutation Theory in Practical Breeding,” 66. At this time, East and Shull 
accepted de Vries’ contention that selection could act upon fluctuations, but only temporarily, and they soon 
discarded this, taking a hardline position that fluctuations were by definition not inheritable. 
486 East, The Relation of Certain Biological Principles to Plant Breeding, 23–24. The last sentence partially 
refers to the Duke of Argyll’s criticism that natural selection cannot explain the origins of traits because 




This quotation, and East’s work in general, undermines the literature’s emphasis on 
“anti-” or “non-Darwinians” rejecting selection. As East himself states, selection, 
although non-creative, and even non-causal, is “possibly the greatest factor in evolution.” 
Selection’s importance in evolution contradicted its lack of importance as a source of 
creativity.487 
East’s 1909 review of Eugene Davenport’s Principles of Breeding reveals the 
confusion and differences between the two standpoints. (No relation to Charles 
Davenport.) First, according to East, Davenport promulgated the “false impressions 
among out and out Darwinians” who “seem to be able to conceive a mutation only as the 
addition or loss of a complete character and therefore a wide jump.” But East pointed out 
that mutations were mostly “quantitative changes in characters already possessed, i.e., 
simply the production of new modes as centers for linear fluctuation. The difference 
between fluctuations and mutations is merely in their transmission.”488 (Davenport 
accepted East’s correction, redefining them along Mendelian-mutationist lines.) As for 
selection, East described Davenport’s “biometrical explanation” as “explain[ing] 
nothing.” Davenport argued that “the principal function of selection … is to alter the 
type, not to reduce variability”; fixing the type was therefore impossible because “there 
always remains sufficient variability for further selection.” East rejected this view: 
selection altered the type by reducing variability, i.e., by eliminating alternative types 
from a heterogeneous mixture. According to East, this was a “real explanation compatible 
with the belief that to be inherited variations must have affected the germ cell structurally 
— a view to which the author [Davenport] adheres.” That is, Eugene Davenport’s 
selection theory was tied to Pearson’s “lame biology,” based on statistics and ignoring 
underlying causes and mechanics, rather than to his own Mendelism.489 
For East and Shull, the question in terms of practice was not whether to abandon 
“selection,” but what kind of selection was most efficient — “Darwinian” mass selection 
 
Kelvin’s age of the earth argument.) 
487 While I am making use of dialectical materialism to analyze the historical developments, the theory 
proposed by East here is not dialectical but is instead one-sided: Levins and Lewontin, for example, would 
point to niche construction as undermining the mechanical sieve metaphor.   
488 East, “Principles of Breeding,” 261–62. 
489 East, 262–63. 
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of fluctuations or “de Vriesian” individual selection between pure lines originated by 
mutation. But, East noticed, the theoretical disputes over evolution were simultaneously 
of “primary and direct importance to plant breeding … for the factors [variation, heredity, 
selection] in the improvement in crops are the same as those of a natural evolution.”490 
Shull agreed with the identity of nature and artifice in this case, writing that, 
If the mutation theory holds for plants and animals in a state of nature, and this appears 
daily the more probable, then mutation is the basis for the origin of every permanent 
variety or strain. In nature, mutations have been preserved because they were adapted to 
the life conditions in which they originated; in the garden they have been preserved 
because they pleased the eye of man or promised to minister to his wants or needs.491 
 
East’s rejection of Darwinism (not selection) initially seems incongruent with his 
experience at Illinois, but to the contrary, East now believed de Vries and Johannsen 
better explained the results. The Illinois maize experiment had made rapid progress in 
increasing and decreasing protein and fat content, but was approaching a limit. A 
corroborating scenario was that of beets, in which selection had not improved sugar 
content over the past thirty years, but had prevented deterioration from crossing. That is, 
“the isolation of the pure lines is fast being accomplished,” although its permanence, 
predicted by Johannsen, remained undetermined.492 
East explained the evolutionary dynamics of the situation as follows. Whether a 
Darwinian (mass) or de Vriesian (pedigree) method of selection was followed, its 
tendency was to sort between and isolate types within the field. Where they differed was 
in the rate, due to two major factors. First, uncontrolled crossing under mass selection 
produced heterogeneity (soon labeled heterozygosity), a “mixture of several types” that 
contained within them “‘blood’ of types less productive. … By continuous and very rigid 
selection we will necessarily reduce the number of types.” Second, fluctuations produced 
by environmental effects, such as non-uniform soil conditions, could make a less 
productive type overlap with a more productive type, propagating it to the next 
 
490 East, The Relation of Certain Biological Principles to Plant Breeding, 19. 
491 Shull, “Importance of the Mutation Theory in Practical Breeding,” 62. 
492 East, The Relation of Certain Biological Principles to Plant Breeding, 46–47. East also recognized the 
relationship of population size in this context — the higher the number of individuals, the more likely an 
extreme fluctuation was to appear, thus lessening the need for improvement via selection. This would 
become important when East developed the multiple factor theory. 
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generation despite its genetic inferiority. This explained a population’s initial and rapid 
response to mass selection, as well as its eventual halt and, if selection were discontinued, 
the population’s regression. Thus, de Vries, Pearson(!), Johannsen, “and the experience of 
breeders” in general contradicted “the opinion of Darwin that by selection the type of the 
race would be raised and a new selection possible from the extremes in fluctuation of this 
new type.” Rather, there was a “limit to the amount of improvement that could be 
made.”493 East had carefully distinguished between two types of selection and had 
worked out their practical implications. 
Shull reached the same conclusions: “contrary to the general belief of breeders,” 
Darwinian mass selection was inferior to “the method of isolation of types by pedigree 
cultures” worked out by Vilmorin, Hays, and Nilsson and scientifically developed by 
Johannsen – a theory condensed from practice. Johannsen’s theory held that isolating a 
pure line produced a strain that would breed true to its type, rather than regressing to the 
original mean. (This was the theoretical basis of Shull’s development of hybrid corn 
discussed below.) Shull explained the “characteristic features of the method” to be “the 
production of enormous numbers from which to select, the complete isolation of each 
individual whose characters suggest the possibility that it may be the starting point of a 
new strain, the complete control of the fertilization processes, and the rearing of the 
offspring of the guarded plants under conditions that will allow all distinguishing 
characteristics to reach a normal development.”494 The point was to control against 
contamination, crossing, regression, and inbreeding. (The worry over inbreeding, a 
holdover from Darwin, was the next major problem tackled by Shull and East, discussed 
below). But bringing a crop under such a degree of control may have made extrapolations 
to nature tougher than before; after all, detasseling does not occur naturally. 
Despite their emphasis on production and control, both noted the method’s 
passivity. East wrote, “in no case are we trying to force a variation along unnatural lines; 
 
493 East, The Relation of Certain Biological Principles to Plant Breeding, 29–30. With respect to Pearson, 
East saw little conflict between biometry and what would become genetics. He thought the law of ancestral 
heredity “approximate[d] the truth” when applied to a whole organism with thousands of characters or 
when dealing with the averages of a population, but it failed to work for individual characters and could not 
describe the results of individual crosses or the physiology of heredity. Why East saw Pearson as aligned 
with de Vries and Johannsen he left unclear. East, 28, 44.  
494 Shull, “Importance of the Mutation Theory in Practical Breeding,” 66. 
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we take types as nature has produced them, isolate, propagate and use them. In most 
crops there is no need for selection other than to obtain the necessary purity of type.”495 
Shull “confidently expected” that mutations could soon be artificially induced — not only 
in terms of frequency, but perhaps even their direction. MacDougal’s injection 
experiments pointed to the possibility, but “we seem to be at present entirely at the mercy 
of nature.”496 But, now that biologists had developed a new theory about how evolution 
worked in nature and in the garden, “nature treats us well, if we stand equipped with as 
complete understanding of her ways as science provides, ready to take advantage of and 
preserve every advance she makes.”497 
East and Shull concluded that selection could maintain a race, but not create it, 
contrary to Castle’s recent views. Selecting fluctuations may prevent deterioration and 
regression, but “this is entirely distinct from trying to breed into a variety by selection a 
heritable character that it does not naturally possess.”498 The difference between 
“selection” and “isolation” was blurry, since the former “does contribute toward the slow 
isolation of the best natural high yielding type,” but the theoretical underpinning was 
quite different. Thus, while passive, it was more efficient; Shull estimated that the 
successful development of a new strain of barley through mass selection over twenty 
years could have been accomplished through isolation in five years.499 Creativity was left 
for nature itself, while selection was within the hands of breeders. This contrasted with 
Castle, who was now arguing that creativity and control were identical with selection. 
It cannot be forgotten that a crucial third method of plant improvement enjoyed a 
long history — hybridization — and had received a recent boon from Mendel. While East 
considered the belief that “Mendel’s work will make the characters of hybrids as easy to 
predict as are those of chemical compounds” to be “an extreme view,” Mendel did 
provide “the most direct plan of procedure in combining known desirable characters 
possessed by distinct varieties,” once the characters were confirmed to Mendelize. (This 
 
495 East, The Relation of Certain Biological Principles to Plant Breeding, 55–56. 
496 Emphasis mine. Sharon Kingsland discusses MacDougal extensively in “The Battling Botanist: Daniel 
Trembly MacDougal, Mutation Theory, and the Rise of Experimental Evolutionary Biology in America, 
1900-1912,” Isis 82, no. 3 (1991): 479–509. 
497 Shull, “Importance of the Mutation Theory in Practical Breeding,” 66. Emphasis mine. 
498 East, The Relation of Certain Biological Principles to Plant Breeding, 59. 
499 Shull, “Importance of the Mutation Theory in Practical Breeding,” 63. 
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was Castle’s position prior to supporting gametic contamination.) According to East, 
Mendel additionally “brought confirmatory evidence that characters are established fully 
formed by mutation, and are inherited as such.”500 In terms of practice, though, East 
advised isolation should be done prior to any hybridizing, since “at present it is 
undesirable to complicate the work until we have accomplished what can be done without 
it.”501 As mentioned above, Shull also embraced Mendelism, but in the context of plant 
breeding, he, too, did not place much emphasis upon it, at least at the time, for he would 
soon develop a method of hybridizing maize with known genetically inbred strains. 
East concluded, acknowledging the “pronounced De Vriesian view” he presented, 
that 
the view is from the standpoint of the principles and theories that give at present the most 
practical and efficient help in actual plant breeding. … It may be admitted that certain 
forces may have been of great value in effecting an evolution through eons of time, and 
[yet] still be ineffective agents in the time allotted to the man who wishes to make 
changes under domestication from the standpoint of commercial gain. It is here that the 
two lines [philosophical and experimental biology] part company; and it is the plant 
breeder who remembers this distinction between natural and artificial evolution when 
studying disputed theories of variation and heredity, that will obtain the greatest aid from 
the results of the experimental biologist. We may admit, for instance, that the believer in 
Lamarckian factors as agents in evolution can say that experiments concerning the 
inheritance of acquired characters have been carried on only for a period of time that 
would be negligible in a geological epoch; we may admit the justness of the same 
criticism of our conclusions regarding the ineffectiveness of the selection of fluctuations 
in permanently changing characters: but we are justified in retorting that only such 
theories can be of use to us that produce results within the span of a human life.502 
 
Thus, East’s primary concern with breeding practices and experimentation, primarily 
time, motivated his theoretical understanding of evolution. He alluded to potential 
differences between nature and artifice but had played it down due to its experimental 
intractability (time). This introduced an interesting notion that the process of controlling 
 
500 This relies on an assumption that a tall or short allele and morph in peas, for example, were formed as 
such and not evolved over time. 
501 East, The Relation of Certain Biological Principles to Plant Breeding, 64–72, 79–80. 
502 East, 90. The rhetorical device of comparing what happens in nature and what humans do is common in 
East’s and Shull’s writings.  
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evolution differed from its natural method, despite being based on the same causes, laws, 
and material.  
Shull, for his part, admitted that it was possible that “old methods” of breeding 
may “harmonize perfectly with the theory,” relegating the mutation theory’s practical 
significance to “better appreciation” of what breeders already grasped.503 For example, 
dissolving the boundary between nature and artifice, “sports or mutants are [now] 
recognized as normal products of a natural process,” and their usual minuteness forced 
the breeder to pay closer attention for inherited differences than they formerly would 
have.504  But Shull also believed there was a larger spiritual significance: 
… The value of the mutation theory is great in the feeling it gives the breeder that he is 
handling the normal and eternal forces of nature. An added interest attaches to each new 
variation when it is realized that every instance of mutation is a part of the order or [sic] 
nature, and not a monstrous departure from natural conditions; and the sense of exaltation 
that comes from dealing with the processes and products of universal evolution cannot 
fail to increase enthusiasm and efficiency in the breeder’s work.505 
 
But, the most significant development, beyond naturalizing mutations and explaining 
existing practices, was their landmark work on hybrid maize. This not only contributed to 
the United States’ future skyrocketing corn production, but also shaped evolutionary 
theory. Until now, they had conducted most of their work without much reference to 
genetics, hence their work being properly considered experimental evolution, but this 
would change as they found it to be useful explanatorily. 
Shull's Development of Hybrid Corn and Overturning the Anti-Inbreeding 
Bias 
Still the Station for Experimental Evolution’s botanist, Shull conducted breeding 
experiments with maize that reshaped the biological view of inbreeding and its value. 
This was largely due to the incorporation of genetics into pure line and mutation theories 
 
503 This claim falls in line with the historical consensus that genetics itself did little to improve techniques, 
but instead explained them scientifically. I discuss this issue elsewhere. However, even at this point, later 
known for their genetics work, both East and Shull were not incorporating Mendelism into their theories 
yet — their work is primarily under the influence of de Vries, Johannsen, and the late 19th C. Breeders 
Vilmorin, Hays, Nilsson. 
504 Shull, “Importance of the Mutation Theory in Practical Breeding,” 63. 
505 Shull, 66–67. Although the degree that a non-scientist breeder would feel this way is uncertain. 
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that Shull had so far helped develop. From that work he would help develop hybrid corn, 
an important agricultural feat, and perhaps the most important practical innovation from 
this era of experimental evolution. Typically considered an innovation in agriculture or 
genetics, I argue that hybrid corn is more properly an accomplishment of experimental 
evolution, despite Shull’s acknowledgement that the work had little to say about how 
evolution occurred in the wild, representing a further distinctly artificial trend within the 
tradition. Furthermore, this work was the reverse case of Darwin’s theorizing: Darwin 
took artifice to stand in for nature, whereas Shull and East moved had from nature to 
artifice. This difference was also reflected in the ties to capitalism: While both Darwin’s 
“experiment on a gigantic scale” and hybrid maize were the result of capitalist 
developments, Darwin had also tied his work into the rich “entangled bank” of natural 
history; the intention of hybrid maize was the reductionist control of a commodity’s 
evolution for profit. Thus experimental evolution contained the possibility of escaping the 
constraints of natural evolution, but was not defined by it.  
Interestingly, though, Shull acknowledged this contradiction but rejected it 
somewhat. Shull’s research on maize rested primarily upon pedigree culture, the 
“peculiar instrument” of genetics. Well-aware of potential limits of artificial work, he 
acknowledged that methodologically “the distinctive feature … [of] isolation [is] unlike 
anything which commonly occurs in nature,” its results having “valid application only to 
those rare situations in which similar isolation is found in nature.” Shull countered, 
however, arguing that its distinctive feature was not isolation, “but perfect knowledge of 
ancestry.”506 He added, citing de Vries’ extensive Oenothera pedigrees, 
It is needless to urge that in nature no other than the possible combinations exist, and that 
therefore when with respect to any species or group the full scope of the pedigree-method 
has been utilized we have the fundamental data upon which alone can be based any 
proper conception of what goes on in nature, and that the data so found when properly 
confirmed by repetition are applicable to all nature in which the particular species or 
group in question is involved.507 
 
Thus, Shull argued that through artifice, the scientist could work out all possible 
 
506 George H. Shull, “The Pedigree-Culture: Its Aims and Methods,” The Plant World 11, no. 2 (1908): 21–
22. 
507 Shull, 22.  
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combinations and this knowledge allowed one to extrapolate experimental results back to 
nature. Like Mendel, Shull bridged the gap between laboratory and nature by working 
with “the composition of a field of maize.”508 
So far, maize had proved to be exempt from improvement by pure line methods. 
Although he had himself praised the power of isolation methods in crop improvement, 
self-fertilized maize tended to deteriorate. This lent credence to the belief that inbreeding 
produced “evil effects,” or in more scientific language, that it resulted in the 
“inharmonious or unbalanced constitution produced by the accumulation of 
disadvantageous individual variations.” But, given pure line theory’s success elsewhere, 
these old explanations were becoming insufficient.509 Shull thus set out to work out how 
maize could be incorporated into the emerging theories of variation, heredity, and 
evolution. 
Shull’s work on maize was an extension of Johannsen’s. Shull replicated 
Johannsen’s experimental design by planting the offspring of self-fertilized ears of corn 
along rows. When cultivated, differences between the rows were “immediately apparent,” 
including height, stalk diameter, leaf color, susceptibility to fungus, and the number of 
rows in an ear.. And typical of F1 hybrids, rows of cross-bred ears resembled one another. 
The differences between self-fertilized rows were hereditary, thus constituting, in Shull’s 
view, “elementary species” or “biotypes” à la the mutation theory. Because Shull tested 
traits beyond height or weight, such as vigor, he was able to conclude that self-
fertilization did not result in deterioration; instead, self-fertilization isolated types of 
varying qualities. Inbreeding’s effect was indirect and “simply isolated the two [biotypes] 
by separating them from their hybrid combinations with other elementary species.” 
Inbreeding could not be the “direct cause” of deterioration.510 
True to de Vries and Johannsen, Shull explained that what frequently appeared to 
be variations within a self-fertilized line of maize were impermanent. Instead, a biotype 
varied about an inherited mode.511 The character of a biotype’s offspring sat between the 
 
508 George H. Shull, “The Composition of a Field of Maize,” 1908. 
509 Shull, 296. 
510 Shull, 297–98. 
511 Shull still thought selection could “temporarily modify” a biotype, but regression would take hold as 
soon as it ceased or the conditions changed. 
167 
 
parents and the mode, but selection could reduce the discrepancy, i.e., variability. 
Selection could also “detect” biotypes from a mixture through isolation, such as when 
Shull found a 10-rowed stock among one that averaged 12-14 rows.512 This was much 
like how Johannsen’s beans had displayed a normal curve of variation in terms of weight, 
but they were actually a population of distinct types. 
From these experiments, Shull concluded the “obvious”: 
An ordinary cornfield is a series of very complex hybrids produced by the combination of 
numerous elementary species. Self-fertilization soon eliminates the hybrid elements and 
reduces the strain to its elementary components. In the comparison between a self-
fertilized strain and a cross-fertilized strain of the same origin, we are not dealing, then, 
with the effects of cross and self-fertilization as such, but with the relative vigor of 
biotypes and their hybrids.513 
 
Shull thus explained that within a field of maize were numerous, hidden biotypes, 
themselves disguised within hybrid combinations. While Shull was not advocating a 
modern populational view, it was not a purely “typological” view either. Contrary to 
Ernst Mayr’s strict dichotomy, the pure line theory appears to be a transition in 
“population thinking.”514 These scientists were working out the implications of 
mutationism and Mendelism on populations, or in this case, “the composition of a field of 
maize.” 
In practical terms, self-fertilization broke the hybrids into their constituent 
biotypes. Due to Mendelism, a hybrid cross could also reveal the biotype in the 
homozygotic class, but only if the offspring were from two “rigidly selected” parents. It 
 
512 Shull, 298–99. Shull added, “the greater vigor of the cross-fertilized rows is thus immediately brought 
into harmony with the almost universal observation that hybrids between nearly related forms are more 
vigorous than either parent.” That is, cross-fertilization and hybridization were both a merging of two types. 
513 Shull, 299. 
514 For additional evidence of this transition, see Shull, “Elementary Species and Hybrids of Bursa,” 
Science 25, no. 641 (1907): 590-591; Shull, Bursa bursa-pastoris and Bursa heegeri biotypes and hybrids 
(Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1909). In his study of the highly variable 
shepherd’s purse, Shull determined that there were at least four “biotypes” or elementary species within the 
Linnean species that required pedigree culture to identify. He showed these biotypes Mendelize, their 
differences consisting mainly of two unit-characters, but claimed that when hybridized, they re-emerged in 
full in the F2 generation (i.e., did not break apart and recombine as would become the dominant theory. 
Thus, while Shull’s notion of biotypes is outdated, he was also finding the precise ways in which a species 
contains genetic variation. Shull also at this time suggested that recessive biotypes benefited from being 
able to hide within hybrids and speculated on how this scenario would play out in nature. 
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would be “much slower” to work, however, because of the “reintroduction [of] elements” 
eliminated in the father strain from the mother strain, and vice versa.515 Interestingly, 
Shull still maintained a distinction in his analysis between pure line theory and 
Mendelism. 
Shull inverted the practical problem regarding maize: it was no longer the 
prevention of inbreeding, but the “development and maintenance of that hybrid 
combination which possesses the greatest vigor.” While selection would initially improve 
the strain by eliminating maladaptive “components,” if it “continued in the same rigid 
manner” “it may lead to the loss of one after another of the component biotypes” that 
produced the desired vigor. Shull concluded, therefore, that “the fundamental defect in 
every empirical scheme of corn-breeding” based in isolation “lies in the fact that there is 
no intelligent attempt in these methods to determine the relative value of the several 
biotypes in hybrid combination, but only in the pure state.”516 It was impossible, 
however, to predict the vigor of a cross between two biotypes. Pointing to the methods of 
a hog breeder who crossed two original strains every year to remake the same hybrid, 
Shull suggested the same for corn breeders (which proved to be adopted method). He also 
suggested carrying out selection “to a point at which the most efficient combination has 
been isolated from the less efficient components” and then “relaxed” so as to not 
eliminate the constitutive biotypes. Here Shull began to point to another function of 
selection in addition to isolation: the maintenance or even creation of hybrid 
combination. 
 
Shull's and East's Consolidation 
Once East and Shull became aware of their shared understanding of evolution and 
plant breeding, their views became even more integrated and consolidated, particularly 
with respect to inbreeding and maize. In his report as station agronomist, East picked up 
on Shull’s new theory and technique of inbreeding. Explaining again the work of de Vries 
and Johannsen, East noted that his previous bulletin had advised methods based in a “fear 
 
515 Shull, 299–300. How exactly he saw this working is unclear, given that the paper predates the discovery 
of crossing over. 
516 Shull, 300. 
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of the dangers of inbreeding,” a belief rooted in Darwin’s work as well as his own 
experiences with maize.517 Now, East believed Shull had “given … the correct 
interpretation of this vexed question”: “instead of saying there is a loss of vigor through 
inbreeding, we say there is an increase in vigor from hybridizing.” In a bulletin he 
declared the method to be “worthy of trial.”518 
However, “with the conception of biotypes within a species, there is a radical 
change in the thought.” East deduced from Shull’s hypothesis that because of the 
relationship between inbreeding and degeneration, there should be a limit to 
degeneration. Now more fully integrating Mendelism into their work, East suggested 
degeneration would end upon reaching homozygosity, i.e., genetic uniformity.519 
With the new theory, East reevaluated Darwin’s The Effects of Cross and Self 
Fertilisation in the Vegetable Kingdom (1876), discovering that Darwin’s experiments 
corroborated Shull, despite Darwin having reached a contradictory conclusion. 
Specifically, when comparing self-fertilized lines, Darwin assumed that inbreeding 
necessarily had a negative and degenerative effect, but Shull and East now argued that 
isolated/inbred biotypes may vary in quality.520 East picked out a ten-generation 
experiment with Ipomea purpurea, in which Darwin compared heights of crossed with 
selfed lines, and instead of the latter continually decreasing in height, they began to 
converge to a limit.521 The flower color of the selfed lines varied less than in the crossed 
lines, enough so that Darwin’s gardener could identify a type by the trait alone, with no 
sense of “deterioration,” i.e., Darwin had actually isolated biotypes.522 East argued that 
when reconsidered in new light, Darwin’s experiments were actually “in strict accord 
with the modern theory” which stated that “with continued inbreeding there is no 
 
517 East, “Report of the Agronomist,” 421–22. 
518 East, 422, 428. 
519 East, “Report of the Agronomist,” 423. 
520 East, 424. 
521 Darwin measured height as the selective index, whereas Shull and East used multiple characters, but 
especially yield. East was skeptical of the utility of height, choosing to measure fecundity. [Make sure 
true:] This choice was what produced the different conclusions. 
522 Another experiment of Darwin’s with Petunia violacea lasted five generations, and while there was 
overall deterioration, the third selfed generation was more vigorous than the crossed. As he put it later, 
“Darwin was not dealing with the same strain at the end of his experiments that he was at the beginning.” 
East and H. K. Hayes, Heterozygosis in Evolution and in Plant Breeding, vol. 243 (Washington, D. C.: 
Bureau of Plant Industry, 1912), 16. 
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accumulation of detrimental characters.”523 Instead, “this change was due … to the 
elimination of Mendelian segregates.”524 
Already having reinterpreted the Illinois maize experiment in light of the mutation 
theory, East addressed it once again, but now with regard to Shull’s hypothesis.525 While 
the experiment had initially shown that “inbreeding in corn was deleterious to its vigor,” 
it now indicated that the “superiority of crossed over inbred seed was not on the 
increase.” He predicted that “continued selection will also, though more slowly, isolate a 
uniform type upon the crossed rows, which will bring the yields of tasseled [inbred to 
varying degrees] and detasseled [crossed] closer together.”526 That is, both self-
fertilization and mass selection theoretically reduced variability, but at different rates, 
with different degrees of control, and ended with different products: a biotype versus the 
best hybrid combination.527 Like fluctuation and mutation, East was identifying 
operational and practical differences among apparently identical phenomena.    
The role of environmental action in creating fluctuations that could mask discrete 
pure lines or mutations remained important to these investigations. To examine the 
question, East turned to the potato, a crop with few breeders working on its systematic 
improvement. East asserted that “there are characteristic differences in seeding power 
which are inherited by different varieties. Fluctuations in these characters are so large and 
may be increased artificially by changing environmental conditions; but no ordinary 
treatment will force a variety across its critical point into another biotype.”528 After 
analyzing the hereditary and environmental factors that influenced potato and tuber 
development, East wrote that: 
Our whole problem is reduced to the question whether types may or may not be changed 
by the selection of fluctuations. If types may be changed by the selection of individual 
fluctuations, they may likewise be changed by the selection of partial fluctuations. Until 
recently an affirmative answer to this theorem would not have been questioned. All of our 
conclusions, however, have been based upon the supposition that the data obtained in 
 
523 East, “Report of the Agronomist,” 425. 
524 East and Hayes, Heterozygosis in Evolution and in Plant Breeding, 243:16. 
525 Should I reiterate what East’s previous ideas were? 
526 East, “Report of the Agronomist,” 426. 
527 Note that much of Castle’s argument is that selection does not reduce variability. 
528 East, “Report of the Agronomist,” 433. In this context, East was criticizing the “Lamarckian belief that 
continued improvement in tuber formation has led to degeneration of the sexual functions.” Instead, East 
argued that it was an inherited character, not a life history trade-off. 
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experiments with fluctuations, were obtained from homogeneous material. Johannsen’s 
work has thrown into considerable doubt the homogeneity of natural populations. He has, 
moreover, concluded that the selection of fluctuations has nothing to do with the 
improvement of a race. Probably no other conclusion of recent times is so important to 
plant breeders. The work should certainly be duplicated along as many lines as possible; 
for its corroboration would not only sound the death knell of methods of improvements 
by the selection of partial fluctuations, but would entirely change our conception of 
procedure in other breeding operations. … Furthermore, if Johannsen was correct, then 
“no improvement can be made by selecting plus fluctuations in potatoes, except upon the 
intervention of mutative changes.”529 
 
East found improving potatoes upon this conception exceedingly difficult, 
however, because “results have been obscured by seasonal, climatic and local soil 
conditions which have a tremendous effect and which are not constant enough to permit 
tracing marked hereditary transmission.” Observed changes could be the result of 
mutation as well as fluctuations resulting from variation in health or age, among other 
factors. Putting to work a theory that rested upon detecting these minute differences could 
be rather troublesome, enough so that he ended the experiments following uncontrollable 
disasters (fire and drought).530 
Shull continued to elaborate upon his “pure-line method in corn breeding.” In an 
address to the American Breeders’ Association, Shull claimed to have confirmed his 
previous conclusions that an “ordinary field of corn” is composed of complex hybrids. As 
East had pointed out, a major result of the pure line work was that it threw into 
“considerable doubt the homogeneity of natural populations.”531 Furthermore, they had 
reinterpreted the impact of inbreeding and self-fertilization: “the deterioration which 
takes place as a result … is due to the gradual reduction of the strain to a homozygous 
condition.” Both pedigree selection and mass selection reduced a population’s variability, 
towards homozygosity, although at different rates, the latter more slowly due to the 
 
529 East, A Study of the Factors Influencing the Improvement of the Potato, 401–3. East critiqued de Vries 
and Johannsen for their neglect of “bud mutation,” which he thought of as no different than germinal 
mutations. However, East studied existing data regarding utility and concluded that most bud mutations 
were not progressive, but regressive (loss of character), and thus, likely useless except for flower colors. 
Edward M. East, “Suggestions Concerning Certain Bud Variations,” The Plant World 11, no. 4 (1908): 83. 
530 Edward M. East, “Inheritance in Potatoes,” The American Naturalist 44, no. 523 (1910): 424. This 
problem was also of concern to Jennings and MacDowell, discussed at length below. 
531 East, A Study of the Factors Influencing the Improvement of the Potato, 401–3. 
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problem presented by non-inheritable fluctuations as well as crossing.  
Shull now had new ideas for how breeders should look to “find and maintain the 
best hybrid combination.” Crosses between “unselected” strains (i.e., inbred with no 
concern for yield or other traits) produced individuals with slightly higher yield than the 
continuously crossbred controls. Therefore, “… the result is sufficiently striking to 
suggest that the method of separating and recombining definite pure-lines may perhaps 
give results quite worth striving for.”532 Because this method selected for the most 
heterozygous individuals, the high yield could not persist because heterozygosity 
segregates in the following generations. The upshot was that by maintaining homozygous 
self-bred stocks, the material from which to create vigorous hybrids remained the same 
through the generations (barring mutations), allowing breeders to repeatedly remake 
optimal crosses.533  
Ironically, East and Shull had potentially arrived at a method to improve maize, 
not so much by directing the species’ evolution in a certain direction, but by freezing 
stocks to remake the same combination at will. To arrive at these techniques, East and 
Shull had adopted the stances, generally, of Hugo de Vries and Wilhelm Johannsen, both 
of whom were critical of Darwinism (as it was commonly interpreted). Their conclusions 
were contradictory to Castle’s in a straightforward way: Castle argued that selection 
created variation, whereas Shull and East argued that selection eliminated variation; 
although in artificial conditions, they thought selection could be used to maintain hybrid 
combinations. Because of these stark differences in theory as well as their implications 
for breeding techniques, the Mendelian-mutationism of Shull and East, conflicted with 
 
532 George Harrison Shull, “A Pure-Line Method in Corn Breeding,” Journal of Heredity os-5, no. 1 (1909): 
52–56. 
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Castle’s genetic Darwinism or selectionism. 
The early history of hybrid maize demonstrates the interpenetration of theory and 
practice. Inbreeding had long been considered mostly deleterious, sometimes used to fix 
traits (as with Bakewell) but overall unhealthy for a population. This view was bolstered 
by Darwin’s own experiments. Through their own experimental work, Shull and East did 
not necessarily overturn the view in general, but instead challenged the nature of the 
relationship between inbreeding and vigor – it was correlative, but not causative. This 
refinement allowed them to take greater control of maize: it had thus far escaped the 
fluctuation-mutation distinction of Mendelian-mutationism, but was now integrated into 
the evolutionary theory, a theory that itself was grounded in practical developments. 
Herbert Spencer Jennings and Selection’s Ability to See 
Herbert Spencer Jennings was also among the first Americans to corroborate the 
pure line theory. A biologist who had made his name studying the behavior of the “lower 
organisms,” Jennings expanded his studies of Paramecia to include variation, heredity, 
selection, and the inheritance of acquired characters.534 Jennings’ two publications on 
Paramecia were extensive — each over 100 pages long; his thoroughness and attention 
to detail would lead Castle, pure line theory’s chief experimental critic, to consider them 
better evidence than Johannsen’s own original publication. Although he developed his 
work independently of the other pure line workers, including Johannsen, Jennings 
developed rather similar theories regarding the interaction between selection, heredity, 
and variation. Like East, Shull, and Castle, Jennings’ research is best understood as 
another instance of experimental evolution, rather than genetics, particularly because it 
was unclear at the time if the “lower organisms” had genetics. Unlike the others, 
however, he was not as interested in application and control, representing a more “pure 
science” approach. Rather than make analogies between nature and artifice, Jennings 
became primarily concerned with how his experimental results seemed to conflict with 
the “demands” of evolution in nature. Like Castle, Jennings’ experimental methods 
 
534 H. S. Jennings, “Heredity, Variation and Evolution in Protozoa. I. The Fate of New Structural Characters 
in Paramecium, in Connection with the Problem of the Inheritance of Acquired Characters in Unicellular 
Organisms,” Journal of Experimental Zoology 5, no. 4 (1908): 577–632; H. S. Jennings, “Heredity, 
Variation and Evolution in Protozoa. II. Heredity and Variation of Size and Form in Paramecium, with 
Studies of Growth, Environmental Action and Selection,” Proceedings of the American Philosophical 
Society 47, no. 190 (1908): 393–546. 
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eventually led him to reject pure line theory and Mendelian-mutationism, but his 
conversion to selectionism will be presented in the next chapter as the proponents of 
competing theories debated and conflicted. 
Jennings chose his experimental organisms deliberately. Due to his career choice 
of organism — asexually reproducing microorganisms — Mendelism played little role in 
his work.535 In fact, he considered the avoidance of such, which “tremendously 
complicates the study of heredity in higher animals,” a virtue of his research. An 
additional virtue of microorganisms was that they are “essentially free germ cells that are 
subjected to the immediate action of the environment, both direct and selective,” the 
distinction between the two actions being of prime importance.536 Although they were 
difficult to measure, 
unicellular animals present all the problems of heredity and variation in miniature. The 
struggle for existence in a fauna of untold thousands showing as much variety of form 
and function as any higher group, works itself out, with ultimate survival of the fittest, in 
a few days under our eyes, in a finger bowl. For studying heredity and variation we get a 
generation a day, and we may keep unlimited numbers of pedigreed stock in a watch 
glass that can be placed under the microscope.537 
 
These are the same virtues that microbial experimental evolutionists point to today. But, 
before molecular biology and modern microbiology, studying these organisms did not 
appear to have immediate application. They could help make evolution visible: Jennings 
believed that “here if anywhere we should see readily the effects of environment and of 
selection in modifying a race.”538 Even if academic, experimental evolution with a 
microbe was relevant in the surrounding debate centered mostly on maize and rats.  
Jennings’ method was primarily biometrical, following Davenport. He collected 
Paramecia from a pond, measured their dimensions, reduced the data to statistical tables, 
and graphed the data. By studying wild-borne Paramecia, Jennings sought to dissolve the 
barrier between the natural and the artificial. His first sample contained four hundred 
 
535 Although Mendelism does not appear in this work, Jennings soon contributed to the chromosome theory 
of heredity in collaboration with the Morgan laboratory and published on the mathematics of Mendelism. 
536 H. S. Jennings, “Heredity and Variation in the Simplest Organisms,” The American Naturalist 43, no. 
510 (1909), p. 322. 
537 Ibid., p. 321. 
538 Ibid., p. 322. 
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individuals taken at random, killed with a chemical “known to cause practically no 
distortion when properly used.” To observe such minute organisms, taken by the drop and 
measured on the scale of microns, Jennings projected light through the slide onto paper, 
later measured by scale.539 When Jennings cultured multiple populations at once, the need 
for meticulous measurement, combined with the organism’s rapid multiplication, caused 
Jennings to “probably” lose half of his experiments.540 Thus were the difficulties of 
experimental evolution. 
His results were remarkably like Johannsen’s, East’s, and Shull’s regarding pure 
lines, the inheritability of variation, and the power of selection, despite being conducted 
apparently without knowledge of the previous work. Jennings immediately distinguished 
two sets of Paramecia within his experimental population. Following months of isolation 
and propagation he concluded they were previously described (albeit contested) species: 
the smaller, P. aurelia, and the larger, P. caudatum. Jennings propagated a “pure line” of 
Paramecia under uniform conditions, measuring size, and found that “the progeny of 
large and of small individuals (within a given pure line) showed no characteristic 
differences in size.”541 Jennings had independently corroborated the pure line theory. 
Jennings went beyond Johannsen in important ways, however. He took extensive 
pains — roughly half of the 128-page article — to analyze the effects of growth and 
environment on individual size. Before considering these effects, attributing anything to 
internal factors would be unjustified. As would become a problem, continuous traits such 
as size were also traits of growth, muddying the results. (A strength of Castle’s work was 
that coat color was independent of growth.) But Jennings had little choice, given that 
Paramecium are “so minute and relatively differentiated an animal.”542 As East had 
discovered with potatoes, external factors such as nutritional changes could nearly double 
the breadth of the organism within a week, problematic enough that Jennings excluded 
breadth as a reliable trait. 
Jennings concluded that growth and environment caused the variation within a 
 
539 Jennings’ precision was to the half micron; the first sample ranged in length from 84 to 164 microns. 
540 Jennings, “Heredity, Variation and Evolution in Protozoa. II. Heredity and Variation of Size and Form in 
Paramecium, with Studies of Growth, Environmental Action and Selection,” 500. 
541 Jennings, 405–6, 408. 




pure line and were thus non-inheritable. (He did not use the term “fluctuation.”) His 
analysis had shown selection was of no effect in that it was “difficult or impossible to 
produce other races within these pure lines.” However, “there remains, of course, the 
possibility that still other lines exist in nature. Can we find in a ‘wild’ culture, by proper 
selection of differing individuals, still others of differing size?”543 From a new wild 
culture, Jennings isolated several lines, but due to experimental contingencies, they lived 
under different conditions from his first cultures, and when brought together, some lines 
perished (i.e., selection). Thus, Jennings had to gradually acclimate each line to the same 
conditions, complicated by the fact that transferring an individual also entailed 
transferring some of the old medium, especially different strains of bacteria, necessitating 
a washing scheme. Once completed, Jennings propagated the cultures for about two 
weeks and determined that he had four distinct lines of Paramecia. In a new population 
cultured with the intention of testing the effects of growth, Jennings detected three new 
lines. Therefore, while size was a continuous trait, and thus the variability of lines 
overlapped, there were distinct and inheritable differences in size between the lines, just 
as Shull had discovered in a field of maize. (See Figure 5.)  
Like Castle, Jennings was interested not only in the state of variation and heredity 
within these two groups, but wondered about selection’s power, asking “can we by 
selection and propagation produce within the limits of a single group races of different 




543 Jennings, 485.  




Figure 5: From Jennings, “Heredity and 
Variation in the Simplest Organisms” (1909), 
Fig. 3. Jennings pointed out that individuals of 
size “a” occur in all eight races, showing that 
appearance alone cannot identify an 
individual as belonging to a certain race; 
rather, “breeding is the only test” (pp. 329-
330). This also shows why Jennings was 
concerned whether selection could identify 
these pure lines. 
 
Jennings began a long-term 
selection experiment, their fast 
reproductive growth and microscopic size allowing in months what Castle, East, or Shull 
would not be able to do in over ten years of work with animals and plants. Taking one of 
the original stocks — likely at 250 generations of culture in less than a year —, Jennings 
separated large from small and allowed the two cultures to multiply for seventeen days.545 
The mean dimensions were identical. Measurements over the next several weeks showed 
variation in mean size, but rather than further separating, the trend lines crossed, from 
which Jennings interpreted the variation as non-inheritable. In another experiment, 
Jennings selected a larger stock to become larger and a smaller stock to become smaller; 
fourteen generations later, these stocks also reversed. Jennings continued the experiment 
over the next month — five rounds of selection — and the stocks, despite directional 
selection, fluctuated randomly. Thus, “the results of selection, if there are any, quite 
disappear in comparison with the effects of slight environmental differences.” Jennings 
reported that “many other attempts were made to break a pure line by selection into 
 
545 Jennings had also changed the “basis” of selection to account for growth over time (age) by propagating 
both the largest and smallest individuals. “Therefore, the best method of procedure will be to take an old 
strain, which, derived from a single individual, has for a long time been multiplying freely without 
conjugation. From this the largest and the smallest individuals should be separated and allowed to 
propagate under identical conditions. If hereditary variations in size have occurred, we should in this way 
reach the same result as by actual selection and isolation through many generations. Physiological isolation 
has been as complete as would be experimental isolation.” Jennings, 506. 
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several lines; on this point an immense amount of work was directed.” Countering the 
commonplace that experimentalists did not allow enough time for evolution to occur, he 
wrote, “In the experiments described above, though their futility seemed evident from the 
first results, the work was continued for many generations, in order that failure might not 
be due to lack of perseverance.”546  
Jennings was troubled by the nature of selection and mutation in evolution that 
emerged from his experiments. Selection’s power was again relegated to isolation — it 
was effective within a mixed population of pure lines, but once the population was 
reduced to a single line, its effects ceased (like when self-fertilized maize became 
homozygous). The ubiquitous variation in Paramecium was due solely to growth and 
environmental action, such as nutrition and “injurious bacteria.”547 But because he had 
not detected a single inheritable variation, large or small, the origin of these pure lines 
remained unanswered; mutations were “much rarer than had been supposed.”548 As 
evolution had come under exact experimental and statistical scrutiny, the theory 
apparently could not account for its reality: how could selection detect inheritable 
differences within a morass of non-inheritable variation? And how could selection-as-
isolation result in the evolutionary progress from microorganisms to humans? 
This was what I call “Jennings’ Problem.” His view of selection’s power was 
pessimistic, not only within an experimental setting, but in nature as well. Jennings 
echoed East’s methodological problem with external factors masking genetic differences 
in potatoes, expanding it to a theoretical conclusion about nature. He wrote, 
We must consider, however, that if the non-inheritable differences are so much more 
numerous and marked than the inheritable ones as to render conscious selection by 
human beings ineffective, they would apparently have the same effect on selection by the 
agencies of nature. The same ground for selection offered by heritable variations is 
offered so much more fully by those not inheritable that there would be as little effect in 
selection by nature as in selection by man.549 
 
546 Jennings, 506–509. 
547 Jennings, 518–22. 
548 Jennings, 524. 
549 Jennings, 522. Note that Jennings was already wondering whether “slight variations” and “mutations” 
were merely two ends of a spectrum, rather than physiologically distinct processes, something he reiterated 
in 1917. It would be interesting to compare this work with the later population genetics work on slight 




That is, in both potatoes and paramecia, selection acted upon the variation within a 
population, but if most variation was non-inheritable, selection would have trouble even 
performing its isolating effect. Jennings did not argue for selection’s irrelevance; instead, 
he could not figure out how evolution could work. 
Thus, like East and Shull, Jennings did not adopt the extreme view that selection 
was unimportant or ineffective. When he presented the “Evidence on the Effectiveness of 
Selection” to the American Society of Naturalists, he declared that “by methodical and 
progressive selection striking results can be reached.” That is, it had the power to isolate. 
“From a wild culture … By properly regulated selection a great variety of permanently 
differentiated lots are obtainable.” However, when dealing with an individual line, 
selection produced “not the faintest trace of effect,” even over hundreds of generations; 
“the race or line is absolutely permanent,” “unyielding as iron.” The differences that did 
exist were not inherited and therefore “they furnish absolutely no foothold for selection.” 
Thus, “the effects of selection have then consisted simply and solely in isolating races 
that already existed.”550 
With Johannsen’s introduction of the “genotype” in 1909, Jennings extended his 
conclusions to sexually reproducing species, or “biparental inheritance.” Specifically, a 
genotype was a “set of individuals which, so long as they are interbred, produce progeny 
that are characteristically uniform in their hereditary features, not systematically splitting 
into diverse groups.” Jennings illustrated how the “genotypic explanation of the effects of 
selection” could fit with biparental inheritance: 
Organisms in which selection has shown itself effective are composed of many 
genotypes. … From such a mixture of genotypes it is possible to isolate by selection any 
of the things that are present—perhaps in a great number of different combinations. … 
But from such a mixture it is not possible to get by methodical selection anything not 
present. … [or] anything lying outside the extremes of the genotypic characters already 
existing. … In the case of genotypes that cross-breed readily, we may get an indefinite 
number of combinations of all that lies between the extremes of the existing genotypes—
the variety of combinations realized depending on the rules of inheritance.551 
 
550 H. S. Jennings, “Experimental Evidence on the Effectiveness of Selection,” The American Naturalist 44, 
no. 519 (1910), pp. 136–137.  




Jennings’ 1910 articulation of evolution is remarkably prescient with respect to the theory 
of evolution that later emerged from population geneticists that emphasized 
recombination as a major source of variation. Jennings was not discussing actual 
recombination, the exchange of genetic material between chromosomes in sexual 
reproduction, but was pointing to the importance of genetic mixing within a population. 
This demonstrates that these biologists had a sophisticated understanding of genetics and 
selection, and that given their anti-Darwinian bent, that this emerging theory of evolution 
had a non-Darwinian character.  
Using both his pure line work and Johannsen’s notion of the genotype, Jennings 
contextualized, supported, and critiqued the work of others. As he had completed his 
work, he found that Johannsen, Pearl, Shull, and de Vries, among others, had reached the 
same conclusions about selection, isolation, and pure lines. Others, however, such as 
Galton, Fritz Müller, de Vries (in some of his experiments), and Castle “had reported 
definite progress as a result of methodical selection. Why this difference? Is there one law 
for the Jews, another for the Gentiles?” Jennings thought not, instead alleging that it was 
due to disparate attention to an experiment’s initial conditions. Because Jennings, too, 
had found selection to be effective, but within mixtures and only until a single race was 
left, Castle’s mistake was to have not accounted for this. Castle’s stocks were of 
“complicated descent; they plunge us at once into all the difficulties due to interweaving, 
blending and transfer of characters from one genotype to another. … MacCurdy and 
Castle got by selection all sorts of conditions lying between the extremes with which they 
started … but they do not give us evidence that methodical selection can produce 
anything beyond combinations of what already exists.”552 That is, “bridging the gap” did 
 
compared to later evolutionary work, it is possible that what Jennings was missing was that rare 
combinations could potentially lie outside the extremes of what was then present. As is, Jennings’ 
interpretation of genotype fit well with Shull’s and East’s ideas at this time. 
552 Jennings, “Experimental Evidence on the Effectiveness of Selection,” 137–38, 140–41. Müller’s and de 
Vries’s experiments with maize did not account for male parentage and selection was actually “pick[ing] 
out the progeny of extreme male genotypes.” De Vries’ experiments on buttercups were troubling, but there 
were too many confounding variables to determine whether they fit or rejected a selectionist theory: the 
experiment did not begin with pure lines, “the variations dealt with are not out of the ordinary fluctuating 
sort (as de Vries points out); change in cultural conditions doubtless played also a large part.” Jennings, 
142. While Castle thought a replication of the buttercup experiment would shore up his position, Jennings 
thought it was not so certain. Citing the results of German breeders (Fruwith, von Rümker), Jennings 
argued, “continued methodical selection is often necessary, but what it does is to purify a contaminated 
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not account for the potential fact that both ends of the spectrum already exist within the 
genotype.553 
To Jennings, the “pure line idea” was, like mutation, “an instrument for analysis 
of the entire field of variation, heredity, and evolution” — a “dissecting knife.”554 
Combined with Shull’s “peculiar tool” of the pedigree, the pure line work produced a 
critical methodological development: without pure lines, or without ensuring genetic 
purity within the stock, any work in experimental evolution was questionable. The initial 
conditions must be known “precisely.”555 Hence Jennings’ choice of Paramecium was 
prescient: dealing with a non-Mendelian organism allowed him to separate signal from 
noise. He also had far less trouble moving back and forth between experiment and nature. 
Once he had contextualized his work within the broader field of experimental evolution, 
Jennings concluded that “the results of the analysis made by its aid indicate that most or 
all of the experiments in methodical selection have consisted in shifting about, isolating 
and recombining preexisting, permanent hereditary differentiations…”556 
Jennings emphasized again that the pure line work did not entail that selection 
was unimportant; instead, it was limited by the nature of variation and heredity, i.e., 
Jennings’ Problem, partially resolved by mutation. “What the pure line work shows is 
that the changes on which selection may act are few and far between, instead of 
abundant; that they are found not oftener than in one individual in ten thousand…; that a 
large share of the differences between individuals are not of significance for selection or 
evolution… Thus the work of natural selection is made infinitely more difficult and slow; 
but logically it is still possible.”557 
 
race,” consistent with the pure line and genotype ideas (and as promulgated by Shull and East). Jennings, 
141 
553 The irony of this conclusion is that Stoltzfus and Cable argue that what allowed Darwinism to revive 
under the Modern Synthesis was an emphasis on recombination as a source of small variation. 
554 Jennings, “Experimental Evidence on the Effectiveness of Selection,” 138, 141. He asked this as a 
rhetorical question; I changed it to a statement. 
555 Jennings, 136. 
556 Jennings, 143. 
557 Jennings, 144. In his conclusion, Jennings attacked the biometrical school, what was now a “small 
remnant (if there be such a remnant) of the biometrical school that still submits to the dictation of 
Pearson. …How quickly the biometricians that devote themselves to careful biological investigations fall 
away from the Pearsonian faith. Darbishire, Davenport, Tower, Shull, Johannsen, Pearl; are there any 
biologists of achievement that still hold with Pearson? … One of those sardonic paradoxes through which 
nature revenges herself, the men who from outside have lectured biology on the necessity of becoming 
exact are the strongest opponents of exact experimental and biological analysis. … Those who find the 
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Jennings specified the need for pedigrees and careful measurement to make 
evolution visible, mostly through statistical analysis. After all, “the work with genotypes 
brings out as never before the minuteness of the hereditary differences that separate the 
various lines.” For example, 
Johannsen found his genotypes of beans differing constantly merely by weights of two or 
three hundredths of a gram in the average weight of the seed. Genotypes of Paramecium I 
found to show constant hereditary differences of one two-hundredth of a millimeter in 
length. Hanel found the genotypes of Hydra to differ in the average number of tentacles 
merely by the fraction of a tentacle. That even smaller hereditary differences are not 
described is certainly due only to the impossibility of more accurate measurements; the 
observed differences go straight down to the limits set by the probable error of our 
measurements. 
 
Jennings later emphasized that the smallness of hereditary differences supported a 
Darwinian theory, but here it was used in service of a theory that challenged the power 
and creativity of selection. Despite not having witnessed the origin of a new pure line, 
Jennings concluded from the pure line work in general that 
Genotypes so differing have not risen from one another by large mutations. The 
genotypic work lends no support to the idea that evolution occurs by large steps, for it 
reveals a continuous series of the minutest differences between great numbers of existing 
races.558 
 
Contrary to the general depiction of mutationists, Mendelians, or pure line theorists, one 
of their more generalizable conclusions was the minuteness of inherited variation. These 
differences were revealed by statistical analysis of large populations, and over time, 
selection, whether natural or artificial, was able to slowly isolate them. Jennings was 
open to the possibility that selection could be shown to be effective within a pure line or 
genotype, to ‘break” it, but setting a new standard, “the demonstrators will need to show 
precisely the relation of their results to the pure line concept.”559 
 
genotype idea useful may then prepare themselves for one of those justly famous bludgeonings from the 
dictator of the whilom orthodox biometrical school; this is the last honorable mark of distinction which 
stamps the investigator as a thorough and exact analyst of things biological.” Jennings, 143. See Kim, 1994 
for more. 
558 Jennings, “Experimental Evidence on the Effectiveness of Selection,” 144–45. 
559 Jennings, 145. 
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Once again, it was not that Jennings desired to find selection ineffective; indeed, 
the results were puzzling (Jennings’ Problem). His conclusion that selection “had 
produced nothing new” meant that his long-term experiment had also shown “no progress 
that would form a step, however slight, in the journey from Amoeba to man.” Yet this 
contradicted what was “demanded” of natural selection: what evolution required was 
precisely the power to “produce progress from Amoeba up to man.” Evolution must 
somehow “produce, from a given condition, something that did not before exist in that 
given condition.”560 Beyond mutations which he himself had not witnessed in his work, 
Jennings had no answer. When combined with Shull’s practical work focusing on 
processes unlikely to occur in nature (frozen inbred lines hybridized continually), the 
experimental study of evolution had rendered it apparently historical improbable. The 
major exception was Castle’s systems of hooded rats and polydactylous guinea pigs, but a 
contingent of his colleagues now thought there were serious methodological problems 
with his work. 
The following year, Jennings spoke again before the American Society of 
Naturalists on pure lines and genotypes in Paramecia, in which he asserted their “actual 
existence” as “concrete realities” due to “facts that strike you in the face.”561 He had even 
witnessed selection occur between them. He considered pure lines to be “different 
method[s] of responding to the environment,” particularly in their rates of multiplication 
and conjugation (and had been able to distinguish this from their dependency on 
environmental conditions). These differences produced  
striking cases of natural selection between genotypes. … If we place together in the same 
culture two genotypes of Paramecium, as I have many times done, almost invariably one 
flourishes while the other dies out. This ruins many a carefully planned experiment; it 
must take place on a tremendous scale in nature.562 
 
560 Jennings, 136–7. This was not an entirely new worry or critique of Darwinian evolution. It is to some 
degree a rehashing of the canard that goes “what use is half an eye?” that Darwin countered in the Origin. 
But importantly Jennings was now discussing small changes such as mutations in body size in 
Paramecium. Furthermore, Jennings was not discussing so much adaptive value, but whether a given 
hereditary change was large enough to not be masked by fluctuations. This worry was perhaps resolved by 
theoretical population genetics, such as Norton’s table in Punnett’s Mimicry in Butterflies, discussed by 
Stoltzfus and Cable, “Mendelian-Mutationism: The Forgotten Synthesis,” 525 and Provine, The Origins of 
Theoretical Population Genetics, 137-139. 
561 Jennings, “Pure Lines in the Study of Genetics in Lower Organisms,” The American Naturalist 45 
(1911): 79–89. 




Thus, Jennings saw an additional virtue of his experimental organism as not needing to 
account for the artifice of laboratory experimentation, instead it was “ruining” his work. 
He did not witness artificial selection, but “natural selection between genotypes.”  
Therefore, Jennings could now report “with pleasure” that “wild populations … 
include many genotypes” and the 
extensive operation of selection among the diverse existing lines, and particularly in this 
extensive production of new combinations at conjugation, with cancellation of many of 
the combinations. … Numbers of the strains produced die, or multiply so slowly that they 
have no chance in competition with those that are strong and multiply rapidly. Thus many 
of the combinations produced are canceled; only the strongest combinations survive. We 
have then on a most extensive scale an operation in natural selection and the survival of 
the fittest; the production of many combinations, some of which survive, while others 
fail.563 
 
Perhaps evolution was now the survival of the best genetic combinations. All that was 
needed for “evolutionary progress,” still, was to discover how “diverse genotypes must 
have arisen from one…”564 He thus lamented that while he had witnessed selection 
between types and combinations, he had not witnessed creative evolution: 
When operating on a single isolated type it appeared that the progressive action of 
selection had not been seen. … I hoped to accomplish this myself, but after strenuous, 
long-continued, and hopeful efforts, I have not yet succeeded in seeing selection effective 
in producing a new genotype. This failure to discover selection resulting in progress came 
to me as a painful surprise, for like Pearson I find it impossible to construct for myself a 
“philosophical scheme of evolution” without the results of selection and I would like to 
see what I believe must occur.565 
 
But, hopefully, the pure line work had cleared the theory of evolution of its confusion and 
had set the stage for detecting evolution in action (despite introducing some new 
problems): 
These are facts of capital importance to the experimenter; besides their theoretical 
significance, they open to each of us the opportunity to direct our efforts upon precisely 
 
563 Jennings, 87–88, 90. 
564 Jennings, 90. 
565 Jennings, 88. Emphasis original. 
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this point, and so perhaps to be the first to see examples of this fundamental process not 
yet seen.566 
 
In the end, Jennings “hoped” that “someone on our program, more fortunate than 
myself, will be able to record seeing the actual production of two genotypes from one, or 
the transformation of one into another, by selection, or in any way whatever.”567 
Ironically, it would be Jennings himself, concluding a new experiment in 1916, that 
would overturn both his belief in the pure line theory and his doubts concerning the 
frequency of inheritable variations and selection’s ability to act upon them. 
Conclusion 
This chapter shows that the experimental evolution that studied the intersection of 
pure line theory, mutation theory, Darwinism, and Mendelism was both lively and 
fruitful. In contrast to Robert Kohler’s pessimism regarding the results of early 
experimental evolution, his thesis applies only to experimental evolution in the field. 
Experimental evolution in the laboratory, at least this subset of it, generated results and 
fueled debate on pure lines, gametic purity/contamination, and especially selection, even 
if the theoretical understanding remained somewhat inconclusive. However, fundamental 
questions and preliminary answers had been outlined, resting on distinct theories of 
variation, heredity, and selection. Selection – the more controllable evolutionary process 
– was either creative and the key to the human control of evolution as a whole (Castle) or 
it was merely an isolating and eliminative dynamic that depended upon extant variation 
(pure lines) and mutations, in which extreme inbreeding was an even more effective tool 
at human disposal even if not operative in nature (Castle’s opponents). (This led in turn to 
the question of controlling mutation, emphasized by MacDougal, Davenport, Blakeslee, 
and later, Muller, as discussed by Kingsland, Campos, and Curry.) That is, in East’s 
words, whether selection “altered the type” or “reduced variability.” Although the next 
chapter will show that most geneticists considered Castle’s theories and experimental 
systems to be fatally flawed, his opposition played an essential role in driving the 
theoretical and practical elements of the science forward. 
By applying statistics, rearing organisms in controlled conditions, making 
 
566 Jennings, 88–89. 
567 Jennings, 89. 
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pedigrees, and subjecting populations to selection and inbreeding, these experimentalists 
had made moves to bring evolution under control, at least within their laboratories and 
fields. They could now quantify the (in)effectiveness of selection and ranges of variation, 
observe the arrival of a mutation (or not at all), and determine the degree to which a trait 
was inherited. They had combined Darwin’s experimental spirit with Mendel’s exactness, 
with the push to control descended from the breeders and encouraged by the institutional 
and social context of capitalism. 
Early geneticists are frequently referred to as “typological” thinkers, particularly 
in the view of evolutionary biologist turned historian/philosopher Ernst Mayr. While 
there is some truth to this claim, they were, I argue, in a transition between typological 
and populational thinking. Johannsen, East, Shull, and Jennings all emphasized that 
populations were made of types, hidden until revealed by experimental control. But they 
did not think of populations as an intermixed and recombining gene pools, at least not 
yet. That is, they apparently considered a biotype, or pure line, to be the basic ontological 
unit within their work, these lines then hybridizing with each other. Then again, the work 
on recombination, crossing over, and chromosomal mechanics in general, had not yet 
begun. They worked up from the pure line, rather than down from the population, based 
on the experimental evidence before them. Populational thinking arguably then rests on 
the developments that came out of the Morgan laboratory, and hence to denounce these 
experimental evolutionists as typological thinkers is anachronistic. To do so assumes that 
Darwin was right all along, and ignores that, as Stoltzfus and I argue, the Darwinism of 
the Modern Synthesis is not the Darwinism of Darwin. Rather, these experimental 
evolutionists took Darwin’s theory, tested it experimentally in light of the work of de 
Vries, Johannsen, and Mendel, and found it wanting. They then ironically produced a 
body of work that provided the foundation for a “restoration” of Darwinism during the 
Modern Synthesis, which will be developed further in the next chapter. 
One question their work raises though is whether the work was too artificial.568 
 
568 S. Andrew Inkpen has examined this debate over the division between the artificial and natural with 
respect to Darwin, Dobzhansky, and Jared Diamond in “Denaturing Nature: Philosophical and Historical 
Reflections on the Artificial-Natural Distinction in the Life Sciences,” PhD diss., (University of British 
Columbia, 2014) and “‘The Art Itself Is Nature’: Darwin, Domestic Varieties and the Scientific 




Jennings, not interested in breeding, avoided this issue, but East, Shull, and Castle 
arguably used methods that would not occur in nature: intensive inbreeding. (Think of 
how one of the conditions considered in Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium is the spectrum of 
random to assortative mating, of which inbreeding is an extreme form of the latter.) This 
is to some degree reflected in their comments on nature: Castle, as I will discuss, began 
his career in experimental evolution commenting frequently upon the implications for 
natural evolution, but once he took up a genetic Darwinism, stopped doing so altogether. 
Similarly, East and Shull questioned the validity of extrapolating their work into nature. 
East acknowledged that most experimentation still consisted of relatively few 
generations, but that worrying about the problem was impractical. Shull remarked that the 
extreme isolation he practiced likely did not occur in nature, but it also allowed for 
“perfect knowledge” of ancestry. One answer is that they simply did not care, and that the 
possibility to control evolution for practical purposes seemed so within grasp that for the 
moment, nature ceased to matter. This was amplified by many of these organisms being 
commodities whose yield (in capitalist society) became paramount, yield and profit 
acting as the proxies of the emerging notion of fitness. However, the Darwinian dialectic 
of artificial evolution being a form of evolution meant that it held theoretically productive 
power when carefully integrated with other scientific threads. 
Through this chapter, Castle, East, Shull, and Jennings developed their systems 
and theories in relative isolation. In the next chapter, debates over the validity of pure 
lines, the effectiveness of selection, the importance of mutations, and other evolutionary 
questions erupted. This debate will also draw in figures not yet discussed — Raymond 
Pearl, the Morgan lab, especially Sturtevant, Bridges, and H. J. Muller, as well as the 
European breeder-scientists, the Hagedoorns. It was in this period, 1911-1919, that 
selection and genetics was reworked into a theory resembling Darwin’s and met the 













Despite more than a decade of debate, exactly how to control genetic evolution 
remained hotly contested. Up to this point, Castle had promulgated his new theories of 
variation, heredity, and selection relatively free of criticism. Once he definitively 
published his heresies, combined with his rejection of pure line theory and the multiple 
factor hypothesis, Castle’s work was subjected to a steady stream of attacks by other 
scientists engaged in experimental evolution: Raymond Pearl, Hermann J. Muller, Alfred 
Sturtevant, Calvin Bridges, the Hagedoorns, and even his former student, E. C. 
MacDowell. Only Jennings became sympathetic, but it took his own experimental work 
to be convinced, and even then, he took a middle road. These criticisms ranged across 
methods, data, interpretations, and even presentation, but Castle’s views only hardened 
until his sudden concession in 1919. 
Through the 1910s, the subject of this chapter, experimental evolution began to 
merge with genetics. With East’s introduction of multiple factor theory, in addition to the 
Morgan laboratory’s interventions, Castle’s opponents integrated their theory of evolution 
with Mendelism and chromosomal mechanics. In contrast, Castle and Jennings 
downplayed the importance of chromosomal mechanics, relying more on the surficial or 
phenotypic effects of selection, a move their opponents rejected as violating core 
Mendelian principles. Yet Castle’s intransigence and Jennings’ conversion made 
selection’s creative power a notion their opponents had to contend with. Although they 
never used the term, they were forging a “synthesis” between Mendelism and natural 
selection. Castle may have played the role of the Darwinian, but it is the Mendelians who 
appear to be more “modern.” They denied the creativity of natural selection, but they still 
investigated its dynamic effects within genetic populations. 
This chapter follows the debate over selectionism, mutationism, and Mendelism 
from 1910 to 1920, its implications for controlling evolution, and its contributions to 
evolutionary science in general. It begins with East’s and Shull’s Mendelizing of 
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selection through the former’s articulation of the multiple factor theory, a way to explain 
continuous variation and blending inheritance through what is now called polygeny.  
Then I turn to Castle’s theory of creative selection as an explanation of his hooded rats 
experiment using John Beatty’s phrase of the “sliding scale.”569  I then address the 
debates that ensued between Castle and Muller, the Hagedoorns, and Raymond Pearl that 
bore on methods, results, and theory that interwove science and breeding. The next 
section covers Jennings’ work with Difflugia that convinced him to abandon the hardened 
pure line position for a more selectionist one. Following these debates, Castle, Jennings, 
and Pearl published in 1917 three papers that addressed the “selection problem” from a 
general vantage point. Here I use a set of correspondence between Jennings and Pearl to 
interrogate the subtleties of the “selection problem,” showing further that there was much 
more at play than merely Mendelians rejecting the effectiveness of selection. Lastly, the 
chapter discusses the Drosophilist intervention in which they demonstrated the existence 
of modifiers which in turn explained phenotypic responses to selection. This work, 
combined with an experiment with the hooded rats suggested to Castle by Sewall Wright, 
convinced Castle to concede the debate in 1919 with the implication that evolutionary 
control remained out of reach. 
  
East’s and Shull’s Mendelizing of Selection 
As Jennings, East, Shull, and others corroborated the pure line theory, they 
continued to develop and integrate it with Mendelism and breeding practices, shown by 
East’s 1910 landmark publication, “A Mendelian Interpretation of Variation That Is 
Apparently Continuous.” Usually depicted as a synthesis of Mendelism (discontinuous 
variation) and Darwinism (continuous variation), East did not interpret his own work in 
this way, as he revealed with an additional paper that year, “The Role of Selection in 
Plant Breeding.” Given the tendency to misconstrue some of the specifics of the period’s 
theoretical and experimental disputes, I will also show how East can easily be misread as 
a Darwinian. For both Shull and East, this period was one of further consolidation around 
the work of de Vries, Johannsen, and Mendel, as they extended their experimental work 
 
569 John Beatty, “The Creativity of Natural Selection? Part I: Darwin, Darwinism, and the Mutationists,” 
Journal of the History of Biology 49 (2016): 659-684. 
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to explain more of evolution, synthesizing genetics and selection.570 
East claimed that biology was recapitulating the history of chemistry, 
transforming from an analytic science into a synthetic science. Shull also elaborated on 
biology’s growing analytic power, writing that Darwin had “overthrow[n] the conception 
of permanency of specific types,” convincing scientists that “everything is in a state of 
flux.” However, Darwin’s “appeals” to the experiences of breeders meant many of his 
ideas “were the result of no such careful control of conditions or analysis of results as has 
been found necessary for the discovery of genetic laws.”  Analytical tools, such as 
pedigrees and pure lines, and conceptual distinctions, such as mutation/fluctuation and 
genotype/phenotype, moved the science forward, but further entrenched within 
evolutionary theory a tension between permanence and fluidity.571 This tension was the 
contradiction over which Jennings lamented and Castle rejected in favor of total 
fluidity.572 
Now was the time of “heredity as an exact science,” according to Shull, the “era 
of experimental evolution.” The initial steps — Jordan’s study of Draba verna, N. H. 
Nilsson’s breeding work, and de Vries’ synthesis of scientific and horticultural results — 
had culminated in the work of Johannsen.573 Johannsen had also combined the positive 
aspects of Weldonian biometry (important methods with improper biology) with 
Batesonian genetics (which unduly emphasized “alternative types”).574 East also pointed 
to Johannsen’s work, a “puzzle” that fit together pieces from de Vries, Galton, Pearson, 
Darwin, Weismann, de Vilmorin, and Le Couteur, “an explanation that should have been 
thought of before, but like many other important discoveries, it was too simple for 
ordinary minds to grasp.”575  
 
570 Edward East, “A Mendelian Interpretation of Variation That Is Apparently Continuous,” The American 
Naturalist 44 (1910): 65–82; East, “The Role of Selection in Plant Breeding,” Popular Science Monthly 77 
(1910). 
571 These conceptual distinctions provided the “order” that allowed for scientists to exert power and control 
evolution. George Shull, “The Genotypes of Maize,” The American Naturalist 45 (1911): 234. 236. This 
critique conforms to de Chadarevian’s arguments about Darwin and the professionalization of biology. 
572 Shull’s and East’s comments about flux and permanency are examples of “unconscious” dialectics. 
573 I mentioned Jordan’s study of Draba verna in Chapter 2; de Vries emphasized that Jordan had 
demarcated 200 “elementary species” within this Linnean species. 
574 George Shull, “Heredity as an Exact Science,” Botanical Gazette, 1910, 226. Shull emphasized that 
differences between biotypes could be incredibly minute. See also Shull, “The Genotypes of Maize,” 236–
37. 
575 East, “The Role of Selection in Plant Breeding,” Popular Science Monthly 77 (1910). Louis de Vilmorin 
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East and Shull praised how Johannsen’s work had practical implications for both 
evolution and plant breeding. East pointed to Johannsen’s populational perspective that 
emphasized a given crop as a mixture of genetic lines with heritable differences, as 
opposed to the ancestral lineage perspective of Galton and Pearson. Rather than 
explaining regression as the “pull toward mediocrity exerted by former ancestors,” 
Johannsen characterized regression as a result of not controlling for crosses between 
superior and mediocre individuals.576 Shull held the most important of Johannsen’s 
contributions to be demonstrating “the permanence of the elementary types,” an extension 
of de Vries’ work, and now conceptualized within the distinction of genotypes and 
phenotypes first articulated in 1911.577 He acknowledged that Johannsen, because of his 
new distinction, “dismisses all [evolutionary factors] which are not based upon” it, such 
as direct effects, Lamarckism, and even Weismannism. (Note, though, that these theories 
were falling away in general due to experimentation, including at the Station.) Thus, 
isolating a pure line, unaffected by permanent changes via environmental action or 
selection, from an initial mixed population, prevented regression and set the stage for the 
breeders’ control of evolution. 
For Shull and East, Johannsen’s theory facilitated the further control of evolution; 
the past had less influence over the present. However, Shull was disappointed that 
 
was an important French commercial plant breeder, whose wheat the Hagedoorns used in their argument 
against Castle (discussed below). John Le Couteur was a nineteenth-century British Army officer who took 
up an interest in breeding, but unfortunately East did not explain his influence upon the art and science of 
breeding. 
576 Johannsen interpreted the same phenomenon to be “mixture[s] consist[ing] of sub-races each with a 
heritable difference in the character size.” Thus, under the “German method of mass selection with poor 
control against mediocre pollen, the chances were overwhelmingly in favor of the selected type recrossing 
with the more commonly cultivated and poorer type from which it came.” East and Hayes integrated this 
view with Mendelism: If one crossed two strains of maize differing in height, a product of “many 
contributing factors,” the F2 generation showed greater variability following a normal curve due to a 
combination of fluctuations and recombination. “This condition of affairs tends toward the maintenance of 
a general mean in height, but this mean is false. It is false because the modal class which Galton and 
Quetelet took to be the type toward which the species is tending actually contains more heterozygous 
individuals and individuals heterozygous for more factors than any other. An individual selected from this 
class is less likely to breed true than one selected from the extremes. Cross-fertilization, therefore, may tend 
toward the production of a mean that gives falsely an appearance of fixity of type.” East and Hayes, 
Heterozygosis in Evolution and in Plant Breeding, vol. 243 (Washington, D. C.: Bureau of Plant Industry, 
1912), 45. 
577 In Shull’s words, genotypes were “collections of individuals having like germinal characters to 
distinguish them from mixtures of individuals having like external characters, but of unlike germinal 
composition [phenotype].” Shull, “Heredity as an Exact Science,” 227–28. 
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Johannsen “devote[d] relatively little attention” to the origin of biotypes.578 Shull 
suggested that new biotypes may arise from “changes in the characters of the genes or 
determiners, loss of genes, combinations of different genes through hybridization, etc.” 
But like Darwin, he was frustrated by the lack of causal knowledge, a lack which in turn 
curtailed controlling evolution. 
East himself provided a theoretical boon to Mendelism in 1910 through “multiple 
factor theory.”579 East forwarded and corroborated the work of Swedish botanist and 
geneticist Herman Nilsson-Ehle, in which “the curve of variation simulates the 
fluctuation curve, with the difference that the gradations are heritable.”580 In essence, East 
and Nilsson-Ehle independently showed that a continuous trait (such as size or color) 
could be considered “the concrete result of the inter-action of several cumulative units 
affecting the same character” (what is now called polygenism). The key was to raise 
enough offspring: if a trait were made of four units, only one of every 256 individuals 
would be purely recessive, “a larger number than is usually reported in genetic 
publications.” East demonstrated maize’s consistency with this principle through dihybrid 
combinations of dominant yellow and recessive white: if too few individuals were grown, 
the probable result was a mix of yellows, e.g., non-Mendelian, but in larger samples, 
whites appear in a ratio of 1 to every 15. The more factors and the more incomplete the 
dominance, the more mixed the blend, the more the trait approached continual gradation 
— a possible explanation of Castle’s hooded rats. The theory had explanatory power.581 
Usually presented as a synthesis of Mendelism with Darwinism or biometry, 
East’s comments indicate that it was simply an extension of Mendelism into cases 
normally considered outside its bounds. Expanding upon Johannsen’s reinterpretation of 
the genetics of populations, the new hypothesis eliminated the biometric modal “type,” 
“around which variants converge”; instead, the mode was likely heterozygous for several 
 
578 Shull, 228. 
579 Note that this theory was not wholly new: Bateson and Saunders, for example, had proposed this scheme 
in their first genetics publication. See Stoltzfus and Cable, “Mendelian-Mutationism: The Forgotten 
Evolutionary Synthesis.” Castle ironically had also picked this up, albeit briefly. 
580 East, “A Mendelian Interpretation of Variation That Is Apparently Continuous,” 73. East reiterated that 
“fluctuation” referred to “somatic changes due to immediate environment, and which are not inherited.” 
581 East, 72, 75, 81. Emphasis original. East noted one possible exception, but “this is only an hypothesis, 
and while I have faith in its foundation facts, the details may need to change.” East, 81. Soon East 
expressed more confidence, in East, “The Role of Hybridization in Plant Breeding,” Popular Science 
Monthly 77 (1910), and East and Hayes, Heterozygosis in Evolution and in Plant Breeding: 34–35. 
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units that would break apart due to segregation.582 The reliance on biotypes in Shull’s 
“Composition of a Field of Maize” had given way to a view more akin to gene pools. 
East immediately realized the negative implications this theory had for Castle’s 
work: that characters could be the result of multiple factors entailed that “the term unit-
character [had] less of an irrevocably-fixed-entity conception.” Castle’s single 
quantitatively-varying factor might instead be several independent units, mostly 
undetectable with small population sizes. East asked, “can it be said that anything has 
heretofore been known concerning the actual gametic status of [the] parents…?”583 The 
multiple factor theory further cemented the methodological need to know the initial 
conditions of a population’s genetics. 
In a prescient passage, East thought that the multiple factor theory even gave “a 
rational basis for the origin of new characters, which has hitherto been somewhat of a 
Mendelian stumbling-block.” For example, East considered “biological isomerism,” in 
which multiple “Mendelian unit forms” contributed to the same character but were not 
allelomorphs, perhaps differentiating in the past and now becoming dihybrid when 
hybridized. Or, “several of these quantitative units which produce the same character may 
become attached like a chemical radical and again behave as a single pair.” In any case, 
East concluded that the hypothesis would “add another link to the increasing chain of 
evidence that the word mutation may properly be applied to any inherited variation, 
however small…”584 
East again reevaluated the Illinois corn experiment, now in light of the multiple 
factor theory, illustrating the subtle theoretical differences that had emerged among 
experimental evolutionists. The experiment had begun in 1896 “with a hazy Darwinian 
idea that as corn was known to vary in composition, continuous selection of extreme 
variations would produce a continuous change in type.” Success in increasing or reducing 
oil and protein content “clearly show[ed] the rapidity with which results can be obtained 
by this method of selection…” Indeed, “selection ha[d] been the main cause of 
improvement” of the United States’ “agricultural wealth.” From this, one may conclude 
 
582 East, “A Mendelian Interpretation of Variation That Is Apparently Continuous,” 80. 
583 East, 81-82. 
584 East, “A Mendelian Interpretation of Variation That Is Apparently Continuous,” 82. 
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that East was Darwinian. However, by “selection,” East meant “the isolation of superior 
strains” via “detection [and] a sufficient increase for commercial use.” East’s counter-
interpretation of the Illinois corn experiment was now as follows. 
The published records showed that the variability of the strain was but little, if any, 
reduced by continuous selection. With extreme variants comparatively as far removed 
from each year's type, available for planting in each successive generation, the gain each 
year should have been at the same rate, if the Darwinian interpretation of the role of 
selection were correct. On the contrary, we notice that the regular curve fitted to the crop 
averages for ten generations, is first concave showing great progress made by selection, is 
later convex as progress becomes slower, and last becomes horizontal as no more 
progress results. It is very evident that the original stock was a mixed race containing 
sub-races of various composition intermingled by hybridization. Selection rapidly 
isolated these sub-races. The isolation was practically complete at the eighth generation 
in the case of the protein strains and the ninth generation in the oil strains. After this 
selection accomplished nothing. That the effect of selection was simply the isolation of a 
sub-race and not a continuous response, is further demonstrated by the fact that in 1903 
another plot was started with seed from the isolated high oil strain. After four years' 
cessation of selection, the average composition of the crop remained the same, showing 
that after complete isolation of a homogeneous type no retrogression of the selected 
character occurs unless intercrossing with mediocre strains takes place. Fluctuation in 
composition still appears, but this is the non-inherited kind produced by external 
conditions.585 
 
Selection’s effect was to isolate, not create. Selecting fluctuations led to no permanent 
change; instead, mutations served as “the basis of selection. They are constant from the 
beginning and remain so unless changed by a second variation…” Still of unknown 
frequency, he suggested that mutation size is “controlled” by the “mathematical law of 
error,” in that small mutations were likely far more frequent than large ones.586 What this 
meant for the agent of selection was that they had to wait for mutation. He wrote, 
the whole aim and action of selection is to detect the desired heritable variants among the 
useful commercial plants and through them to isolate a race with the desired characters. 
 
585 East, “The Role of Selection in Plant Breeding.”  
586 East continued to adopt de Vries’ distinction between progressive and retrogressive variation, but now 
considered degressive to be unnecessary, now explained as latency. He suggested that “the relative value of 
progressive and retrogressive variations is difficult to estimate. In organic evolution the former must have 
been far more valuable; commercially the latter are often of great worth.” Ibid. 
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When this is accomplished, selection can then do nothing until nature steps in and 
produces another desirable variation. In other words, the results of selection are not 
continuous. Selection does not gradually perfect a character. The production of heritable 
variations is intermittent and the intermissions may be long.587 
 
But he also remarked on how selection could appear to make continuous 
progress:  
 
If the practical results seem to be parts of a continuous process, it is because of the 
imperfect methods at hand to isolate the desirable variations from their combinations with 
undesirable characters formed by natural hybridization [heterozygosity].588 
 
This view of mutation and selection was an early articulation of a “lucky mutant” point of 
view and also accounted for genetic heterozygosity as a complicating factor. Shull also 
reinterpreted the work in Illinois on maize in non-Darwinian terms. Begun long before 
the articulation of Shull’s and East’s new explanations, the Illinois work could not have 
consciously accounted for them in their experimental designs: 
[That] the fact that yield and perhaps many other qualities attain their highest 
development in the case of complex hybrids naturally leads to the unconscious selection 
of heterozygous plants for the next year's cultures, and the continual breaking up of these 
complex hybrids in subsequent generations gives a result which closely resembles 
fluctuating variation, but which is fundamentally different from it. The genuineness of the 
gains made by selection in corn might naturally lead to the conclusion that fluctuations 
are inherited were it not for the abundant evidence now available showing that a 
considerable portion of the variation presented is not fluctuational, but is due to the 
presence of a mixture of different types which any selection partially segregates.589 
 
Thus, Shull had worked out how the accumulative selection of fluctuations was illusory 
and could provide a coherent account of how it worked genetically through hybridization 
and heterozygous combinations. Summarizing his own work on the benefits of inbreeding 
in maize improvement, Shull referred to the self-fertilized stocks as “genotypically 
distinct,” selection showing them to have “different centers” around which they varied 
 
587 Ibid. Emphasis mine. 
588 Ibid. 
589 Shull, “The Genotypes of Maize,” 252. 
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(such as in number of rows). As the breeder selected or isolated, strains “approach[ed] 
purity as a limit,” explained as the “distinct genotypes of maize … gradually 
segregat[ing] from their hybrid combinations.”590 Thus, East and Shull did not so much 
as reject the appearance of how selection, heredity, and variation interacted, but 
redeveloped their underlying mechanics.  
Given that early Mendelians are frequently labeled as “typological” thinkers, it is 
unfortunate that Shull and East were ambiguous about the ontology of hybrids and pure 
lines. Did genotypes pre-exist in their hybrid combination or was it merely their origin? 
For example, Shull envisioned a “similar demonstration that populations of cross-
breeding plants and animals are composed of fundamentally distinct types, intermingled 
but not changed by panmixia, and capable of being separated by appropriate means and 
of being shown to possess the discreteness, uniformity and permanence already 
demonstrated for the genotypes of self-fertilized and clonal races…” Under two 
interpretations, Shull meant that hybrids themselves were composed of “fundamentally 
distinct” pure lines or that a field of maize was a mosaic of pure lines. In the same paper, 
however, Shull writes that “self-fertilized families” are “derived originally from a 
common stock.”591 The question at hand is: Were stable genotypes present within fields 
of maize or were genotypes artificial creations of the breeder? Whichever is the case, and 
taking note these publications predate robust theories of recombination, East and Shull 
show that geneticists were not uniformly “typological” thinkers, but could not yet grasp 
the “populational” outlook in its entirety, hence I argue that East and Shull took part in 
the transition from one to the other.592 
Shull and East now labeled the phenomenon they had studied for several years as 
“heterozygosis,” fully integrating Mendelism with the pure line theory and the notion of 
“hybrid vigor.” According to Shull, “the degree of vigor is correlated with the degree of 
 
590 Shull, 239–41, 246. Shull presented the evidence that vigor and inbreeding are separable phenomena: 
Breeding together two individuals within the same self-bred stock caused no change (because no new 
hereditary elements were introduced). The F1 of a cross between two self-fertilized lines produced the most 
vigor because of high heterozygosity. “Crosses between sibs among the first-generation hybrids between 
two genotypes will yield progenies having the same characteristics, the same vigor, and the same degree of 
heterogeneity” as self-fertilizations of those sibs (i.e., a repetition of the first point). 
591 Shull, 246, 238, 240. 
592 See footnote 94 in Chapter 4 for evidence that Shull thought of biotypes and pure lines as originating by 
mutation but remaining distinct even within Mendelian hybrids, re-emerging in full in the F2 generation. 
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heterozygosis.”593 Maize was a “collection of complex hybrids,” heterozygous for many 
characters. The “sole function of selection” was to separate homozygous strains from 
each other.594 In addition, “the effects of inbreeding are not to accumulate ill effects, but 
to isolate homozygous strains,” both “good” and “poor.” In practice, “complete 
homozygosis is approached as a variable approaching a limit” and was “difficult to 
obtain.” It also meant that selection and inbreeding were two forms of the same process 
of reducing heterozygosity: “From this illustration we think it is a fairly easy to see that 
no matter in how many characters a plant is heterozygous, continued inbreeding will 
sooner or later eliminate them. Close selection, of course, tends toward the same end, but 
not with the rapidity or certainty of self-fertilization.”595 When homozygous strains were 
crossed, the next generation showed hybrid vigor or a “developmental stimulus” 
(heterozygosis). Decreasing vigor from the inbreeding of crossed species and increasing 
vigor from the crossing of self-fertilized species “are manifestations of one phenomenon. 
This phenomenon is heterozygosis.”596  
The scientific upshot of the maize work on pure lines, genotypes, and 
heterozygosis, according to Shull, was that a “cross-bred plant like Indian corn 
harmonizes in its fundamental nature with such normally self-fertilized material as beans, 
wheat and other grains, and such clonal varieties as potatoes, paramecium, etc.” That is, 
the gametes “of even the most complex hybrids present a limited number of different 
types which can be assorted into homozygous combinations, and that, therefore, the 
progressive change resulting from continued selection may be simply explained as the 
gradual segregation of homozygous types or of the most efficient heterozygous 
combinations.”597 This was Shull’s “peculiar tool” of pedigree keeping providing “perfect 
knowledge” of ancestry put to work: knowledge provided the capacity to wield selection 
and hybridization effectively. 
East did not limit this combination of experiment and theory to only breeding 
 
593 Shull, “The Genotypes of Maize,” 246. 
594 East and Hayes, Heterozygosis in Evolution and in Plant Breeding, 243:38. 
595 East and Hayes, 16, 21. East and Hayes were unsure of how useful inbreeding would be in in general, 
pointing to effort, cost, price, and biology as determining the method’s value (pp. 47–48). 
596 East and Hayes, 32. Another formulation: “Crossing produces heterozygosis in all characters by which 
the parent plants differ. Inbreeding tends to produce homozygosis automatically.” 
597 Shull, “The Genotypes of Maize,” 252. 
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practices, again returning to a dissolution of distinctions between artificial and natural 
scenarios. He rejected the claim from biologists that successfully self- or close-fertilizing 
species were physiologically unique from those that cross-fertilized, a bias resulting from 
“the experimental breeder” witnessing the origin of and allowing degenerate strains. 
Cross-fertilized species, in fact, “produce strains poor in natural vigor, degenerate strains, 
and they are kept from sight.” Indeed, degenerate domesticated strains 
survive the scythe of natural selection; they are selected for propagation by man because 
they are crossed with other strains and are vigorous through heterozygosity. Inbreeding 
tears aside their mask. They must then stand or fall on their own merits. Those strains 
with a high amount of natural vigor, due to gametic constitution, lose the added vigor due 
to a heterozygous condition, but are still good strains, ready to stand up forever under 
constant inbreeding. The poor strains that have had the help of hybridization with good 
strains, combined with the added vigor due to heterozygosity, are stripped of all pretense, 
shown in all their weakness, and inbreeding is given as the cause for their degeneracy. At 
least inbreeding has until recently been given as the cause, but it is hoped that the newer 
interpretation will now be accepted as logically interpreting all the facts.598 
 
East and Hayes claimed that this theory of evolution and breeding extended to 
animals, writing that it was “speculative evolutionary philosophy” to declare sexual 
reproduction a “protoplasmic necessity.”599  First-generation sterile hybrids seemed 
especially vigorous, although it was possible this was due to the elimination of the sexual 
organs (a trade-off). More importantly, while it was commonly believed that nature 
abhorred incest, “the greatest breeds of horses, cattle, swine, and sheep have been 
developed by in-and-in breeding.” In his early experiments with Drosophila, Castle had 
shown inbreeding functioned as it did in plants — it isolated homozygous strains without 
necessarily degenerating them. Thus, East and Hayes expanded their interpretations 
 
598 East and Hayes, Heterozygosis in Evolution and in Plant Breeding, 38. 
599 They concluded that sexual reproduction is “not the cause of variation” and “presumably never increases 
variation.” Its role, instead, was to “permit recombination of the gametic factors of the parents, and this has 
no doubt been of great service in evolution.” For example, “if a rigid competition is allowed, new and 
better combinations of characters would replace the old.” East and Hayes, 44. Their conclusion was that 
sexual reproduction, or cross-fertilization, were byproducts of heterozygosis. They suggested that cross-
fertilization may not be ultimately advantageous; that is, cross-fertilization allowed for “the survival of 
weak strains in combination.” Therefore, cross-fertilization and self-fertilized species were not necessarily 
weaker or stronger than the other. East and Hayes, 45. 
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beyond crops to animals and nature.600 
Still, East emphasized how much work remained. “When one speaks of producing 
new plants, … he should not be misunderstood. Man has not yet actually produced new 
variations (although the time may come when even this is possible); he simply works 
with the variations which have occurred through natural causes of which little is known.” 
In hopes of creating mutations, East was excitement for MacDougal’s (CIW-funded) 
injection work. He reasoned that the method was worth pursuing because “progressive 
variation occurs but rarely in nature,” so “one ought then to expect to increase this 
proportion only if he can multiply artificially the effectiveness of nature’s causes.”601 He 
reported negative results in his own attempt to turn a yellow tomato red, but as with 
MacDougal’s work, East emphasized that well-done experiments that gave negative 
results to control evolution were still worth reporting. 
But it was this point around 1912 that East and Shull concluded their engagement 
in debates in experimental evolution. Their development of pure line theory, its 
incorporation into genetics through homo- and heterozygosity, and East’s co-articulation 
of multiple factors were essential contributions to the science of evolution.602 Although 
 
600 East and Hayes, Heterozygosis in Evolution and in Plant Breeding, 38, 40. 
601 East, “Notes on an Experiment Concerning the Nature of Unit Characters,” Science 32 (1910): 93–94. 
He proposed injecting plant embryos with enzymes from different species. He also discussed MacDougal in 
Report of the Connecticut Agricultural Experiment Station for the Years 1907-1908 (Hartford: State of 
Connecticut, 1908), 433. Shull made similar remarks about MacDougal in 1907. 
602 One article worth remarking upon however is East and Hayes, “A Genetic Analysis of the Changes 
Produced by Selection in Experiments with Tobacco,” American Naturalist 48 (1914): 5-48. In cooperation 
with the Connecticut Agricultural Experiment Station and the Bureau of Plant Industry, they sought to 
extend the pure line work to the crossbreeding crop, tobacco. They intended to show that genetic responses 
to selection, contrary to Castle, should be “interpreted entirely by the segregation and recombination of 
hypothetical gametic factors which are constant in their reactions under identical conditions.” 
Simultaneously, the work also shows the tension between understanding evolution in the wild versus 
evolution in a crop field. Their experiment crossed two tobacco varieties that differed in leaf number and 
selecting the extremes in both directions. (By doing so, they showed that a specific and profitable tobacco 
strain named “Halladay” was a reproducible hybrid between “Havana” and “Sumatra,” not a mutation.) 
After selfing 100 Halladay individuals, they selected for higher or lower leaf numbers in the 100 families 
with population sizes in the several hundreds. They found that consistent with the Mendelian-mutationist 
argument, the 100 families differed in how they responded to selection in terms of final leaf count and how 
long it took to reach that point. They thus demonstrated the genetic variation within their populations of 
tobacco and selection’s limitation to what was available. They also figured that while selection could 
“always cause a shift in the mean … it will necessarily be … so slight that it can be detected only by long-
continued experiment and enormous numbers”: perhaps relevant for evolution in the wild, but not so much 
for “experimental genetics.”  East and Hayes concluded that “important economic results can be obtained 
easily and surely by selection” by “the isolation of homozygous strains from mixtures that are either 
mechanical or physiological, that are either made artificially or are found in nature.” They also notably 
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they no longer personally participated in the ensuing debates, Castle’s opponents adopted 
their work enthusiastically and transformed them into the orthodox view. Castle himself 
rejected the universality of their ideas, if not totally, partially due to the implications for 
control. For what Shull had said in 1907 seemed to remain to be the case: “we seem to be 
at present entirely at the mercy of nature” but perhaps “ready to take advantage of and 
preserve every advance she makes.” But it was this view that Castle could not abide.603 
Castle's Theory of Selection as a Sliding Scale 
 
In 1911, Castle reiterated his goals of controlling evolution. In a lecture, he said, 
The evolutionary idea has forced man to consider the probable future of his own race on 
earth and to take measures to control that future, a matter he had previously left largely to 
fate. With a realization of the fact that organisms change from age to age and that he 
himself is one of these changing organisms, man has attained not only a new ground for 
humility of spirit but also a new ground for optimism and for belief in his own supreme 
importance, since the forces which control his destiny have been placed largely in his 
own hands.604 
For these lectures, however, Castle was not so much interested in the destiny of human 
evolution, but in controlling the evolutionary improvement of livestock. Believing that 
civilization and its future progress rested upon the cultivation of domesticated plants and 
animals, a scientific understanding of breeding was critical. According to Castle, the issue 
at hand remained how. 
… the production of new and improved breeds of animals and plants is historically a 
matter about which we know scarcely more than about the production of new species in 
nature. Selection has been undoubtedly the efficient cause of change in both cases, but 
how and why applied and to what sort of material is as uncertain in one case as in the 
other.605 
Castle continued to pit selectionism against mutationism within this context of 
 
challenged some tenets of de Vries’ mutation theory, an example of how the integration of Mendelism 
sublated (but did not entirely overthrow) mutationism. 
603 Shull, “Importance of the Mutation Theory in Practical Breeding,” Journal of Heredity 3 (1907): 65. 
604 Castle, Heredity in Relation to Evolution and Animal Breeding (D. Appleton, 1911), 1–2. These 
originated as lectures (one of which Sewall Wright attended), later published as a standalone book and the 
second as a chapter within a volume with contributions from East, Tower, and Davenport on evolutionary 
science’s latest findings. 
605 Castle, 3–4. 
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control. He described the latter as “the way in which Minerva was begotten.” Darwinian 
selection, on the other hand, was akin to “the ever-growing power of a hydraulic 
press.”606 Mutations were responsible for some changes, such as “the great color variation 
of domesticated animals” resulting from the “accidental loss of simple unit-
characters.”607 But, as with Minerva’s birth, these mutations remained outside of human 
control, and lacked creative power, whereas selection was not only under direct human 
control, but became more powerful as it accumulated variations (the “hydraulic press”).  
Castle contrasted his own work with that of de Vries, Johannsen, and Jennings, 
critical of both mutationism and pure line theory. Castle worried that through the 
“brilliancy of Mutation theory,” de Vries “has somewhat dazzled our eyes” regarding the 
“efficacy of selection.”608 Castle compromised, saying selection was slower to work 
within a pure line than in a “mixed race,” but asked, “we know the effects should be less, 
but are they nil?”609 It was the pure line workers’ absolutism with which Castle took 
umbrage. 
Castle also rejected East’s multiple factor theory, remarking that selection would 
then become “dependent upon the inheritance of unchanging units,” increasing or 
decreasing the proportions of two or three characters “until a pure race was obtained.”610 
He claimed his study of hooded rats had shown instead that “these quantitative variations 
behave as simple units, not as multiple ones … The only logical escape from this 
dilemma for one devoted beyond recall to a pure-line hypothesis will be to assume further 
that the assumed multiple units are all coupled … so that in cell-division they behave as 
one unit.”611 Moreover, a collection of unchanging units, according to Mendelian theory, 
would require breeders to carry out crosses with an immense number of offspring in order 
 
606 Castle, “The Method of Evolution,” in Heredity and Eugenics (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1912), 39–40. 
607 For example, the wild house mouse by simple loss of three independent factors has given rise to seven 
additional varieties known among fancy mice.” Castle, 52–53. (A “unit-character” was a trait that 
segregated.) 
608 He once again cited de Vries’ buttercup experiments as corroborating his own. De Vries had concluded 
that increased petals was a Mendelian unit-character produced by mutation and that after five generations, 
selection’s ability to increase petals had been exhausted; however, Castle argued that there should have 
been no further increases following two generations if Mendelism fully explained the results. Castle, 
Heredity in Relation to Evolution and Animal Breeding, 107–11. 
609 Ibid., 117. 
610 Castle, “The Method of Evolution,” 55–56. Emphasis mine. 
611 Castle, “The Inconstancy of Unit-Characters,” The American Naturalist, 1912, 359. 
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to produce all possible genetic combinations.612 A theory of a single quantitatively 
varying factor subject to selection was simpler to put into practice. 
To counter the pure line and multiple factor theories, Castle reiterated his own 
theory of creative selection and gametic contamination along with the introduction of 
“potency,” now “of prime importance in evolution.”. Castle developed the concept from 
his polydactylous guinea pigs, whose extra digit’s relative potency, or perfection, varied 
and was inherited among individuals in non-Mendelian proportions. While he 
acknowledged that the extra digit, and potency in general, could be explained by “several 
independent factors,” he considered it improbable (but testable).613 Instead, “this 
manifestation of the character, though feeble, was sufficient to afford a guide for selection 
of those individuals which formed the most potent gametes, and so a polydactylous race 
was formed by selection and inbreeding.”614 Selection now also accounted for the role 
that Castle previously gave to mutation. 
Castle elaborated upon how his hooded rats demonstrated the creativity of natural 
selection, introducing an important theory about its action (or inaction) on variability:   
The amount of variability of the offspring is not materially affected by the selection, but 
the average about which variations occurs is steadily changed, as are also the limits of the 
range of variation. The interesting feature of this experiment is the production, as a result 
of selection, of wholly new grades [in both directions]. … By selection we have 
practically obliterated the gap which originally separated these types… Regression grows 
less with each successive selection and ultimately should vanish, if the story told by these 
statistics is to be trusted. As yet there is no indication that a limit to the effects of 
selection has been reached.615 
Castle argued that selection, moving the mean of a trait in one direction, facilitated new 
 
612 Breeding tests could ensure purity, but the exertion required made it less practical than simply 
eliminating the homozygous recessives across generations. Castle, Heredity in Relation to Evolution and 
Animal Breeding, 47. 
613 Ibid., 100–101. He still followed Mendelian thought here in that he considered potency a property of a 
unit character, not of a gamete or individual (apparently in contrast to the breeders). Alfred Sturtevant later 
remarked that Castle never tested it; therefore, the polydactylous guinea pigs could not be considered 
evidence in favor of gametic contamination (discussed below). 
614 Castle, 104. Castle used nearly identical language in “The Method of Evolution.” To bolster the concept 
of potency, Castle cited the work of Richard Woltereck on parthenogenetic (pure line) water fleas 
(Hyalodaphnia). According to Castle, Woltereck’s selections had “served to augment both the degree of 
development of an organ [a rudimentary eye made of pigmented cells] and the frequency of its occurrence 
within that race (Castle, Heredity in Relation to Evolution and Animal Breeding, 97–98.) 
615 Castle, “The Method of Evolution,” 60–61. 
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variations farther along the spectrum, rather than reducing variability. Thus, Mendelism, 
while a “great contribution,” did not supply the whole foundation of evolutionary 
control.616  Although Castle never used this term, Morgan later designated this theory the 
“sliding scale,” a term I adopt for clarity. In his words, selection, under Castle’s 
interpretation, “could slide successive generations along in the direction of selection.”617  
 
Figure 6: From Castle and Phillips, Piebald Rats and Selection (1914), Plate 1. 
 
Therefore, through the sliding scale, selection was the agency responsible for these 
visible changes witnessed in real-time, not 
random mutations. Indeed, despite the 
protests of pure line workers, who believed 
“selection can do nothing but sort out 
variations already existing in a race,” Castle 
asserted “there are strong reasons for 
believing that mendelizing [sic] characters 
can be modified by selection.” While 
mutations did occur, “more frequent and 
more important, probably, are slight, scarcely 
noticeable modifications of unit-characters 
that afford a basis for a slower alteration of 
the race by selection,” interpreted as “slight 
differences in the potentiality of gametes 
representing the same unit-character 
combinations.” Therefore, Castle “prefer[red] 
to think with Darwin … that [selection] can 
 
616 Castle, Heredity in Relation to Evolution and Animal Breeding, 104–5. This can also be seen in how 
Castle subordinated Mendelism to potency: Castle found that the starker the difference between the 
dominant and recessive traits, the more Mendelian it behaved in crosses. He concluded that the degree of 
difference depended upon the relative potency of the two characters, conditional upon the environment (pp. 
97-98). 
617 Thomas Hunt Morgan, A Critique of the Theory of Evolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1916), 153–55. See John Beatty, “The Creativity of Natural Selection?”, 672. 
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heap up quantitative variations until they reach a sum total otherwise unattainable, and 
that it thus becomes creative.”618 
  Castle had continued his long-term experiments, raising and grading 25,000 rats 
over 13 generations by 1914, the results further confirming his theoretical interpretations. 
(See Figure 6.) Working with student John C. Phillips, he continued their plus and minus 
selection experiments on pigmentation, alongside reverse experiments and crosses.619 In 
the five generations since his 1911 book, selection respectively widened and narrowed 
the stripes of the plus and minus series.620  Variability had decreased, but on account of 
large generation sizes allowing for “more rigid selection.” Regression toward the mean 
persisted, but decreased in magnitude as the means increased.621 Hence, selection was a 
sliding scale. 
Castle’s sliding scale theory could also account for mutations. When he 
discovered two possible mutants in the plus series, he suggested that it “seems to us quite 
improbable that the plus mutation could have arisen in the minus selection series.” 
Rather, “we believe that the repeated selection which was practised had something to do 
with inducing this change in the plus direction.” According to Castle, the Mendelians 
were wrong: mutations were under the ultimate direction of selection, not the other way 
around. 
Having demonstrated that one can increase and decrease pigmentation “at will” in 
a single direction, it remained open whether such changes were permanent and whether 
selection’s accumulation could be reversed. Castle and Phillips found that during return 
selections, the direction of regression itself reversed, away from zero, “toward the mode 
established by selection,” producing new centers of variation. These results confirmed 
that selection was “immediately effective” and “has cumulative and permanent effects.”622  
Although Castle admitted that multiple factor theory made sense of some results, 
 
618 Castle, “The Method of Evolution,” 56, 61. In the 1911 publication, but not in the 1912 version, Castle 
also included in his conclusion that: “It is possible to ascribe such differences to little units additional to the 
recognized larger ones, but if such little units exist, they are indeed very little as well as numerous, and by 
adding to the effect of the larger ones they produce what amounts to modification of them” (pp. 126-127). 
619 Castle and John C. Phillips, Piebald Rats and Selection: An Experimental Test of the Effectiveness of 
Selection and of the Theory of Gametic Purity in Mendelian Crosses (CIW, vol. 195, 1914). 
620 Castle and Phillips, 195:37, 43. 
621 Contrary to the pure line theory, which held that regression should be complete. 
622 Castle and Phillips, 14–15, 16, 22. 
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he rejected it in favor of selection’s creativity. The theory was consistent with increased 
variability in the generation following a cross (maximum heterozygosity) as well as 
selection decreasing that variability over time (reduction of heterozygosity). But with the 
total loss of variability being minimal, Castle believed the endpoints — all black and all 
white rats — remained within selection’s reach. He also did not think the theory would 
alter selection in practice. If modifiers were to spontaneously appear, “selection can use 
these to modify the pattern … [and] we must admit that selection is an agency of real 
creative power.” It was the force that could “secure at will” change in any direction.623 
 
Castle’s Battle with the Pure Line Work and Multiple Factor Theory 
 
At this point, extensive debates erupted among the experimental evolutionists on 
numerous argumentative fronts against Castle. I first address the disputes between Castle 
with H. J. Muller and the Hagedoorns that revolved around the “fundamentality” of pure 
lines, both methodologically and theoretically, as well as selection. I then turn to his 
debate with Raymond Pearl which offers an interesting look at the notion of populations 
at the time. Despite the full-out attack, Castle remained steadfast in his views. 
Castle rejected the pure line theory as non-scientific. He even compared the pure 
line workers to geometers, as opposed to those rooted in practice such as breeders and 
draftsmen: 
The biologist’s “pure line” is an imaginary thing. I doubt very much whether it was ever 
realized in any actual race of animals or plants. It has no more relation to actual animals 
and plants than a mathematical circle has to the circles described by the most 
accomplished draftsman. All the circles of the draftsman have wiggles in them, if you 
look at them carefully enough; only the mathematician’s imaginary circle is perfect. Now 
the biologist undertakes to be the mathematician of breeding and to construct an “exact” 
system of heredity in which the “pure line” concepts holds a conspicuous place.624 
 
623 Ibid., 23–26. 
624 Castle, “Pure Lines and Selection,” 93. “Exact” is a reference to Johannsen’s book. Castle’s accusation 
of idealism ironically ignores the dialectical interplay of mathematical theory and practice. Marga Vicedo 
has also analyzed the Castle’s debate (specifically with East) and highlights that rhetoric around 
realism/idealism and complexity/ simplicity was mostly to score argumentative points, rather than 
substantial critiques, in “Realism and Simplicity in the Castle-East Debate on the Stability of the Hereditary 
Units: Rhetorical Devices versus Substantive Methodology.” Studies in the History and Philosophy of 
Science 22 (1991): 201-221. 
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Like geometry, Castle argued the pure line theory was deduced from two assumptions: 
that “the effects of the environment are not inherited” and “inherited characteristics 
[specifically, “factors”] do not vary.” Castle agreed that experimental evidence, including 
his own work on ovary transplantation, confirmed the first, rejecting neo-Lamarckism. 
He attacked the second, however, using his own experimental cases while questioning 
those of his opponents. He argued that constancy should be attributed to traits, not to their 
“ultimate factors of inheritance,” and assuming such was to treat genetic factors like the 
imaginary “circles of the mathematician.”625 Castle elaborated upon this accusation of 
idealism, insinuating that even if one could remove all environmental effects and 
modifying factors, any sign of variation would cause a pure line worker to “suppose that 
all factors but one have not yet been eliminated.”626 Moreover, Johannsen and Jennings 
based the theory on size characters, continuous traits without a proved Mendelian basis 
(even if one included “hypothetical” modifying factors). Castle wrote, “this is like 
supposing that the moon is made of cheese and that further this cheese is green.”627 When 
responding to Muller’s claim of pure line theory’s fundamentality (below), Castle again 
remarked on the “slender basis” in which Mendelism and pure line theory had become 
entangled, asking “do biologists take themselves seriously when they reason thus?”628 
  Throughout the 1910s, Castle faced several attacks from the Dutch animal 
breeders, Arend and Anna Hagedoorn, the up-and-coming Drosophila geneticist Hermann 
J. Muller, his former student, E. C. MacDowell, and Raymond Pearl, who had worked out 
pure line theory in poultry. 629 These attacks took every available path, including 
 
625 Castle, “Pure Lines and Selection,” 94. On this point Castle was not totally unique; Bateson and 
Morgan, among others, had their own skepticism of genes that changed over time. 
626 When Johannsen “was successful, he attribute[d] the success to variation in genetic factors; whenever 
unsuccessful he assumes that no variation in genetic factors occurred.” 
627 Castle, 95.  
628 “We shall look in vain, I think, for those “principles” outside of the “Exakten Erblichkeitslehre” (or its 
imitations), and when we inquire as to the experimental basis of the principles in question we are met with 
the satisfied reply, “Johannsen’s beans.”” Castle, “Mr. Muller on the Constancy of Mendelian Factors,” The 
American Naturalist 49, (1915), 40. Hermann J. Muller, “The Bearing of the Selection Experiments of 
Castle and Phillips on the Variability of Genes,” The American Naturalist 48 (1914): 568. Muller explained 
Castle’s crossing experiments by assuming that wild and Irish rats contained numerous ‘plus’ modifying 
factors (as Castle suggested). 
629 For more on Arend Hagedoorn, who was a student of de Vries and Loeb, see Bert Theunissen, “Practical 
Animal Breeding as the Key to an Integrated View of Genetics, Eugenics and Evolutionary Theory: Arend 
L. Hagedoorn (1885–1953),” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and 
Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 46: 55-64 (2014). 
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methodological, presentative, theoretical, and practical critiques. This section summarizes 
the most pertinent exchanges regarding the interaction of genetics with “the selection 
problem.”630 
 
The Hagedoorns used a “natural experiment” to challenge Castle, work he considered 
hypocritical. They compared contemporary wheat to plants in Louis de Vilmorin’s “living 
museum of pure lines of commercial wheats,” claiming that “fifty years’ work in 
wheat … show[ed] not one of the varieties changed in any way by these generations of 
selection.” Therefore, “selection can have no effect in material pure for its genetic 
factors. Genetic factors are constant.”631 (See Figure 7.) But Castle noted, they did not 
depict the entire wheat plant, ignored potential physiological changes or limits, and 
neglected to discuss whether Vilmorin selected to type (no expected change) or to change 
 
630 The cited critiques and responses are worth further investigation as commentaries on the contemporary 
state of genetics and experimental evolution. 
631 Hagedoorn and Hagedoorn, “Selection in Pure Lines: Fifty Years’ Work in Wheat by Vilmorin Shows 
Not One of the Varieties Changed in Any Way by These Generations of Selection,” American Breeders’ 
Magazine 4 (1913): 167. This was not to say that selection was ineffective within a population. For 
example, the Hagedoorns adopted a dynamic model similar to East and Shull, claiming that “animal 
populations are nearly always impure for the most diverse genetic factors,” whether wild or domesticated, 
making selection usually effective (unless highly inbred), but to a limit, speed depending upon the degree 
of genetic mixture. Hagedoorn and Hagedoorn, “Studies on Variation and Selection,” Zeitschrift Für 
Induktive Abstammungs- Und Vererbungslehre 11 (1914): 155–56. 
Figure 7. From “Selection in Pure Lines” (1913). 
208 
 
the type. They also challenged opponents to use selection to change a character after 
inbreeding and then reverse it while accounting for genetic “impurities.” Castle noted 
they had not rose to the challenge themselves and maintained that he had already met 
theirs, claiming also that fifteen generations of selection should have eliminated the 
original variation.632 He posed a contrary challenge, that selection on “any character of 
any animal” would prove its effectiveness.633 Most breeders had themselves shown this 
already, according to Castle, because pure lines are “purely imaginary.”634 
The Hagedoorns lodged a more serious theoretical and methodological critique, 
however, echoed by Muller and Pearl: Castle assumed an identity between genotype and 
phenotype, ignoring that a phenotype could be produced by multiple genotypes or by the 
environment. Castle, for example, argued that “in this series of rats the somatic character 
(appearance) of an individual is in general a true indication of its germinal character, 
since the higher the grade of the parents the higher the grade off the offspring, and vice 
versa.”635 This assumption “decimated the value of his work,” according to the 
Hagedoorns, because more than one gene could be producing the same character.636 In 
essence, Castle’s selections may be associating or eliminating independent factors, not 
changing a single gene or “unit-character.”637 Castle’s rats may in fact be “a complete 
analogon to Nilsson-Ehle’s case of the coloured wheats.” The Hagedoorns therefore 
flipped Castle’s assertion that size may not be Mendelian against him.638 
The Hagedoorns also pointed to a statistical methodology that neglected 
biological causes. Reminiscent of Bateson’s criticism of Weldon and Pearson, the 
Hagedoorns bounced back the geometer insult and accused Castle of being a 
 
632 Castle, “Variation and Selection; a Reply,” Molecular and General Genetics MGG 12 (1914): 259. 
633 They soon conducted their own experiment with hooded rats which ended prematurely after three years 
due to an “all-devastating epidemic,” but still concluded there were at least two genes responsible for the 
trait. (They further claimed to have achieved “far better results than Castle” due to their strict inbreeding 
and rigorous selection.) Hagedoorn and Hagedoorn, “Studies on Variation and Selection,” 165–70. 
634 Castle, “Pure Lines and Selection,” 97. 
635 Castle and Phillips, Piebald Rats and Selection, 12. 
636 “The possibility remains, that amongst [Irish and hooded rats], more than one gene differentiates the 
animals, and that selection favours a change of proportion between animals with and those without such 
genes.” 
637 Hagedoorns, 162-163. Specifically, they claimed that there may not even be a “main” factor that was 
modified by other factors; instead, the trait may be entirely built by independent factors, even if some had 
more of an influence than others. In fact, the Hagedoorns considered the multiple factor theory as “not a 
new one at all,” but made to “look new” by the incorrect “one-factor-one-character idea” (p. 181). 
638 Hagedoorn and Hagedoorn, 163. 
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mathematician himself, “absolutely callous to the biological problems involved, 
delighting in arranging and manipulating the figures for their own sake … hopelessly 
tangl[ing] up … causes.” Instead, “for the biologist the statistical method must be the 
very last resource.” Statistical methods based on appearance assumed genetic 
homogeneity and could not account for modifying factors or environmental effects. As 
MacDowell put it, Castle measured “one variable (germ plasm) through a measure 
(soma) influenced by a second variable (environment),” the last of which “of [its] power 
and nature nothing seems to be known.” Thus, in addition to modifying factors, 
MacDowell suggested that Castle may have witnessed strong environmental influences 
producing high variability, “confus[ing] the various combinations of germinal factors, 
and selection would continue to produce slight advances for a long time,” the same 
problem that Jennings had encountered in 1908. The problem, according to MacDowell, 
as well as the Hagedoorns, was that Castle extended his arguments beyond the 
phenotypic effects of selection to the “nature of the changes in the germ plasm.”639 This 
specific argument is what the Drosophilists would later focus upon (discussed below).640 
Muller elaborated on the point of multiple factors through a reinterpretation of 
Castle’s experiments. Although Castle had argued that fifteen generations of selection 
were sufficient to eliminate his stock’s heterozygosity, Muller suggested that the rats 
remained “presumably heterozygous.” If there was a high enough number of factors 
contributing to coat color, then Castle’s advances and reversals remained possible. Unlike 
Drosophila, in which genetic factors could be closely followed, Castle’s experiment on 
the hooded rats in itself could not address the underlying genetic and chromosomal 
mechanics. Rather, Castle’s results were consistent with Johannsen, who had “proved the 
 
639 MacDowell, “Piebald Rats and Multiple Factors,” The American Naturalist 50 (1916): 722. MacDowell 
listed over ten points in favor of the pure line and multiple factor theories, some of which Pearl, Muller, and 
the Hagedoorns had articulated. Castle believed he had already successfully countered them and 
admonished MacDowell for failing to explain how the data was equally compatible with Castle’s 
interpretations: Castle, “Piebald Rats and Multiple Factors,” American Naturalist 51 (1917): 103 
640 On causes, the Hagedoorns even indirectly accused Castle of Lamarckism for his sliding scale theory: 
that selection itself is responsible for producing adaptive variations. Instead, selection could alter “the mean 
of the group”; that “selection can not influence a gene” was a “law” “to which there are no exceptions.” 
Hagedoorn and Hagedoorn, “Studies on Variation and Selection,” 182. Beatty touches on this argument 
implicitly with respect to Morgan and de Vries: “The question as to how variations arise should be kept 
separate from the question as to whether they will be selected or not.” Beatty, 676. 
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constancy of a great many genes ‘at one blow.’”641 (By this Muller meant that because 
size was the result of multiple factors, and Johannsen had shown the constancy of size, 
then this meant that the “great many genes” were also constant. Castle specifically 
rejected this argument.) Multiple factors also explained the blending in the offspring of 
the plus and minus cross as well as the decreased variability upon return selection, as 
“selection gradually tends towards homogeneity in a population.”642 Therefore, Castle’s 
results were due to mixes of existing factors.643 That Castle rejected this Mendelian 
interpretation in favor of his theory of gametic contamination irked Muller, who 
suggested that Castle was taken in by a “spirit of mysticism.”644 
Castle, unperturbed, continued his attacks on the pure line theory and factor 
constancy in favor of his version of Darwinism in experimental systems outside the 
hooded rats. In a genetic study of color patterns in rabbits, he found that repeated 
crossing between two Mendelian traits caused the independent “English” pattern to 
darken. This provided “conclusive evidence against the idea of unit-character constancy,” 
in favor of gametic contamination, allowing him to assert that “if unit-characters are not 
constant, selection reacquires much of the importance which it was regarded as 
possessing in Darwin’s scheme of evolution, an importance which many have recently 
denied to it.” In another case, a newly discovered allele of agouti in rabbits, “black-and-
tan,” afforded him the possibility to test for the presence of modifiers using the 
Drosophilists’ linkage theory. According to linkage theory, the likelihood of the two 
genetic factors breaking apart increased with the number of crosses, but no evidence of 
this appeared. Instead, “the present modal condition of the black-and-tan character is one 
which has been attained only as a result of persistent selection,” amenable to “gradual 
and apparently indefinite modification.” Not only were there likely more alleles for 
 
641 Muller, 574. The Drosophilists asserted that Castle’s hooded rats were “a good illustration of the effects 
of selection on a group in which a particular character owed its modifications to multiple factors.” Morgan, 
et al., The Mechanism of Mendelian Heredity (Holt, 1915), 201–2. 
642 Muller, “The Bearing of the Selection Experiments of Castle and Phillips on the Variability of Genes,” 
The American Naturalist 48  (1914): 572. Muller contradicted the Hagedoorns due to the fact that he had to 
acknowledge Castle’s success with return selections. 
643 MacDowell, discussed below, reinterpreted a case of “genic variation and contamination” to be a case of 
selection of constant multiple factors, pointing against Castle’s interpretations. Muller, 576. 
644 Castle’s theory of gametic contamination “violat[ed] one of the most fundamental principles of 
genetics—the non-mixing of factors—in order to support a violation of another fundamental principle—the 
constancy of factors.” Muller, 573-575.  
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experimental breeders to reveal, but the two cases showed that breeders’ own selection 
could modify these factors. Castle concluded, “here are fruitful fields of inquiry to be 
cultivated before we conclude with the exponents of ‘exact’ heredity that selection of 
fluctuations is useless and that only mutations count in evolution.”645 
Strangely, as Castle worked with chromosomal mechanics (such as linkage) in 
these two cases, he also diminished its importance, returning to practice. Castle wrote, 
“whether an imaginary ‘unit-factor’ for English pattern has or has not changed in 
correlation with the visibly changed English unit-character” was only of “academic 
interest.” It “scarcely affect[ed] the practical question whether the visible Mendelizing 
characters of animals are subject to change through crossing or through selection or 
both.”646 The difficulty of assessing the existence of a modifier next to black-and-tan 
rendered it “unimportant.” What mattered was that selection caused evolutionary change, 
not the underlying mechanics. He concluded in another paper that East’s and Nilsson-
Ehle’s multiple factor theory was “quite superfluous.”647 
 
Raymond Pearl, too, entered the fray, debating with Castle on the nature of 
selection’s interaction with characters and populations, through both methodological and 
theoretical grounds. Raymond Pearl elaborated and extended the arguments that 
“selection can change a population but not a character.”648 He argued that both Castle’s 
work and his own work with poultry had demonstrated this principle. Castle believed 
Pearl was comparing apples to oranges. Whereas Castle dealt with a visible, 
developmentally early, and sexually universal trait, Pearl experimented with winter egg 
production, a sex-linked physiological trait that appeared only upon sexual maturity. 
Although Pearl claimed that egg production was controlled by two genetic factors, he had 
not provided the data for others to independently calculate; thus, unlike color, but like 
 
645 Castle and Philip B. Hadley, “The English Rabbit and the Question of Mendelian Unit-Character 
Constancy,” PNAS 1 (1915): 42; Castle and H. D. Fish, “The Black-and-Tan Rabbit and the Significance of 
Multiple Allelomorphs,” American Naturalist 49 (1915): 93–96. Emphasis mine. 
646 Castle and Hadley, 42. Castle had made the similar argument that whether traits were the result of a 
single gene or many genes of small effect, “selection slowly and surely changes the range of variability” 
(“Mr. Muller on the Constancy of Mendelian Factors,” 39, 40). 
647 Castle, “New Light on Blending and Mendelian Inheritance,” American Naturalist 50 (1916): 334. This 
article was a commentary on another article about the genetics of flowering time in peas. Castle 
consolidated the author’s two-factor (four class) system into a single quantitatively varying factor. 
648 Castle, “Some Experiments in Mass Selection,” 713. 
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size in Johannsen’s beans, Castle did not grant that egg production was Mendelian. 
Disease, parasitism, crowding, and nutrition were harder to control in poultry-keeping, 
which hindered statistical sampling and limited the amount of “material on which 
selection can be practised.” Rats, in contrast, aided sampling techniques and afforded 
selection “a vastly greater amount of material to work with.”649 Pearl’s entire flock over 
seventeen years numbered 4,282 individuals, whereas Castle, at the time of writing, 
raised and measured 33,248 individuals over seventeen generations — the 16th plus 
selection produced 1,690 offspring alone, “numbers certainly more nearly justifying the 
term ‘mass selection’ than those studied by Pearl.” Thus, “the hooded pattern of rats is 
materially admirably adapted for the purpose” of an “experimental test of “mass 
selection.”” Pearl’s poultry, on the other hand, were “entirely unsuitab[le].”650 On this 
point, Pearl explained that in addition to deaths, a major sampling effect took place every 
generation in both experimental systems. He also remarked that in total numbers, Castle’s 
rats were dwarfed by the commercial and “expert” crop breeders, such as the “pioneer 
work at Svalöf”; the spread of its methods in cereal crops demonstrated as “fact, real and 
definite,” the validity of the pure line theory and factor constancy. Castle conceded these 
methodological points but held fast to his theoretical commitment.651 
Theoretical differences over the interaction of selection and variation were 
clarified through the exchange. Pearl’s success with selecting between pure lines entailed 
that he had not produced a race superior than the original stock in terms of egg 
 
649 Castle had noted this importance when attacking the Hagedoorns: when charged with inbreeding 
insufficiently, he pointed to the need to balance the needs of the experiment with the needs of his stock’s 
vigor and survival. He slyly pointed out that that had he followed the Hagedoorns’ advice, his “experiments 
would have ended as abruptly as those of [his] critics,” who had lot sizes as small as fifty-nine individuals 
and lasted only “two full selections,” the last producing only six offspring. He later noted that “in the third 
and all subsequent generations selection was made as rigorous as possible consistent with the maintenance 
of a strong colony from which to make further selections.” Castle, “Some Experiments in Mass Selection,” 
The American Naturalist 49 (1915): 721. In 1916, Castle claimed were he to meet his critics’ standards, his 
stocks would fail to produce enough offspring to sustain the population; even his own methods had 
“crossed the danger-line in advancing the standard of selection …; more than once we have had to relax our 
standard temporarily in order to keep the race alive.” Castle and Sewall Wright, Studies of Inheritance in 
Guinea-Pigs and Rats, 241 (Washington, D. C.: CIW, 1916), 168–169. 
650 Pearl was surprised by Castle’s condescension. He conceded that Castle’s “work on the selection is 
vastly superior to my own” and that his experiments “constitute[d] an achievement of which their author 
may well be proud.” Unlike Castle, Pearl had focused only on differences of “interpretation,” because Pearl 
admired “the factual basis afforded by” Castle’s experimentation. Pearl, “Fecundity in the Domestic Fowl 
and the Selection Problem,” The American Naturalist 50 (1916): 89–90. 




production; instead, he had “secured” more of the better layers already extant within the 
stock. Castle, on the other hand, produced a stock wholly different than what had existed 
at the beginning, for “every individual” in either series “is of higher grade” — “a genuine 
and permanent racial change has occurred, following step by step upon repeated 
selection.” Castle felt “forced to conclude that this unit itself changes under repeated 
selection in the direction of the selection; sometimes abruptly…” and in either direction. 
(Hence the Hagedoorns’ accusation of Lamarckism.) In contrast to Pearl’s theory, “no 
great change in variability has attended the selection” of hooded rats, but instead, an 
increased mode and an entire shift of the trait’s distribution (the sliding scale). Pearl 
claimed that selection changed populations, but Castle believed, “in a word, the character 
changes.”652 
According to Pearl, the combined results of commercial breeders and pure line 
workers demonstrated the “power of systematic selection to alter populations which were 
not pure lines” and that “such alteration may extend the range of variation very greatly 
beyond what it was in the original population.”653 (As I have mentioned, this is signaling 
a transition to populational thinking.) However, a mutation, “a sudden definite change in 
the germ plasm” of any magnitude, was ultimately necessary. These mutational 
differences could be detected only through the cumbersome progeny test about which 
Castle complained, but, to Pearl, was one of the “chief results of the Mendelian 
method.”654 This was especially critical, because as Castle himself knew as a collector of 
genetic anomalies, Mendelism entailed the existence of recessive allelomorphs, imperfect 
segregation, heterozygosity, and other conditions that prevented the biologist from 
assuming a simple 1:1 relationship between germ and soma. Coat color in rats may be a 
simpler trait than fecundity in poultry, but it was “a difference in degree, if they differ at 
all, not in kind.” Furthermore, this imperfect relationship meant that neither 
experimentalist had proved selection to be a cause in changing “the absolute somatic 
equivalent of a particular gene or hereditary determinant.” Castle, although altering the 
mean of a character within a population, could not demonstrate his argument by this 
 
652 Castle, 722. 
653 Pearl, 100. Emphasis mine. 





Pearl considered Castle’s alternative theory to be “repugnant.” The union of two 
gametes developing into a soma with a trait beyond the range of the parent population 
“leads logically straight to genetic indeterminism.” Selection causing variation, Pearl 
considered a “nonsense” assumption, for it must result from hens being “placed in 
particular cages … to breed, for this is the only physical thing that selection means in this 
case.”656 This produced a logical contradiction: how could selection create variation 
when breeding two genetically alike individuals especially when “as selection continues, 
homozygosity automatically increases”? Instead, Pearl said, “a new inheritable variation 
in the direction of selection has appeared while selection was in progress.” The variation 
arose independently of selection: a mutation.657 
Pearl charged that Castle’s hypothesis was not Darwinism, but a “wholly new 
addition to the classic Darwinian selection theory,” for “Darwin never supposed that 
selection was a cause of favorable variation.” Indeed, if Darwin thought the source of 
variation was selection, why did he emphasize his own uncertainty? Although geneticists 
remained puzzled by mutation’s causes, Pearl considered Castle’s hypothesis “the rankest 
kind of mysticism plus bad logic.”658 Pearl hoped their differences “reduce[d] … to a 
dispute over the use of words.” He wished to convince selectionists not to use the 
formulation that ‘selection causes new variation.’659 
Whereas Pearl emphasized selection’s tendency to reduce variation, Castle 
asserted that genetic variation was so widespread and available that a pure line likely 
never existed. Rather than “begging the question,” Castle suggested that if two 
individuals of the highest grade reproduced, by chance, a small percentage could be of a 
 
655 Pearl, 93, 100–101. 
656 Oddly, Pearl’s symbolic example he used to work this out assumed a perfect relationship between germ 
and soma. 
657 Pearl, “Fecundity in the Domestic Fowl and the Selection Problem,” 101–3. 
658 Pearl, 103–4. 
659 Pearl also pointed out that Castle’s “special bete noir” remained his unfounded complaint that “pure-
linists” deny the possibility of small “germinal variations.” As Pearl’s paper was published, Castle equated 
‘pure-linists’ with nineteenth-century catastrophists and species fixists. To the contrary, Pearl said, 
correctly, that “neither Johannsen nor any followers of his, so far as I am aware, have ever attempted to set 
any limitations on how big or how little a germinal variation could be.” Pearl, “Fecundity in the Domestic 
Fowl and the Selection Problem,” 105; Castle, “Is Selection or Mutation the More Important Agency in 
Evolution?,” The Scientific Monthly 2 (1916): 91, 98. 
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slightly higher grade than the parents – the causal basis of the sliding scale. Pearl had 
dismissed this “genetic indeterminism” as “repugnant” and “mystical,” but Castle 
interpreted this as “incapable of prediction and control.”660 What was mystical was his 
opponents’ reliance on “causeless mutations” and “genetic miracles.” He concluded, 
emphasizing control, 
Intelligent selection only accelerates this natural process of progressive variation, for it 
singles out the individual which is producing gametes of unusual value and permits the 
union of such high grade gametes only with gametes of their own sort, so that step after 
step in a particular direction becomes possible… Can we doubt that it is progressive 
variation guided by rational selection in a particular direction that has made possible the 
doubling in size that most of our domesticated animals have undergone since they were 
taken from the wild state?661 
Rather than waiting for “causeless mutations” and “genetic miracles,” Castle could create 
the situation among his rats most likely to engender the selectable variation the breeder 
desired. He later pointed out that the pure line workers had to do the same if they were to 
wait for mutations to select. 
Castle was careful to note the limitations of selection as well. For example, while 
Castle had failed to change the “mutants” with selection, he explained this away by 
pointing to the stock’s health: he struggled to raise enough mutant rats “to afford a basis 
for selection. Its inbredness and its feebleness are perhaps causally related.”662 Therefore, 
selection’s ineffectiveness did not necessarily imply mutation’s importance. A further 
limit was that no character was capable of “indefinite modification” in every direction: 
sugar beets, for example, can hold only so much sugar and flies had only so much space 
for bristles. The slowing down of selection over time in some instances did not 
necessarily indicate the depletion of modifying factors; rather, selection run into 
physiological limits. This line of thought was in line with his early work on spotted 
guinea pigs. 
Throughout these debates, Castle continued his experiments with hooded rats, 
 
660 MacDowell also challenged this notion, discussed below. 
661 Castle, “Can Selection Cause Genetic Change?,” 248–49, 253–56. 
662 Castle and Wright, Studies of Inheritance in Guinea-Pigs and Rats, 241 (Washington, D. C.: CIW, 
1916), 173.  
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now alongside his student Sewall Wright.663 He had now graded over 33,000 rats through 
sixteen generations, evolution neither ceasing nor slowing.664 The plus series now 
produced an individual “black all over except a few white hairs on the chest.” Variability 
remained “steady,” “plainly still large enough to permit further racial modification…” 
There was also “no indication that it will cease until the hooded character has been 
completely selected out of existence,” ending in all-black and all-white rats.665 He held 
that sixteen generations should have eliminated any modifying factors that may have 
resided within the initial stock, thus, upholding his sliding scale theory. Furthermore, he 
claimed, extensive crosses between wild and domesticated guinea pigs confirmed it was a 
non-Mendelizing trait anyway. Where the multiple factor theory should have been the 
most helpful, a widespread continuously varying trait like size, it instead failed, being 
“quite unnecessary and so should be discarded.”666 Instead, Castle’s single quantitatively 
varying factor, along with gametic contamination, was the simpler explanation, backed 
by his experimental systems as well as Jennings’ new work on Difflugia (discussed 
below).667  
But what mattered most to Castle was that the theory of varying factors and 
gametic contamination allowed for human control; the experimentalist, by selection, 
could direct future variation. In this context, Castle took the chance to challenge 
Galtonian theory (indirectly). He claimed that rather than remaining static and requiring a 
mutation to overcome, “points of racial equilibrium or stability” are “capable of being 
 
663 In a collection of three reports published as one through CIW, Wright, sole author of the second report, 
established his career-long interest in physiological genetics and, contrary to Castle’s trajectory, espoused a 
pluralistic view, asserting that it was difficult to predict a priori what mode of inheritance a character will 
show, and that “in each case a complex of the most varied causes underlies an apparently simple continuous 
series of variations” produced by multiple allelomorphs, imperfect dominance, modifying factors, residual 
heredity, and non-inheritable effects. Castle and Wright, Studies of Inheritance in Guinea-Pigs and Rats, 
120–21. 
664 Since the last report, the means of both the plus and minus series advanced a third of a grade in the 
parents and a fifth in the offspring. 
665 Castle and Wright, 170–71, 172. 
666 Castle and Wright, 55. 
667 He seems to have abandoned “potency” by this point. Castle offered an explanation of gametic 
contamination by way of metaphor: “if a 5 per cent solution of cane sugar were poured into the same dish 
with a 10 per cent solution and then samples were dipped from this before the two solutions had been 
thoroughly stirred together, it might very well happen that the samples would not be of uniform strength.” 
Because blending is imperfect, more variation should be expected in the offspring than in their inbred 
parents. This is why Mendelism explained the results of crosses between starkly differentiated hooded rats 
and Irish rats, but not between two alike selected hooded rats — contamination could not take full effect in 
the former in one generation. Castle and Wright, 55. 
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moved either up or down the scale of grades at the will of the breeder, provided he has 
the patience and persistency and will [to] select repeatedly.”668 That is, his theory 
suggested a dialectic between the breeder’s selection and the internal constitution of the 
stock, rather than on the one hand, total control by the breeder, or on the other, total 
immutability from selection. As he concluded in his response to his former student, 
MacDowell, 
But what happens to these spontaneous variations when once they have put in an 
appearance depends on external agencies, man or other factors in the struggle for 
existence. The modern study of evolution has indeed emphasized the importance of 
spontaneous internal changes in producing variations, but we still have to reckon with 
selection, natural and artificial, in determining the survival of variations as well as in 
controlling their magnitude and the direction of their further variation.669 
Castle’s description of evolution was approaching his opponents’ with the language of 
“spontaneous internal changes” then becoming subject to “external agencies,” but he still 
emphasized selection’s power over mutation and variation – its creativity. 
 
Jennings’ Conversion from Johannsen to Castle 
 
After his major 1908 publication on pure lines and selection, Jennings became 
director of the Zoological Laboratory at Johns Hopkins which under his direction 
published a number of “investigations on inheritance in uniparental reproduction … to 
find heritable variations and effects of selection if such occur.”670 To meet the standards 
of pure line critics, Jennings adopted a new organism, Difflugia, and began a new series 
of long-term experiments testing the effectiveness of selection on a pure line. To his 
surprise, he discovered what he considered to be completely contrary to his accumulated 
years of evolutionary work: pure lines varied more than thought, thus making selection 
effective within a pure line. He published his new work in the first volume of Genetics, 
despite it not containing any Mendelism, showing the loose integration of experimental 
evolution and genetics.671 Jennings was the only major defection from the pure line camp 
 
668 Regression had persisted as Galton would have predicted, but Castle’s rats had not been limited by it. 
669 Castle, “Piebald Rats and Multiple Factors,” 114. 
670 Lashley, Middleton, Stocking 
671 Jennings, “Heredity, Variation and the Results of Selection in the Uniparental Reproduction of Difflugia 
218 
 
to Castle’s, reflective of the mostly independent path he took throughout the debate, even 
serving as a mediator, especially with Pearl, discussed at length below. 
Following criticisms of the pure line work from biometricians and from Castle, 
Jennings searched for an organism that could meet his critics’ standards. They had 
charged that most of the characters pure line workers studied were not “sharply defined 
and readily determinable,” especially size, which was “continually altered during growth” 
and “greatly modified by environmental agencies.” (Keep in mind that over half of 
Jennings’ 1908 publication was dedicated to trying to account for this.) And, as usual, his 
critics charged he had conducted his experiments for too few generations. Therefore, 
Jennings sought organisms “multiplying vegetatively [and quickly], with definite 
structural characters that can be counted and measured, these characters being (1) 
unchanged by growth; (2) unaffected by the environment during the life of the individual; 
(3) heritable, yet (4) variable.”  
He found “this unusual combination of favorable conditions” in Difflugia corona, 
a shelled amoeba.672D. corona forms a test of collected sand grains glued together with a 
“chitinous secretion.” The shell had a number of traits unchanged by growth, such as 
their teeth and spines, as well as dimensional characters that were not modified following 
development.673 Jennings thus classified these characters with coat color in birds and 
mammals, rather than with size. A further advantage of the shell is that it served as a 
permanent record — after killing the organism, the shell could be stored for later 
comparisons. Its asexual reproduction recreated an identical test, the original serving as a 
mold for the new. Thus, its combination of reproductive system, physical characters, and 
small size were ideal for Jennings’ program. Like Paramecium, it was not a commodified 
organism, reflecting Jennings’ academic concerns. 
Also like Paramecium, he collected Difflugia from local ponds and transferred 
them with capillary pipettes into hollow-ground slides with five to ten drops of water 
along with washed aquatic plants. While the water was far from standardized, Jennings 
reported that “an immense amount of time was wasted in attempts to make a culture 
 
Corona,” Genetics 1 (1916): 407–534. 
672 Jennings, 410. 
673 Jennings, 413. 
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medium in the laboratory.” Each slide housed a single organism and Jennings carefully 
pedigreed every individual using a card catalogue. Between 1911 and 1915, Jennings 
gathered “four wild collections or ‘populations’” and six “laboratory cultures” (which he 
also called “populations”). In total, he measured 9,060 individual Difflugia.674 
By combining biometry with pedigrees, Jennings discovered a large amount of 
variation among the lineages of wild samples he took from his surrounding environment. 
In addition, he calculated correlations between some traits, finding that these values 
varied between populations. (For example, the correlation between parents and offspring 
in number of teeth was 0.99, but the number of teeth between families varied 
significantly.) While he considered it possible that individuals tended to “reproduce in 
some degree the peculiarities of their varying parents” within a homogeneous population 
(like Castle), he began these experiments still in favor of pure lines, adopting a line 
similar to Pearl about “securing more” within a population: “in such mixed populations, 
if we select individuals having a certain character in a higher degree, we shall on the 
whole obtain specimens having also the other characters in a higher degree.” Jennings 
appeared to have adopted Pearl’s reasoning that “the effects of selection in populations” 
was the crux of the debate; his goal was to determine whether selection could improve a 
stock “within single families.” Such “remain[ed] to be seen,” but until then he maintained 
his position: “it is indeed extraordinary to see these minute masses of protoplasm 
reproduce so true to type, yet with such marked diversities between the families. … It is 
clear that a population of Difflugia consists of large numbers of different strains, each 
strain remaining in a high degree true to type.”675 So far, nothing was different from 
Paramecium. (See Figure 8.) 
With Difflugia, Jennings designed a more sophisticated attempt to break a pure 
line into two. (Note that his original goal was to “bridge the gap,” now it was to “break 
into two.”) That correlations within a family varied between families led him to wonder if 
selection could break apart those correlations. That is, “in most families, selection of 
larger individuals would be on the whole a selection likewise of individuals with more 
numerous spines and teeth and longer spines. But this would not be the case in all 
 
674 Jennings, 415, 418–19. 
675 Jennings, 429, 437, 444. 
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families.”676 Thus, could selecting within a pure line “produce from it a set of hereditarily 
diverse families?”677 Here we see that while Jennings showed no interest in the practical 




Figure 8: From Jennings, “Heredity, Variation, and the Results of Selection in the Uniparental 
reproduction of Difflugia corona” (1916), Fig. 7. Each row is a distinct line, and each individual 
is the immediate progeny of the one to its left. Jennings intended to show that without selection, 
the lines show distinct and inheritable differences from other lines. 
 
  But, contrary to his ‘pure-linist’ expectations, Jennings’ initial study revealed that 
the evidence pointed to the “inheritance of [new] variations within the single family.” 
Selecting for increased or reduced number of spines in these two families, Jennings 
differentiated one family into two “hereditarily diverse” sets. “Selection was effective” 
also in a family of 1,949 offspring, and importantly, the shifts were gradual, not sudden. 
Like in Castle’s experiment, one family did show a “sudden noticeable variation inherited 
 
676 Jennings, 452. That is, similar to his comments in 191x that natural selection would have trouble 
differentiating inheritable versus non-inheritable variations, selection in this case potentially ran up against 
family-dependent constraints. [Best way to word that?] 
677 Jennings, 462. 
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by the descendants — something comparable to a ‘mutation,’” but this was not the trend. 
678 His results continued to contradict his previous work. (See Figure 9.) 
 
Figure 9: From Jennings, 1916, Figure 15. A pedigree of 
Difflugia descended from the ancestor at the top-left. 
Jennings intended to show that unlike his experience 
with Paramecium, Difflugia showed a more marked 
tendency to vary in size and spine number and length, 
both by a “sudden noticeable variation” (or “mutation”) 
as well as small variations (p. 485). Their ubiquity led 




Jennings set out to account for possible 
“deceptions,” particularly from growth and 
environmental effects. For example, offspring tended to become larger as generations 
passed. Environmental conditions were also more similar between parent and offspring 
than between more distant relatives. These tendencies could be removed from 
consideration “if by selection we can obtain stocks hereditarily diverse for generation 
after generation…”679 In a way, this was methodologically accounting for Jennings’ 
Problem: persistence, and thus inheritance, of a new variation through long experimental 
time despite environmental similarities or differences.  
Because the results were “so opposed” to the Paramecium work, Jennings 
replicated the experiment in another family with even more offspring. Over 34 
generations, Jennings tracked and measured 4,645 individuals originating from a single 
individual. In the first six generations, selection had no effect on spine number. Believing 
 
678 Jennings, 476–85. 
679 Jennings, 467. Jennings also worried that his sample sizes were too small, collecting new wild 
populations in 1914 from the Johns Hopkins Brickyards to re-examine his contradictory results, producing 
two families of 496 and 1,050 individuals with distinct correlation figures for shell diameter, number of 
spines, among others. 
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his selection was possibly not rigorous enough, Jennings more stringently differentiated 
the population, paying attention to an individual’s offspring (progeny testing) — if an 
individual with a high number of spines produced offspring with low numbers, or vice 
versa, Jennings discarded them. Over the next 63 days — six generations — “selection 
was effective. In every period the high parents produce progeny with higher numbers of 
spines than do the low parents, and the difference is in every case considerable.” When 
Jennings ceased selection for eleven generations, the inherited differences “persisted.” 
The lines somewhat converged toward the middle, but such regression was to be expected 
if new variations appeared. Jennings concluded that “it may well be therefore that the 
inherited racial differences observed in a wild population of Difflugia corona have been 
similarly produced by differentiation during vegetative reproduction.”680 He framed his 
actions as “clearly a breaking up into groups of diverse hereditary size comparable to the 
diverse families found in a wild population.”681 Jennings also claimed therefore that his 
laboratory populations likely showed how evolution in the wild occurred. 
Ironically, as Pearl would soon point out to him, Jennings had replicated Pearl’s 
experimental trajectory with hens. Mass selection based on phenotype had failed to 
increase egg production, but Pearl discovered that if he selected based on progeny, he 
could quickly sort between pre-existing lines of high- and low-layers. Even though 
Jennings stated in his conclusion that the discovery of ubiquitous variation in Difflugia 
was possible partially “by basing selection entirely on congenital characters,” he seems to 
have not recognized the importance. 682  
Jennings concluded that new variation was relatively common and minute in 
Difflugia. Considering the contradictory results between Paramecium and Difflugia, 
Jennings lent more weight to the latter precisely because of his attempt to counter his 
critics through Difflugia’s more reliable characters. He also thought the Paramecium 
experiments may have not lasted long enough, considering Difflugia revealed gradual 
 
680 Jennings, 489, 490, 493. Emphasis original. 
681 Jennings, 501–2. 
682 Jennings, 522–523. Selection was not uniformly effective, however, aligning with Castle’s caution that 
selection could not necessarily overcome physiological limits. Jennings could increase the size of Difflugia, 
but, decreasing size “soon met a complete barrier.” The larger individuals were also weaker, sometimes 
even producing “offspring” consisting of empty shells. Jennings, 501–2. 
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changes over thirty generations.683 
This work placed Jennings outside the Mendelian-mutationist camp and partially 
in Castle’s. He thought the former placed too much emphasis on stability rather than flux. 
And if variation was more ever-present and renewing, than selection had an important 
role to play as his own experiment had shown in “breaking” apart pure lines. However, it 
seems that Jennings did not fully grasp the arguments from East, Shull, and Pearl, but 
they continued to hash it out. 
 
Castle’s Final Word 
 
In 1917, Castle, Jennings, and Pearl ended the bulk of their experimental work on 
the nature of variation and “the selection problem.” They also hoped to bring the debate 
itself to a close. While Jennings forged a middle path, Pearl, Castle, and the Drosophilists 
held fast to their positions. 
In “The Role of Selection in Evolution,” presented before the Washington 
Academy of Sciences, Castle interpreted the history of evolutionary science through the 
context of control, using Darwin and de Vries as representatives of the two poles.684 
Darwin emphasized gradualism, plasticity, accumulation; selection “determine[d]” not 
only “what classes of variations shall survive,” but “what shall be the variable material 
subjected to selection in the next generation.” Therefore, invoking the sliding scale, “the 
further evolution of our domestic animals and cultivated plants (and of man himself) is to 
some extent controllable because we can by selection influence the variability of later 
generations.” De Vries, on the other hand, emphasized abruptness, stability, independent 
mutations (opposed to accumulation), and that selection “exercise[d] no influence on the 
subsequent variability of the race.” Therefore, “evolution is beyond our control except as 
we discover and isolate variations.”685 Although experimental evolutionists had reached 
 
683 There were possible counters, including cytoplasmic inheritance or chromidia, but these were not any 
more likely than his explanation. In any case, these possibilities were still “material,” i.e., “if the nucleus in 
Difflugia may vary gradually, it has the properties attributed to organisms in general by old-fashioned 
Darwinism,” no matter the precise methods of variation and inheritance. Like Castle, Jennings became less 
concerned with the underlying mechanics. Jennings, 523–25. 
684 Note he continued to consider de Vries his authoritative opponent, rather than his critics, and repeated 
his misinterpretation of the mutation/fluctuation distinction. 
685 Castle, “The Role of Selection in Evolution,” Journal of the Washington Academy of Sciences 7 (1917): 
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consensus with regard to hybridization as a “very potent agency in producing variability,” 
the question of selection remained as apparently unresolved as when East articulated the 
problem of evolutionary control in 1903. 
The first figures who addressed these questions, Hugo de Vries and Wilhelm 
Johannsen, left mixed legacies in Castle’s view. De Vries may have conducted selection 
experiments in maize, buttercups, striped flowers, and four-leaved clovers, but they did 
not last long enough or sufficiently control for contamination/hybridization to elucidate 
the interaction between variation and selection. Johannsen was more careful, and Castle 
now believed the pure line theory was a “safe working hypothesis” for crops in which 
selection had been shown to be a “waste of time” (due to the rarity of genetic variation in 
self-fertilizing species). However, Castle rejected the supposed universality of their 
theories. Pearl’s extensions to sexually reproducing species “met with small success,” 
thus, no case of a pure line of animals had yet been discovered, although his opponents 
assumed that the “principle of the pure line” remained applicable.686 Morgan’s 
interpretations of the evolutionary dynamics within Drosophila were feasible only 
because he had redefined “mutation” to include “just ordinary heritable variations.”687 
His own work on albinism, an apparently unalterable trait, was ironically the best case, 
but he considered it the exception to the rule. 688 His opponents’ work therefore remained 
preliminary at best.  
Furthermore, even within pure line theory, selection remained key to 
improvement. It was required not only to test the validity of a pure line, but to isolate 
mutations and purify variation within a population. Castle claimed that a “formal 
adherent of the pure line doctrine” was “pragmatically a selectionist.” Although the 
theory predicted that selection’s power would cease upon “the attainment of complete 
homozygosity,” “such a completely stable condition ha[d], … rarely been 
 
372–73. Emphasis mine. 
686 Castle, 377–79. “Morgan would undoubtedly admit this since he claims that all heritable variations arise 
as mutations, but this is simply juggling with names, giving a new meaning to the word mutation in order to 
justify a sweeping generalization otherwise untenable.” Again, Castle misinterpreted the history. 
687 As I discuss below, Sturtevant and Bridges rejected this interpretation of their work. 
688 Castle also failed to produce guinea pigs that matched the small size of their wild ancestors or the large 
size of domesticated varieties in South America. He suggested this was due to the changes being “too slow 
to be observable in the lifetime of one observer” (p. 381). 
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demonstrated.”689 The hooded rats and spotted rabbits instead showed that selection’s 
exhaustion of variation was unlikely, therefore remaining useful.690 
Ever practical, “…there are very few valued economic characters” which do not 
blend. Just as Johannsen had never demonstrated size to be Mendelian, Castle pointed to 
the “weight of carcass, quality of wool, milk production in cattle, egg production in 
fowls—all these are blending characters which in later generations show either no 
segregation or imperfect segregation.”691 (Castle’s claim regarding egg production 
amounts to a rejection of Pearl’s genetic claims regarding his poultry.) The case was the 
same for plants — the Illinois corn selection experiment, which East and Shull claimed to 
demonstrate their theory, should have long since produced a pure line, but instead 
continued to change. Note, however, that his opponents thought they had addressed this 
point through multiple factor theory.  
  Castle asserted that, just as the pure line workers had wished, the debate “has 
done us great good in dispelling or clarifying the hazy notions which formerly existed as 
to what natural selection could accomplish.”692 He accepted the mutation theory’s 
proposition that selection is “primarily an agency for the elimination of variations, not for 
their production” and that it acted upon only “variations actually existing.”693 However, 
 
689 Castle, 379–80. “No other method of detecting and utilizing a favorable variation, when it does occur, 
can be suggested than the very method of methodical and persistent selection against which the pure line 
advocates direct such vigorous attacks.” Castle, 380. 
690 These contradictions, Castle believed, depended upon geneticists’ “particular choices” of species and 
characters. He suggested the possibility of “plastic genes” and “fixed genes” to explain the lack of 
universality, although it seems he never took this notion up seriously. He thought a “perfectly stable gene” 
to be rare, although the difference could possibly explain Jennings’ contradictory results in Paramecium 
and Difflugia.  
691 Castle, “The Role of Selection in Evolution,” 383–84. 
692 Castle also speculated on how his views corresponded with nature for the first time in over a decade, 
basing his argument in experimental versus evolutionary time. He asked, “If this is true concerning a single 
character under experimental study for a period of twenty generations, may it not also be true of entire 
organisms and groups of organisms subjected to keen competition with all other organisms in a struggle for 
existence which has continued for millions of generations? … If artificial selection can, in the brief span of 
a man’s life time, mould a character steadily in a particular direction, why may not natural selection in 
unlimited time also cause progressive evolution in directions useful to the organism?”692 This contrasts with 
East’s comment in Chapter 4 that Lamarckism and to some extent Darwinism may make themselves 
noticeable and present over a long period of time, but did not seem to be present in experimental time,  
which was what ultimately mattered. 
693 Castle here is to some extent presciently describing the basis of Darwinism’s “restoration” as described 
by Stoltzfus and myself: the genetic theory of evolution under the Synthesis accepts the Mendelian-
mutationist critiques but claims about the ubiquity of “variations actually existing” means selection was 
nearly always able to act. See Stoltzfus and Cable, 537-538. 
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selection, acting as a sliding scale, can “continue and extend variation already initiated by 
shifting in the direction of selection the center of gravity of variation…”694 Responding 
directly to Pearl’s criticism that selectionists misused language regarding causes, Castle 
wrote: 
It is not then a misuse of terms to say that the selection has in this case been the cause of 
further variation in the direction of selection and so an agency in the progressive 
evolution of a new type.695 
This was Castle’s final word on the subject until he conceded in 1919. He appears to have 
been moving toward a synthetic view of evolution (once again) by admitting that one of 
his opponents’ core arguments – that selection eliminates variation but does not create it – 
was true. Where his argument now rested was on the nature of causation: new variation 
was partially determined by where selection left a population after its action. This was 
close to both sides being in accordance, yet his persistence in denying multiple (and 
stable) factor theory irked his contemporaries. The rest of this chapter follows Jennings 
and Pearl hashing out the selection problem based on this debate and the Drosophilist 
intervention with chromosomal mechanics, before proceeding to Castle’s concession. 
 
Jennings and Pearl Grapple with “The Selection Problem” 
 
Jennings also addressed the Washington Academy of Sciences regarding the 
implications of his Difflugia work, attempting to resolve the debate “on the occurrence of 
variations; on the effects of selection; on the method of evolution.”696 He acknowledged 
that “the modern experimental study of variation” had demonstrated that genetic 
 
694 Castle, 387. On the previous page, he described it this way: “… it is evident that a change in the mean of 
the character in a particular direction in consequence of selection actually displaces in the direction of 
selection the center of gravity of variation, so that in a very true sense selection makes possible further 
variation in that same direction.” 
695 Castle, 386. Emphasis original. He also  
696 H. S. Jennings, “Observed Changes in Hereditary Characters in Relation to Evolution,” Journal of the 
Washington Academy of Sciences 7 (1917): 281–301. Jennings also discussed evolutionary controversies 
within paleontological work, thinking it confirmed gradualism, but not orthogenesis. He wrote, “we do not 
observe” orthogenesis in “experimental work; by selection we can move in more than one direction. I do 
not mean that the possible variations are not limited by the constitution of the varying organism; they 
certainly are. But there is no indication, so far as I can see, that the variations push in one determinate 
direction only” (p. 296). Jennings also disputed Bateson’s belief that “evolution has occurred by loss and 
disintegration” (p. 299). 
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variations were “permanent diversities; they are static, not dynamic.” From these facts 
flowed Mendelism and Johannsen’s genotype, concepts to which even Castle should 
concede.697 What Castle “must do” is show that this “foundation” is “not final,” “that the 
diverse existing stocks, while heritably different as the genotypists maintain, may also 
change and differentiate, in ways not yet detected…”698 
Jennings characterized the debate as between “genotypic mutationists” and Castle, 
who alone bore the “full brunt of the attack.”699 But, Castle had “carried the war into the 
enemy’s country by predicting that the so-called unit characters in Drosophila would be 
found to be modifiable through selection,” which, according to Jennings, the 
Drosophilists had since confirmed — at least under Jennings’ interpretation. 
Jennings adopted Castle’s (oscillating) disregard for chromosomal mechanics. 
This fit with his work on Paramecium and Difflugia, then treated as non-Mendelian 
organisms. But Jennings also planned “to abandon the ground that Castle would defend, 
i.e., gametic contamination,” and instead “proceed directly into the territory of the enemy, 
accept the conditions met there, then see where we come out in relation to the nature of 
variation, the effects of selection, and the method of evolution.”700 Although exactly what 
those “conditions” were remained a matter of dispute, contrary to Jennings’ assertion. 
‘Proceeding into enemy territory,’ Jennings reinterpreted the results of the 
Drosophilists on eye color, emphasizing gradualism over the physical basis of heredity. 
They had revealed the presence of seven gradations between white and red, in addition to 
seven modifiers. Jennings considered this a “pragmatically continuous series. The 
extreme selectionist asks only a little more than this.” Although Jennings admitted that 
the Drosophilists had a different genetic interpretation of eye color’s evolutionary history, 
 
697 Jennings, “Observed Changes in Hereditary Characters in Relation to Evolution,” 282–83. Some 
scientists, such as Jordan, supposed that this sufficiently explained “evolution,” that what was observed was 
the mere reshuffling of what existed. Instead, Jennings described his now opponents’ views with relative 
accuracy (especially when compared to Castle): “Organisms forming a multitude of diverse strains with 
diverse genotypes; the genotype a mosaic of parts that are recombined in Mendelian inheritance; selection a 
mere process of isolating and recombining what already exists; large changes occurring at rare intervals, 
through the dropping out of bits of the mosaic, or through their complete chemical transformations; 
evolution by saltations.” Jennings, 284. Jennings overplayed the Mendelian reliance on saltations. 
698 Jennings, “Observed Changes in Hereditary Characters in Relation to Evolution,” 283. 
699 Jennings, 287. 
700 Jennings, 288. Although Castle himself vacillated between claiming whether or not the underlying 
chromosomal mechanics mattered. 
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he took their results as demonstrating the “intermediate conditions” that would allow for 
a “gradual transition from one extreme to the other,” just as Castle had produced in his 
rats.701 Jennings emphasized, “these modifying factors are themselves alterations in the 
hereditary constitution.” Although “there are indeed certain differences in detail,” they 
were merely over “exactly where the changes occur” and this specific dispute — 
variations in a single factor or reshuffling of modifying factors — “does not touch the 
fundamental question.”702 The fundamental question was, for Jennings, the “occurrence 
of … minute changes in the hereditary constitution … [and] the possibility of getting 
therefrom by selection various grades of a given external characteristic. In this, so far as I 
can see, there is complete agreement.” To emphasize issues of continuity versus 
discontinuity when “steps become so minute as to be beyond detection” was 
“metaphysical” and not “pragmatical.”703  (Note this is not what his now opponents 
thought!)704 
This kind of resolution was possible because both schemes included and allowed 
for the effectiveness of selection. In Jennings’ view, their differences were over how 
selection worked and how effective it was. But as Morgan had written, when the theory 
of natural selection is stated in general terms, “there is nothing in the theory to which 
anyone is likely to take exception.”705 But as discussed by Pearl and Jennings below, 
selection being effective could mean quite different things. (I also showed how East’s 
 
701 The Drosophilists held that the gradations themselves in eye color did not come about gradually — red 
could mutate to white — but, he argued that the eye was already a “complex product of evolution”; 
mutations breaking the trait now did not necessarily correlate with how the trait was built in the past. 
Biologists did not know how the eye actually came about genetically. Indeed, Jennings wondered if 
Drosophila showed large changes “perhaps due to the fact that we are witnessing the disintegration of 
highly developed apparatus in place of its building up.” Jennings, 291, 295–96. 
702 Recall that MacDowell had said selection’s power was not the “ultimate question,” but instead, 
emphasized the “nature of the changes in the germ plasm.” This should be included in chapter conclusion. 
703 Jennings, “Observed Changes in Hereditary Characters in Relation to Evolution,” 293, 295. He had 
written along similar lines in his Difflugia publication: Whether variation was continuous or discontinuous, 
he [remarked] that it must be the latter, not within the terms of the debate, but because “in the sense that 
they involve chemical change,--since all chemical change is discontinuous.” In essence he did not find 
these distinctions meaningful. He did, interestingly suggest that large mutations in animals and plants may 
be a result of gradual variation being amplified through development’s cell divisions. Jennings, “Heredity, 
Variation and the Results of Selection in the Uniparental Reproduction of Difflugia Corona,” Genetics 1 
(1916), 525–26. 
704 Yet oddly the notion that variations could be so minute to be beyond detection was the opposite of 
pragmatic; Jennings was unconsciously reasserting his own Problem that the size of fluctuations and 
mutations could hamper selection’s effectiveness. 
705 Morgan, A Critique of the Theory of Evolution, 147. 
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phrasing of a theory of selection in a seemingly general way was actually quite specific.) 
Thus Jennings could claim that rather than Castle and the Drosophilists representing two 
oppositional poles, 
it appears to me that the work on Drosophila is supplying a complete foundation for 
evolution through selection of minute gradations. … The objections raised by the 
mutationists to gradual change through selection are breaking down as a result of the 
thoroughness of the mutationists’ own studies. 
He concluded, 
evolution according to the typical Darwinian scheme, through the occurrence of many 
small variations and their guidance by natural selection, is perfectly consistent with what 
experimental and paleontological studies show us.706 
However, as the rest of this chapter shows, Pearl, Sturtevant and Bridges, and MacDowell 
did not accept this formulation of the debate or his conclusions. Whereas Jennings sought 
resolution through dissolving the poles between Castle and his opponents, their argument 
was that Jennings had identified the wrong axis. The dispute was not over gradualism or 
(dis)continuity, but rather over what Jennings tried to mask: selection’s interaction with 
the mechanics of the “hereditary constitution.”  
 
That same month Pearl published “The Selection Problem” in the American 
Naturalist.  Pearl agreed that the logic of natural selection as a progressive factor of 
evolution was sound but questioned whether selectionists had experimentally 
demonstrated their case. For Pearl, 
the question to which we want an answer is not whether natural selection can cause 
evolutionary changes, but rather whether it does cause such changes in any significant 
degree or extent. In other words, we shall prefer the “hard cash” of objective 
experimental evidence to any logical “promise to pay,” however tight and compulsive its 
reasoning.707 
Therefore, the biometric work of Bumpus, Crampton, Weldon, and others, whether 
producing positive or negative results, were insufficient.708 Pearl’s review of the literature 
 
706 Jennings, “Observed Changes in Hereditary Characters in Relation to Evolution,” 300. 
707 Raymond Pearl, “The Selection Problem,” The American Naturalist 51 (1917): 68. Emphasis original. 
Pearl traced the current debate to Weismann’s speculative declaration of the Allmacht of natural selection, 
stated as recently as 1909. Pearl, 65–66. 
708 In this list, Pearl also included di Cesnola, Davenport, Lutz, Harris, Kellogg and Bell, and himself. 
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led him to believe that even the “experimental and quantitative evidence regarding 
selective elimination” was “distinctly meager” and the “net result … not so clear-cut and 
outstanding as could be wished.” He believed that if a scientist were to visit from another 
planet and observe the situation, they would conclude 
that in some cases natural elimination is certainly in some degree selective, while in other 
cases it certainly is not; and in the most favorable cases of all the selection is apparently 
not very rigorous. Grossly teratological abnormalities are eliminated. But the small 
deviations from type, which in theory ought to furnish the basis of selection, appear upon 
quantitative study less generally and sharply determinative of survival than might 
reasonably have been expected theoretically.709 
Thus, even if Jennings were correct regarding the size and frequency of inheritable 
variation, it remained uncertain whether selection in nature could detect them. That is, 
Jennings in 1916 had failed to account for the problem introduced by Jennings in 1908. 
This may explain why Pearl curiously wrote that many evolutionary changes “come 
about by relatively large, discontinuous steps,” one of the few instances of a pure line 
worker declaring so.710 
  According to Pearl, the problem for the theory of natural selection was that it was 
developed as a “somatic theory.”711 But any theory of evolution rested on associated 
theories of variation and inheritance, which had been revised by Mendelism and the 
“epoch-making researches of Johannsen.” Biologists needed to be “extremely cautious in 
assuming a priori that any particular somatic difference is so inherited.” Another 
troublesome fact, which MacDowell emphasized (discussed below), was that individuals 
“possess … the power of personal, immediate, individual, somatic adaptation to the 
environment,” negating a “function of any static, single-valued relation between” soma 
and environment. It would work if selection acted upon the germ cells, but this was rarely 
the case.712 Indeed, Pearl noted that when Jennings had worried over whether his 
 
Pearl, “The Selection Problem,” 69–70. as well as Poulton, Sanders, Reighard? 
709 Pearl, 71. This is somewhat reminiscent of Jennings’ Problem. 
710 Pearl, 74. Keep in mind that he had earlier rejected the notion that mutations were always large. It is also 
worth noting that most mutationist then did not seek a way out of this dilemma, possibly because their own 
methods of selection – reducing a population’s variation or heterozygosity – were effective. 
711 Pearl, 72, 74. 
712 Although Pearl had experimentally shown the positive selective effects of alcohol on the germ cells of 
domestic fowl (but Stockard found it a negative effect in guinea pigs). “Here is real selection making real 
evolutionary progress.” Pearl, 75. 
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selections were rigorous enough in Difflugia, that he had switched from selecting by an 
individual’s phenotype to the qualities of its offspring. Pearl pointed out to Jennings that 
this as a change in “the fundamental basis of selection” from somatic to germinal, 
consistent with his own poultry work.713 Not only does this point to the pure line workers’ 
acceptance of natural selection, but also their careful distinctions. 
Pearl admonished his fellow biologists for their use of statements by practical 
breeders in support of their own academic theories. Specifically, he charged them for not 
acknowledging that breeders, unconcerned with or not privy to academic debates, did not 
use the word “selection” with precision.”714 Furthermore, a systematic study of the 
origins of cultivated crops revealed selection to be relatively unimportant.715 In the 
production of these cultivars, “selection, in the sense of the accumulation of minute 
favorable variations, has had no part.”716 Instead, the “experience of practical breeders” 
pointed to “improved conditions of domestication, mutations …, hybridization …, and 
the purification of previously mixed races or varieties by selective sorting.”717 Although 
Pearl did not note it, this was precisely what East and Shull were doing with maize at the 
time. 
 
In May 1917, Jennings published an edited version of his address that purportedly 
ended the “controversy.”718 Jennings wrote, 
It is curious to find that their [“mutationists”] studies of Drosophila furnished almost all 
that could be asked by the radical selectionist as to the existence of a single unit character 
 
713 Pearl to Jennings (1917/1/15), APS Pearl, Box 15, “Jennings, Herbert Spencer 1914-1918,” folder 8. It is 
also located in Jennings’ correspondence papers with Pearl  at APS. 
714 Pearl cited an example of a breeder developing a new breed of poultry via a complicated cross who 
called “the series of matings as … ‘this process of selection’!” Pearl, “The Selection Problem,” 75–76. 
Emphasis original. 
715 Grape varieties usually resulted from the mere transplantation of “chance seedlings” or some basic 
hybridization, as was the case for “apples, plums, cherries, strawberries, etc.” In the case of the blueberry, a 
breeder discovered that only an acid soil and a nitrogen-fixing root fungus were required for successful 
domestication. Pearl’s colleague Surface had generated the “Maine 340” oat variety, the most widely grown 
in the state, by mere isolation. Its nearest competitor originated from an individual discovered on a 
roadside.” 
716 Pearl, “The Selection Problem,” 78–80. 
717 Pearl, 81. The history of animal breeding methods was more complicated, but in bantams Pearl found 
that selection by itself was insufficient. 
718 Jennings, “Modifying Factors and Multiple Allelomorphs in Relation to the Results of Selection,” 303. 
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in in a series of numerous hereditary gradations.719 
Indeed, “by selective crossbreeding it is possible to bring together into one stock all the 
modifiers that have been produced in diverse stocks. Mendelism acts as a tremendous 
accelerator to the effectiveness of selection.”720  
Pearl wrote to Jennings soon thereafter, acknowledging his clarity, and agreed that 
“the controversy would be at an end, so far at least as I am concerned, … if the 
selectionist stopped here, instead of going on to the further, and as it seems to me wholly 
unwarranted and preposterous assertion to the effect that the selection is the cause of the 
alteration in the hereditary constitution.”721 While Pearl did not think Jennings believed 
this, “Castle does & has said it with all the vigor of a fanatic.” Pearl believed that no one 
disagreed with Jennings’ statement that “selection could accumulate genetic differences if 
they exist already,” but it was over the initial cause of variation where the opposing 
camps disagreed. Pearl did believe, however, that Jennings held “the key whereby I can 
work myself out in my own thinking to the right conclusion, as a matter of logic.”722 
In response, Jennings questioned whether “all your anti-selectionist colleagues 
agree in admitting all the basic facts for the gradual operation of selection.” (He did not 
name anyone.) He did agree with Pearl, however, that “it is evident that all that selection 
can do is to preserve what is already existing; that it cannot originate, or as you put it, 
‘initiate variation.’” Indeed, the Difflugia work did not address the origin question 
because Jennings considered it a settled matter; instead, the work was designed to test 
“concrete, experimental questions” regarding the size of hereditary variations and 
whether selection could accumulate these variations in a desired direction. To that end, 
Jennings was “free to say that to me the answer was not a foregone conclusion and that 
indeed I was somewhat surprised at the result.”723 And, contrary to Pearl’s belief, “there 
was extensive difference of opinion on this matter.” He reiterated that the origin question 
did not appear to be “the important question” and was instead “non-experimental.” Here, 
 
719 Jennings, 303–5. 
720 Jennings, 306. Emphasis mine. 
721 I discuss in the conclusion however that I do not believe Jennings played a particularly “clarifying” role 
in the debate and was more obfuscatory. 
722 Pearl to Jennings (1917/5/4), APS Pearl, Box 15, “Jennings, Herbert Spencer 1914-1918,” folder 8. 
Emphasis original.  




Jennings perhaps showed his academic leanings, for the question of the origin of 
variation was quite a practical matter for many of his colleagues. 
The nature of selection remained important to Jennings because he saw no 
“naturalistic explanation of adaptation save through selection. [Although] I have no 
leaning toward making selection a general explanation…” Thus, he expounded upon the 
question, “What can selection conceivably do?” even though he inexplicably considered 
it “of minor interest.” He sought to clarify the dispute, wondering if Pearl was “in a little 
danger of having [his] judgement [sic] affected by the spirit of controversy...” In his 
letter, Jennings differentiated among five plausible effects of selection to which Pearl left 
marginal notes in response. First, selection can “accumulate” extant hereditary variations. 
Pearl: “Yes.” Second, “the act of selecting, in a given instance, can have no effect on the 
variation; cannot ‘initiate,’ cannot produce anything. Here I agree with you completely.” 
Pearl: “Yes.” Third, 
But may not the present selection determine what variation shall or shall not appear? If 
we find now A, B, and C, and I select A, and kill off B and C, — may not A later produce 
variations (in its progeny) which B would not have produced, if it had been the one 
selected? I see no logical difficulty in this; indeed it appears to me probably true. I had 
always assumed that this was the idea underlying the notion of a ‘dynamic effect’ by 
selection; or of the production of variation by selection, such expressions are crude and 
inaccurate things, I supposed they had a reality underlying them.724 
Pearl noted at this point that “If this is what is meant then why don’t the selectionist say 
so in his paper?”725 Indeed, this was rather close to Pearl’s point to Jennings about 
germinal versus somatic selection. Jennings continued, “If it be true that by the present 
selection the future variation is determined, in unlimited ages the results might go far. 
This is what our friend Longley means I take it by his cryptic utterance that selection may 
affect the course of evolution even though it may not alter the germ plasm.”726 Pearl: 
“This is a question of fact. To be answered by keeping, not by killing off. Logically, it 
 
724 This is a somewhat odd statement given that Jennings is the only one to have ever used this phrase, in 
1910, as far as I can tell. 
725 For a possible example of what Pearl would have considered the lack of clarity from selectionists, see 
this quote from earlier from Castle: “the further evolution of our domestic animals and cultivated plants 
(and of man himself) is to some extent controllable because we can by selection influence the variability of 
later generations” (Journal of the Washington Academy of Sciences 7 (1917): 372–73). 
726 This refers to W. H. Longley, “The Selection Problem,” American Naturalist 51 (1917): 250-256. 
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seems probably true. Factually what little evidence there is seems divided [about] 
equally.”  
The fourth and fifth methods of selection were what Jennings thought Castle may 
possibly support. Fourth, and “rather moonshiny, yet not utterly inconceivable,” was the 
“possibility that by saving stocks that tend to vary, and killing off those that do not, one 
can get more and more variation as generations pass?” Pearl: “Yes, but it is in need of 
experimental trial. …” Last, is it possible that by “saving stocks that tend to vary in a 
particular way or direction, and killing off those that vary otherwise, one can get in later 
generations a more marked tendency to vary in that direction? This again seems not 
utterly inconceivable, though I do not see that there is any evidence that it is true, and to 
one it seems improbable.”  
Although Castle did not participate in this conversation and would not necessarily 
use their language, it is worth considering where he would have fallen along these 
distinctions. I suggest that Castle would have agreed with (1) selection accumulates 
heredity changes, agreed with but had begun to waiver on whether (2) selection initiates 
variation, asserted most strongly that (3) selection shapes future variation, i.e., the sliding 
scale, and definitely (5), selection produces further variation in that direction. Whether he 
would have agreed or disagreed with (4) is unclear, although his brief proposal for the 
notion of “fixed” and “plastic” genes may matched it. For his part, Jennings figured that 
Castle meant by “dynamic effect of selection” or “selection causing variation” the last 
two points, although Jennings did not “hold any brief” for them. Pearl thought these 
options were “logically” possible, but “Castle’s work does not prove it. Must have 
individual analysis.” Jennings argued, however, that accepting Point 2 (that selection did 
not cause initial variation) did not “touch” or logically “annihilate” 4 and 5; instead, they 
“require to be met explicitly.” Indeed, this is where Castle had ended his argumentation, 
although not very clearly: he could accept that selection did not create mutations but 
argued that selection shaped their basis and direction. Furthermore, as clarifying as these 
distinctions may have been, it also is somewhat of a retreat from the populational 
perspective that had emerged from East, Pearl, and Shull earlier: Jennings discussed 
selection in the abstract in the letter, rather than making differences based on the effects 
of selection in populations. 
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Jennings thought his ultimately bridgeable differences with Pearl might be due to 
his “having lived for two or three years in close communion with an organism that 
persisted in showing slight hereditary variations that could be accumulated, so that by 
selection marked changes of stock could be brought about. One doesn’t do through such 
an experience without its leaving an effect!” He proposed a joint paper to Pearl to work 
out the selection problem, but unfortunately for the historian, Pearl visited Jennings 
within two weeks of the latter’s reply and a collaborative article never appeared. The 
American intervention in World War I, in which Pearl worked under Herbert Hoover in 
the Inter-Allied Scientific Food Commission, may have prevented such work. The next 
available letter in their correspondence was a little over a year later in which Pearl 
announced his resignation from the Maine Agricultural Experiment Station to join 
Jennings at Johns Hopkins as Professor of Biometry and Vital Statistics in the School of 
Hygiene and Vital Statistics.727 
 
The Drosophilists Analyze the Physical Basis of Genetic Evolution 
 
The last major volleys of the debate were launched by the Drosophilists. Although 
Morgan had commented upon and subscribed to the pure line theory as early as 1903 (and 
later, the multiple factor theory), his laboratory had mostly engaged from the sidelines, 
the exception being H. J. Muller’s direct criticism of Castle in 1915. This is not surprising 
given the laboratory’s preoccupation with the chromosome mapping projects that began 
in 1912. Starting in 1917, Sturtevant and Bridges, along with Castle’s former student, E. 
C. MacDowell, used Drosophila to counter Castle and Jennings. While Jennings had 
remarked several times that Drosophila supported the arguments of the “radical 
selectionist,” the Drosophilists themselves advocated a view like East’s and Shull’s based 
on their practical work with chromosomes. 
This section revises Robert Kohler’s depiction of the Morgan lab’s relationship to 
experimental evolution. According to Kohler, Morgan initially studied Drosophila for the 
purposes of experimental evolution, specifically to test de Vries’ theory of mutation 
 




periods. But, he then argues that the dynamics of mutation they discovered “entirely upset 
any plans for a project in experimental evolution using Drosophila.” The flies led Morgan 
to “gradual[ly] abandon … this line of work for neo-Mendelian experimental heredity,” a 
“transition from experimental evolution to modern genetics.”728 While it is certainly true 
that experimental evolution was de-prioritized, the lab’s major work, The Mechanism of 
Mendelian Heredity (1915), as well as Morgan’s A Critique of the Theory of Evolution 
(1916), contained extensive commentaries on experimental evolution, including the work 
of the Jennings’ laboratory. This view further relies upon a partially artificial distinction 
between experimental evolution and “neo-Mendelian experimental heredity.” But as I 
have shown so far in this chapter, East, Shull, Pearl, and even Castle and Jennings, 
integrated Mendelism and selection through experimental evolution. Furthermore, 
Sturtevant and Bridges directly engaged Castle and Jennings with original work in 
experimental evolution by redeploying their chromosome mapping techniques in its 
service.  
 
Beyond criticizing his former mentor for misinterpreting his results as contrary to 
pure lines, factor constancy, and multiple factors, E. C. MacDowell at the Station for 
Experimental Evolution took up Drosophila to provide a new positive contribution in the 
late stages of these debates. MacDowell took on the issue of “genetic indeterminism.” 
Whereas Pearl had asked if selection alters a population or a character, MacDowell 
considered “the crux of the selection problem [to be] whether abmodal parents have 
abmodal children. Specifically, it is, do parents with higher bristle grades produce 
children with higher bristle grades?”729 Thus, MacDowell addressed Pearl’s charge 
against Castle that his theory consisted of “genetic indeterminism.” 
MacDowell conducted pure line and selection experiments on mutations for more 
or fewer bristles, reminiscent of Castle’s hooded rats, yet arrived at opposite conclusions. 
MacDowell was able to make use of the experimental virtues of the fly: he propagated 
 
728 Robert E. Kohler, Lords of the Fly: Drosophila Genetics and the Experimental Life (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1994), 43–45. 
729 MacDowell, “Bristle Inheritance in Drosophila. II. Selection,” Journal of Experimental Zoology 23 
(1917), 119. MacDowell, 119. This is Jennings’ fifth form of selection, Castle’s sliding scale. 
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flies for 49 generations, counting over 100,000, easily surpassing Castle’s 33,000 rats.730 
Each generation was the progeny of two parents, a bottleneck that allowed rigorous 
inbreeding without necessarily injuring the stock’s vigor. In the early stages, selection 
rapidly increased, but later ceased to change the mean number of bristles, replicating the 
varying rate of change he derived from Castle’s data, and pointing to selection as an 
isolating mechanism.731 He detected strong, but impermanent and random fluctuations 
due to environmental changes or methodological shortcuts.732 MacDowell also collected 
the data for extreme variations, finding that the lower limit never increased and the 
highest point occurred early in the experiment and was not inherited.733 He also found 
that “high parental averages are not accompanied by high filial averages,” and rather the 
means were transmitted, i.e., somatic appearance and genetic variation were not 1:1.734 
The flies demonstrated what MacDowell saw in the rats, and conformed with Pearl’s 
Mendelian-mutationist argument. In contrast, Castle’s theories of a single varying factor, 
potency, and gametic contamination could not account for the failure of reverse selection 
or the restoration of selection’s power after crossing a selected line with normal flies.735  
However, the fluctuations MacDowell presented a problem along the lines of 
“Jennings’ Problem,” the possibility that fluctuations from environmental effects mask 
genetic variation from selection’s view. Initially, selection was capable of sorting between 
heterozygous stocks. But the variation that remained in the genetically homozygous 
stocks MacDowell concluded was mostly due to age and environmental action, the latter 
enough so that “the number of extra bristles appearing can be controlled to a certain 
extent;” not by selection, but through the environmental manipulation of nutrition, 
moisture, and temperature.736 This was shown by contemporary experimental lines 
 
730 This paper does not provide sample sizes, but MacDowell mentions this number in “The Bearing of 
Selection Experiments with Drosophila upon the Frequency of Germinal Changes,” PNAS  3 (1917): 292. 
731 MacDowell, “Bristle Inheritance in Drosophila. II. Selection, 124–25. 
732 MacDowell, pressed for time during some generations, could not count all the flies; flies that emerge 
earlier tend to have more bristles, skewing the data. Generations 32 to 49 were raised in constant 
temperature rooms to eliminate environmental confounding (p. 113). 
733 MacDowell, “Bristle Inheritance in Drosophila. II. Selection,” 109–16. 
734 MacDowell, 122–23. 
735 To account for the restoration of selection’s power following a cross with normal flies, “contamination 
theory” entailed that the “allelomorphic mates” must “fuse” and “then that this fusion weakens the power 
of that factor for forming extra bristles,” but in some cases must not be weakened at all. 
736 MacDowell, “Bristle Inheritance in Drosophila. II. Selection,” 139. 
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exhibiting parallel changes over time. MacDowell thought this conclusion, that the 
environment could “overpower” genetic differences, was worthy of more attention. It 
may allow for some human control over biological growth, but it produced 
methodological problems for experimental evolution: MacDowell suggested that Castle 
“ignore[d] the scope of the influence of environment.” Instead, 
… there is very little support for the supposition that the soma mirrors the germ plasm in 
all cases except when obvious environmental relations are found. It seems hardly possible 
that one can look forward to ever establishing firmly an exact relationship between soma 
and germ plasm, at least in bi-sexual multicellular animals.737 
However, MacDowell was cautious to not extrapolate too far from this experiment. One 
could claim that MacDowell’s experiment could not detect small germinal changes akin 
to Difflugia’s. But MacDowell in turn claimed that the opposing camp had not fully 
controlled for environmental effects. And when considering practical conditions, a 
breeder could never hope for the standardized environment that would reveal such minute 
genetic variation. Thus, MacDowell adopted a version of Jennings’ Problem: 
The claim [that undetectable variation is occurring] may be made, but it will give neither 
the breeder, nor natural selection any opportunity to make progress. It appears that 
instead of offering a fatal objection to the work here reported, the evident environmental 
factor serves well to emphasize the utter futility of attempting to deal in theory or fact 
with supposed germinal phenomena that can never be demonstrated or utilized.738 
To whom this assertion was directed is unclear, but it seems likely that he was 
challenging Jennings’ claim for the universality of new variation’s ubiquity. He 
concluded “no change that could have either evolutionary or practical significance has 
occurred in these units [determining bristle number] during the 50 generations of the 
experiment.”739 To some degree, MacDowell foreshadowed Castle’s own pessimistic 
conclusion in 1919. 
 
The Drosophilists Alfred Sturtevant and Calvin Bridges hammered at Castle’s 
 
737 MacDowell, 140. 
738 MacDowell, “The Bearing of Selection Experiments with Drosophila upon the Frequency of Germinal 
Changes,” 296. 
739 MacDowell, 297. In 1920, MacDowell calculated new correlation coefficients and confirmed the 
conclusions he presented in this paper. Edwin Carleton MacDowell, “Bristle Inheritance in Drosophila. III. 
Correlation,” Journal of Experimental Zoology 30 (1920): 419–460. 
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theories of gametic contamination and selection’s creativity. Having developed the 
chromosomal theory of heredity using linkage mapping techniques, Sturtevant and 
Bridges now deployed it to address evolutionary questions, without which “any claim 
that factors can themselves be changed can have no finality.”740 In contrast to how Castle 
and Jennings hedged on questions of the mechanics undergirding evolutionary change, 
they were able to demonstrate the existence of modifying factors and their implications 
for evolution. This is an important historiographical point: the Morgan lab at this time, 
and especially his students, are usually portrayed as just (physical) geneticists, but they 
also saw their work as part of a larger science of evolution.  
Published by CIW, “An Analysis of the Effects of Selection” was the Drosophilist 
answer to Castle’s guinea pigs. Focusing on “variability in bristle number” in the 
Mendelian mutant Dichæt (“two-bristled”), Sturtevant, starting from a range of zero to 
seven bristles, selected in the plus and minus directions, crossed them, tested for the 
presence of modifying factors, and argued against contamination. He concluded, 
unsurprisingly, that “selection is usually effective only in isolating genetic differences 
already present; and that genes are relatively stable, not being contaminated in 
heterozygotes, and mutating only very rarely.”741 MacDowell had also conducted 
selection experiments with bristle number, but his flies did not vary to the degree that 
Dichæt did, possibly providing material for selection.742 
Sturtevant reduced the selection problem and the method of his experiment to the 
following formula: if Castle was right, then selection should be as effective within inbred 
stocks as any other, but if his opponents were right, then the rate of change should slow 
down quickly but regain speed when crossed (due to more modifying factors to sort 
between).743 There were four experimental lines: inbred plus and minus and crossbred 
plus and minus, carried out for up to fourteen generations with a total of 3,504 flies, 
 
740 Finding a mutation for shorter wings (truncate), the laboratory bred the culture for shorter wings for 
three years. They were then able to locate at least three modifying factors and even isolate and recombine 
them. Morgan, A Critique of the Theory of Evolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1916), 166-
170. 
741 Sturtevant, An Analysis of the Effects of Selection (Washington, D.C.: CIW, vol. 264, 1918), 3. 
742 Sturtevant, 4–5. Like MacDowell, Sturtevant checked for environmental effects, finding some 
significant differences between “broods” with identical pedigrees raised in separate bottles. Because they 
were inbred for four generations, he considered differences in modifying factors, such as genetic 
differences in rates of crossing-over, unlikely. Sturtevant, 6–7. 
743 Sturtevant, 8–9. 
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finding that the mean bristle number did not significantly change. Reverse selection had 
no effect. One line did respond to minus and reverse selection, providing “perhaps the 
clearest evidence of the effectiveness of selection that we have yet observed.”744 Yet 
Sturtevant maintained that the wealth of evidence pointed towards the Drosophilists’ 
theory of multiple modifying factors. 
In a complicated series of crosses, Sturtevant used linkage mapping to find the 
modifiers. He located modifiers on the second chromosome in addition to one or two on 
the third. He also identified mutations and determined whether they were allelomorphs or 
modifying factors, “a striking illustration of the danger of arguments as to the identity of 
characters based on similarity of appearance.”745 
According to Sturtevant, Dichæte flies were a perfect test of Castle’s theory of 
gametic contamination. Because Dichæte was lethal when homozygous, making Dichæte 
flies necessarily heterozygous, half of their offspring were wildtype homozygous flies. If 
contamination were true, a stock kept for more than forty generations should contain 
wildtype flies with fewer bristles than usual given they were borne of heterozygous 
parents in which the gametes united and perhaps blended. However, Sturtevant claimed 
that “there is no evidence that any progressive change has occurred…” In the selected 
stocks, normal flies occasionally had fewer bristles in the minus series and more bristles 
in the plus series (with only one exception among 477 flies), not unexpected if modifiers 
were accumulating.746 The experimental evidence of more than forty generations, 
combined with Sturtevant’s detailed dismissal of Castle’s list of cases of gametic 
contamination, contradicted Castle’s entire theory.747 
Sturtevant provided his analysis of the “selection problem.” Whether selection 
was responsible for de novo “germinal differences” Sturtevant considered 
“incomprehensible” and without evidence.748 Citing MacDowell, he suggested that the 
 
744 Sturtevant, 10–19, 22–23. 
745 Sturtevant, 23–28, 32–34. 
746 Sturtevant, 34–35. 
747 According to Sturtevant, the known cases of contamination were consistent with multiple factors, 
remained untested, or were based on unreliable data. Combined with the evidence against contamination, 
provided by Sturtevant and Muller, and how Castle resorted to “non-genetic factors,” it was Castle’s theory 
that was now superfluous. Sturtevant, An Analysis of the Effects of Selection, 39–46. 
748 Bridges’ take on this question was that “there is not one iota of evidence to show that either the rate or 
the direction of the mutation processes” are “altered by such selection.” However, in large populations or 
“when mutation in the direction of selection occurs, there should be a jump in the speed of progression.” 
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evidence in favor of such a scheme was likely the result of the scientist “examining his 
animals or plants for that character with unusual care,” an experimental artifact. Instead, 
mutations could occur during an experiment independently of selection, but because these 
were relatively rare, selection instead mostly relied upon extant variation.749 This was 
especially the case when one considered that most populations were not inbred, hence 
“likely to be heterozygous for factors influencing many characters,” including 
modifiers.750 Sturtevant also suggested that the linkage mapping work logically entailed 
that a majority of mutations would occur within the more frequent modifiers than in the 
main factors. As Bridges pointed out, Castle’s theory required “repeated mutation in a 
single locus,” which was “theoretically possible,” but unlikely. Any genetics-based 
experimental evolution needed to demonstrate that these variations were not already 
present in the stock. 
Bridges’ response to Jennings’ use of Drosophila eye color the following year 
tackled Castle’s sliding scale theory. Whereas Jennings claimed that Bridges had shown 
eye color mutations to fall along a unidimensional spectrum, the historical “origin” of 
“these modifiers were entirely independent of one another.” Because of their careful 
record keeping, Bridges could show their independent origins: Cream a appeared on July 
15, 1913, and Cream c appeared on July 21, 1916. Bridges demonstrated that the order of 
their occurrence bears only a random relationship to this spectrum, a “purely artificial and 
descriptive scale.” Therefore, Castle’s sliding scale theory did not apply: the genetics 
showed there was no scale to slide along. Rather, selection was able to act upon a 
“multiple heterozygous stock” made of a “combination of several … simple modifiers.” 
Bridges asserted, contrary to Jennings, that Castle’s hypothesis was “parallel,” but not 
identical.751 
 
Bridges, “Specific Modifiers of Eosin Eye Color in Drosophila Melanogaster,” Journal of Experimental 
Zoology 28 (1919): 380. 
749 Sturtevant thought this was the explanation for Castle’s “mutants” and wondered why Castle considered 
it a special case, rather than the norm for all variation.  
750 Later in the paper, Sturtevant addressed the need for published pedigrees to determine whether Castle’s 
inbreeding was sufficient to eliminate initial heterozygosity. He cited examples from thoroughbred horses 
that demonstrated the need. Sturtevant, 47–48. 
751 Bridges, “Specific Modifiers of Eosin Eye Color in Drosophila Melanogaster,” 371, 381, 338, 378. 
Bridges described how evolution would work in this way: “The first result of selection in such a 
heterogeneous stock in the direction of lighter forms would be to pick out individuals homozygous for one 
or more of the modifiers and probably heterozygous for others. These different individuals of course would 
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Bridges also addressed the question of variation size and the definition of 
mutation. Although Jennings and Castle claimed that the Drosophilists had redefined the 
word to suit their theory, Bridges countered that this broader interpretation, which did not 
originate with them, was clarifying. Bridges wrote, 
In our opinion, the attempted distinctions between ‘saltations,’ ‘mutations,’ and 
‘variations of slight degree’ have led rather to confusion of thought than to clearer 
thinking. To us these are all a single class, ‘mutations,’ and the term carries no restrictions 
of degree, covering the most extreme as well as the slightest detectable inherited 
variation.752 
Perhaps to the Drosophilists’ own detriment, Bridges noted they tended to focus on 
visible mutations. They were aware of the trade-offs of their work: slight mutations were 
probably more important biologically and evolutionarily, but extreme mutations were 
experimentally tractable. This dialectical argument, that qualitatively these quantities 
were essentially the same yet differed in experimental tractability, is what allowed them 
to experimentally counter Castle. 
Sturtevant concluded with a summary of the theoretical results of their work: 
That many characters may be influenced by more than one pair of genes has long been 
recognized, and this is the essence of the multiple-factor view. That genes exist which 
require the action of other genes before they produce visible effects has also been long 
known. Furthermore, that there are genes which produce very slight visible effects is now 
another commonplace. Given these three facts, and the hypothesis (which is supported by 
much specific evidence) that most races are heterozygous for a number of such genes is 
all that is required to complete the conception that is held by most adherents of the view 
that multiple factors or modifying genes are responsible for the results of selection. … 
Factors do change, and more than two forms are possible for certain loci; but there is no 
known method of inducing such changes, and they are ordinarily quite rare and 
definite.753 
Therefore, in the views of Sturtevant and Bridges, the mutationist and pure line 
 
not necessarily be homozygous for the same factors, and therefore the population might still remain 
heterogeneous for these factors. Continued selection would result in a greater and greater degree of 
homozygosity and homogeneity and a consequent slowing down of the speed of the progression of the 
population in the direction of selection. The grade of the form reached when the population is homozygous 
and homogeneous would depend on the number and character of the particular modifiers in the initial 
population” (p. 378). 
752 Bridges, 382. 
753 Sturtevant, 51. 
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theories of evolution and selection proposed by their laboratory as well as by East and 
Shull was consistent with a Mendelism upon which they had also elaborated and made 
physical. Furthermore, this shows that the Drosophilists had evolution in mind as they 
conducted their genetics work and made a serious contribution to its development 
through this debate.754 Sturtevant’s and Bridges’ independent and late intervention in the 
debate shows how there was a conceptually distinct and coherent theory of evolution that 
united most of the experimental evolutionists despite their lack of central and united 
program (as seen in the Synthesis). 
 
 
Castle's Concession and the Limits to Control 
 
In 1919, Castle conceded. His former student, Sewall Wright, had suggested a 
“crucial experiment.” Wright, who had long accepted the evolutionary and genetic views 
of East, proposed an experiment that could determine whether the hooded factor was 
modified by accessory factors. Castle crossed plus and minus lines with a third wildtype 
race. He then extracted the hooded character as a recessive in the F2 generation. As he 
repeated these crosses, they rapidly converged as modifying factors were removed. He 
concluded “that three or at most four crosses with a wild race suffice to obliterate all the 
racial differences which had been induced by ten generations of selection in the case of 
the plus race and sixteen generations in the case of the minus race.” Castle pointed out 
that Phillips and he had offered this scenario as a possibility in their 1914 publication but 
had considered the evidence insufficient. But with this crucial experiment in addition to 
the Drosophilists’ linkage techniques showing the presence of modifiers, the opposing 
view was “greatly strengthened.”755 While Castle apologized for his “own obtuseness,” 
he defended the usefulness of his adversarial role: he “recall[ed] with satisfaction how 
much clearer the rôle of selection now stands revealed than it did when these experiments 
 
754 Oddly, though, Sturtevant’s selection experiment did not leave a legacy within the Morgan lab; for 
example, Dobzhansky, despite being a close collaborator of Sturtevant in the 1930s, never mentioned it. I 
suggest this is due to their physical proximity (i.e., lack of correspondence) and that the debate’s conclusion 
meant that later scientists would not cite individual articles and instead accept the results as general 
knowledge. 
755 W. E. Castle, “Piebald Rats and Selection, A Correction,” The American Naturalist 53 (1919): 373. 
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were begun…”756 His work also showed that even if he misunderstood the genetic 
mechanics of his experimental systems, selection was arguably creative and powerful, 
influencing Fisher, among others.757 
Castle did not fully adopt his opponents’ position, finding a way to keep the 
creativity of selection. He agreed with Jennings that mutations were more common than 
usually thought, in both pure lines and cross-fertilizing species, thus allowing for 
selection to operate. This was shown especially by the research on maize by Emerson and 
Hayes. It was just that “modifying factors rather than repeated mutation seems to be the 
explanation…”758 Castle also argued that when he had begun his work, “he was treated as 
a traitor to Mendelism who saw any utility in selection or advocated its use as a means of 
improving the inherited characters of animals or plants.”759 Now, “that selection … is an 
effective agency in producing racial changes is not questioned to-day…” 
Castle hoped that this was not the end of the story for experimental evolution. 
Although there was no evidence in its favor, he wondered “whether the direction of 
genetic variation is controllable, other than by manipulation of modifying genes or the 
discovery of multiple allelomorphs…” Whether or not a breeder could “produce 
variability of a genetic character” remained to be determined. But with pessimism, Castle 
concluded his now seventeen-year-old mission to control with evolution with the remark: 
“we certainly at present have to follow nature’s lead rather than to lead nature, as regards 




 In 1910 Shull declared that it was “the era of experimental evolution.”760 Yet few 
if any historians have described this time period as such. What these two chapters have 
 
756 Castle, 374. 
757 Gayon, Darwinism’s Struggle for Survival, 314. 
758 Castle, 375. In a footnote, Castle complained that Sturtevant had misrepresented his definition of 
contamination. Castle claimed that he only ever applied contamination to the visible character, not the 
genetic factor itself. Thus, he considered the addition or subtraction of modifying factors to be a form of 
contamination. Either Castle is misrepresenting the history (as he repeatedly did with regard to mutation 
size) or never clarified what he meant. 
759 Castle, 374. 
760 George Shull, “Heredity as an Exact Science,” Botanical Gazette, 1910, 226. 
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done is help establish that Shull was correct. While historians would see much of the 
content as genetics, the scientists saw it as the experimental study of evolution as a 
process to be controlled. Furthermore, Shull and East, especially, initially took more 
influence from Hugo de Vries, Wilhelm Johannsen, their breeder contemporaries, and 
even Darwin, than they did William Bateson and Gregor Mendel. That Castle did initially 
take inspiration from Bateson and Mendel, yet became one of Mendelism’s main 
antagonists demonstrates that viewing this era as broader than just Mendelism and 
genetics is essential to understand what happened. Additionally, Jennings worked entirely 
without Mendelian theory. I suggest then that Stoltzfus and I were correct to call this 
loosely agreed-upon theory that emerged from their work as Mendelian-mutationism.761 
And, I argue that experimental evolution should become a more prominent category in 
the historical analysis of biology in the early twentieth century: it describes their motives 
and approach to process, but without tying all scientists into a theory (Mendelism, 
genetics, etc.) with which they did not always agree.  
The arguably most intensive attempts to scientifically control evolution led to a 
more precise understanding of the genetic process of evolution by 1920. Biologists now 
saw selection as acting upon a population’s genetic makeup, increasing or reducing 
inheritable variation or its heterozygosity and homozygosity. They also had a better 
understanding of inbreeding and hybridization (although the notion of “hybrid vigor,” or 
later, “heterosis,” still required explanation). Mutations versus fluctuations was a key 
distinction to make with major implications to work out, even if in retrospect it seems 
rather banal. I have also pointed out throughout the chapter that these biologists were in 
the process of making the transition to “population thinking.” Ernst Mayr, who coined the 
distinction between typological/essentialist and population thinking, argued somewhat 
similarly, when he briefly notes that contrary to de Vries and Johannsen, “other 
geneticists who had entered genetics from natural history or from animal or plant 
breeding, like Nilsson-Ehle in Sweden, East, Jones, Jennings, Castle, and Payne in the 
United States … made findings which showed that there is no conflict between the 
genetic evidence and either natural selection, gradualness of evolution, or population 
 
761 Arlin Stoltzfus and Kele Cable, “Mendelian-Mutationism: The Forgotten Evolutionary Synthesis,” 
Journal of the History of Biology 47 (2014): 501–46. 
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thinking.” Yet, as I have shown in Chapters 2, 4, and 5, their theory of evolution emerged 
from de Vries and Johannsen: Mayr labeled their theories as “antiselectionist” and 
“saltational,” but I argue that this is too one-sided and ignores that a rejection of 
Darwinian selection does not make one “anti-selectionist.” 762 Mayr’s static dichotomy 
allows no space for latency, emergence, and transition that is the hallmark of this period 
in the history of evolution. Rather, de Vries, Johannsen, East, Shull, Castle, Jennings, 
Pearl, the Morgan lab, among others, all contributed to what Jean Gayon called a 
“kinetic” theory of selection within a population that was then mathematized by the 
theoretical population geneticists, Wright, Fisher, and Haldane.763 
Jennings himself offered his own version of events as they occurred which is 
worth remarking upon. In one intriguing quotation, Jennings remarked: 
it appears to me that the work on Drosophila is supplying a complete foundation for 
evolution through selection of minute gradations. … The objections raised by the 
mutationists to gradual change through selection are breaking down as a result of the 
thoroughness of the mutationists’ own studies.764 
I argue that this is somewhat misunderstanding what happened. Both Jennings and Castle 
attacked strawmen, emphasizing that the mutationists argued for large mutations whereas 
Darwinians argued for small variations, whereas the mutationists almost always 
emphasized themselves that mutations could be of any size. The hailing of the Drosophila 
work as correcting this purported mistake is common, but incorrect. Where Jennings is 
correct, though, and I have never been sure if he was being genuine or sarcastic in this 
passage, is that the mutationists were indeed responsible for putting forward a “complete 
foundation for evolution through selection of minute gradations”: it is just that they never 
rejected either selection or minute gradations, but changed what both terms meant! That 
Jennings did not appreciate this fully was shown by his analysis of Drosophila eye color 
which Bridges countered.  
 
762 Ernst Mayr, The Growth of Biological Thought (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1982), 550. 
763 Jean Gayon, Darwinism’s Struggle for Survival: Heredity and the Hypothesis of Selection (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), 308-314. 
764 Jennings, “Observed Changes in Hereditary Characters in Relation to Evolution,” 300. He made a 
similar remark in his other 1917 paper: “It is curious to find that their [“mutationists”] studies of 
Drosophila furnished almost all that could be asked by the radical selectionist as to the existence of a single 
unit character in in a series of numerous hereditary gradations.” From “Modifying Factors and Multiple 
Allelomorphs in Relation to the Results of Selection,” 303-305. 
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 Yet, ironically, through control, these scientists had also encountered 
limitations.765 As Castle concluded, they had “to follow nature’s lead rather than to lead 
nature, as regards the course of evolutionary change.” Castle had for 15 years pushed for 
selection’s creativity – that it not only shaped a population’s genetic composition, but that 
it itself produced the genetic changes necessary for it to operate. Yet, Shull and East 
would probably not recognize Castle’s pessimistic conclusion. Sure, mutations were 
independent and random with respect to selection, but selection, combined with 
inbreeding and hybridization, remained powerful tools for controlling evolution. A 
particularly intriguing practical application developed by East and Shull (with Donald 
Jones and Henry Wallace) was hybrid corn using inbred lines, which emerged from this 
science of experimental evolution, yet bears little resemblance to how evolution works in 
the wild; an artificial yet dialectical pole to Mendelian-mutationism.766 
As messy and complicated as this debate within experimental evolution was, this 
was a serious attempt to understand and control evolution. This was true even if not all 
the biologists involved, such as Jennings and Sturtevant, articulated their own 
motivations as such – since other participants integrated their work into their mission to 
control. The debate also cohered through the Station for Experimental Evolution and 
 
765 As Friedrich Engels remarked on this sort of contradiction, “Thus at every step we are reminded that we 
by no means rule over nature like a conqueror over a foreign people, like someone standing outside nature - 
but that we, with flesh, blood, and brain, belong to nature, and exist in its midst, and that all our mastery of 
it consists in the fact that we have the advantage over all other beings of being able to know and correctly 
apply its laws.” From “The Part Played by Labour in the Transition from Ape to Man” (1876) in Dialectics 
of Nature, indexed at https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1876/part-played-labour/index.htm. 
766 There has been considerable debate over the impact of genetics on agriculture. The consensus appears to 
be that genetics may not have contributed new breeding methods but helped explain and rationalize the 
methods that did exist. I touch on this question in the Conclusion. For more on the science behind the 
development of hybrid corn, see Deborah Fitzgerald, The Business of Breeding: Hybrid Corn in Illinois, 
1890-1920 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990). Barbara Kimmelman and Diane Paul argue that the 
success of hybrid corn was due not only to experimental evolution but American political economy. East 
and Jones in 1919 acknowledged that selection in maize could produce better strains than the hybrid 
method; however, such strains would be propagatable by farmers, whereas hybrid corn was patentable by 
the seed companies (“Mendel in America: Theory and Practice, 1900-1917,” in The Development of 
American Biology, eds. Keith R. Benson, Jane Maienschein, and Ronald Rainger, 263–83 (New Brunswick: 
Rutgers University Press, 1988)). But as Roll-Hansen points out, this alternative but unused method was 
borne from the same science as double hybrid corn (“Theory and Practice: The Impact of Mendelism on 
Agriculture,” Comptes Rendus de l’Académie Des Sciences-Series III-Sciences de La Vie 323 (2000), 
1114). Thus, double hybrid corn as one of experimental evolution’s most important impacts is not negated 
but was one of several options that emerged from the science of experimental evolution. For Pearl’s 
perspective on his work’s applicability to agriculture, see Kathy J. Cooke, “From Science to Practice, or 
Practice to Science? Chickens and Eggs in Raymond Pearl's Agricultural Breeding Research, 1907-1916,” 
Isis 88 (1997): 62-86. 
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CIW, which funded (and published) the work of Shull, Castle, and the Morgan laboratory, 
alongside the Maine, Illinois, and Connecticut Agricultural Experiment Stations. My 
dissertation treats their work seriously as theoretically and practically important, even 
though like all sciences, it had limitations and blind spots. 
Castle articulated the limits and power of experimental evolution, or 
“experimental breeding” as he called it in “The Role of Selection in Evolution.” He did 
not think the method was superior to paleontology, biogeography, and other field studies. 
What made it unique was that “the experimental breeder can study a few successive 
generations with an intensiveness that is possible by no other method.” Yet, “his glimpses 
of evolution at work are momentary.” In a sense, the experimental evolutionist could see 
microevolution, but not the macroevolution of the paleontological record; he could 
“witness the production of new sorts but it is doubtful whether any man has witnessed the 
contemporary production of a new species.” However, pointing once again to control, 
Castle concluded that the breeder “deal[s] with the actual material concerned in organic 
evolution. He can see and handle it and observe it change under his hands.”767 
Experimentation held the potential to make evolution visible, controllable, and useful, 




















 I began this dissertation on the history of experimental evolution not with Charles 
Darwin, but with the late eighteenth-century livestock breeder, Robert Bakewell. As 
Darwin himself argued, humans had gradually exercised more control over the future 
direction of their livestock and crops, first unconsciously, but with Bakewell and his 
contemporaries, more systematically. Systematic breeding, which involves artificial 
selection, inbreeding and outcrossing, hybridizing, progeny testing, and the creative 
foresight of the breeder, emerged alongside British capitalism, enclosure, and market 
formations. But its gradual emergence from unconscious human interaction with nature 
allowed Darwin to make a leap from artifice back to nature: artificial selection was a 
special type of natural selection. While Darwin’s influence from breeders is well-known, 
considering it forms the bulk of the Origin’s first chapter, they have been overshadowed 
by Thomas Malthus. Both breeders and Malthus were capitalist influences on 
evolutionary thought, but importantly, breeders, through their practice and intervention 
upon the world, demonstrated inheritable variation and the power of selection. It was 
what Darwin called “an experiment on a gigantic scale.” Breeding was arguably 
impactful enough that Darwin’s theory of natural selection is, in large part, a theory of 
pigeon breeding. Thus, I argued that evolutionary science itself is rooted in experiment, 
and that it emerged from practice; experimental evolution precedes, in some sense, 
evolutionary thought. For Darwin, evolution was already visible, controllable, and useful, 
despite his own personal disinclination to develop the science in that direction. 
 Gregor Mendel, I argued, is rather similar. Moravia was another major European 
breeding center that had established societies and journals to develop breeding methods 
and knowledge. This culture in turn influenced Mendel. While he is not typically 
considered an evolutionary theorist, the integration coming decades later, I argued he 
worked within a tradition of experimental evolution. His famous paper, “Experiments on 
Plant Hybrids,” followed his predecessors’ work on what he called the “transformation of 
one species into another through artificial fertilisation.” Despite working in a garden 
with Pisum, Mendel saw no reason a plant would obey different natural laws under his 
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tight control than in nature. He shared a common regard with Darwin for the use of 
artificial conditions to understand the wider world.  
I argue, therefore, that much like how the steam engine preceded thermodynamics, the 
practical methods of systematic breeding preceded the theories of natural selection and 
alternative inheritance. When phrased this way, it seems obvious, but it therefore means 
that experimental evolution is at the heart of evolutionary science. Evolution was being 
controlled and used before it was scientifically understood; it being controlled and used 
was how it became understood. 
That a more conscious and direct experimental evolution was available at the 
time, but not taken up, is demonstrated by the curious case of Reverend Dallinger’s long-
term selection experiment. The work is frequently noted by today’s experimental 
evolutionists yet has not been mentioned by a single historian of biology. (The sole 
historian to discuss his work is J. W. Haas, Jr., a scholar of science and religion.) It had 
little to no influence on later developments – Davenport did not even mention him in his 
historical notes! – but did show experimental evolution’s promises and limitations. From 
the sophisticated (and vulnerable) apparatus to the microscopic subject, Dallinger’s 
experiment remarkably foreshadowed developments over a half-century later. At the 
same time, questionable antiseptic technique, iffy morphological indicators, and a design 
that could not differentiate Darwinism from Lamarckism prevented its widespread 
adoption. Dallinger did however arguably make evolution visible – his apparent sole 
goal. Darwin’s use of breeding as natural experiment in the end was far more convincing 
of evolution’s reality. 
 
Chapter 2 
As biology professionalized, the methods and standards of science became more 
precise. Two figures especially took on this project, combining natural history with 
experimentation, with ideological agitating for their proposed method: Raphael Weldon 
and Hugo de Vries. Perhaps known more for their theories, I focused on their methods. 
Weldon was a naturalist who sought to make evolution visible with statistics, a 
relatively new science itself. By carefully measuring animal populations, Weldon 
revealed subtle dimorphisms and even directional changes in sea creature populations. 
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His and Karl Pearson’s program avoided experimentation, but his study of crabs in 
Plymouth Sound transitioned from a natural experiment into an actual, massive one. The 
aloof statistical study gave way to an interventionist experiment aimed at replicating 
natural changes in the crabs’ environment to understand the cause and mechanisms 
behind the evolutionary change. In essence, they sought to avoid the excess speculation 
that dominated evolutionary thought, but these speculations needed to be dealt with 
through experimentation. Like Darwin, Weldon was not so personally interested in taking 
control of evolution himself, instead focused on evolution in the wild. Many biologists, 
particularly geneticists, rejected the “Darwinian” theory of evolution and the Pearsonian 
idealist research program with which he was associated, but his combination of statistics 
and experimentation reverberated throughout the world of experimental evolution as key 
to making evolution visible. 
Hugo de Vries was quite different despite sharing the same interest in making 
evolution visible. I spent much of my discussion of de Vries revising widespread 
misinterpretations of his experimental work and of his mutation theory. This was 
important for the dissertation because de Vries’ methods and ideas were among the most 
defining of experimental evolution’s early years in the twentieth century, whether or not a 
scientist agreed with him (particularly Castle). Using Carolyn Merchant’s formulation of 
control, de Vries’ distinction of fluctuation and mutation was key to bringing order to the 
science of heredity and variation, his followers attempting to figure out how to gain 
power over the processes. But as I show, the distinction itself resulted from trying to 
experiment with and control evolution. Ironically, Oenothera has come to define de 
Vries’ theory, but much of it was not experimental, and he instead constructed his theory 
from a wide range of botanical evidence, including horticulture, natural history, and 
selection experiments. Histories typically portrayed de Vries’ mutation theory as a dead 
end and emphasize where he went wrong, but his agitation for experimentation, the 
promise of control, as well as his mutation theory (which was more than just saying 
mutations were important) were why he was so popular and impactful.768 Unsurprisingly, 
he was invited to formally open the Station for Experimental Evolution in 1904. 
 
 




The work of Weldon and de Vries contributed to a growing sentiment among 
biologists that experimental evolution required significant investment in capital, land, and 
labor. Most calls for stations failed, but Charles Davenport succeeded in convincing the 
Carnegie Institution of Washington to fund his vision, a realization of Francis Bacon’s 
dream of a New Atlantis: The Station for Experimental Evolution at Cold Spring Harbor, 
New York. Despite his and the Station’s association with eugenics, I showed how his 
lengthy application materials and early lectures make no mention of the subject. Instead, 
Davenport elaborated upon a broad naturalistic vision of experimental evolution that 
searched for new principles for the purposes of understanding evolution and improving 
crops and livestock. The mission was to wade through the morass of contradictory 
evolutionary theories and mechanisms and breeding methods. He therefore considered 
both biologists and breeders as experimental evolution’s predecessors. The point was to 
avoid replicating the research of the country’s agricultural experiment stations, which at 
this time required the money of a robber baron. 
Davenport’s (self-admittedly) ambitious plans, the individual work of the Station’s 
resident scientists, and the difficulties encountered in making experimental evolution 
work, combined to create a rather messy and confusing history. One example was George 
Shull’s attempt to systematize the methods of Luther Burbank which ended up being a 
dead end. Overall, the Station’s work reflected the theoretical situation of the time: the 
biologists published conclusions that contradicted the others. Over time though the 
Station settled on a Mendelian view of evolution that emphasized internal factors, genes, 
and chromosomes, with mutations at the forefront of change, over environmental-based 
theories such as the inheritance of acquired characters. Oddly, selection did not play a 
prominent role in the Station’s work although it was not rejected or disputed as strongly 
as is typically portrayed at happening at that time. The explanation that Davenport 
offered was that the Station had focused on inheritance, perhaps too much, to the expense 
of variation and ecology. Thus, as messy as the Station’s work was, the theory that 
emerged from its endeavors was far more restrictive than the epistemological pluralism 
that characterized Davenport’s application to CIW. And at the time that I end my 
discussion when the Station merged with the Eugenics Record Office into the Department 
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of Genetics, the control of evolution remained mostly out of reach in Davenport’s eyes. 
However, the Station and thus Carnegie did help fund experimental evolution’s major 
dispute: the effects of selection on variation and heredity and its relationship to mutation.  
 
In the last half of the dissertation, I examined in detail a decade-long debate 
among a set of American biologists. This debate involved William Castle, George Shull, 
Edward East, Herbert Spencer Jennings, and Raymond Pearl, with minor interlocuters 
such as the Hagedoorns, H. J. Muller, Alfred Sturtevant, and Calvin Bridges.  
While the debate was theoretically over the effects of selection, it was also about 
how to control evolution. The major theories of evolution at the time suggested 
contradictory methods of breeding. In turn, these biologists used the breeding methods of 
the time to test the theories. Thus, these scientists implicitly argued that the theoretical 
problems would be solved through active intervention in the process (i.e., experimental 
evolution). A mixture of inbreeding, crossing, and selection, combined with statistical 
analysis, multiple generations, and environmental controls were the dominant methods of 
the experimental evolutionists. (A few hoped for mutation induction, but this did not 
come to pass in this period. See Campos and Curry for more on this project.769) 
Therefore, the methods of Bakewell remained the core of experimental evolution over a 
century later. 
There were key differences between breeding and experimental evolution, however: to 
paraphrase Bukharin, a special mark of science is that it accumulates practice into theory. 
The experiments of these scientists were not at all haphazard; rather, they were guided by 
the major theories of evolution at the time, namely Darwinism (defined by me here as 
emphasizing selection as creative), Mendelism, pure line theory, and the mutation theory. 
As the scientists experimented, they reassessed their ideas, and even changed major 
positions. 
I showed that Harvard geneticist William Castle served as a lightning rod around 
which the debate revolved due to his well-regarded zoological experimental systems of 
 
769 Luis Campos, Radium and the Secret of Life (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015); Helen Anne 
Curry, Evolution Made to Order: Plant Breeding and Technological Innovation in Twentieth-Century 
America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016). 
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rats, rabbits, and guinea pigs, and his increasing heretical stance against the growing 
Mendelian-mutationist orthodoxy. His emphasis on selection as creative, and evolution’s 
major controllable force, was a position that these experimental evolutionists all had to 
contend with. While he initially theorized how mutationism and Mendelism would 
operate in the wild, he dropped such efforts even as he began to emphasize his version of 
Darwinian selection.  
In parallel I discussed the botanical work of George Shull at the Station for 
Experimental Evolution and Edward East at the Connecticut Agricultural Experiment 
Station (and later Harvard’s Bussey Institute, alongside Castle). Primarily (but not 
exclusively) focused on maize, East and Shull adopted Johannsen’s pure line theory and 
de Vries’ mutation theory as their guiding principles to investigate the interaction 
between inbreeding, variation and mutation, and selection. (Despite the typical portrayal 
of these theories, East and Shull repeatedly made clear that mutations were not defined 
by size, but by inheritability.) In 1908, they came to similar conclusions that inbreeding 
did not necessarily produce “evil effects,” but instead created hereditarily stable pure 
lines that were immune to selection and frequently produced “evil effects” but not 
necessarily. In 1910, East corroborated the hypothesis of Nilsson-Ehle that continuous 
variation was produced by multiple factors, thus expanding the domain of Mendelism 
from strict alternative inheritance to more complex traits such as size. Once they 
incorporated genetics into their work, they argued that both selection and inbreeding 
reduced heterozygosity to homozygosity, but at different rates. Their continued 
experimentation with this evolutionary dynamic eventually produced the hybrid maize 
that came to dominate American agriculture – a development of experimental evolution. 
I argue that this type of work is better thought of as experimental evolution rather 
than genetics. They are very similar, and soon merged (as signified by the Station for 
Experimental Evolution’s rechristening to the Department of Genetics in 1920). But, 
these scientists continued a tradition that preceded genetics, were mostly interested in the 
dynamics of evolution and not just the question of variation and inheritance, and 
incorporated non-genetic theories – namely, mutationism and pure line theory. This is 
further shown by Herbert Spencer Jennings, who used organisms that at the time were not 
considered Mendelian organisms: the protozoa. His careful experimentation with large 
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numbers of organisms across several generations brought him to the same conclusions as 
Johannsen, but apparently independently: most visible variation was not inherited and 
was produced by the environment; and selection separated pure lines in a mixed 
population but did not create new lines. His work was also marked by his use of natural 
populations rather than domesticated plants and animals. He also worried over what I 
have called Jennings’ Problem: because pure lines differed by very small degrees, he 
wondered how selection could see them when environmentally-induced variation masked 
them. While this problem did not dominate the debates due to its concern with evolution 
in nature, it popped up repeatedly as scientists thought out the implications of their work. 
This was exacerbated by East’s crucial contribution of multiple factor theory, which 
brought continuous variation under Mendelian theory, and seriously undermined Castle’s 
experiments. 
Castle however was not happy with the emerging orthodoxy of pure lines and the 
impotence of selection, and so launched an attack that became the center of experimental 
evolution in the 1910s. To maintain selection’s creative power, Castle argued that his 
opponents had no evidence that genes were stable factors immune to selection. He instead 
deployed his hooded rats (among other systems), which in an ongoing multiple-
generation selection experiment had continued to expand or reduce the dark markings on 
their back, beyond the (visible) range of the parent population. From this experiment he 
argued that selection could change the genetic factor. Castle proposed questionable and 
vague mechanisms such as “potency,” but eventually settled on what could be called a 
“sliding scale” theory of selection: because selection favored or eliminated certain 
variations, selection determined the course of future variation in that direction. (He 
usually did not articulate it this clearly, unfortunately.) 
This attack and proposal received numerous counter-attacks, particularly from the 
up-and-coming Drosophila geneticist H. J. Muller, the Dutch livestock scientist Arend 
Hagedoorn, his former student now at the Station, E. C. MacDowell, and Maine 
Agricultural Experiment Station experimental evolutionist Raymond Pearl. These 
criticisms ranged across methods, materials, theories, and even accusations of mysticism. 
Beyond the specific content, this debate demonstrates how much of evolution remained 
up in the air theoretically and methodologically. Occasionally Castle suggested a 
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concession but overall hardened his views as his hooded rats experiment continued to 
produce favorable results. At this time Jennings began a new experiment with Difflugia to 
counter criticisms of his work and to his surprise, argued that his results were more in 
line with Castle than with East and Pearl. Unfortunately, though, I suggest that Jennings 
joined Castle in obfuscating the terms of the debate rather than engaging their opponents 
in good faith.  
 The debate waxed in a series of 1917 articles by Pearl, Jennings, and Castle, and 
then waned as Castle conceded in 1919. I examined Pearl’s and Jennings’ 
correspondence which highlighted the complexities of the debate, particularly over the 
meaning of “selection.” But unfortunately, this correspondence never produced the 
hoped-for collaboration between the two as World War I broke out. Then a rather 
interesting contribution from Drosophilist geneticists Alfred Sturtevant and Calvin 
Bridges countered Jennings and Castle, who were now emphasizing the phenotypic 
effects of selection over the genetic mechanics that undergirded what was visible. Both 
Sturtevant and Bridges deployed their “breeder reactor” and chromosome mapping work; 
the former conducted a selection experiment in which modifying genes could be tracked, 
and the latter showed that the order of mutations mattered during evolution.770 Lastly, 
another of Castle’s students, Sewall Wright, who agreed more with East, suggested a 
hybridization experiment between the selected rats and wild rats that forced Castle to 
concede that selection depended on mutation, rather than selection creating the mutations 
themselves. In one last echo for the project of controlling evolution, Castle concluded 
that biologists remained “at nature’s mercy.” However, this one-sided lament reflected 
only the undermining of his own theory, rather than where evolutionary science ended in 
this period, with a sophisticated view of how variation, heredity, selection, mutation 
interacted within genetic populations. At the same time, the promise of control did not 
result in the hoped-for power that the Station for Experimental Evolution was tasked with 
investigating and developing. 
  
 
770 “Breeding reactor” is Kohler’s term for Drosophila in the Morgan laboratory in Lords of the Fly 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 53. 
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 What my dissertation has interpreted, established, and argued for is the following: 
1) that experimentation and “experimental evolution” are at the heart of evolutionary 
science, and is from which much theory has developed, rather than being a later offshoot; 
2) that Darwin should be considered a key part of the tradition of experimental evolution 
although he did not programmatically develop it; 3) that Mendel is also part of this 
tradition, despite being known for the static and rigid “laws of heredity,” 4) that both 
developed their methods and ideas within capitalist societies that developed systematic 
breeding; 5) that a systematic experimental evolution was conceivable in Darwin’s time, 
as shown by the heretofore undiscussed Reverend Dallinger, and the difficulties he faced 
were not unique to his time but permeate experimental evolution as a whole; 6) that 
Weldon had to face the limits of his own scientific program and had to engage in causal 
experimentation to understand why the changes he made visible were happening in the 
first place; 7) that de Vries’ contributions to evolution need to be further investigated on 
their own terms and merits rather than their purported ultimate fate, and that a full 
understanding of his work needs to move beyond his observations of Oenothera; 8) that 
biologists understood a program of experimental evolution required significant funding 
and lobbied state and capital for an institution to carry out this work; 9) that Davenport 
intended the Station for Experimental Evolution to take on a broad set of investigations 
into practice and theory during “the eclipse,” and that eugenics played little to no role in 
convincing the Carnegie Institution to fund such work; 10) that laboratory and 
agricultural biologists developed sophisticated methods and theories dealing with 
selection, mutation, inbreeding, hybridization, populations, before Fisher, Wright, and the 
Synthesis architects did so; 11) that several of them, especially East, Shull, Jennings, and 
Pearl contributed to the “forgotten synthesis” of Mendelian-mutationism emphasized by 
Arlin Stoltzfus and myself; 12) that while typically thought of as genetics and geneticists, 
it is better to interpret this period as the “time of experimental evolution” (Shull) for 
under debate and contention was not only the “laws of heredity,” but Mendelism as an 
evolutionary theory, in addition to the independently developed mutation theory, pure 
line theory, Lamarckism, and Darwinism (in its various guises); to interpret the work in 
Chapters 3-5 as genetics is thus anachronistic; 13) relatedly, that before Drosophila, key 
organisms in experimental evolution were poultry, Paramecia and Difflugia, rabbits, 
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guinea pigs, rats, maize, potatoes, and tobacco, among others; 14) that control was a 
motivating factor for these scientists and the actual method by which they developed 
theory and interrogated their theoretical differences. 
 What follows are brief discussions of historiographical comments and future 
directions that more historical work on experimental evolution could take. 
 
Eugenics. The early history of experimental evolution has obvious associations 
with eugenics, but the nature of that association is not so obvious. One clear connection is 
that Charles Davenport, who is known today only for eugenics, was also the captain of 
American experimental evolution with the power to distribute Carnegie funds. When I 
began this dissertation, I expected to find clearly articulated links between evolutionary 
experiments and eugenic policies. But as I showed in Chapter 2, Davenport’s extensive 
application materials make no mention of eugenics. (His brief summaries of Galton, for 
example, include his experiments on blood transfusion and pangenesis, but nothing 
eugenical.) Instead, it was only after several years that Davenport began to investigate 
human inheritance; prior to that he was personally interested in ecology, statistics, and 
zoology. Therefore, I argue that the Station was latently eugenical but that the initial 
plans were more tied to studying evolution in nature and in the improvement of livestock 
and crops. Notably, though, because the dominant trend within eugenics relied on the 
laws of heredity, my argument that Mendel should be considered within the tradition of 
experimental evolution further implicates experimental evolution and eugenics. At the 
same time, these principles as Davenport would discuss them depended on the earliest 
versions of Mendelism and did not make use of the science as it had developed after 
1900.771 
But once eugenics became a main priority of the Station and CIW, what was the 
nature of the connection? Beyond using pedigrees to track information and work out 
Mendelian ratios, I again found no clear articulation at the Station linking the study of 
evolutionary dynamics and mechanisms (such as selection versus mutation) to eugenical 
policies, such as anti-immigration laws, mass sterilization, positive eugenics, or 
 
771 See Davenport, Eugenics: The Science of Human Improvement by Better Breeding (New York: Henry 
Holt, 1910) as an example. 
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miscegenation laws. (Needless to say, the Station also never studied euthenics.) Thus, the 
links – in this period – are subtler. Eugenics was an easy addition for many biologists: if 
breeders were improving crops and livestock, then humans could also be improved. 
Yet, what makes finding a direct connection between experimental evolution and 
eugenics is that the methodological conclusions biologists were coming to do not seem to 
readily apply to humans. East and Shull, for example, had articulated a breeding method 
that was dominated by inbreeding. Hugo de Vries ended up rejecting many eugenical 
conclusions because his mutation theory dismissed selection as mostly non-creative in 
favor of random mutation. Castle attacked the scientific legitimacy of eugenics, but 
favored eugenics for political and social reasons.772 Oddly, mutation theory and pure line 
theory logically entailed non-eugenical views, despite producing powerful theories of 
evolution. Therefore, despite the broad mission of controlling evolution, how this applied 
to human populations was not at all clear, if not deemed impossible. This took some time 
for the biologists to recognize and publicize, as shown by Jennings’ and Pearl’s 
interventions in the late 1920s.773 Although this still was not straightforward, as Garland 
Allen shows with Pearl, who attacked eugenics but transitioned to population control and 
continued to make racist and anti-Semitic remarks through the 1930s.774 
A history such as this runs the risk of heroizing its actors. This is potentially 
problematic for my own dissertation given the close alignment of Davenport, East, and 
others with the eugenics movement. They also made their share of sexist, racist, and 
xenophobic remarks. So, here I acknowledge that by focusing on the science of evolution, 
and not the science’s wider impacts, my history could appear naïve. This is heightened 
because I have also argued that these figures played a more important role in the history 
of evolution than typically ascribed to them. Mark Largent has suggested that a reason for 
the large blank space in the history of evolution between Weismann and Dobzhansky is 
due to Synthesis architects distancing themselves from the previous generations’ explicit 
 
772 Diane Paul, Controlling Human Heredity, 112–113. 
773 Diane Paul, Controlling Human Heredity, 70–71. 
774 Garland E Allen, “Old Wine in New Bottles: From Eugenics to Population Control in the Work of 
Raymond Pearl,” in The Expansion of American Biology, eds. Keith R. Benson, Jane Maienschein, and 
Ronald Rainger (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1991): 231–61. 
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eugenical ties, which became especially anathema following World War II.775 Thus, 
restoring figures such as Davenport and East into the foundations of the history of 
evolution could imply an endorsement of their eugenical views if not qualified and 
acknowledged.  
 
Reductionism. I have for the most part avoided criticizing their views and their 
science. I am not sure of the value of criticizing 100-year-old science that has long since 
been modified, honed, and/or overturned, whether it is de Vries’ mutation theory or the 
theory and practice that emerged from the debates between Castle, East, Pearl, and the 
others. Think, for example, of how “the gene” has undergone an incredible amount of 
debate, especially after the rise of molecular biology.776 However, there are a few 
comments worth making, particularly around reductionism. 
The irony of using dialectical materialism to understand the history of 
experimental evolution is that the science that emerged from this period was not 
dialectical in some major ways. The most obvious example is Davenport’s total rejection 
of euthenics, the fledgling and never fully developed counter-science that emphasized 
social and environmental effects on human development, versus genetic determinism.777 
Naturalists at the time criticized the laboratory biologists for not adequately addressing 
the problems and questions that they faced in their own studies (notably, adaptation), that 
this led to theoretical missteps, and is why the laboratory biologists were non- or anti-
Darwinian. Nothing I have found challenges this perception; the back-and-forth between 
artifice and nature of Darwin’s method was not prominent among the experimental 
evolutionists in Chapters 4-5. I do argue that their full embrace of artificial conditions 
 
775 Mark Largent, “The So-Called Eclipse of Darwinism,” in Descended from Darwin: Insights into the 
History of Evolutionary Studies, 1900-1970, eds. Joe Cain and Michael Ruse (Philadelphia: American 
Philosophical Society, 2009), 3–21. 
776 Evelyn Fox Keller, The Century of the Gene (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000). In my 
dissertation, the debates around “the gene” were over (1) whether genes could “contaminate” each other, 
and (2) their relative independence from the environment, (3) if the act of selection could change them 
directly, (4) if they could be induced to mutate. This is a far cry from whether they actually exist or how 
promoters, enhancers, exons and introns, etc. affect our understanding of them. 
777 “Apart from the fact that the truth must be faced whether pleasant or not, the contention can not be too 
strongly urged that improvement of conditions is only palliative, while improvement of blood is essential to 
permanent progress. Our only hope, indeed, for the real betterment of the human race is in better matings.” 
From Charles Davenport, “Euthenics and Eugenics,” Popular Science Monthly 78 (1911): 16-20.  
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was within the Darwinian tradition, as Bateson argued, but this should not be taken too 
one-sidedly; they rarely extended their findings back to evolution in the wild. But if one 
is interested in controlling evolution and making it useful, the question of adaptation is 
solved: it is whatever the breeder wants and can achieve. 
However, reductionism takes on numerous guises, and when it came to 
evolutionary process, I suggest that they were not reductionist, but dialectical. While a 
cartoon version of mutationism would say that large mutations create species in a single 
step, the scientists I discuss rarely if ever expressed such a sentiment. Rather, they were 
interested in how the processes of evolution interacted with each other. Did selection 
create new variation or was its function to reduce heterozygosity? Did inbreeding always 
produce “evil effects” or did it have a more concrete effect on the genetics of a 
population? If mutations were small, could selection see them? Although these questions 
are somewhat naïve when compared to the questions asked by theoretical population 
genetics (such as variations in selection pressure) or the broader questions interrogated by 
the Synthesis (such as geography), it was these questions in evolutionary interactions that 
provided the foundation for those more sophisticated questions. I argue that while the 
science had its limitations, it is also an example of Levins’ and Lewontin’ description of 
reductionism being an extraordinarily successful aspect of science; the problem is when 
that reductionism is confused for how the world works as a whole, from which the 
experimental evolutionists did not fully escape.778 
Agriculture, Horticulture, and Breeding. As I emphasize from the very 
beginning, experimental evolution and agriculture are closely linked and nearly identical, 
 
778 Richard Levins and Richard Lewontin, The Dialectical Biologist (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press), 1-2. The one figure in this dissertation who adamantly rejected reductionism and instead sought a 
more dialectical biology was Herbert Spencer Jennings. In a 1926 address as the retiring president of the 
Zoological Section of the AAAS, he advocated for an “Emergent Evolution” that rejected crude mechanism 
and determinism. He argued that biologists should adopt a “radical experimentalism” that emphasized 
diversity over unity. In practice, this was a retreat from eugenics and other ideas that assumed what was 
true of one species was true of others: that to understand humans required more than physiology, but 
economy, history, and politics. It was also a jab at the mechanistic conception of life propounded by 
Jacques Loeb. Although he did not call it dialectical, Jennings was trying to understand the contradictions 
of unity and diversity, mental and physical, determinism and free will, reductionism and emergence, and 
mechanism and vitalism.  As Kingsland notes, Jennings’ advocacy for an emergent point of view 
foreshadowed the fight for biology’s autonomy from being reduced to physics and chemistry. See Sharon 
Kingsland, “A Man Out of Place: Herbert Spencer Jennings at Johns Hopkins, 1906-1938,” American 
Zoologist 27 (1987): 807–17. 
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as demonstrated by Bakewell and Darwin and Mendel in Moravia as has been 
emphasized by Theunissen, Woods, and Orel. Other figures, such as de Vries, and 
particularly East and Shull, developed their most important contributions within a 
botanical and agricultural context. A potentially important issue to study and develop is 
the careful distinction de Vries made between agriculture and horticulture as producing 
two different notions of evolution, which I mentioned in Chapter 2. But because of the 
laws of heredity and hybrid maize, the relationship between genetics and agriculture has 
been contested for decades.779 The only claim I make about the impact of experimental 
evolution upon agriculture and horticulture is that hybrid maize emerged from 
experimental evolution, not genetics. Whether corn production required inbred hybrid 
maize to be more successful than with long-continued mass selection is interesting to 
consider but does not change the argument itself.780 The consensus appears to be that 
genetics did not produce new breeding methods, but instead explained and rationalized 
existing breeding practices; but this is not really a surprise: genetics and evolution are 
theorizations of practice! If Theunissen is correct, for example, then Darwin’s theory of 
evolution by natural selection is a theorization of pigeon breeding. 
Control. A major theme that runs throughout my dissertation is that of control. I 
discussed in the introduction how control was and is a common theme among histories of 
biology, but was usually tucked away and not brought to the fore. Thus, I suggest that a 
 
779 See, for example, Nils Roll-Hansen, “Theory and Practice: The Impact of Mendelism on Agriculture,” 
Comptes Rendus de l’Académie Des Sciences-Series III-Sciences de La Vie 323, no. 12 (2000): 1107–16; 
Jonathan Harwood, “Did Mendelism Transform Plant Breeding? Genetic Theory and Breeding Practice, 
1900-1945,” in New Perspectives on the History of Life Sciences and Agriculture, eds. Denise Phillips and 
Sharon E. Kingsland (Cham: Springer, 2015), 345–70; Dominic Berry, “Historiography of Plant Breeding 
and Agriculture,” in Handbook of the Historiography of Biology, eds. Michael Dietrich, Mark Borrello, and 
Oren Harman (Cham: Springer, 2018), 1-27. The volume edited by Phillips and Kingsland as a whole urges 
for an examination of the history of biology and agriculture outside of genetics, with which I heartily agree.  
780 One question potentially worth pursuing, and related to reductionism and dialectics, is that of the 
Marxist theory of metabolic rift. Developed by John Bellamy Foster, metabolic rift is the Marxist notion 
that capitalism has created severe rifts in the biogeochemical cycles of the environment and of the earth. 
Marx, for example, worried over the forced migration of English workers from the countryside to the city 
as disrupting the flow of nitrogen as nightsoil was robbed from the earth. Regarding my dissertation, I have 
come to wonder whether the systematic breeding, and the focus upon quantity of crops, dairy, and meat 
over qualities such as ecological sustainability, has introduced another metabolic rift. If so, then 
experimental evolution played a role in creating the rift, but a dialectical biology could be crucial to closing 
it. See John Bellamy Foster and Brett Clark, “The Robbery of Nature: Capitalism and the Metabolic Rift,” 
Monthly Review 70, no. 3 (2018): 1-20; Ryan Wishart, R. Jamil Jona, and Jordan Besek, “Metabolic Rift: A 




comprehensive history of biological control remains to be written. This dissertation is a 
contribution to this theme from the perspective of late eighteenth- and early twentieth-
century evolutionary biology. I argue that controlling life was relevant from Bakewell 
and Darwin onward and was required to make progress in understanding evolution for 
every step of its development. Whether or not a scientist was interested in making 
evolution useful depended on circumstances: Weldon, Jennings, and the Morgan 
laboratory, for example, were not, whereas Mendel, de Vries, Davenport, Castle, East, 
and Pearl were. This sort of division exists to this day, with Lenski’s Long-Term 
Evolution Experiment representing the former whereas the latter is represented by the 
numerous projects on the industrial application of organisms such as yeast. But drawing a 
hard distinction has limited use: much experimental evolution both uses and interrogates 
bacterial and viral drug resistance. Control, both of experimental conditions and of a 
population’s evolution, remain as central to today’s experimental evolution as it did for 
Bakewell and Darwin. 
Dialectics. Throughout the dissertation I have made use of dialectical materialism 
to understand the history of experimental evolution. This is admittedly more prominent in 
some sections than others, though is useful for understanding the subject throughout its 
history. Particularly, dialectical materialism centers labor and activity in human conduct 
and history, which is precisely what I argue throughout the entire dissertation: practice 
drove the theory. It, however, avoids one-sided pronouncements and following Bukharin, 
treats theory as a special form of practice. It was the active intervention upon biological 
populations that ultimately developed the science, this intervention being shaped by 
theory and in turn shaping theory. Dialectics also helped better interrogate the nefarious 
distinction between nature and artifice; rather than rejecting the dichotomy, I follow 
Darwin (and Oren Abeles’ understanding of Darwin’s rhetoric) in thinking of artifice as 
emerging from nature and thus, for example, making artificial selection a kind of natural 
selection. In line with what I wrote above regarding reduction, it is not so much that the 
experimental evolution in Chapters 4-5 were too artificial, it is that the scientists 
themselves did not care to link their “part” back to the dialectical whole – that awaited 






Experimental evolution particularly requires further study due to its notable neglect in the 
history of evolution. That it has so far escaped widespread attention is rather remarkable 
given that the history of evolution dominates the history of biology. I addressed various 
reasons this is the case in the Introduction. But here I want to discuss future directions 
historians can take the study of this topic. I would argue that my dissertation is still one of 
the first explicit and lengthy studies of experimental evolution as its sole focus. (This is 
evident by the fact that Dallinger and de Varigny remain mostly unknown figures in the 
historical literature.) My work follows the path paved by Kohler, Kingsland, Curry, and 
Campos, yet requires much further elaboration. 
My dissertation does not exhaust experimental evolution in the early twentieth 
century. While I briefly discussed a set of experiments by Davenport and Castle on the 
subject of Lamarckism, I ignored Lamarckism as a trend of experimental evolution. Paul 
Kammerer engaged in one of the most infamous (and fraudulent) experiments in 
evolution with midwife toads, and perhaps overshadows his contemporaries, but Sander 
Gliboff his revised and developed his role in the history of evolutionary science and what 
he represented.781 One notable figure whom I had to leave out was ecologist Frederic 
Clements who in 1905 was among the first to use the phrase “experimental evolution.”782 
Clements’ use of transplantation to study evolution starkly contrasts with the breeding 
methods of his contemporaries. That he used it as evidence of neo-Lamarckism, and his 
potentially non-rigorous methodology, explains why he was not part of the mainstream 
discourse, but his methods were rather influential in the experimental study of taxonomy: 
another example of practice driving evolutionary science.783 Another figure is William 
Tower, whose work Kohler shows was mired by a lack of rigor and even academic 
controversy. (Castle personally questioned him and Tower was evasive.) Increased focus 
on Clements and Tower would have likely only contributed to Kohler’s pessimistic thesis 
 
781 Sander Gliboff, “The Case of Paul Kammerer: Evolution and Experimentation in the Early 20th 
Century,” Journal of the History of Biology 39, no. 3 (2006): 525–63. 
782 Frederic E. Clements and Irving S. Cutter, Research Methods in Ecology (Lincoln, Neb: Jacob North 
and Company, 1905), 12. 
783 Joel Hagen, “Experimentalists and Naturalists in Twentieth-Century Botany: Experimental Taxonomy, 
1920-1950,” Journal of the History of Biology 17, no. 2 (1984), 249-270. 
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that experimental evolution was largely a failure, whereas I wanted to emphasize 
experimental evolution’s key and notable contributions to the science. 
 
The Modern Synthesis. Despite the extensive literature on the Modern Synthesis, 
its relationship with experimentation remains underdeveloped. It is widely recognized as 
important, but specifically how is usually left unsaid. For one, the debate participants 
such as East, Shull, Pearl, and Castle would be more widely recognized as 
experimentalist contributors to the Modern Synthesis if experimental evolution was more 
closely studied. And the neglect is somewhat surprising due to their own direct 
connections, including Sewall Wright being a student of William Castle’s and 
Dobzhansky working with the Morgan laboratory. Really, the only figure I discuss who is 
acknowledged as having a notable impact on evolutionary thought is H. J. Muller, whose 
Nobel Prize winning work was conducted in the late 1920s. Sturtevant, in contrast, is 
noted for his taxonomic work on Drosophila later in his career, but his selection 
experiment is rarely discussed by historians, as far as I am aware.784  
As for the Synthesis itself, future work on experimental evolution would likely 
focus on Stebbins, who conducted and relied upon an extensive set of experiments and 
was also sympathetic to his predecessors, recognizing the difficulties of studying heredity 
and variation in plants. Jean Gayon has discussed the experimental evolution of 
L’Heretier and Teissier who developed the population cages to understand Drosophila.785 
Provine’s last book, The “Random Genetic Drift” Fallacy, examines a number of 
experiments on genetic drift by Dobzhansky’s laboratory as well.786 Histories of the 
Synthesis have predominantly focused on its social elements as well as the theoretical 
developments and debates, but histories of experimentation remain minimal. 
 
 
784 For example, Provine notes the work in passing in The Origins of Theoretical Population Genetics 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1971), 127. 
785 Jean Gayon, Darwinism’s Struggle for Survival: Heredity and the Hypothesis of Selection (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007): 365–370; Jean Gayon and Michel Veuille, “The Genetics of 
Experimental Populations: L’Héritier and Teissier’s Population Cages, Thinking about Evolution: 
Historical, Philosophical, and Political Perspectives, eds. by Rama S. Singh, Costas B. Krimas, Diane B. 
Paul, and John Beatty, vol. 2:77–102 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
786 William Provine, The “Random Genetic Drift” Fallacy (self-pub, 2014). 
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Microbiology and Molecular Biology. When starting this project, I planned to 
cover experimental evolution’s incorporation into the emerging fields of microbiology 
and molecular biology that in large part characterize experimental evolution to this day. 
Two papers have been published on the topic: Maureen O’Malley’s “The Experimental 
Study of Bacterial Evolution and Its Implications for the Modern Synthesis of 
Evolutionary Biology” and Angela Creager’s “Adaptation or Selection? Old Issues and 
New Stakes in the Postwar Debates over Bacterial Drug Resistance.”787 (The latter 
emphasizes the lingering Lamarckism among microbiologists.) Sharon Kingsland has 
also devoted some attention to G. F. Gause, whose experiments with yeast and 
Paramecium led to his formulation of the competitive exclusion principle.788 As I argued 
in the introduction, a reason I think experimental evolution has been missed by historians 
is that it has no real disciplinary home: if one is interested in the history of evolution, 
microbiology and molecular biology are not immediately obvious places to investigate.  
 However, there is a rich history here to explore. Scientists today such as Richard 
Lenski point to the 1943 publication by Max Delbruck and Salvador Luria as something 
of a re-founding of experimental evolution, establishing that bacteria have genetics. But 
other work could extent Kohler’s and Curry’s studies of technology and evolution by 
examining the invention of the chemostat by nuclear physicists Leo Szilard and Aaron 
Novick. (The chemostat is an instrument that houses and regulates the growth and 
metabolism of bacteria and is used extensively today.) Not only does this episode show 
the limits of disciplinary boundaries but would contribute to the literature on physicists 
becoming biologists after World War II, with evolution amongst them. Other projects 
would include studies of the former Station for Experimental Evolution under the 
direction of Milislav Demerec, who oriented the Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory towards 
experimental evolution and penicillin during World War II and hosted numerous 
conferences on molecular biology and bacterial genetics. More work could examine the 
 
787 Maureen O’Malley, “The Experimental Study of Bacterial Evolution and Its Implications for the 
Modern Synthesis of Evolutionary Biology,” Journal of the History of Biology 51 (2018): 319–54; Angela 
N. H. Creager, “Adaptation or Selection? Old Issues and New Stakes in the Postwar Debates over Bacterial 
Drug Resistance,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy 
of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 38, no. 1 (2007): 159–90. 
788 Gause, G. F., “Experimental Populations of Microscopic Organisms,” Ecology 18, no. 2 (1937): 173–




research of Francis Ryan and Johsua Lederberg. The 1985 volume edited by Robert P. 
Mortlock, Microorganisms as Model Systems for Studying Evolution, by itself could 
serve as a launchpad for a history of experimental evolution involving interesting work 
by Patricia Clarke, Barry Hall, and Daniel Dykhuizen. What makes work such as Barry 
Hall’s particularly interesting is that it brings evolution to Philip Pauly’s remark on the 
organism being lost in the science: he conducted experimental evolution on molecules 
(beta-galactosidase). A key moment to study as well is when experimental evolution 
began to combine micro- and molecular biology with ecology and evolutionary biology, 
as done by Bruce Levin, Richard Lenski, Paul Turner, and Michael Travisano. 
 
 How to control and experiment with evolution was always a central question 
within the science, even if its relevance has mutated with time. Any history of evolution 
that centers this theme will shine new light on old subjects and reveal entirely new ones. 
Without focusing on experiment, Reverend Dallinger and his curious instrument 
remained obscured, alongside biologists usually painted as naïve geneticists but were 
rather critical to the development of evolutionary biology. Ideas and theories have 
heretofore played a prominent role in the historiography of evolution, but what is needed, 
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Appendix I: Dallinger’s Machine and His Reception 
 
Part A. Dallinger’s Machine 
Once he finished his preliminary experiments, Dallinger ordered a custom apparatus from 
the Elliot Brothers, a thermostatic incubator outfitted with an elaborate mercury 
regulator.789 (See Figure 10.) The primary structure consisted of three glass chambers 
immersed in a water-filled copper tank heated by burners beneath. A thermometer was 
placed in each chamber in addition to two immersed in the incubator itself. As is, this 
would allow for water to be heated to a certain temperature, but for Dallinger’s 
experiment to work, the temperature needed to be kept static continuously and 
indefinitely for years. 
The mercury regulator (on the top-left of the image) automatically governed the 
temperature via a thermal feedback loop. The tubes depicted within the incubator were 
filled with mercury and were contiguous with the tube extending vertically from the 
instrument. Flammable gas flowed from the top of the instrument (O) through a regulator 
chamber (M) and tube (N) to the burner beneath the instrument (P). In addition to heating 
the water within the incubator (A), the burner heated a “gridiron” of mercury-filled glass 
(F) (resting upon copper tubes (E)), that extended above and out of the incubator, 
connecting to the regular chamber (M), creating a feedback loop. Before reaching 
chamber (M), the mercury passed through a bulb (J) connected to a steel screw plunger 
(K). This chamber contained within it a smaller tube (O) housing platinum exposed to M. 
The gas flowed between the platinum in O and the mercury in G at level H. 
 
789 Dallinger, 193–95. The term “cybernetic” I borrowed from Sheref Masny and Sascha Pohflepp who 
discuss Dallinger’s instrument. Sheref Mansy and Sascha Pohflepp, “Living Machines,” in Synthetic 
Aesthetics: Investigating Synthetic Biology’s Designs on Nature, ed. Alexandra Daisy Ginsberg et al. 




was regulated by opening 
and closing the gap 
between the platinum and 
the mercury. When this 
gap was closed, 
additional gas could not 
pass through; but, 
because mercury is liquid 
and its volume subject to 
changes in temperature, 
when the temperature 
decreased, the gap 
opened, allowing gas to 
flow once again. As the 
gas flow increased, the 
volume of the mercury 
grew with the increasing 
temperature, closing the 
gap again. Through the 
platinum was a tiny hole 
through which a small 
amount of gas could 
always flow, preventing 
the system from turning off, keeping heat. The screw (K) is what allowed Dallinger to set 
the temperature of the system. According to Dallinger, the incubator could be kept within 
a quarter of a degree F. (In addition to this instrument, he built a hollow microscope stage 
that connected to the incubator, circulating heated water at the same temperature in which 
the organisms being examined had lived.)790 
 
790 William H. Dallinger, “Dr. Dallinger’s Thermostatic Continuous Stage,” Journal of the Royal 
Microscopical Society 7, no. 2 (1887): 317–18. Dallinger had initially constructed a similar apparatus for 
Figure 10. From Dallinger, “President’s Address,” Journal of 
the Royal Microscopical Society 7, no. 2 (1887), 193. 
282 
 
Part B. Dallinger’s Reception 
According to the minutes of the meeting in which he revealed his experiment, 
James Glashier motioned for the Royal Microscopical Society to thank and praise 
Dallinger for his address, to which Albert Davidson Michael seconded, who implied that 
such attention to detail was inhuman.791 Upon his resignation as president of the Society, 
Francis Jeffrey Bell compared him to Darwin because his research was “a striking 
example of what patience, perseverance, and love a true student of nature could throw 
into his work.”792 Some contemporary newspapers also reported his findings: The Times 
apparently had high hopes, writing “he has now extended it [the experiment] to well nigh 
a decade; and we may apparently look forward to future series of continuous observations 
being handed on from observer to observer for centuries.” The newspaper noted the 
power of evolutionary research on microbes, not only repeating Dallinger’s claim that the 
work is relevant because all life is made of cells, but because of the features of the 
organisms: “Darwin distinctly insisted on the slowness of the process of adaptation; here 
we have creatures which are incessantly multiplying by dividing, the longest interval 
being four minutes. Dr. Dallinger must therefore have observed something like half a 
million generations of the organisms under consideration. Here are the “countless 
generations” required.”793 They concluded that from his research, despite his protests of 
limited application, “an endless vista of possible adaptations is owned up.” The Northern 
Echo praised Dallinger’s meticulous skill and scientific attitude, his work “one more 
striking confirmation of his [Darwin’s] doctrine of the origin of species.”794 
Following this immediate praise, mentions of Dallinger’s experiment are 
fragmentary and rare. Ironically, when discussed, his work was interpreted as support not 
for Darwinism, but for the inheritance of acquired characters! Manly Miles, for example, 
 
the purpose of studying a “septic organism” at its normal temperature, 90-95° F. 
791 Journal of the Royal Microscopical Society for the Year 1887, vol. 1 (London: Williams and Norgate, 
1887), 354. James Glaisher was an astronomer, meteorologist, balloonist, and photographer who had 
previously served as the Society’s president. Albert Davidson Michael was an amateur naturalist and 
founding figure of acarology (mites and ticks) who served as the society’s president following Dallinger. 
(Other previous presidents included Richard Owen, Willam B. Carpenter, and Edwin Lankester.) 
792 Journal of the Royal Microscopical Society for the Year 1887 (London: Williams and Norgate, 1888), 
328. 
793 “The Royal Microspical Society,” The Times, February 14, 1887. 
794 “The Infinitely Great and the Infinitely Small,” The Northern Echo, February 15, 1887. Both articles are 
striking for their detailed description of Dallinger’s experiment. 
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claimed the experiment showed 
that the modified or acquired habits or organisms are beyond question transmitted to their 
offspring. … At times a slight increase of temperature was not tolerated until the changed 
habits of their protoplasm provided for the complete adjustment of their vital activities to 
the new environment. … It is evident that the germ plasma was affected by the changes in 
the environment, either directly, or with greater probability through the modified 




C. C. Nutting also claimed that if August Weismann’s distinctions between somatogenic 
and blastogenic characters were true, in which the former included “changes … directly 
due to nutrition and any of the other external influences which act upon the body,” then 
“the increased toleration of a high temperature shown by the bacteria in Dr. Dallinger’s 
experiments, would be an acquired character, and that this character was transmitted was 
experimentally proven.”796 Frederick Headley, in Problems of Evolution, also cited 
Dallinger’s experiment as Lamarckian, although it “admits of a non-Lamarckian 
interpretation. Natural selection was no doubt at work.”797 However, because of fission, 
“the last generation belonged also to the first: they were fragments of the individuals that 
existed at the outset.” Therefore, “we have here merely the gradual acclimatisation of one 
individual.”798 A. S. Packard in a letter to the editor of Science, advocating for the 
Carnegie Institution of Washington to fund “pure, unapplied biology,” such as the 
“researches … in temperature experiments in the line of the splendid researches of 
Dallinger, Weismann, Standfuss …, who have wellnigh demonstrated the actual process 
of species, variety, and racemaking.”799 That Packard acknowledged Dallinger makes 
Davenport’s lack of citation all the more intriguing.  
 
 
795 Manly Miles, “Heredity of Acquired Characters,” The American Naturalist 26, no. 311 (1892): 897–99. 
796 C. C. Nutting, “What Is an ‘Acquired Character?,’” The American Naturalist 26, no. 312 (1892): 1010. 
In an obituary, Arthur Shipley wrote that Dallinger had opposed August Weismann’s anti-Lamarckism, but I 
have not located any documents showing this. 
797 Frederick Webb Headley, Problems of Evolution (London: Duckworth, 1900), 43. 
798 Headley, 44. 
799 Bashford Dean et al., “The Carnegie Institution,” Science 16, no. 408 (1902): 647. 
